In 1974, at the height of the oil crisis that followed the Arab nations -payback for U.S. military support for Israel during the Yom Kippur War -quadrupled oil prices. Inflation soared, the stock market crashed, and the U.S. economy was in a tailspin. A deal was struck: the basic framework was strikingly simple. The United States would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and provide the kingdom military aid and equipment. In return, the Saudis would plow billions of their petrodollar revenue back into Treasuries and finance America’s spending.

Source: Bloomberg

The untold story behind Saudi Arabia’s 41-year U.S. debt secret

By ANDREA WONG BLOOMBERG |MAY 31, 2016 AT 10:32 AM

https://martinplaut.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/william-simon.jpg?w=101 101w, https://martinplaut.files.wordpress.com/2020/10/william-simon.jpg?w=202 202w" sizes="(max-width: 580px) 100vw, 580px" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; border: 0px; font-family: inherit; font-size: 17px; font-style: normal; font-weight: 400; line-height: 1; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; text-align: left; height: auto; max-width: 100%;">Former Treasury Secretary William Simon, who served under President Richard Nixon and is shown in 1982, went on a trip to Europe and the Middle East with a secret goal: neutralize crude oil as an economic weapon and find a way to persuade a hostile kingdom to finance America’s widening deficit with its newfound petrodollar wealth. To do it, he leveraged U.S. debt. (Ira Schwartz / AP)

Failure was not an option.

It was July 1974. A steady predawn drizzle had given way to overcast skies when William Simon, newly appointed U.S. Treasury secretary, and his deputy, Gerry Parsky, stepped onto an 8 a.m. flight from Andrews Air Force Base. On board, the mood was tense. That year, the oil crisis had hit home. An embargo by OPEC’s Arab nations-payback for U.S. military aid to the Israelis during the Yom Kippur War-quadrupled oil prices. Inflation soared, the stock market crashed, and the U.S. economy was in a tailspin.

Officially, Simon’s two-week trip was billed as a tour of economic diplomacy across Europe and the Middle East, full of the customary meet-and-greets and evening banquets. But the real mission, kept in strict confidence within President Richard Nixon’s inner circle, would take place during a four-day layover in the coastal city of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The goal: neutralize crude oil as an economic weapon and find a way to persuade a hostile kingdom to finance America’s widening deficit with its newfound petrodollar wealth. And according to Parsky, Nixon made clear there was simply no coming back empty-handed. Failure would not only jeopardize America’s financial health but could also give the Soviet Union an opening to make further inroads into the Arab world.

It “wasn’t a question of whether it could be done or it couldn’t be done,” said Parsky, 73, one of the few officials with Simon during the Saudi talks.[Most read] Second stimulus check updates: Pelosi dismisses latest White House COVID-19 relief offer; GOP roasts Mnuchin on conference call »

At first blush, Simon, who had just done a stint as Nixon’s energy czar, seemed ill-suited for such delicate diplomacy. Before being tapped by Nixon, the chain-smoking New Jersey native ran the vaunted Treasuries desk at Salomon Brothers. To career bureaucrats, the brash Wall Street bond trader-who once compared himself to Genghis Khan-had a temper and an outsize ego that was painfully out of step in Washington. Just a week before setting foot in Saudi Arabia, Simon publicly lambasted the Shah of Iran, a close regional ally at the time, calling him a “nut.”

But Simon, better than anyone else, understood the appeal of U.S. government debt and how to sell the Saudis on the idea that America was the safest place to park their petrodollars. With that knowledge, the administration hatched an unprecedented do-or-die plan that would come to influence just about every aspect of U.S.-Saudi relations over the next four decades (Simon died in 2000 at the age of 72).

The basic framework was strikingly simple. The United States would buy oil from Saudi Arabia and provide the kingdom military aid and equipment. In return, the Saudis would plow billions of their petrodollar revenue back into Treasuries and finance America’s spending.

It took several discreet follow-up meetings to iron out all the details, Parsky said. But at the end of months of negotiations, there remained one small, yet crucial, catch: King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud demanded the country’s Treasury purchases stay “strictly secret,” according to a diplomatic cable obtained by Bloomberg from the National Archives database.

With a handful of Treasury and Federal Reserve officials, the secret was kept for more than four decades-until now. In response to a Freedom-of-Information-Act request submitted by Bloomberg News, the Treasury broke out Saudi Arabia’s holdings for the first time this month after “concluding that it was consistent with transparency and the law to disclose the data,” according to spokeswoman Whitney Smith. The $117 billion trove makes the kingdom one of America’s largest foreign creditors.[Most read] Security guard for TV station in custody after fatal shooting at dueling protests in Denver »

Yet in many ways, the information has raised more questions than it has answered. A former Treasury official, who specialized in central bank reserves and asked not to be identified, says the official figure vastly understates Saudi Arabia’s investments in U.S. government debt, which may be double or more.

The current tally represents just 20 percent of its $587 billion of foreign reserves, well below the two-thirds that central banks typically keep in dollar assets. Some analysts speculate the kingdom may be masking its U.S. debt holdings by accumulating Treasuries through offshore financial centers, which show up in the data of other countries.

Exactly how much of America’s debt Saudi Arabia actually owns is something that matters more now than ever before.

While oil’s collapse has deepened concern that Saudi Arabia will need to liquidate its Treasuries to raise cash, a more troubling worry has also emerged: the specter of the kingdom using its outsize position in the world’s most important debt market as a political weapon, much as it did with oil in the 1970s.

In April, Saudi Arabia warned it would start selling as much as $750 billion in Treasuries and other assets if Congress passes a bill allowing the kingdom to be held liable in U.S. courts for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, according to the New York Times. The threat comes amid a renewed push by presidential candidates and legislators from both the Democratic and Republican parties to declassify a 28-page section of a 2004 U.S. government report that is believed to detail possible Saudi connections to the attacks. The bill, which passed the Senate on May 17, is now in the House of Representatives.[Most read] WGN weather anchor Paul Konrad lists Near West Side condo with rooftop penthouse for $2.95 million »

Saudi Arabia’s Finance Ministry declined to comment on the potential selling of Treasuries in response. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency didn’t immediately answer requests for details on the total size of its U.S. government debt holdings.

“Let’s not assume they’re bluffing” about threatening to retaliate, said Marc Chandler, the global head of currency strategy at Brown Brothers Harriman. “The Saudis are under a lot of pressure. I’d say that we don’t do ourselves justice if we underestimate our liabilities” to big holders.

Saudi Arabia, which has long provided free health care, gasoline subsidies, and routine pay raises to its citizens with its petroleum wealth, already faces a brutal fiscal crisis.

In the past year alone, the monetary authority has burned through $111 billion of reserves to plug its biggest budget deficit in a quarter-century, pay for costly wars to defeat the Islamic State, and wage proxy campaigns against Iran. Though oil has stabilized at about $50 a barrel (from less than $30 earlier this year), it’s still far below the heady years of $100-a-barrel crude.

Saudi Arabia’s situation has become so acute the kingdom is now selling a piece of its crown jewel-state oil company Saudi Aramco.[Most read] The Columbus statues are gone, and there’s no parade or CPS holiday this year. But Chicago Italian Americans say Columbus Day will live on. »

What’s more, the commitment to the decades-old policy of “interdependence” between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, which arose from Simon’s debt deal and ultimately bound together two nations that share few common values, is showing signs of fraying. America has taken tentative steps toward a rapprochement with Iran, highlighted by President Barack Obama’s landmark nuclear deal last year. The U.S. shale boom has also made America far less reliant on Saudi oil.

“Buying bonds and all that was a strategy to recycle petrodollars back into the U.S.,” said David Ottaway, a Middle East fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center in Washington. But politically, “it’s always been an ambiguous, constrained relationship.”

Yet back in 1974, forging that relationship (and the secrecy that it required) was a no-brainer, according to Parsky, who is now chairman of Aurora Capital Group, a private equity firm in Los Angeles. Many of America’s allies, including the U.K. and Japan, were also deeply dependent on Saudi oil and quietly vying to get the kingdom to reinvest money back into their own economies.

“Everyone-in the U.S., France, Britain, Japan-was trying to get their fingers in the Saudis’ pockets,” said Gordon S. Brown, an economic officer with the State Department at the U.S. embassy in Riyadh from 1976 to 1978.

For the Saudis, politics played a big role in their insistence that all Treasury investments remain anonymous.[Most read] Couple seeks to block sale of ‘Windy City Rehab’ host’s Bucktown home »

Tensions still flared 10 months after the Yom Kippur War, and throughout the Arab world, there was plenty of animosity toward the U.S. for its support of Israel. According to diplomatic cables, King Faisal’s biggest fear was the perception Saudi oil money would, “directly or indirectly,” end up in the hands of its biggest enemy in the form of additional U.S. assistance.

Treasury officials solved the dilemma by letting the Saudis in through the back door. In the first of many special arrangements, the U.S. allowed Saudi Arabia to bypass the normal competitive bidding process for buying Treasuries by creating “add-ons.” Those sales, which were excluded from the official auction totals, hid all traces of Saudi Arabia’s presence in the U.S. government debt market.

“When I arrived at the embassy, I was told by people there that this is Treasury’s business,” Brown said. “It was all handled very privately.”

By 1977, Saudi Arabia had accumulated about 20 percent of all Treasuries held abroad, according to The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets by Columbia University’s David Spiro.

Another exception was carved out for Saudi Arabia when the Treasury started releasing monthly country-by-country breakdowns of U.S. debt ownership. Instead of disclosing Saudi Arabia’s holdings, the Treasury grouped them with 14 other nations, such as Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Nigeria, under the generic heading “oil exporters”-a practice that continued for 41 years.[Most read] Chicago Cubs roster outlook for 2021: Who will return and who will be gone? »

The system came with its share of headaches. After the Treasury’s add-on facility was opened to other central banks, erratic and unpublicized foreign demand threatened to push the U.S. over its debt limit on several occasions.

An internal memo, dated October 1976, detailed how the U.S. inadvertently raised far more than the $800 million it intended to borrow at auction. At the time, two unidentified central banks used add-ons to buy an additional $400 million of Treasuries each. In the end, one bank was awarded its portion a day late to keep the U.S. from exceeding the limit.

Most of these maneuvers and hiccups were swept under the rug, and top Treasury officials went to great lengths to preserve the status quo and protect their Middle East allies as scrutiny of America’s biggest creditors increased.

Over the years, the Treasury repeatedly turned to the International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act of 1976-which shields individuals in countries where Treasuries are narrowly held-as its first line of defense.

The strategy continued even after the Government Accountability Office, in a 1979 investigation, found “no statistical or legal basis” for the blackout. The GAO didn’t have power to force the Treasury to turn over the data, but it concluded the U.S. “made special commitments of financial confidentiality to Saudi Arabia” and possibly other OPEC nations.[Most read] The 25 best pizzas in Chicago — from scrappy newcomers to beloved classics »

Simon, who had by then returned to Wall Street, acknowledged in congressional testimony that “regional reporting was the only way in which Saudi Arabia would agree” to invest using the add-on system.

“It was clear the Treasury people weren’t going to cooperate at all,” said Stephen McSpadden, a former counsel to the congressional subcommittee that pressed for the GAO inquiries. “I’d been at the subcommittee for 17 years, and I’d never seen anything like that.”

Today, Parsky says the secret arrangement with the Saudis should have been dismantled years ago and was surprised the Treasury kept it in place for so long. But even so, he has no regrets.

Doing the deal “was a positive for America.”

Source=https://martinplaut.com/2020/10/12/ever-wondered-why-the-americans-are-so-close-to-the-saudis-heres-an-answer/

In addition to demanding the immediate release of Dawit and other political prisoners, the Parliament importantly takes these measures:

Calls on the Commission to ascertain whether the conditionality of EU aid is respected and to ensure that no financing for projects in Eritrea, particularly those that are carried out using national service labour, benefits the Eritrean Government; deplores, in this regard, the fact that the Commission continues to finance the ‘Roads Project’, and calls on it to strictly respond to the needs of the Eritrean people for development, democracy, human rights, good governance, security and freedom of speech, press and assembly, and to evaluate tangible outcomes regarding human rights that have resulted from the EU-Eritrea strategy and the so-called ‘dual track approach’
Condemns the use by the Eritrean Government of the extraterritorial ‘diaspora tax’; urges the government to respect freedom of movement and to end the ‘guilt-by-association’ policies that target the family members of those who evade national service, seek to flee Eritrea or fail to pay the 2 % income tax imposed by the government on Eritrean expatriates, including EU citizens;

European Parliament resolution on Eritrea, notably the case of Dawit Isaak

Source: European Parliament

(2020/2813(RSP))

The European Parliament,

– having regard to its previous resolutions on Eritrea, in particular that of 6 July 2017 [1],

– having regard to the report of 11 May 2020 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea,

– having regard to the statement of 30 June 2020 by the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, delivered at the 44th session of the Human Rights Council,

– having regard to the UN Human Rights Council resolutions on the situation of human rights in Eritrea,

– having regard to UN Security Council resolution 2444 of 14 November 2018, terminating with immediate effect all UN sanctions against Eritrea (arms embargo, asset freezes and travel bans),

– having regard to Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/1944 of 10 December 2018 repealing Decision 2010/127/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against Eritrea [2],

– having regard to Case 428/12 (2012) filed to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights on behalf of Dawit Isaak and other political prisoners,

– having regard to the Final Declaration of the 66th session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 22 May 2017,

– having regard to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,

– having regard to the Constitution of Eritrea, adopted in 1997, which guarantees civil liberties, including freedom of religion,

– having regard to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,

– having regard to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966,

– having regard to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement (the Cotonou Agreement)[3], as revised in 2005 and 2010, to which Eritrea is a signatory,

– having regard to Rules 144(5) and 132(4) of its Rules of Procedure,

A. whereas Dawit Isaak, a dual citizen of Eritrea and Sweden, and therefore a citizen of the European Union, a journalist and co-owner of Eritrea’s first independent newspaper, the widely distributed Setit, was arrested by the Eritrean authorities on 23 September 2001, along with 21 other persons; whereas the Eritrean Government accuses Dawit Isaak of being a ‘traitor’, although he has never been charged or brought to trial; whereas Dawit Isaak had returned from Sweden following Eritrea’s independence in 1992 to assist with the solidification of the country’s fledgling democracy;

B. whereas the imprisonments occurred after the publishing of an open letter condemning the regime and calling on President Isaias Afwerki to make democratic reforms; whereas on the day of the arrests, the government announced a ban on all independent media; whereas the detainees have not been charged with a crime;

C. whereas Dawit Isaak was released from custody on 19 November 2005 after significant interventions on his behalf by the Government of Sweden, among others; whereas he was re-arrested two days later while on his way to hospital, with the Eritrean authorities claiming that he had only been temporarily released in order to undergo medical treatment; whereas since then, Dawit Isaak has been held incommunicado by the Eritrean authorities, who refuse to disclose his exact location or details of his health and well-being;

D. whereas in December 2008, there were unconfirmed reports that Dawit Isaak was transferred to a maximum security prison in Embatkala, and that shortly after, on 11 January 2009, he was admitted to an air force hospital in Asmara, believed to be seriously ill; whereas the nature and extent of his illness remain unknown and the Government of Eritrea refuses to confirm his hospitalisation;

E. whereas Dawit Isaak’s family, including his three children, have faced huge distress and uncertainty since his disappearance, having little knowledge of their loved one’s well-being, whereabouts or future prospects; whereas Dawit Isaak’s daughter, Betlehem Isaak, continues to advocate for her father’s release; whereas Betlehem Isaak confirmed in 2020 that her father was alive;

F. whereas the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ruled that journalists arrested in Eritrea in September 2001, including Dawit Isaak, were being held in arbitrary and unlawful detention, and urged the Eritrean authorities to release them or at least to hold a fair trial;

G. whereas the situation in Eritrea’s overcrowded and unsanitary detention centres amounts to cruel and inhuman treatment; whereas these conditions put detainees at increased risk of transmission of COVID-19; whereas access to healthcare, food and sanitation is extremely limited or lacking entirely, leaving detainees reliant on visitors for basic supplies; whereas prison lockdowns aimed at combating the pandemic have contributed to further malnutrition and corresponding mental and physical ailments; whereas many more prisoners are being held in shipping containers, where they are subjected to extremely harsh temperature conditions;

H. whereas, since gaining independence, Eritrea under Isaias Afwerki has systematically jailed thousands of people for their political views or their work as journalists, or for practising their religion; whereas enforced disappearances take place on a structural basis; whereas detainees are typically subjected to arbitrary and unlawful arrests and detentions without charge and are denied access to lawyers or family visits;

I. whereas Eritrea is ranked 182nd out of 189 countries in the Human Development Index for 2019, according to the 2019 Human Development Report of the UN Development Programme; whereas the Reporters Without Borders World Press Freedom Index ranks Eritrea 178th out of 180 in 2020; whereas the Committee to Protect Journalists ranked Eritrea the world’s most censored country in 2019;

J. whereas the report of the UN Commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea, published on 9 May 2016, noted that crimes against humanity had been committed in a widespread and systematic manner in detention centres, military training camps and other places across the country over the past 25 years;

K. whereas according to the report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea of 16 May 2019, ‘the positive momentum for peace and security in the region has raised expectations in Eritrea and in the international community that the Government of Eritrea will implement political and institutional reforms’, however, ‘the Eritrean authorities have not yet engaged in a process of domestic reforms and the human rights situation remains unchanged’; whereas the UN Special Rapporteur has been denied access to Eritrea to conduct in-country visits since 2009;

L. whereas in May 2019, the Eritrean authorities carried out a crackdown on non-recognised Christian congregations;

M. whereas the President of Eritrea continues to refuse to hold elections and to implement the country’s constitution, in spite of the fact that it was ratified in 1997 and that Eritrea’s electoral law was ratified in 2002; whereas the interim legislature has not met since 2002 and the judiciary is controlled by the government;

N. whereas recent developments in regional peace and security were expected to lead to the introduction of reforms to national service and to the demobilisation of conscripts in Eritrea; whereas to date, there have been no official announcements of a reduction in the duration of national service or of any demobilisation plans; whereas national service continues to be involuntary in nature and of an open-ended duration; whereas national service places many citizens, including women and girls, in a situation of slavery, where their whole life is under the control of others and where they suffer, inter alia, physical, sexual and verbal abuses and may be forced to work as domestic servants;

O. whereas in July 2018, Eritrea and Ethiopia signed an historic peace agreement ending twenty years of conflict; whereas the July 2018 peace agreement opened new prospects for the country’s socio-economic development, linked with the advancement of regional economic integration in the Horn of Africa;

P. whereas following the peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, the EU changed its approach towards Eritrea based on ‘principles of engagement’, which had previously allowed neither political dialogue nor EU development cooperation with Eritrea, to the so-called ‘dual track’ approach;

Q. whereas, the EU’s partnership with Eritrea is governed by the Cotonou Agreement, and whereas parties to this agreement are bound to respect and implement its terms, in particular respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law;

R. whereas despite gross and systematic violations by Eritrea of the essential and fundamental elements of the Cotonou Agreement regarding human rights, the EU never initiated consultations as provided for in Article 96 thereof, despite Parliament’s calls to do so;

S. whereas the EU is a significant donor to Eritrea in terms of development assistance; whereas following the 2018 peace agreement between Eritrea and Ethiopia, a new Development Cooperation Strategy for 2019-2020 was agreed upon by the EU and Eritrea, under which the EU allocated EUR 180 million;

T. whereas the autocratic government attempts to control the Eritrean diaspora by means of a 2 % expat income tax and by spying on the diaspora and targeting relatives who remain in Eritrea;

1. Demands that all prisoners of conscience in Eritrea be immediately and unconditionally released, notably EU citizen Dawit Isaak and the other journalists detained since September 2001; demands immediate information regarding Dawit Isaak’s whereabouts and well-being; urges the Eritrean authorities to provide him with access to representatives of the EU, the Member States and Sweden in order to establish his healthcare needs and any other necessary support;

2. Condemns in the strongest terms Eritrea’s systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations; calls on the Eritrean Government to put an end to detention of the opposition, journalists, religious leaders and innocent civilians;

3. Appeals to the African Union, as a partner of the EU with an explicit commitment to the universal values of democracy and human rights, to step up its activity in relation to the regrettable situation in Eritrea and to work together with the EU to secure the release of Dawit Isaak and other political prisoners;

4. Demands that, given the current COVID-19 health crisis, the poor sanitary conditions in Eritrean prisons and the high risk of infection for detainees, adequate food, water, and medical care be promptly provided; expresses concern that the COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating the situation of famine and malnutrition that exists in parts of the country and is contributing to food shortages;

5. Demands that the Eritrean Government provide proof of life and detailed information on the fate and whereabouts of all those deprived of physical liberty; calls for fair trials for those accused, the immediate and unconditional release of any prisoners not charged with any crimes, and the abolition of torture and other degrading treatment such as restrictions on food, water and medical care; reminds the Eritrean Government of its obligation to address all human rights violations, including by investigating extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances as well as the capital punishment, which should be abolished in line with the recommendations presented in the UN Human Rights Council Annual Report 2020;

6. Deplores the fact that Eritrea provides no space for independent human rights defenders, members of the political opposition or independent journalists; calls, therefore, on the Eritrean Government to open civic space for independent civil society organisations and allow the creation of other political parties in the country; reminds Eritrea of its obligations under ILO conventions, with particular regard to the right of civil society organisations and trade unions to organise, peacefully demonstrate, participate in public affairs and campaign for better workers’ rights;

7. Demands that the Eritrean Government desist from using its citizens as forced labour through indefinite national service and put an end to the compulsory practice of all children undertaking their final year of schooling in a military training camp;

8. Calls on the Commission to ascertain whether the conditionality of EU aid is respected and to ensure that no financing for projects in Eritrea, particularly those that are carried out using national service labour, benefits the Eritrean Government; deplores, in this regard, the fact that the Commission continues to finance the ‘Roads Project’, and calls on it to strictly respond to the needs of the Eritrean people for development, democracy, human rights, good governance, security and freedom of speech, press and assembly, and to evaluate tangible outcomes regarding human rights that have resulted from the EU-Eritrea strategy and the so-called ‘dual track approach’;

9. Calls for the immediate implementation of Eritrea’s 1997 Constitution, which was drafted in full consultation with all stakeholders and civil society and duly adopted;

10. Condemns the use by the Eritrean Government of the extraterritorial ‘diaspora tax’; urges the government to respect freedom of movement and to end the ‘guilt-by-association’ policies that target the family members of those who evade national service, seek to flee Eritrea or fail to pay the 2 % income tax imposed by the government on Eritrean expatriates, including EU citizens;

11. Calls on Eritrea to lift the ban on independent media and to allow the creation of political parties, as a central tool for promoting democracy in the country; calls for human rights organisations to be allowed to freely operate within the country;

12. Demands that the Eritrean authorities put an end to detention of the opposition, journalists, religious leaders, civil society representatives and innocent civilians; urges Eritrea to fully respect and protect freedom of religion and to stop its ongoing persecutions on the basis of faith;

13. Reiterates its urgent request for a global EU human rights mechanism, the so-called European Magnitsky Act; calls on the Council to adopt this mechanism through a decision relating to the Union’s strategic interests and objectives under Article 22(1) of the Treaty on European Union;

14. Demands that Eritrea fully respect and immediately enact the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and fully uphold its obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, both of which prohibit torture;

15. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Council, the Commission, the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the African Union, the President of Eritrea, the UN Human Rights Council, and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly.