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Martin Plaut posted: " Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church Diocese of Europe. No. NHS/03/2017 In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen To: All sub-dioceses in Europe Subject: Annual tithe of churches and associations With spiritual greetings fi" Martin Plaut

 

Martin Plaut

May 31

Eritrean Orthodox Tewahedo Church

Diocese of Europe. No. NHS/03/2017

In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen

To: All sub-dioceses in Europe

Subject: Annual tithe of churches and associations

With spiritual greetings first,

The case applies to the payment of tithes from churches and associations.

Date 04/03/2017

The Diocese of Europe gives you strict instructions to inform churches and associations to pay tithes for the years 2015-2016 by the end of March 2017.

God bless our country and our faith!

Fox. Joseph Merhatsion

Secretary for the diocese in Europe

Pastor Zeresenay Pastor Solomon

Chairman of the diocese in Europe

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Martin Plaut posted: " “On 25 May 2023, a mission led by UNOCHA deputy head of Ethiopia comprised from UNOCHA, UNDSS, WHO and other INGOs were prohibited from entering Gemhalo village in Tahtay Adiyabo woreda [district] by Eritrean forces,” they said. Source: CNN By " Martin Plaut

 

Martin Plaut

May 26

“On 25 May 2023, a mission led by UNOCHA deputy head of Ethiopia comprised from UNOCHA, UNDSS, WHO and other INGOs were prohibited from entering Gemhalo village in Tahtay Adiyabo woreda [district] by Eritrean forces,” they said.

Source: CNN

By Gianluca MezzofioreBethlehem Feleke and Eve Brennan, CNN

Updated 11:25 AM EDT, Fri May 26, 2023

Eritrean forces prevented a UN-led humanitarian mission from entering a village in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray on Thursday, in what would mark violation of a peace deal ending fighting in the area, aid workers on the ground told CNN.

After two years of fighting, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a deal to end hostilities in November last year that included withdrawing all foreign forces from the north of the country. Eritrean soldiers had joined in on the conflict on the side of Ethiopia.

But aid workers said officials from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), as well as those from other NGOs, were stopped from reaching the village of Gemhalo by Eritrean forces.

“On 25 May 2023, a mission led by UNOCHA deputy head of Ethiopia comprised from UNOCHA, UNDSS, WHO and other INGOs were prohibited from entering Gemhalo village in Tahtay Adiyabo woreda [district] by Eritrean forces,” they said.

“The mission was stopped after traveling 16km from Sheraro around Waela-Nihbi. Eritrean forces are in Tigray in close distance from Sheraro occupying five kebeles [neighborhoods] of Tahtay-Adiyabo woreda [district],” they added.

“Looting, destructing infrastructures, raping are continued. Eritrean forces are committing all forms of violations in the villages including denying humanitarian access to those areas,” they said.

In January, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield said at a press conference in Nairobi that Eritrean troops were still in Ethiopia, contradicting authorities in Addis Ababa.

“We understand that they have moved back to the border, and they have been asked to leave Ethiopia,” she told reporters.

Eritrean forces also recently prevented “an African Union [peace] monitoring and verification team from carrying out their activities,” said Getachew Reda, the head of Tigray’s interim government. Tigrayan authorities continue to discuss the issue with the Ethiopian government, he added, saying, “it must be resolved.”

CNN has reached out to the Eritrean and the Ethiopian governments for comment.

Blinken accuses all sides in Ethiopian conflict of committing war crimes

The Tigray conflict has its roots in tensions that go back generations in Ethiopia. The country is made up of 10 regions – and two cities – that have a substantial amount of autonomy, including regional police and militia. Regional governments are largely divided along entrenched ethnic lines.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018 after decades of iron-fisted rule by a TPLF-dominated coalition, and began a drive for a new pan-Ethiopian political party, sparking fears in some regions that the country’s federal system was under threat. Tensions with the TPLF boiled over and in November 2020 Abiy ordered a military assault against the group, sending in national troops and fighters from the neighboring region of Amhara, along with soldiers from Eritrea.

Thousands of people died in the fighting, while many more fled, and Tigray was plunged into severe food insecurity. All actors have been accused of carrying out atrocities in the conflict, but Eritrean forces have been linked to some of the most gruesome. In addition to perpetrating mass killings and rape, Eritrean soldiers have also been found blocking and looting food relief in multiple parts of Tigray.

Eritrea’s government has denied any involvement in atrocities. Ethiopia’s government has pledged investigations into any wrongdoing.

© Mapbox © OpenStreetMap Improve this map

TigrayCNN — 

Eritrean forces prevented a UN-led humanitarian mission from entering a village in the northern Ethiopian region of Tigray on Thursday, in what would mark violation of a peace deal ending fighting in the area, aid workers on the ground told CNN.

After two years of fighting, the Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a deal to end hostilities in November last year that included withdrawing all foreign forces from the north of the country. Eritrean soldiers had joined in on the conflict on the side of Ethiopia.

But aid workers said officials from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), as well as those from other NGOs, were stopped from reaching the village of Gemhalo by Eritrean forces.

“On 25 May 2023, a mission led by UNOCHA deputy head of Ethiopia comprised from UNOCHA, UNDSS, WHO and other INGOs were prohibited from entering Gemhalo village in Tahtay Adiyabo woreda [district] by Eritrean forces,” they said.

“The mission was stopped after traveling 16km from Sheraro around Waela-Nihbi. Eritrean forces are in Tigray in close distance from Sheraro occupying five kebeles [neighborhoods] of Tahtay-Adiyabo woreda [district],” they added.

“Looting, destructing infrastructures, raping are continued. Eritrean forces are committing all forms of violations in the villages including denying humanitarian access to those areas,” they said.

In January, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield said at a press conference in Nairobi that Eritrean troops were still in Ethiopia, contradicting authorities in Addis Ababa.

“We understand that they have moved back to the border, and they have been asked to leave Ethiopia,” she told reporters.

Eritrean forces also recently prevented “an African Union [peace] monitoring and verification team from carrying out their activities,” said Getachew Reda, the head of Tigray’s interim government. Tigrayan authorities continue to discuss the issue with the Ethiopian government, he added, saying, “it must be resolved.”

CNN has reached out to the Eritrean and the Ethiopian governments for comment.

01 Blinken 0802

Blinken accuses all sides in Ethiopian conflict of committing war crimes

The Tigray conflict has its roots in tensions that go back generations in Ethiopia. The country is made up of 10 regions – and two cities – that have a substantial amount of autonomy, including regional police and militia. Regional governments are largely divided along entrenched ethnic lines.

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018 after decades of iron-fisted rule by a TPLF-dominated coalition, and began a drive for a new pan-Ethiopian political party, sparking fears in some regions that the country’s federal system was under threat. Tensions with the TPLF boiled over and in November 2020 Abiy ordered a military assault against the group, sending in national troops and fighters from the neighboring region of Amhara, along with soldiers from Eritrea.

Thousands of people died in the fighting, while many more fled, and Tigray was plunged into severe food insecurity. All actors have been accused of carrying out atrocities in the conflict, but Eritrean forces have been linked to some of the most gruesome. In addition to perpetrating mass killings and rape, Eritrean soldiers have also been found blocking and looting food relief in multiple parts of Tigray.

Eritrea’s government has denied any involvement in atrocities. Ethiopia’s government has pledged investigations into any wrongdoing.

 

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Martin Plaut posted: " Source: 2023 Global Slavery Index Below are two extracts from the report, which also says that the Eritrean government has been among the worst at addressing this problem. This al-Jazeera report gives some context. " Martin Plaut

 

Martin Plaut

May 24

Source: 2023 Global Slavery Index

Below are two extracts from the report, which also says that the Eritrean government has been among the worst at addressing this problem. This al-Jazeera report gives some context.

AFRICAHORN OF AFRICARUSSIASUDAN

 

“According to an Al-Monitor source from the security service of a Russian energy company operating in Africa, Wagner mercenaries had stopped training the RSF recently and Hemedti himself, among others, had spoken about it. “This is due to the fact that the US and European countries began to recognize Prigozhin’s structure as a criminal organization, but this hardly extended to shadow operations on the border with the Central African Republic,” the source said.” 

Source:Al Monitor

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with Sudan’s paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo also known as Hemedti in Khartoum, Sudan in February 2023. - Russian Foreign Ministry

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with Sudan’s paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo also known as Hemedti in Khartoum, Sudan in February 2023. – Russian Foreign Ministry

Anton Mardasov @anton_mardasov

May 14, 2023

Events in Sudan would have perhaps gone unnoticed in Russian society, including by politicians and the media, if Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had not visited Khartoum two months before fighting broke out last week between Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. 

Lavrov’s was his first visit to the country after a nine-year hiatus, during which he met with both sides in the current confrontation. 


The head of Russian diplomacy reiterated Moscow’s commitment to the agreement on the establishment of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. The agreement is awaiting ratification by the Sudanese civilian legislature which has now been blocked. This is despite the fact that at the time, as Al-Monitor’s source in the Russian parliament noted, “Many in Moscow had already given up hope of an official presence in the Red Sea amid a reshaping of trade logistics due to the conflict with the West and Ukraine.” 

This suspicion is in part due that many did not believe not only that the deployment of the facility was possible, or that Moscow would be able to negotiate a deal after the toppling of former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019. 

Russian naval port obsolete? 

As for logistics, because of the sanctions, there is a restructuring of supply chains with a focus on trade with Africa and Asia, making the port in Sudan of great importance to Russia in these conditions as a transshipment trading point.

After this visit, rumors began to circulate in the Russian military and diplomatic corps that the Sudanese had reduced their demands as representatives of Burhan stated that the conditions proposed by Russia were not in the economic interests of Sudan.  The “yes” that was given to Lavrov was because the Russian foreign minister had allegedly been able to agree on the possibility of deploying a forward operating facility in Eritrea on his visit in January 2023.

 Whether this was true or just a diplomatic trick by which Lavrov created a favorable atmosphere for negotiations remains to be seen, but it is clear that in Sudan he tried to alleviate the crisis. 

“Before the visit, it was clear that Khartoum was ready to continue playing up the Russian base factor in relations with both Egypt and the West, and the Russian Ministry of Defense could no longer resolve this issue [naval facility] on its own,” a Russian source close to the foreign ministry said.

“The Ministry of Defense could not agree on this issue from the very beginning under [former dictator] Omar al-Bashir despite the baggage of connections — as we know, negotiations on the official military facility were conducted unofficially by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s people, i.e., the Wagner Group,” said another Al-Monitor source close to the Foreign Ministry.  

Although Lavrov’s trip to Khartoum was a positive development, the negotiations didn’t yield any tangible breakthroughs, the source suggested. The ratification of the naval facility agreement is only possible if the power is passed on to the civil government in Sudan. Yet this in itself is the issue at stake in the ongoing conflict between Sudan’s military commanders.

In any case, once the Burhan-Hemedti conflict has shifted into a hot phase, Russia’s plans for a naval facility in Port Sudan can with certain confidence be considered obsolete and will remain unfulfilled for a long while, Al-Monitor’s sources say. Other Russian experts largely concur with that view. 

However, there is a growing conviction among Russian politicians that the failures over the base in Sudan have to do not with the principle of Russia’s choice of a base, but with the machinations of Western intelligence services, primarily American and French. Indirectly, Lavrov said the same thing. “Geopolitical engineering is not good for anything,” he said on the events in Sudan in April. 

The Russian State Duma habitually accuses the United States of destabilizing the situation in Sudan. The media, for example, which is associated with the Russian secret service, at least tried to make sense of it, albeit with far-fetched arguments. For example, they wrote in all seriousness that the military actions in Khartoum were not accidental but deliberate in order to prevent Russia from gaining a foothold in Sudan and Africa as a whole. 

As evidence, Russian media cited the news that on the eve of the hostilities, Sudanese authorities charged a Russian citizen with smuggling 5 kilograms of gold mined by Al-Sawlaj for Mining Ltd., a company affiliated with Wagner PMC. According to these media outlets, the trial was allegedly initiated in the interest of Western states in order to have arguments for further pressure on the mercenary Wagner Group in various countries on the continent. 

The founder of Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, predictably denied all accusations of “stealing from African countries” and stated that there had not been a single Wagner mercenary in Sudan for two years. However, many experts question this assertion, citing as evidence the posts from 2022 on Telegram channels associated with the Wagner Group that showed footage of training of local forces by Russian mercenaries.  

Wagner becomes problematic

According to an Al-Monitor source from the security service of a Russian energy company operating in Africa, Wagner mercenaries had stopped training the RSF recently and Hemedti himself, among others, had spoken about it. “This is due to the fact that the US and European countries began to recognize Prigozhin’s structure as a criminal organization, but this hardly extended to shadow operations on the border with the Central African Republic,” the source said. 

One of Russia’s experts on Africa, Alexei Tselunov, noted that Hemedti directly or indirectly controls 250 state-owned enterprises, including gold-mining companies that regularly fail to pay taxes to the budget. 

It is known that structures associated with Prigozhin’s mercenaries not only did not stop using Sudan to smuggle gold (resources were either flown out of Khartoum or trucked to the Central African Republic) as part of the fight against international sanctions, but also, according to Politico, expanded mining to finance military actions in Ukraine. 

Although Wagner PMC has longstanding ties with Burhan, that is precisely because of the smuggling business that the Wagner Group has recently worked more closely with the RSF, which ensured the safe removal of gold from Sudan by the Russians.  

As for the information about the supply of missiles and heavy weapons by Russian mercenaries to Hemedti’s forces, Al-Monitor’s sources admit the possibility of some arms deliveries but note that their extent may be exaggerated in the media because it would be a rather risky move both for Prigozhin — who publicly offered his mediation in the conflict between Burhan and Hemedti — .

Kirill Semenov, nonresident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, tells Al-Monitor that there has been little discrepancy between official Moscow and Prigozhin on the Sudanese track so far. He agrees that the information about extensive support for Hemedti by Wagner PMC may be greatly exaggerated, especially since Prigozhin’s people are well aware of the real balance of power. 

“First, Hemedti does not have the necessary power resources to take power in the country. At best, he can only participate in the division of it, and this will not bring Moscow any closer to solving the problem of establishing a naval facility there. Second, Russia’s unilateral support for Hemedti would lead to a further deterioration of relations with Egypt, which is much more important for Moscow in terms of economic cooperation,” Semenov said. 

Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar’s assistance in delivering goods in the interests of the RSF is often presented as evidence of Russian support for Hemedti. Yet there are other regional players supporting Hifter besides Russia, Semenov notes. “As far as one can judge, Hifter’s support for Hemedti is limited, and one cannot rule out that Hifter will try to distance himself from supporting the RSF and shift all the responsibility for that assistance to the Wagner Group,” the expert concluded.

 

Martin Plaut

May 10

Here are two reports which provide chapter and verse about how the Eritrean government puts pressure on Eritreans in the diaspora to extract funds from them, and attempts to intimidate the Eritrean community. They were prepared for the Norwegian government's Ministry of Labour and Social Inclusion.

These are some extracts:

·        "A minority organisation which appears to be characterised by conflict, rivalry and factionalism, or which is funded by forces in the country of origin, may in fact be infiltrated or may have originally been established by a foreign power. Eritrean diaspora organisations in particular are subject to this problem."

·        "3.1.2 Among other things, we describe how the Eritrean authorities threaten families with sanctions if persons... engage in opposition activity or do not pay the so-called two per cent tax."

·        "3.2 ...among other things, from Norwegian-Eritrean informations who told of death threats, often made face-to face in various contexts. Several of these cases have been reported to the police, and several victims have been assigned a violence alarm....we also reports more indirect threats, by being told that 'we know where you are and where you live.' Both Ethiopians and Eritreans have reported such threats."

·        "3.3.2...describes acts where discrediting content is spread in social media, through derogatory comments, including toward the Eritrean diaspora."

·        3.4.1...reported from Eritrean informants that pro-regime circles and individuals engage in power struggles in Eritrean diaspora organisations, and can also 'coup' governing bodies."

·        3.4.1 We were further told that to the extent that organised communities survive, it is reportedly because pro-regime individuals have taken control, and excluded Eritreans who do not support the regime. It is also reportedly common to exclude, ostracise or ban Norwegian-Eritreans who are not pro-regime or fail to pay the two per cent tax for meetings, church services or cultural events."

·        3.5 "For Eritreans, the embassy requires the payment of the Eritrean two per cent tax in order to receive a passport, but also public documents, such as diplomas, birth certificates, marriage certificates, etc."

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Martin Plaut

May 5

Source: East African

Sudan's conflict: Outside players backing army, RSF generals

THURSDAY MAY 04 2023   

Sudan's rival generals al-Burhan and Hemedti

Sudan's rival generals, army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (left) and the leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo 'Hemedti'. PHOTO | ASHRAF SHAZLY & EBRAHIM HAMID | AFP

Summary

·        Diplomats and analysts say Cairo is crucial to applying any short-term pressure on Burhan.

·        Saudi Arabia has had close ties to Burhan and Hemedti.

·        Ethiopia and Kenya hold some sway due to their prominent role in regional diplomacy and mediation in Sudan.

·        Critics say the US was too lenient with the generals.

By REUTERS

More by this Author

Military rivals locked in a conflict that erupted in Sudan on April 15 both courted foreign backing in the years leading up to the fighting.

That support could now influence the course of the power struggle between army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and the leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo commonly known as Hemedti, as well as efforts to stop the violence.

The conflict has brought open warfare to Sudan's capital Khartoum and sparked new unrest in the western region of Darfur, displacing hundreds of thousands of people within Sudan and sending 100,000 fleeing across its borders.

The influence of outside players has loomed over events in Sudan since the overthrow of former leader Omar al-Bashir during a popular uprising four years ago.

Who supports Burhan?

Burhan's most important backer is Egypt, which shares a border with Sudan that more than 40,000 people have crossed since the fighting began.

In both countries, the military has assumed a dominant role in the decades since independence and has intervened following popular uprisings in Egypt when former army chief Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi led the ousting of democratically elected President Mohamed Mursi a decade ago, and in Sudan when Burhan led a military takeover in 2021.

Diplomats and analysts say Egypt feels comfortable dealing with Burhan and sees him as the most likely guarantor of its interests, including in negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam being constructed on the Blue Nile upstream of Sudan and Egypt.

In recent months, as much of the international community backed a transition plan involving the main civilian coalition to emerge from Sudan's 2019 uprising, Cairo created a parallel track of negotiations involving figures closer to the army.

During the current fighting Egypt has joined calls for an effective ceasefire while saying they consider the conflict an internal matter for Sudan. On Tuesday Egypt's foreign ministry received an envoy for Burhan.

Diplomats and analysts say Cairo is crucial to applying any short-term pressure on Burhan.

Read: Sudan: US mounts pressure for ceasefire

Who supports Hemedti?

The most important regional ally for Hemedti before the conflict was the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Hemedti has presented himself as a bulwark against Islamist-leaning factions that established deep roots in the army and other institutions under Bashir. The UAE has aggressively sought to roll back Islamist influence across the region.

The UAE has provided Hemedti, who grew rich through the gold trade, with a platform for channelling his finances as well as public relations support for the RSF, said Andreas Krieg, Associate Professor at King's College, London.

Analysts however say the UAE has also sought to hedge its bets, retaining ties to Burhan and the army and joining the Quad, a grouping that has taken the lead on diplomacy on Sudan and includes the United States, Saudi Arabia and Britain.

"While it publicly supports the policy approach by the Quad, it has used its networks to create an alternative influence hub with Hemedti and the RSF," said Krieg.

Hemedti had also cultivated ties with Russia. Western diplomats in Khartoum said in 2022 that Russia's Wagner Group was involved in illicit gold mining in Sudan and was spreading disinformation. Hemedti said he advised Sudan to cut ties to Wagner after the US imposed sanctions on the private military contractor. Wagner said on April 19 that it was no longer operating in Sudan.

Read: Russia’s Wagner keeps low profile in Sudan

Which other powers have influence?

Saudi Arabia has had close ties to Burhan and Hemedti, both of whom sent troops to the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen.

As it steps up its diplomatic ambitions across the Middle East, Riyadh has asserted itself in mediating over Sudan while also looking to protect its economic ambitions in the Red Sea region, said Anna Jacobs, Senior Gulf Analyst with Crisis Group.

"Saudi Arabia is focused on Red Sea security, which is integral to Saudi Vision 2030 and investments along the Red Sea like Neom," she said, referring to the futuristic city backed by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Saudi Arabia and the United States have been leading efforts to secure an effective ceasefire.

East African powers Ethiopia and Kenya also hold some sway due to their prominent role in regional diplomacy and previous mediation in Sudan.

Read: Ethiopia praised for helping Sudan evacuees

South Sudan hosted peace talks between the Sudanese state and rebel groups in recent years and was designated as one of the countries that could host talks over the current crisis.

Israel, which had been hoping to move forward in normalising ties with Sudan, has also offered to host talks.

What's the West's position?

Western powers swung behind a transition towards elections as the military shared power with civilians after Bashir's overthrow, offering direct financial support that was frozen when Burhan and Hemedti staged a coup in 2021.

Led by the United States, they supported a new transition deal that was meant to be finalised in early April. However, the deal instead helped trigger the eruption of fighting by creating a stand-off over the future structure of the military.

Critics say the US was too lenient with the generals.

"Their strategy was stability, and their basic misconception was that they would get stability by backing the apparently strong and decisive and cohesive players who happened to be in power," said Alex de Waal, a Sudan expert and head of the World Peace Foundation at Tufts University.

 

Martin Plaut

May 4

"Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the RSF."

Source: Economist

The Horn of Africa sits astride key trade routes 

 

May 3rd 2023 | KHARTOUM AND NAIROBI

Four days after war began in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, armed men stormed the home of Muhammad. Ordering the businessman (whose name we withheld for his safety) and his family to leave, the soldiers mounted anti-aircraft guns on the roof of the apartment. Muhammad’s family moved in with relatives in a quieter neighbourhood nearby. But that, too, was soon unsafe as the fighting spread, leaving the streets strewn with bodies.

The battle may have started as a narrow power struggle between the official army, known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (saf), and the Rapid Support Forces (rsf), a militia-turned-paramilitary organisation. But the longer it continues, the greater the risk that it may draw in outsiders because of Sudan’s geopolitical importance.

 

For Sudan sits astride the Nile, Egypt’s lifeline. It also has ports close to the Horn of Africa, which controls the southern chokepoint of the Red Sea and is close to the Persian Gulf. These arteries of the world economy are watched over by America, China and France, which all have military bases in Djibouti. “The Horn is highly strategic, and a microcosm of other international disputes,” says Comfort Ero, the president of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank. It is a place where “the West meets the East, where the Gulf meets Europe.”

For now the two sides seem evenly matched. The saf is commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who seized and then consolidated power as de facto leader of Sudan in coups in 2019 and 2021. It started the conflict with considerable conventional military power, including tanks and fighter jets. Though the rsf is ostensibly the underdog, its commander, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti), has substantial private wealth, because the rsf is said to control elements of Sudan’s gold trade. He also leads tens of thousands of loyal troops.

It was these assets which enabled Mr Dagalo to vie with General Burhan for control of the transition that followed the overthrow of the brutal Islamist regime under the former dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and later saw him become the country’s vice-president. Guns and money may also have helped him to emerge in recent years as a semi-autonomous figure on the international stage, cutting deals with foreign powers. The rsf is not simply an “insurgent militia”, notes Sharath Srinivasan, a Sudan expert at Cambridge University. “It’s a state actor.”

After nearly three weeks of fighting in Khartoum and elsewhere, in particular in West Darfur, neither side has a decisive advantage. The rsf lacks tanks and air power but is compensating by digging into residential neighbourhoods in the capital. There its men are raping women and forcing them to cook for them, according to a Sudanese woman, whose four female cousins escaped through an air-vent after the rsf had occupied their home.

Civilians in Khartoum also have to contend with air strikes by the saf. On May 1st three women selling tea opposite a hospital were killed by a bomb blast. According to the un, more than 500 civilians have already been killed and many more injured in the fighting (the true figure is likely to be much higher). As many as 800,000 refugees are expected to cross Sudan’s borders in the coming weeks and months.

The rsf, whose troops are also better paid and have more recent combat experience that those of the saf, has managed to secure key parts of the capital including the international airport and the country’s largest oil refinery. It also appears to control the presidential palace and the state broadcaster. “For the past two weeks they were roaming around like they owned the place,” says Waleed Adem, a resident of a rsf-controlled district of east Khartoum.

The rsf also dominates Mr Dagalo’s home region of Darfur and controls two of the region’s three air bases. Bloody clashes in el-Geneina, which began when Arab tribal militias affiliated to the rsf attacked non-Arabs in the town, may have subsided.

The army remains in charge pretty much everywhere else. Thousands of Sudanese and foreign citizens have been evacuated from the Red Sea city of Port Sudan, in the country’s troubled east, which was secured by the saf early in the war. The countryside around Khartoum is also more or less peaceful. “It’s business as usual,” reports a university professor who recently fled the city with his family.

Though the rsf is waging a guerrilla campaign of raids on army units and facilities in the capital, the saf’s control of the skies is taking a toll. “We hit all their supply stores around Khartoum,” says a mid-ranking soldier in the saf. Several convoys of rsf reinforcements from Darfur have reportedly been destroyed by air strikes.

The question is whether either side can quickly break the deadlock. The saf has decades of experience fighting insurgencies in distant regions, but never before in the capital. It cannot simply bomb its way to victory there as it has done elsewhere. “Khartoum is going to be a bit of a meat-grinder for a while,” predicts a Western security analyst. He adds that internal divisions within the saf’s leadership may be hampering its ability to press home its sizeable advantage in heavy weapons.

The rsf, too, finds itself in a quandary. It will struggle to supply and rearm its forces as the fighting continues. Even in the unlikely event of a victory, Mr Dagalo is loathed in Khartoum by residents who hold him responsible for a massacre of hundreds of protesters there in 2019 perpetrated by a combination of forces from the rsf, the police and the intelligence service. His troops’ current conduct has only alienated them more. “The people have the army’s back,” says Mr Adem.

The prospects for a protracted war depend on how Sudan’s neighbouring countries react. Due to its size as well as its strategic location on the Red Sea, Sudan has long been seen as strategically valuable within the region as well as by China, Russia and the West. It overlooks the shipping lanes leading to the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which around 10% of the world’s sea trade passes.

The Gulf countries, in particular the United Arab Emirates (uae) and Saudi Arabia, eye economic interests at play. In December an Emirati firm inked a $6bn deal to develop a port and economic zone on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. The Saudis and the Emiratis supported General Burhan and Mr Dagalo after the joint coup, handing out some $3bn in emergency aid. But neither country has an obvious interest in fuelling the conflict. Saudi Arabia has already evacuated thousands of Sudanese fleeing via Port Sudan. Much as Europe does, it fears a sudden influx of refugees.

Complicating matters, though, is the Emiratis’ murky relationship with Mr Dagalo, who received cash and arms in return for sending his rsf to aid their war in Yemen in 2017. He has since cultivated ties in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the uae’s two main statelets. Still the Emiratis do not have “any particular affection for Hemedti”, says Harry Verhoeven of Columbia University. Since the war began there has been little evidence that the uae has continued to supply his forces.

So the Gulf countries may be “hanging back and hedging their bets to see which way the cards fall”, suggests Ms Ero. That may also be the approach of Russia, whose murky mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group, is said to be involved in gold mining in Sudan while helping arm the rsf. The Kremlin’s main aim is to “thwart a democratic transition in Sudan”, says Samuel Ramani, author of “Russia in Africa”. This is because its ambition to build a naval base on the Red Sea is better served by a military government in Khartoum than a civilian, democratic one. And it does not care whether the saf or the rsf prevails.

The civil war in Sudan is not yet a proxy one like those in Syria, Libya or Yemen. But the country shares long and porous borders with conflict-racked neighbours, including the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya and South Sudan. Each has its own bewildering array of militias and rebel groups, many with ethnic or business ties to the rsf or to its rivals. Some may watch for a chance to profit from Sudan’s chaos. “The longer the conflict continues, the more external actors will meddle,” warns Suliman Baldo, who heads the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a conflict-monitoring group.

Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the rsf.

Mr Dagalo’s rsf and Mr Haftar’s Libyan National Army (lna), which controls much of eastern Libya, have worked together in the past. In 2019 rsf troops were sent to support the lna, which was also backed by the uae, in its assault on Tripoli, Libya’s capital. Two days before Sudan’s civil war erupted, Mr Haftar’s eldest son arrived in Khartoum for talks with Mr Dagalo.

Whatever support Mr Haftar may offer, the rsf may be limited by the Libyan warlord’s need to keep in with Egypt, another of his foreign sponsors. Long Sudan’s most influential neighbour, Egypt is a staunch backer of the saf under General Burhan. It views Sudan as vital to its national security and is loth to see either a civilian government or Mr Dagalo in charge.

Early in the war an Egyptian jet was reported to have struck an rsf ammunition dump. On May 1st Mr Dagalo accused Egypt’s air force of hitting targets in Khartoum North. Though the extent of its military involvement is unknown, Egypt is likely to step up its support for the saf if it is flagging. “Egypt is the most serious factor,” says Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute. “The Egyptian goal now is to save central power in Sudan as they know it.”

A wider conflagration may still be avoided. Despite ethnic clashes in Darfur, the conflict has so far been generally limited to fighting between the two armed factions. On May 2nd both sides agreed to a seven-day ceasefire brokered by South Sudan’s president. Peace talks in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, could soon begin.

All the while, a humanitarian disaster is mounting. Food and water supplies in Khartoum are dwindling. Almost no hospital in the capital is functioning. Pregnant women have died on route to give birth. “If there is no ceasefire, everything will collapse,” warns Mohamed Lemine, who heads the un’s sexual and reproductive health agency in Sudan.

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