EPDP EC Statement on the Situation in Tigray

In an extraordinary meeting held on 3 July 2021, the Executive Committee of the Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) seriously evaluated the outcomes of the eight-month long intensive war in Ethiopia’s northern region of Tigray, and at the outset, the meeting wished to express its good wishes to the fraternal Tigray people and their defense forces for the remarkable achievements through steadfastness and exceptional valor.

The meeting found it noting the November 21 2020 statement of the EPDP Central Council, based on relevant resolutions of the last Party congress and related policy guidelines, that strongly condemned the blatant interference of the Eritrean dictatorship in the internal affairs of a neighboring country with the sinister aim of fueling hostile conflicts. The earlier CC statement also referred to the call upon the Eritrean people to watchfully defend their hard-won sovereignty which was under threat of those secret pacts ostensibly reached under the cover of darkness with the Ethiopian Prime Minister, forgetful of the past bitter experiences of the Eritrean people.

At its 3rd of July evaluation, the EC once more saw the Party’s concerns repeating themselves in the war in Tigray that, in spite of the military gains, have caused untold suffering to innocent civilians. And still, the suffering is not ending. The EPDP leadership thus reiterated its deep concerns about the regional ramifications of the conflict whose imminent dangers cannot spare Eritrea. Most importantly, it is timely to recall the following conclusions and  concerns of the CC November statement:

  1. The EPDP condemns the Isaias-Abiy collusion to fight the people and government of the regional Tigray State, and calls for a political solution to the conflict which is in the first place constitutional and political;
  2. The Party supports the combined calls for peaceful settlement of the conflict by international, regional, religious and human rights organizations, and in particular recommends that the warring parties accept the African initiative for reconciliation. The Party leadership also urged concerned international bodies to come on the side of the affected people and see to it that refugees problems are addressed with utmost attention.

Thus, continuing the discussion on an urgent theme of “what can be done to avert a looming additional havoc?” the 3 July meeting of the EPDP Executive Committee reached the following conclusions:

  1. The EC again saluted the Tigrayan people at home and abroad for having forged a unified stand under a solid defense umbrella of its field forces and broke the dark nightmare that befell them until they could restore their legitimate regional government;
  2. It called for the immediate return of public services like supply of electricity, water communication networks, transport, banks and the like which have been disrupted as part of the war project. Likewise, international actors have to increase their pressure and follow up to make sure that access for humanitarian assistance to reach the needy victims is fully realized;
  3. The EPDP leadership further reiterated its call on all parties to agree on workable cease-fire and start serious dialogue to reach a lasting solution;
  4. It commended the distinguished stand of the Tigray regional state and their defense force in their unwavering support to Eritrean sovereign existence, and which remains their honorable trademark. The EPDP Executive Committee thus reminded fraternal Tigray regional state to continue upholding this noble stand and in addition cooperate with Eritrean forces struggling against the tyranny in Eritrea.
  5. The meeting urged the international community to see to it that the crimes and abuses committed against refugees and civilians are not repeated and all the crimes committed in the conflict are fully investigated and the culprits brought to accountability without delay. In addition, all parties are urged to respect the rights of prisoners of war and never fail giving due process of law to any accused amongst them.
  6. At this juncture, we urge the Eritrean people to demand answers to question as to what has been the fate of their sons and daughters who were forced to join in this war that did not concern their country, and many of them reportedly perished under different circumstances. In this connection, our people are called upon to unify their ranks to defeat the cruel tyranny at home that caused so much suffering in neighboring Tigray region and bring to justice all those who committed crimes against other human beings.

Finally, it is time to revisit continuous crimes Isaias and his clique have been committing in Eritrea and now extended the same criminal acts to the  people of Tigray with the aim of instilling mutual hatred and enmity between the fraternal peoples of Eritrea and Tigray. However, the PFDJ regime does not represent the Eritrean people and our people have no involvement in the crimes this repressive regime perpetrated against our neighbors. Therefore, it is now the most opportune moment for the two fraternal people not to have grudges against each other but unify their ranks in cooperating against their common enemy in Eritrea.

Most importantly, the EPDP believes it is time for the Eritrean change and justice seekers to take a new path and launch a new phase of struggle to save their own people and sovereign state. Similarly, friends of Eritrea are urged to put more pressure on the repressive regime in Eritrea and extend the necessary support to the Eritrean pro-democracy actors to realize their long deferred dream for a democratic state in post-dictatorship Eritrea.

We struggle for Democratic Governance and Progress!

The EPDP Executive Committee

3 July, 2021

 News and Press Release Source

 Posted13 Jul 2021 Originally published13 Jul 2021 OriginView original

Eritrean refugees arrive in Adi Harush camp, after being relocated from other camps in the north of Ethiopia’s Tigray region that were destroyed in the early months of the conflict © UNHCR/Hanna QassisEritrean refugees arrive in Adi Harush camp, after being relocated from other camps in the north of Ethiopia’s Tigray region that were destroyed in the early months of the conflict © UNHCR/Hanna Qassis

I am extremely concerned about the conditions of Eritrean refugees in the Tigray region of Ethiopia. Since the outbreak of hostilities in November 2020, they have been deeply affected by the violence and insecurity that has engulfed the region. They have been caught up between warring groups, two refugee camps have been completely destroyed, and tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees were forced to flee – yet again – for their lives. We have received credible and corroborated reports of reprisal attacks, abductions, arrests,and violence meted out against Eritrean refugees for their perceived affiliation with one side or the other throughout this bloody conflict.

I have been disturbed by general criminality against refugees committed, mainly at night, by various armed actors in the Mai Aini and Adi Harush refugee camps. In the past weeks, hundreds of Eritreans have been arrested in Shire. We have sought clarity from the authorities in Mekelle and have requested access to and the immediate release of any unlawfully detained refugees and asylum seekers. We have also heard reports of other very serious allegations of violence against Eritrean refugees and have called on both the Federal Government and the Tigray Regional Government to launch formal investigations into all credible allegations.

The violence and intimidation of Eritrean refugees must stop. Refugees are civilians in need of and with the right to international protection. UNHCR calls on all parties and actors to not only comply with their international legal obligations, including the protection of civilians, but also to stop using and manipulating refugees to score political points.

Our collective focus must instead be on ensuring their protection – including from violence, arrest, and abduction – and stepping up assistance to them. This means urgently constructing a safe new camp for Eritrean refugees who were previously living in the now destroyed Shimelba and Hitsats camps. It means being able to access fuel and cash to run our operations to assist refugees and the two million other displaced people in the Tigray region. It means restoring essential banking services, as well as electricity and communications networks, which are – along with security – essential to ramp up the humanitarian response. And it means opening the airports in Shire and Mekelle, as well as all land routes into Tigray from neighboring regions of Ethiopia so that humanitarians can get more help into the hands of those in need – Eritrean refugees and all other impacted civilians in Tigray.

UNHCR is scaling up its response both in the delivery of relief materials and in the deployment of more senior personnel. But protecting civilians, including Eritrean refugees, and greater efforts to facilitate the humanitarian relief effort are urgently needed by all parties.

July 10, 202111:58 PM ET

Ethiopia's Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, pictured in June, was assured a second term after his Prosperity Party was declared the winner of last month's national election.

Mulugeta Ayene/AP

ADDIS ABABA, Ethiopia — Ethiopia's ruling Prosperity Party on Saturday was declared the winner of last month's national election in a landslide, assuring a second five-year term for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.

The National Election Board of Ethiopia said the ruling party won 410 seats out of 436 contested in the federal parliament, which will see dozens of other seats remain vacant after one-fifth of constituencies didn't vote due to unrest or logistical reasons. Ethiopia's new government is expected to be formed in October.

The vote was a major test for Abiy, who came to power in 2018 after the former prime minister resigned amid widespread protests. Abiy oversaw dramatic political reforms that led in part to a Nobel Peace Prize the following year, but critics say he is backtracking on political and media freedoms. Abiy also has drawn massive international criticism for his handling of the conflict in the Tigray region has that left thousands of people dead.

June's vote, which had been postponed twice due to the COVID-19 pandemic and logistical issues, was largely peaceful but opposition parties decried harassment and intimidation. No voting was held in the Tigray region.

Abiy has hailed the election as the nation's first attempt at a free and fair vote, but the United States has called it "significantly flawed," citing the detention of some opposition figures and insecurity in parts of Africa's second most populous country.
 

The leader of the main opposition Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice party, Birhanu Nega, lost while opposition parties won just 11 seats. The Ethiopian Citizens for Social Justice party has filed 207 complaints with the electoral body over the vote.

Popular opposition parties in the Oromia region, the largest of Ethiopia's federal states, boycotted the election. The ruling party ran alone in several dozen constituencies.

In a social media post late Saturday, Abiy called the election historic in that it was conducted by an electoral body "free from any influences." He promised to include some opposition figures who took part in the election in his new government.

The head of the electoral board, Birtukan Mideksa, said during Saturday's announcement that the vote was held at a time when Ethiopia was experiencing challenges, "but this voting process has guaranteed that people will be governed through their votes."

She added: "I want to confirm that we have managed to conduct a credible election."

Voter turnout was just over 90% among the more than 37 million people who had been registered to vote.

The Prosperity Party was formed after the dismantling of Ethiopia's former ruling coalition, which had been dominated by Tigray politicians. Disagreements over that decision signaled the first tensions between Abiy and Tigray leaders that finally led to the conflict in the region in November.

Though Abiy hinted in 2018 that Ethiopia will limit a prime minister's terms to two, it is not clear whether he will act on that.

Desalegn Chanie, a member of the opposition National Movement of Amhara who won a parliament seat, told The Associated Press the election board performed well overall but has failed in its main duty of being impartial and giving fair judgements for complaints.

"Local election officials, armed men and cadres were snatching the badges of election observers and even beating them," he said.

Source=Ethiopia's Abiy Ahmed Poised For 2nd Term After Party Wins Elections : NPR

JULY 12, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

Appeal for the Renewal of the Mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on Eritrea, and for Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity to be Held to Account

11 July 2021

To: HE Antonio Guterres, United Nations Secretary General

HE Nazhat Shameem Khan, President, Human Rights Council

HE Moussa Faki Mahamat, Chair, African Union Commission

HE Filippo Grandi, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

HE Nicolas de Rivière, Permanent Representative of France to the UN

Peter Maurer, President, ICRC

Hon Jamesina Essie L King, Commissioner, ACHPR

Hon Mudford Zachariah Mwandenga, Commissioner, ACHPR

Excellencies,

As concerned Eritrean individuals and organisations in the diaspora, we write to highlight the ongoing repression, trauma and setbacks our people have endured for 30 years under an unelected totalitarian government, and to urge you to facilitate the renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, and to hold perpetrators of these appalling crimes accountable.

Eritrea’s heroic independence struggle culminated in independence on May 24, 1991. Tragically, the nation immediately transitioned into a dictatorship thereafter, under the tyrannical rule of Isaias Afwerki, who has killed or imprisoned those among his freedom fighter comrades who opposed his authoritarian tendencies. Afewerki’s regime has perpetuated its power by disregarding the fundamental rights and freedoms for which many Eritrean citizens paid the ultimate price. Over 400,000 Eritreans are enslaved in indefinite national service, and are regularly forced to work for individuals or private enterprises for little or no remuneration. There is no independent press or judiciary; the freedoms of religion, expression and assembly are severely curtailed; arbitrary detention is rife, and money can only be withdrawn from banks in small sums, regardless of the amount one has available. Moreover, despite the regime’s self-declared reputation for honesty, officials routinely accept bribes for exemption or early release from military service or detention, or to divulge unofficially information about the location of detained people.

The regime constantly limits access to food, water, fuel, medicine, electricity, and transportation in order to keep the population in constant trauma and anxiety. Families have been destroyed, and our culture, heroic history, and values have been diminished. Most recently, members of our armed forces, many of them minors and conscripts, have been forced to participate in the war in Ethiopia, which was launched without the consent of Eritrean citizens, and where some have been implicated in the most severe human rights violations.

Due to the pervasive repression occasioned by the regime’s totalitarian nature, every month, thousands of young people, elders, and even unaccompanied minors, escape the country, ending up in Libya, Sudan, Europe, North America, and elsewhere, 1Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, 2016 subjected to extortion, mistreatment or torture by unscrupulous people traffickers, or dying enroute in the Sahara Desert or the Mediterranean Sea. By 2018, approximately 507,000 people, almost one-tenth of Eritrea’s population had fled. The regime has perfected divide and rule tactics that instrumentalise our diversity in religion, ethnic and clan which was previously a source of strength and unity, and its secret operatives severely intimidate Eritreans both within the country and in the diaspora, inhibiting our ability to speak out collectively against the injustices our people endure on a daily basis.

The Eritrean dictatorship has now exported its tyranny to Ethiopia, with the agreement of a Nobel Laureate, and thousands of Eritrean conscripts, including underage youth (male and female) are likely either to have been killed, captured, or disabled, in fighting in Tigray and ongoing clashes in Oromo. Many of these minors were abducted from their homes, schools, or city market. The Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) were under orders to demolish historical and religious sites, schools, factories, hospitals, clinics, and commit the most heinous crimes against Tigrayan civilians, or face immediate execution. In addition, two camps housing Eritrean refugees were destroyed, and an unknown number of refugees were forcibly returned.

Every aspect of the fabric of Eritrea has been besieged and violated. As was accurately documented in the 2016 report of the Commission of Inquiry mandated by your august body, since 1991, Eritrean officials have committed the crimes against humanity of enslavement, imprisonment, exile, conscription, torture, reprisals, persecution, rape and murder. It was therefore deeply disheartening for us to watch Eritrea being elected to membership of the UN’s premier human rights organ in 2019, a mere three years after this landmark report, where with typical arrogance the regime refuses to cooperate with Council mechanisms, continues to violate the rights and freedoms of Eritrean citizens comprehensively, and has now extended these violations to people groups in a neighbouring country.

Thus, we strongly urge the UN Human Rights Council, in collaboration with the UN Security Council, the European Union, the African Union, and the entire international community, to facilitate the following and necessary actions:

To the Human Rights Council: 

  • Ensure the renewal of the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Eritrea for a further year. Nothing has changed in Eritrea, and events in Tigray have provided an accelerated display of the violations endured by the Eritrean people for the last 30 years. There must be sustained human rights monitoring of the country until all Eritrean citizens are free to enjoy the rights and freedoms for which so many shed their blood.

To the Security Council: 

  • “(a) Determine that the situation of human rights in Eritrea poses a threat to international peace and security; (b) Refer the situation in Eritrea to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court; (c) Impose targeted sanctions, namely travel bans and asset freezes, on persons where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the said persons are responsible for crimes against humanity or other gross violations of human rights.”1

To the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees: 

  • Ensure protection and provision for Eritrean refugees in Adi Harush and Mai Aini camps, and facilitate relocation to a third country, as they are seriously at risk.

To the International Committee of the Red Cross and relevant institutions 

  • Ensure appropriate treatment for underage Eritrean prisoners of war.

To HRC Member States and international organisations: 

  • “Keep Eritrea under close scrutiny until consistent and tangible progress with regard to the situation of human rights is evident, and ensure the centrality of human rights in all engagement with the State; […] Keep Eritrea on the agenda of the International Labour Organization and continue to address the issue of forced labour; and […] Provide Eritrean nationals seeking protection with refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the international law governing asylum, and in particular the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.”1

Finally, we appeal to the entire international community to ensure that President Afewerki, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and all key officials, individual persons, businesses, institutions, and representatives of both countries who are implicated directly or indirectly in grave human rights violations against Eritrean civilians, Tigrayans, Oromos, and Eritrean refugees not only face targeted sanctions, but are also brought before an international tribunal to account for their atrocities.

Signed 

  1. Adi Red, USA
  2. Alem Ghezey, USA
  3. Arefayne Woldeab, Canada
  4. Assenna Foundation (ATV)
  5. Binega Adhanom Markos, Canada
  6. Daniel Reka Awshek, Canada
  7. Dawit Tewelde, UK
  8. Dr Jerusalem Tesfai, Eritrean Community Activist, USA
  9. Dr Sirak Hagos, UK
  10. Dr Tsigabu Asmelash
  11. Eritrea Focus
  12. Eva Afewerki Tsehaye, Together We Push, Denmark
  13. Fitsumbirhan Araya, UK
  14. Global Yiakl, Canada
  15. Global Yiakl, Denmark
  16. Global Yiakl, France
  17. Global Yiakl, Germany
  18. Global Yiakl, Italy
  19. Global Yiakl, South Africa
  20. Global Yiakl, Sweden
  21. Global Yiakl, Switzerland
  22. Global Yiakl, UK
  23. Global Yiakl, USA
  24. Helen Berhane Neguse, Nightingale Ministries, Denmark
  25. Human Rights Concern Eritrea, UK
  26. Joseph Leadership Academy
  27. Kebreab Y Hailegiorgis CEO (Interim), and Board Chairman, Eritrean Community Connections (ECC), USA
  28. Michael Anday Kidane, South Africa
  29. Mengs Tecle Asfha, USA
  30. Mussie Mulugeta, UK
  31. Mussie Zena, USA
  32. Negassi Solomon, USA
  33. Noh Tukku, Canada
  34. Ogbazgi K Measho, USA
  35. Release Eritrea, UK
  36. Rev Daniel Habtey, UK
  37. Senayit Alem, UK
  38. Tesfalem Mebrahtu Woldeab, Canada
  39. Tirhas Tesfazghi, Canada
  40. Yenet Moges, Canada
  41. Yihdega Retta, USA
  42. Yohannes Alula, UK
  43. Yosief Meconen, UK

—-

Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

+44 7958 005 637

www.hrc-eritrea.org

1Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea, 2016

JULY 11, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

This is a chapter from the report: Tigray War and Regional Implications, which you can The Tigray War and Regional Implications – Volume 1.


The plight of Eritrean refugees

By Mike Slotznick[1]

Introduction

Within weeks after the start of the war in Tigray, Eritrean troops began invading United Nations-supported camps that sustained Eritrean refugees there. The camps, situated just inside the Ethiopian border, housed nearly 100,000 Eritreans who had fled the brutal Eritrean regime. The troops killed some of the refugees, obliterated two of the four camps, and forced several thousand refugees back into Eritrea, where they faced conscription into the invading army, or imprisonment and torture for having initially fled their home country. Eritrean refugees elsewhere in Ethiopia, particularly in the capital city Addis Ababa, also became subject to abduction. Armed Tigrayan actors also attacked some of the refugees in the camps. All of those activities constitute violations of international law.[2]

The atrocities committed against the Eritrean refugees occurred contemporaneously with those committed against Tigrayans and others. In many ways they were all of a piece, reflecting the overall ascendance of violence, demolition of societal order and erasure of human dignity. The author does not compare them, one to the next. Rather, he has attempted in this chapter to narrow his topic to its title.

8.1 Who are the refugees, and why are they in Ethiopia?

Eritrea is one of the most repressive countries on earth. It is widely referred to as “the North Korea of Africa” – due to its hermetic isolation, and to the government’s brutalization and enslavement of its own people, even as they suffer from malnourishment and destitution. Major human rights organizations have amply documented those conditions. In 2016 a United Nations investigatory panel – the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COI) –accused the ruling regime of crimes against humanity.[3] But the regime has been impervious to its widespread condemnation, and the abuses have continued.

There has been no census of Eritrea in modern times, so there is no authoritative figure for its population. The Eritrean government provided an estimate of 3.65 million in 2015.[4] By contrast, the CIA estimate for 2021 is a population of 6.15 million.[5] Either way, it is extraordinary that by 2018 some 500,000 Eritreans had fled to other lands, including to the Tigray region of Ethiopia.[6]

To explain the flight, we should first describe its causes.

  1. Crimes against humanity.

 

After a 30-year war of secession from Ethiopia, Eritrea gained its independence – de facto in 1991 and officially in 1993. The secessionists had promised the Eritrean people democracy, and a democratic constitution was ratified in 1997. But the constitution was never implemented; the new state never became democratic; elections were never held; and, from the start, the country was ruled by the iron hand of the secessionist leader, Isaias Afwerki. The repression avalanched shortly after Eritrea’s 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, in which over 100,000 combatants in the aggregate are estimated to have died.[7] The war had been waged nominally over a disputed boundary, but broader tensions had preceded it, and the armistice resolved nothing. In any event, the war was widely considered not only a defeat but a catastrophe for Eritrea, which had fired the first shots. Enraged, humiliated, possibly fearing an overthrow, and in any case bent on retaining control his country, Isaias moved to shutter all internal political dissent. What ensued was a near-total evisceration of personal freedoms and an acute violation of human rights, as documented by major governmental, inter-governmental and human rights organizations and as summarized in a paper posted by The America Team for Displaced Eritreans (hereafter, The America Team) in October 2016.[8] Since then, the regime’s human rights abuses have continued, and The America Team has continued to track and post reports of them.[9] A restatement of the core reporting in the October 2016 paper follows.

  • Authoritarian police state. The governing regime is authoritarian; no elections have been held for decades; only one political party is permitted; independent non-governmental associations are forbidden; public assemblies for all but recreational or government-sponsored purposes are outlawed; academic freedom is restricted; foreign organizations (and funding from them) are mostly banned; citizens are subjected to constant governmental surveillance and intimidation; the judiciary is not independent; justice is administered without rule of law; and the regime governs by sowing fear. (A documentary film entitled “Escaping Eritrea,” produced and directed by Evan Williams and released by the Public Broadcasting System (PBS) on May 4, 2021, describes in horrific and graphic detail the conditions that have forced Eritreans to flee their homeland en masse.[10])
  • Throttling of press and political expression. No freedom of the press or political expression is permitted. Journalists and political opponents have frequently been jailed, often never to be heard from again.
  • Harsh imprisonment, including of family members. Any suspected dissent on the part of citizens is routinely punished by imprisonment, commonly in underground shipping containers, and commonly under intolerable, inhumane conditions – including starvation, overcrowding, lack of medical attention, rape of female prisoners, lack of sanitation, and extreme cold and heat – which conditions, separately or in the aggregate, often lead to death in detention. Arrests are commonly arbitrary, and prisoners are not informed of charges against them. Political prisoners are held incommunicado and are denied access to lawyers or family members. Family members for their part are often imprisoned or otherwise punished as well: sometimes for merely inquiring about the location or status of their imprisoned loved ones; for the failure of a loved one living overseas to pay the 2% income tax that the government imposes on Eritreans worldwide; or for a loved one’s desertion from the country’s slave-like military service (see below).
  • Religious persecution. The practice of only four religions is permitted, and Eritrean faith institutions are controlled by the government. The Orthodox Church’s freely chosen patriarch has been under house arrest for years, and in May 2021 he was deposed and replaced by the regime.[11] Sunni leaders have been imprisoned and tortured. Various Protestant sects are harshly persecuted: dissent by their followers and unauthorized religious practice are routinely punished by imprisonment. In prison, religious dissidents are often tortured until they renounce their faith.
  • Imprisonment for any of the above offenses commonly results in gruesome physical and psychological torture, from which many prisoners are believed to die. Many detention facilities are known to exist throughout the country, where tortuous conditions and mistreatment are likely to exist.
  • Travel restrictions. Entering and exiting the country is tightly controlled. Those who exit without visas – notably, to escape the regime overland in pursuit of refuge in another country – are in peril for their lives, in that government security forces have at times had orders to shoot-to-kill at the country’s borders. While those orders have been variously enforced in recent years, at a minimum, would-be escapees who are captured are frequently imprisoned and sometimes tortured.
  • Slave-like national service. All citizens are subject by conscription to mandatory national service, either military or civil. Children are routinely conscripted at age 17, and sometimes as young as 15. The service may last for an indefinite term of years, sometimes decades; follow-up reserve duty (or required participation for older citizens in a “people’s militia”) can also last indefinitely, and reservists are sometimes called up en masse; food is inadequate; wages are negligible, thus impoverishing the conscripts’ families; farms are left with inadequate labor; long-term conscripts are unable to form families or to fully participate in family life; conscripts are commonly forced to work for government and military officials in their private affairs or for government-controlled and even foreign enterprises, often in harsh conditions; female conscripts are commonly abused sexually by their commanding officers and others; and any dissent while in the national service (including the practice of prohibited religions and refusing sexual advances) is commonly punished by imprisonment and torture. In sum, the national service has been widely viewed, including by the COI, as amounting to forced labor, and even slavery.
  • Killings and disappearances. The regime has engaged in extrajudicial executions, arbitrary killings, forced disappearances, mass murders of ethnic minorities, and executions of military deserters.
  • The rape of Eritrean women in the military and in detention, as described above, has been characterized in and of itself by the COI as a crime against humanity.

Where to flee?

From the outbreak of the war of liberation in the 1960s, Eritreans had sought refuge in regions adjacent to their homeland – either in Sudan or in the non-Eritrean parts of Ethiopia (of which Eritrea was a part until 1991). Following independence and then the 1998-2000 border war with Ethiopia, Eritreans continued to flee to Sudan and Ethiopia. As a consequence, both countries came to hold large Eritrean populations. But refugee life in Sudan was (and remains) highly insecure, even in camps supported by the office of the UNHCR. Eritreans have at times been in danger of being robbed, murdered and kidnapped, then trafficked and tortured for ransom. While some older Eritrean communities in eastern Sudan have felt safer, newer arrivals often have not. The refugees in Sudan thus have often sought to move elsewhere. Ethiopia thus became a nearby, alternative haven of preference for many. And many of those refugees who fled to Ethiopia settled in UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray, just south of the Eritrean border.

Prior to 2018, Ethiopia and Eritrea were still bitter enemies, and the Ethiopian government could be generally relied upon for securing those camps. Ethiopia had welcomed and protected many thousands of refugees of many nationalities; plus, its government saw its protection of Eritrean refugees there as an embarrassment for the enemy Eritrean regime. Thus secured, genuine communities arose within the camps in Tigray, replete with education provided by international NGOs, former Eritrean teachers and the Ethiopian government. There were adequate (or barely adequate) food, water and sanitation, as provided by UNHCR and the NGOs; petty commercial enterprises run by refugees for refugees; and refugee civic councils interfacing between the refugees, on the one hand, and UNHCR, the NGOs and the Ethiopian government, on the other. In addition, the Tigrayan communities surrounding the camps acquiesced to or even affirmatively welcomed the Eritrean refugees – which is not always the case in refugee loci around the world. Why? Most Eritreans and the Tigrayans spoke Tigrinya. Many Eritreans also had family ties in Tigray, in that, until Eritrean independence, the border had been nominal and individuals had moved freely between the regions. Indeed, Eritreans and Tigrayans often expressed a general ethnic consanguinity and affinity with one another. Since the border war, in which Tigrayan-led Ethiopia was pitted against Eritrea, the Tigrayans also shared with the Eritrean refugees a hatred for and fear of the Eritrean regime. Tigrayans and encamped refugees enjoyed ongoing reciprocal trade, sometimes shared worship services and sometimes even shared the schooling of children.

But life in the Ethiopian camps was a dead-end for the residents. The living standard was rudimentary. As in refugee camps everywhere, one could not easily flourish as a vital participant in a nation, economy or fully constituted society. And there was little prospect in Tigray for any of the three ultimate destinies that UNHCR wishes for the refugees that it supports everywhere: safe return to one’s homeland, resettlement in a third country, or absorption by the host country (including full participation in its civic and economic institutions). As to the first, Eritrea remained an inhospitable dystopia. As to the second, only a small fraction of UNHCR-supported refugees are ever resettled anywhere. And as to the third, Eritrean refugees could live in Ethiopian cities, but (until 2019) they could not lawfully work there.[12] Forward migration thus beckoned, not only for the Eritreans in Sudan, but for those in Tigray as well.

Where then to migrate? Across the Middle East, Eritreans were unwelcome. Migrations to Israel by way of Egypt resulted in horrific rape, torture and extortion for cash at the hands of outlaw Bedouin tribesmen in the Sinai desert. Even the initial Israeli tolerance of African migrants who reached that country beginning in 2007 devolved into a backlash as their numbers grew. The Eritreans were physically safe there. But by 2012, Israel had enacted an “anti-infiltration law” targeting African migrants; it had constructed a fence at the border with Sinai to keep additional African migrants out; and it had begun to sorely pressure its existing Africans to resettle elsewhere.[13]

Contemporaneously, with the collapse of the Libyan state and the onset of massive African migrations across the Mediterranean from that country to Europe, Eritreans joined in the flow – passing through Sudan to Libya, where smugglers set them afloat in unseaworthy boats. Those migrations, or attempted migrations, reached a peak between 2015 and 2017. Many Eritreans and other migrants drowned or otherwise died at sea.[14] Many of those who survived found themselves resented in Europe as part of what was widely referred to as a global migration crisis. In Libya itself they and other Africans were – and they continue to be – routinely enslaved, raped, tortured, extorted and otherwise savagely brutalized. Even the EU has participated in the tragedy, by funding and encouraging Libya’s militias and its coast guard to capture and detain those attempting to sail to Europe. The detentions in Libya are intended to keep the refugees from attempting the Mediterranean crossing again, and the conditions of detention are horrific. In sub-Saharan Africa, resentment and a dearth of economic opportunities also have greeted those Eritreans who have arrived. So small numbers of Eritreans (hundreds annually, not thousands) have chosen to head for the U.S.: they have undertaken a journey across Africa to South America and then northwards through the perilous jungles of Panama toward the U.S.-Mexico border. In America many have won asylum, but others have not.

In sum, outside of Tigray, there has been no ready haven for those on the run. A great many thus have remained concentrated in Ethiopia. On the eve of the Tigray conflict, UNHCR was supporting four Eritrean refugee camps in Tigray: Shimelba and Hitsats in the north – that is, closest to the Eritrean border – and Adi Harush and Mai Ayni further south. As of November 2020, UNHCR counted 8,702 refugees in Shimelba, 25,248 in Hitsats, 32,167 in Adi Harush, and 21,682 in Mai Ayni. In addition, the agency operated a reception center in Endabaguna for refugees first crossing the border into Ethiopia, where they would stay temporarily pending distribution to the various camps. It also counted 8,424 Eritrean refugees residing in towns in Tigray pursuant to the Ethiopian government’s Out of Camp Policy, bringing the total figure in Tigray to 96,223. In addition, some 51,800 Eritrean refugees were living in Ethiopia’s Afar region (many of those in UNHCR-supported camps), and 30,722 in Addis. The total number in Ethiopia was thus 178,745.[15]

As of 2015, around 100,000 Eritrean refugees were living in the camps in Tigray. When the war began in Tigray in 2020, the number was approximately the same. Yet for much of that time, thousands per month had been entering the camps from Eritrea. How to account for the relatively steady state of the camp population? Apparently as many as were arriving were moving on – whether to Ethiopian cities such as Addis; to Libya and then Europe (or the bottom of the Mediterranean); or elsewhere, wherever circumstances might permit, but not often with comfort or joy.

For its part, how did the Eritrean government view the refugees? Their having escaped the country was seen not merely as an embarrassment, but as likely to generate anti-regime narratives and agitation within whatever countries they landed in, including in the West. Regime operatives in Europe and the U.S. often harassed and occasionally assaulted refugees and asylees there. The regime particularly suspected refugees in Ethiopia of anti-Eritrea activities, and of being stoked in that by the Ethiopian government. In addition, the departure of refugees had bled Eritrea of both work force and military force. Not surprisingly, then, official Eritrean policy branded the refugees as traitors – particularly if they had escaped from or avoided military service, or if they had expressed opposition to Eritrea before or after fleeing. And for their treachery, if they were forcibly returned by another country, they stood to be imprisoned, tortured, and possibly killed. But in truth, the regime’s actual outlook seemed more nuanced, or more confused. For example, in some ways, the regime may have been pleased that malcontents had taken their heterodox opinions elsewhere. Refugees in the West had also become an essential source of remittances and foreign exchange, as they supported their families back home in Eritrea. Further, the surge of asylum seekers into Europe resulted in Europe making substantial grants of development assistance to Eritrea (and to other countries of origin), which Europe hoped would stanch the in-flow. In addition, Eritrean border guards often accepted bribes from escaping refugees, and some high-ranking officers appeared to be trafficking in refugees for profit. Overall, the attitudes within in Eritrea relative to those who had escaped thus were mysterious from the outside, and possibly also from within.

As for the families left behind, there too was a mix. They felt terrified for those who had gone off to the perils of Sinai, Libya and the Mediterranean. And they felt anguished when they were extorted for cash to free those who were tortured en route – exorbitant sums, that could ruin a family financially for a generation. But if and when the refugees found a safe destination in which they could work, their families at home took much comfort in the remittances. Some relatives also hoped to rejoin in the West those who had succeeded in gaining refugee or asylum status there.

8.2 The rapprochement

Beginning in June 2018 and formalized by agreement in July, the Eritrean and Ethiopian governments made peace.[16] The world thrilled to the development, and for that achievement Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize. Among the many hopes for the rapprochement were that Isaias – no longer at war – would demobilize his army and end the brutal servitude of its conscripts and of the Eritrean people at large. As the borders opened between the countries, cross-border commerce flowered, and separated families united. A new wave of refugees – Eritrea was still a horrific place to be – freely fled into Tigray. It seemed too good to be true.

In fact, it was. Within months the borders closed once again. Although various rationales for the closing were circulated – some by the Eritrean government, some by others – the actual reasons were unknown, as were the terms of the peace arrangement. The lockdown on information flow within Eritrea did not abate. Both in the camps and in Addis, Eritreans felt a foreboding, that the rapprochement foretold an ascendancy for Isaias within Ethiopian affairs and a marked peril for themselves. Out of fear, expatriate Eritreans linked to oppositionist activities stopped traveling to Ethiopia. Asylum seekers who faced expulsion from the U.S. likewise rejected opportunities to return to Ethiopia. In April 2020, Ethiopia announced that it would no longer grant prima facie refugee status to fleeing Eritreans.[17] It also made plain that it wished to close the northern camps and relocate the refugees.[18] It expressly announced that month that it planned to close Hitsats and move its residents to Mai Ayni and Adi Harush, despite the already crowded conditions there and concerns for the spread of the coronavirus in such circumstances.[19] By the summer of 2020, rumors were rife that Abiy and Isaias were plotting to target the refugees. What had begun as the realization of a dream of peace was now looking more like a nightmare.

8.3 The war in Tigray begins

The war began on 3 November [20] with an attack by Tigrayan forces on multiple bases in Tigray serving the federal government’s Northern Command,[21] followed by a counter-attack by federal forces on 4 November.

The Ethiopian federal government – which even before the war had been harassing and repressing the press – immediately banned international news outlets from the theater. They remained banned for several months. Unverified propaganda from warring factions filled the information void. As one consequence, the chronology of events that follows in this chapter often reflects piecemeal and sometimes uncorroborated information. Sometimes reports appeared weeks or months after the reported events; sometimes dates and details were murky; sometimes a particular event seemed to originate from multiple sources with somewhat differing detail, and thus to possibly consist of multiple events. Sorting it out was and remains challenging, and almost certainly imperfect. Another consequence of the ban on reliable media coverage were that international actors such as the United Nations, Western governments and major human rights organizations – lacking direct evidence of wrongdoing – were for months reluctant to accuse warring factions of specific human rights abuses.[22] Nevertheless, for The America Team, which has followed both published and unpublished reports continuously, the overall flow of events has seemed manifest. In this chapter, we have attempted to relate them more or less chronologically, and at the same time thematically, in our best attempt at coherence.

  • The first days. Already on November 5, UNHCR raised alarms about its ability to provide for the camp refugees.[23] The federal Ethiopian government cut telecommunications throughout Tigray, and Sudan (possibly with the acquiescence or encouragement of Ethiopia) closed its border, such that camp residents could neither communicate nor flee to the west.[24] At least one observer, a leading champion of Eritrean refugees, expressed fears that the refugees could become caught in the crossfire, could become pawns of the belligerents, could be driven out of the camps, or could be refouled to Eritrea where they might be arrested, imprisoned and tortured.[25] Eritrea was quickly suspected of being involved in the war.[26] By November 11, thousands of refugees – mostly Tigrayans, as opposed to Eritreans – had managed to flee to Sudan, notwithstanding the border closure.[27] As of November 13, as fighting approached the Shimelba camp, UNHCR was trying to remove the refugees living there to the Hitsats camp or elsewhere.[28]
  • Terrified at the camps. The war escalated. On November 14, Tigrayan forces launched a number of missiles at Asmara.[29] While they inflicted little damage, the pretext was laid for more overt participation by Eritrea in the war. But Eritrea was already reported to have been shelling the city of Humera in the northwest corner of Tigray.[30] The fighting was now reportedly furious across the region. On November 17, UNHCR reported military clashes near one of the camps.[31] Also on that date, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that UNHCR staff were cutting back their support for the camps due to security issues, and that they were especially concerned for the safety of those in Shimelba.[32] The Red Cross too voiced its concerns for the encamped refugees.[33] Basic sustenance at the camps was imperilled, and fuel for pumping water there was running dangerously low. Across Tigray, the provision of food and medicine and even access to banks were blocked by the federal government. Communications also remained blacked out. Aid workers in the region were reported to be frantic. Their organizations were negotiating with the federal government for a humanitarian corridor through Tigray, but that failed to materialize.[34] Soon international workers for UNHCR and the NGOs withdrew from the camps and from Endabaguna entirely.[35] By November 18, all four camps were reportedly experiencing incidental attacks, although the identity of the attackers was not widely known or immediately revealed.[36] On November 20, UNHCR reported that, having not heard from its local camp staff since November 16, it was “very worried.”[37]
  • Flight to Sudan. Some of the Eritrean refugees did flee to Sudan.[38] Why had more not done so? No survey of course was taken. But the author of this chapter speculated at the time that, first, the refugees did not fear federal Ethiopian forces, which historically had protected them. In addition, the flight to Sudan through the war zone was precarious, and the border was officially closed. What was more, at the camps in Tigray the refugees enjoyed infrastructure, community organization, international NGO support and ethnic coherence. In Sudan, by contrast – despite meritorious emergency responses by UNHCR and other international actors – at that point there was nothing but chaos. In retrospect, many of the Eritreans may have wished they had decided differently and risked flight to Sudan. But there too, no survey likely has been taken.
  • The Eritrean military moves in. By November 18, unconfirmed reports of Eritrean ground forces operating in theater had begun to emerge. Even acting from a distance, Eritrea’s involvement in the war was reported as being multi-form: hosting federal Ethiopian troops who then shelled and attacked Tigray from the north; forcing Eritrean locals – themselves underfed – to feed those Ethiopian troops; treating wounded Ethiopian soldiers at Eritrean medical facilities; and rounding up Eritrean conscripts in apparent preparation for deployment in Tigray.[39]
  • The worst unfolds. At that point, the atrocities against the refugees began to occur. On or around November 19 (as reported much later), Eritrean forces killed some Eritrean refugees in the town of Adigrat and removed others to Eritrea.[40] On November 20, a report appeared that Eritrean refugees were being arrested in Addis and Shimelba.[41] At approximately that time (also as reported much later), federal Ethiopian forces shot a refugee in Selekleka.[42] On November 20, another report appeared of sweeps of Eritrean oppositionists in Addis – possibly some of them well settled there, and thus not even living as refugees.[43] During a significant fire fight on November 24 at Adi Harush – involving Tigrayan militia, Amhara militia and regular Ethiopian federal forces – several refugees were killed, some of the Tigrayan guards were captured, and other guards fled for their lives.[44] Also on November 24, Eritrean forces were credibly reported to be engaged in heavy ground fighting,[45] as well as the shelling of Tigrayan targets from Eritrea and abductions from Endabaguna.[46] Additional reports of Eritrean ground force activities emerged on November 26.[47] According to one unpublished report, Eritrean forces took over Shimelba for several weeks during this period and disappeared five refugee council leaders; publicly executed five other refugees whom they perceived to be Eritrean oppositionists; and shot seven others dead as they attempted to flee the camp. Later, after Tigrayan forces had re-taken the camp, more refugee residents were killed during fighting between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces.[48] In Hitsats as well, the camp exchanged hands as between Eritrean and Tigrayan forces, now with Tigrayans – as reprisals for the savagery of Eritrean forces elsewhere in Tigray – persecuting, starving, disappearing and killing Eritrean refugees, and with Eritrean forces abducting them and looting.[49] On November 27, UNHCR predicted that the four camps would run out of food within days.[50] The same day, an additional attack on Adi Harush was reported, as well as abductions of refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba.[51] The level of panic, privation and displacement was now intense.[52] The Red Cross reported some 1,000 Eritrean refugees having fled the camps to Tigray’s capital, Mekelle.[53]
  • Mass abductions, mass flight, and the killing of aid workers. In the gravest of developments, on November 28 and the days following, multiple sources reported the abduction by Eritrean forces of thousands of refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba. Those who were able to flee had continued doing so. All humanitarian aid workers by then were long gone from the camps.[54] On December 1, UNHCR itself acknowledged the reports of abductions and conscriptions from the camps,[55] and many refugees were reported to be fleeing from even Adi Harush – one of the southerly (and thus seemingly safer) facilities.[56] On December 2, the flights were reported more categorically: many or most able-bodied residents were escaping several camps (probably the northern two), leaving behind mostly elderly and women with young children. Looting at some of the camps, by indeterminate actors, was reported as well.[57] On the same day, several Ethiopian aid workers were reported to have been killed at one of the camps in November.[58] Other reports of aid workers being killed ensued.[59] UNHCR acknowledged the same.[60]
  • The perpetrators. Who were the perpetrators in these episodes, and how concerted were the offenses? Plainly, Eritrean forces committed the abductions and conscriptions, and just as plainly those operations were purposeful, even strategic. Indeed, by early December, observers were beginning to speculate that Eritrea may have contemplated the abductions before the war began, and that abductees were being forced to fight against Tigrayans at the front.[61] As for the killings at the camps, some were attributed to identified forces acting deliberately. But others were of more varied or ambiguous nature. Some may have been accidental; others inspired by passion and indiscipline rather than tactic; yet others incidental to concerted criminal activity such as looting or abduction. In late November, Eritrean troops specifically were reported to have killed a number of refugees at Shimelba, possibly as those refugees had attempted to flee (reports varied considerably, ranging from seven to 100 victims).[62] But for the most part, no broad, deliberate massacre of camp residents appeared – in contrast to deliberate massacres that were befalling Tigrayans and other populations elsewhere.
  • Incidents in the south. Reportedly, reprisals by some Tigrayans against the refugees – for simply being Eritrean – now manifested themselves in the south. On or around December 2, Tigrayans confiscated agricultural produce headed for Mai Ayni and killed a refugee there.[63] Also on December 2, a refugee at Mai Ayni was killed in Tigrayan-Eritrean crossfire,[64] and more crossfire injuries there were reported on December 5.[65] On December 14, a rape by armed but ununiformed actors at Adi Harush was reported.[66] At this point, the widespread flight from the camps was attributable not only to the abductions by Eritrean forces (in the north) but to fear of Tigrayan cross-fire and vengeance (in the south).[67]
  • The UN stymied. UNHCR announced on December 2 that it had reached an agreement with the Ethiopian government to resume aid in areas that were under federal control. But as of December 4, the agency was still unable to access the refugee camps.[68] Indeed, on December 7, federal forces blocked and shot at a UN security team as it was traveling in the vicinity of Shimelba – a quite extraordinary event.[69]
  • At Hitsats and Shimelba: abductions confirmed, vengeance proceeds. As the weeks passed, reports of Eritrean forces abducting and killing refugees at the two northern camps in November and December became legion,[70] including reports by the UN’s High Commissioner for Refugees,[71] as well as by the UN’s Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Eritrea[72] and by the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights.[73] One report, on December 9, held that Eritrean forces armed refugees at Hitsats and sent them out to pillage Tigrayan farms.[74] A report that 26 named abductees were seen in Eritrean prisons appeared on March 7.[75] But, as before, not just Eritrean forces were implicated. Reports that several women had been raped by Tigrayan militia as they were fleeing Hitsats appeared on March 9 and March 18.[76] A report that Tigrayan militia killed nine refugees at Hitsats on December 24 appeared much later.[77] Reports of severe privation at the northern camps continued into December as well,[78] as did additional reports of looting[79] and of refugees fleeing the camps.[80]
  • In Addis. Contemporaneously, a new alarm sounded. On December 8, reports emerged that refugees who had fled the camps and arrived in Addis were being arrested and detained;[81] and within days the Ethiopian government was reported to have forcibly transported them back to Adi Harush, to their considerable peril.[82] Some of those detained had also reportedly been threatened with deportation to Eritrea.[83] Some had reportedly been beaten in Addis as they had attempted to flee.[84] In subsequent weeks, the returns to Adi Harush were confirmed; and additional episodes appeared of Eritrean refugees fleeing the camps, being detained in Addis, and then being forcibly returned by federal actors to the camps.[85] Other reports emerged of Eritrean troops being encamped in Addis with the specific mission of rounding up and refouling Eritrean dissidents.[86] On January 7 and 10, Ethiopian authorities were reported to be denying exit permits to Eritrean refugees who had been approved by UNHCR to travel abroad for family reunification – thus trapping them in Ethiopia.[87]
  • At Adi Harush and Mai Ayni. At length, a small but life-saving bit of relief arrived: on or around December 15, UNHCR managed to deliver food to the southern camps.[88] But aid workers had not yet resumed significant operations at those camps, which remained devoid of security, sanitation items and medical care.[89] Sickness went untreated, looting by outsiders was continuous.[90] In one terrifying and debilitating episode, on or around December 21, five indeterminate assailants at Adi Harush confiscated some 180 to 200 cell phones at gunpoint.[91] On December 24, a man with a saw attacked and injured a refugee at Adi Harush.[92] Federal troops detained refugees from Mai Ayni and Adi Harush on or around Christmas Day as they travelled to a nearby town to retrieve money sent by their families to a bank.[93] On January 18, incidents of emaciation at the southern camps were reported. (Starvation had appeared across Tigray more generally.)[94] Beginning January 23, in multiple episodes, federal troops and militias robbed additional refugees traveling to banks from Adi Harush.[95] On January 27, unknown external assailants shot a refugee woman in Adi Harush.[96]
  • The destruction of Shimelba and Hitsats. Conditions in Shimelba and Hitsats remained largely opaque.[97] But on December 19, satellite images detected fires at Shimelba.[98] The next day, a journalist on the ground reported that that camp was empty.[99] As of January 7, humanitarian relief had still not arrived; indeed, there had been no international activity at the northern camps for almost two months: no food, medicine, security.[100] And then arose one of the starkest crimes of the war. On December 28, The New York Times posted satellite images of scorched earth around Hitsats.[101] AFP on January 2 and Bloomberg on January 9 reported that new images showed the systematic and widespread destruction of both camps.[102] On January 15 and January 19, Al Jazeera reported similarly.[103] As reported by the Associated Press on January 17, the images now showed even greater devastation.[104] By January 21, and in the weeks afterwards, published reports – following earlier unpublished ones from well-informed sources – emerged that nothing was left of the two camps, and that all residents had been conscripted, had been forced back to Eritrea or had fled into Tigray, eating leaves for their sustenance.[105] On February 1, UNHCR confirmed the mass exodus from the north.[106] But as of February 2, the northern camps were still inaccessible, even to the UN. [107]
  • Again at Adi Harush and Mai Ayni. On January 23 it was reported that Eritrean forces were telling Eritrean refugees in the Sheraro area (that is, likely including some of those who had fled Hitsats and Shimelba) not to attempt to reach the two southern camps – as though wishing to abduct more of them.[108] But as of January 24, the Ethiopian federal government was still returning scattered refugees to the southern camps.[109] On January 20-25, a second food shipment by UNHCR and the World Food Program arrived there.[110] On February 1, UNHCR’s High Commissioner nevertheless said that conditions in those camps were abysmal, that the residents were living in fear, and that, altogether, some 20,000 refugees were unaccounted for.[111]
  • Destruction of Shimelba and Hitsats confirmed. On February 9, the Ethiopian government announced, disingenuously, that it had decided to “close” Shimelba and Hitsats, and that it would seek to bring the refugees scattered about Tigray to the two southern camps.[112] Observers called out the deceit,[113] whereupon, on February 11, Ethiopia’s deputy prime minister acknowledged that the camps no longer existed.[114] The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission, a weak but reportedly well-meaning internal body, also acknowledged the destruction of the camps. The Ethiopian government’s refugee unit, the Agency for Returnees and Refugee Affairs (ARRA), claimed that the destruction was “overstated.”[115] But on March 18, the first international relief NGO to arrive in Shimelba and Hitsats confirmed their destruction.[116] On March 24, a British news outlet, reporting from the two camps, graphically described the ruin.[117] On March 26, UNHCR reported that it too had reached the camps, and had likewise found them obliterated, with the humanitarian facilities looted and vandalized.[118]
  • Continuing trauma and fear in the south. Nevertheless, the federal government’s undertaking to concentrate all Eritrean refugees in the two southern camps proceeded, and on February 18 UNHCR announced that it was anticipating receiving some 15,000 refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba there.[119] Yet – in addition to the previous Tigrayan attacks on those camps – on February 19 and 20 it was reported that Tigrayans were again threatening the refugees in Adi Harush, and on March 2 that they attacked and looted.[120] A comparable report emerged on February 27 from Mai Ayni, where the intimidation was accompanied by shootings, looting and a mutilation.[121] Residents of both camps pleaded with UNHCR for protection or evacuation, even as UNHCR was concentrating more Eritrean refugees there. UNHCR, itself under enormous pressure, appeared to have had no solutions to offer them.[122] Still the agency persisted in its mission to support the two camps: on March 31 it reported that it was gradually restoring relief services there.[123] As of April 9, it had received from elsewhere 3,633 Eritrean refugees at Adi Harush and 4,299 at Mai Ayni. (Others among the scattered were being accounted for in Mekelle, Adigrat and Addis.)[124] Yet the camps remained terrifying. On April 8, Adi Harush was attacked, and Eritrean refugees were abducted, at least some of them by Eritrean soldiers. [125] By April 10, Eritrean troops had abducted 17 Eritrean refugees from that camp.[126] In early April, Tigrayan militia seriously wounded a refugee in Mai Ayni.[127]
  • In Addis, again. On February 17, it was again reported that Eritrean oppositionists who had long resided in Addis and elsewhere in Ethiopia were facing harassment and intimidation at the hands of Eritrean and Ethiopian security operatives.[128] Similarly, the arrest of 156 Eritreans in Addis over the past three months was reported on February 22.[129] On April 16 and 19, Eritrean agents were reported to be sweeping Addis neighborhoods on foot and by car in search of Eritreans, with a view to abducting them.[130]
  • Most recently.[131] On May 14, OCHA reported that, of the approximately 20,000 Eritrean refugees who were previously residing in the northern camps of Hitsats and Shimelba (a number different from the 34,000 cited above in this chapter), UNHCR had now verified some 10,000 refugees who were in Adi Harush, Mai Ayni, Mekelle, Adigrat or Addis Ababa, but that 7,000-10,000 Eritrean refugees were still in hard-to-reach areas across the region.[132] On June 2, Relief Web posted a UNHCR report to the effect that nearly 8,100 refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba had arrived at Adi Harush and Mai Ayni; that many refugees continued to likely be scattered about Tigray; that many refugees outside of the camps were in need of life-saving assistance; that many refugees were likely moving to Addis, where they felt they would be safer; and that UNHCR was attempting to protect those in Addis.[133] On June 6, Relief Web posted another UNHCR report, to the effect that the Eritrean refugee count in Tigray was now 87,420, down from the pre-war count of 96,223; and that essential services, including primary education, had been restored in Mai Ayni and Adi Harush.[134] Separately, through mid-June, scattered episodes of Eritrean troops forcibly seizing Eritrean refugees in Tigray and returning them to Eritrea were reported to The America Team, as were episodes of violence by Tigrayans and possibly Eritrean forces against residents of the southern camps.[135] On June 29, the abduction, imprisonment and re-conscription of at least some of the refugees from Hitsats and Shimelba who had previously deserted the Eritrean military was confirmed.[136]

8.4 A Dark Future

  • The Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia have become victims of multiple violations of international law. The killing, wounding, robbery and rape of innocent civilians at the hands of organized military actors have amounted to war crimes and crimes against humanity, in the view of many observers. The invasion of refugee camps in a neighboring country, the abduction and refoulement of refugees there, and the obliteration of camp facilities – all as perpetrated by the Eritrean military – have abridged multiple principles involving the protection of refugees, such as have rarely occurred anywhere in recent decades. The return of refugees to the unsafe camps in Tigray by the Ethiopian government violates principles of refugee protection as well, as does Ethiopia’s failure to protect the refugees generally.[137] On January 28, February 24 and May 12, The United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea expressly called out many of the above activities as potential violations of international principles and legal accords.[138]

As of this writing, the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia appear to be trapped there. Those residing in UNHCR-supported camps at Mai Ayni and Adi Harush are highly vulnerable to attacks by both Eritrean forces and Tigrayan militias and individuals. Indeed, the federal government’s determination to concentrate Eritrean refugees in those two camps would appear to make even more of them vulnerable. The camps were never intended to withstand any material invasion, and they are not able to do so. Just as international relief workers fled the camps at the outset of the conflict, they would certainly flee again if circumstances again deteriorated.

Those refugees residing in and around IDP camps in the Sheraro, Shire and Mekelle areas are suffering acute privation, and they may also be vulnerable to attack. Those who had been in Addis when hostilities began, or who subsequently fled from Tigray to Addis, are vulnerable to removal to the refugee camps by the Ethiopian government and to abduction and refoulement by Eritrean security forces. Tigrayans and others who have fled to Sudan could remain there indefinitely – they appear to be barred from re-entering Tigray by Ethiopian and allied forces, who have shot some refugees who have attempted to do so.[139]

As described above, even if any of the refugees, wherever situated, were somehow able to move outside of their current confines, there are no welcoming countries that they could readily access. A fortunate few with international resources will probably escape – for example, to the West. The rest will probably not.

  • For how long these conditions will last will likely depend on such factors as the status of the war and of the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance. But, in the view of the author, as long as that alliance continues to any extent, the refugees’ prospects for a secure future in Ethiopia remains grim. Even if Eritrean forces were to exit Tigray – as international actors have been demanding for months, and as Abiy has promised – they could seemingly re-enter at any time and pounce upon the refugees. And even short of fresh attacks on the camps by Eritrean forces, Ethiopian and Eritrean security personnel could continue to cherry-pick Eritrean refugees in Addis and elsewhere for refoulement or other harsh actions. Further, even short of such events, the federal government could deny sanctuary to the refugees (with unknowable implications) or otherwise make their lives even more miserable – in an effort to please the Eritrean regime, or otherwise.

One potential rescue operation could consist of removing the refugees to other countries altogether. But as stated above, permanent resettlement of individual refugees in third countries is statistically uncommon. Mass relocation to refugee camps in third countries, alternatively, would require not only host country consent but a major investment in infrastructure, logistics and re-deployment on the part UNHCR and its partner NGOs. Such a wholesale transplantation would possibly have little precedent; but it perhaps could be justified by the extraordinary and illegal attack on the camps in Tigray by Eritrean forces. A substantially more manageable variation might consist of moving the camps out of Tigray and further south into Ethiopia, rather than into another country. That could be faster, less expensive, and actually welcome by the Ethiopian government – which could tout the move as demonstrating its good faith in protecting the refugees. But, as stated above, it would not achieve full protection, as long as Ethiopia and Eritrea remain allied. Notably, on May 5, UNHCR reported that plans were proceeding to build a new camp in the Amhara region of Ethiopia – directly south of Tigray – to house some 20,000 Eritrean refugees.[140] But the number fell far short of the combined Mai Ayni and Adi Harush populations; and the plan did not appear to contemplate protection of either those camps or the new camp from future incursions by Eritrean forces.

To complicate matters, notwithstanding their current peril, some refugees in the camps in Tigray may not relish migrating from their established in-camp communities and their Tigrinya-speaking environs. Some in Addis may hold out hope for the safer, more open and more vital urban life there than can be offered by any refugee camp anywhere. So individual refugees too could have to confront difficult choices, even if choices were offered.

Other means for protecting the refugee camps could include a range of multinational military operations. But any such undertakings would almost certainly necessitate far broader diplomatic considerations and military operations – that is to say, relative to the direct, still raging conflict between Tigrayan forces, on the one hand, and Eritrean, Amhara and federal Ethiopian forces on the other – not just to refugee protection. Of course, a military approach would involve significant economic and strategic costs and risks for the intervening countries – not to mention political risks, both domestic and international.

Still, the potential for such interventions stands as a question. In Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda and elsewhere in recent decades, international interventions – or earlier interventions than at length eventuated – were widely seen after the fact as having been tragically delinquent. But as compelling as the author finds the question, and as much as he has cogitated upon it, he lacks expertise in that area and thus will stand down from pursuing it here. He instead will conclude simply: by urging that the refugees be moved to safer locales, following due consideration by those with the means to do so, but otherwise expeditiously.

[1] Mike Slotznick is counsel to The America Team for Displaced Eritreans (hereafter, “The America Team”).  https://eritreanrefugees.org/ . The America Team is an all-volunteer organization, based in Pennsylvania, that helps Eritrean refugees and asylum seekers in the U.S. and around the world. Other members of The America Team contributed substantially to this chapter.

[2] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10 and https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fd3ab2d4/statement-attributable-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-situation.html and https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_47_21_E.pdf at pages. 13-15 and https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26806&LangID=E and https://www.voanews.com/africa/rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safety-eritrean-refugees-ethiopia

[3] https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/093/42/PDF/G1609342.pdf?OpenElement

[4] Eritrea: Initial National Report (1999-2016) Prepared on the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR), 28 March 2017, The State of Eritrea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, page 25, paragraph 89.

https://eritreahub.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Eritrea-response-to-African-Human-Rights-Charter.pdf

[5] CIA Factbook Eritrea, 2021

https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/countries/eritrea/#people-and-society

[6] Multiple sources indicate or suggest that the stated number of refugees pertains to those who have fled Eritrea during the current regime (that is, since 1991), and who still have refugee or similar status, as opposed to prior waves of refugees from Eritrea. See, e.g., https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/21/concern-grows-for-safety-of-eritrean-refugees-as-tigray-war-rages and  https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/escaping-eritrea/ and https://www.unhcr.org/5fc504d44.pdf at page 12

[7] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eritrean%E2%80%93Ethiopian_border_conflict

[8] https://eritreanrefugees.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ERITREAN-ASYLUM-CLAIMS-SUMMARY7-2020.pdf.pdf . The paper contains many footnoted references, sourced to the major human rights reports that it summarizes.

[9] https://eritreanrefugees.org/reference-materials-2/. “Human Rights Have Not Improved in Eritrea Since the Rapprochement with Ethiopia”

[10] https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/film/escaping-eritrea/

[11] https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-regime-announces-election-of-new-patriarch-whilst-current-patriarch-under-house-arrest/

[12] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/1/5c41b1784/unhcr-welcomes-ethiopia-law-granting-rights-refugees.html

[13] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yWLY6W68954 and https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-african-migrants-in-israel-have-little-hope-2014jan07-story.html  and https://static1.squarespace.com/static/506c8ea1e4b01d9450dd53f5/t/5ae21b29f950b7532c2bb3cc/1524767531404/RI+Israel+Asylum+Report+April+2018.pdf

[14] https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/mediterranean

[15]https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%20%238%20-APR%201-15%202021.pdf and https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%2010%20NovemberFINAL.pdf . The stated figures reflect the number of refugees who had affirmatively registered with UNHCR and who UNHCR believed to still be in the country. The actual totals, including de facto and unregistered refugees, could have been more or less than as were counted.

[16] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/9/11/ethiopia-eritrea-border-opens-for-first-time-in-20-years

[17] https://www.eepa.be/?p=3720 and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/19/ethiopia-plans-to-close-eritrean-refugee-camp-despite-concerns

[18] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210201-eritrean-refugees-caught-in-crossfire-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-war

[19] https://www.swisspeace.ch/apropos/peace-for-whom-the-situation-of-eritrean-refugees-in-ethiopia/ and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/4/19/ethiopia-plans-to-close-eritrean-refugee-camp-despite-concerns

[20] Some sources report that the attack occurred in the early morning hours of November 4.

[21] https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-idUKKBN27K0GX  and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4_November_Northern_Command_attacks and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Tigray_War#2_November

[22] It seemed then to The America Team that a perfect means for avoiding accountability for atrocities was to simply ban the press from investigating and reporting on them – shrewd, but not the way that the international accords around human rights were intended to operate.

[23] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/world/africa/ethiopia-war-tigray.html

[24] https://eritreahub.org/eritrean-refugees-in-tigray-not-in-immediate-danger-from-fighting-but-situation-critical and https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/sudan-closes-border-with-ethiopia-/2033849

[25] https://hrc-eritrea.org/military-offensive-in-tigray-endangers-eritrean-refugees/

[26] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/8/fears-on-eritreas-secret-role-in-ethiopias-brewing-civil-war  and https://hrc-eritrea.org/military-offensive-in-tigray-endangers-eritrean-refugees/

[27] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/11/5fabe9fd4/clashes-ethiopias-tigray-region-force-thousands-flee-sudan.html

[28] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/11/5fae4aec4/humanitarian-crisis-deepens-amid-ongoing-clashes-ethiopias-tigray-region.html

[29] https://eritreahub.org/missiles-hit-eritrean-capital-asmara-after-tigray-threatens-to-attack-eritrea

[30] https://eritreahub.org/missiles-hit-eritrean-capital-asmara-after-tigray-threatens-to-attack-eritrea

[31] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict-un-aid/full-scale-humanitarian-crisis-unfolding-in-ethiopia-u-n-idUSKBN27X14U?il=0

[32]https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/situation_report_no.3_tigray_humanitarian_update_17_november_2020_final.pdf

[33] https://eritreahub.org/red-cross-an-update-on-the-situation-in-n-ethiopia-and-a-hotline-for-relatives

[34] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/17/world/africa/ethiopia-tigray-refugees.html

[35] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2021/1/6006a31a4/unhcr-finds-dire-need-eritrean-refugee-camps-cut-tigray-conflict.htmlb and https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/30/Ethiopia-Eritrea-refugee-camps-tigray-cut-off

[36] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn_18-November-2020.pdf

[37] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/11/5fb78cec4/urgent-support-needed-help-ethiopian-refugees-reaching-sudan.html

[38] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/21/concern-grows-for-safety-of-eritrean-refugees-as-tigray-war-rages and https://eritreahub.org/new-exile-for-eritrean-refugees-fleeing-ethiopia and https://www.voanews.com/africa/rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safety-eritrean-refugees-ethiopia

[39] https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-interferes-in-civil-war-in-tigray-region-of-ethiopia/

[40] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-123-09-April-2021.pdf

[41] http://awate.com/ethnic-profiling-tigrayans-ethiopia/

[42] Reported directly to The America Team, April 12, 2021. (The source for subsequent footnotes referencing such reports is likewise identified as “The America Team.”)

[43] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-5-22-November.docx.pdf

[44] https://eritreahub.org/update-report-from-adi-harush-refugee-camps-for-eritreans-now-trapped-by-tigray-fighting; plus The America Team, November 24, 2020

[45] https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-armed-forces-fighting-inside-tigray/

[46] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-6-24-November.pdf

[47] https://eritreahub.org/report-of-heavy-eritrean-casualties-in-tigray-war and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-armed-forces-fighting-inside-tigray/

[48] The America Team, January 24-25, 2020.

[49] The America Team, January 28, 2021; also https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210201-eritrean-refugees-caught-in-crossfire-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-war and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-79-08-February-2021.pdf .

[50] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/11/5fc0b5774/un-high-commissioner-refugees-visits-sudan-new-refugee-arrivals-cross-43000.html

[51] https://hrc-eritrea.org/refugee-camp-in-tigray-attacked-with-artillery/

[52] https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/30/Ethiopia-Eritrea-refugee-camps-tigray-cut-off

[53] https://www.icrc.org/en/document/ethiopia-hospitals-mekelle-struggling-care-wounded-medical-supplies-run-out-red-cross

[54] https://eritreahub.org/eritrean-refugees-forcibly-conscripted-from-un-camps-to-fight-in-mekelle and https://hrc-eritrea.org/ethiopia-thousands-of-eritrean-refugees-abducted-from-tigray-camps-by-eritrean-armed-forces/ and https://eritreahub.org/mesfin-hagos-eritreas-role-in-ethiopias-conflict-and-the-fate-of-eritrean-refugees and https://www.eepa.be/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-22-11-December.pdf and The America Team, December 3, 2020

[55] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/12/5fc60e414/humanitarian-access-urgently-needed-reach-civilians-eritrean-refugees-tigray.html and https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html

[56] https://eritreahub.org/tigray-a-message-received-today-from-an-eritrean-refugee-in-adi-harush-camp

[57] The America Team, December 2, 2020.

[58] https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-aidworkers-idUKKBN28C2MV?edition-redirect=uk

[59] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-22-11-December.pdf and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55274583 and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-24-13-Dec_2020.pdf  and https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/world/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-Tigray.html

[60]  https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html

[61] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-15-03-December.pdf

[62] The America Team, December 11, 2020, January 4, 2021 and January 10, 2021.

[63] The America Team, December 2, 2020

[64] The America Team, December 2, 2020

[65] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-17-05-December.pdf

[66] https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict/ethiopias-war-scarred-tigray-region-regains-some-services-idUSKBN28O1N8?il=0

[67] The America Team, December 2, December 4 and December 7, 2020

[68] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2020/12/5fc9f7b14/unhcr-poised-resume-aid-delivery-displaced-tigray.html and https://eritreahub.org/un-says-fighting-continues-in-many-parts-of-tigray-hampering-aid

[69] https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-ethiopia-conflict-refugees-idUKKBN28H1A1 and https://apnews.com/article/africa-ethiopia-united-nations-kenya-f945a81239325a418ee22f123058f39f and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/8/warnings-intensify-as-badly-needed-aid-still-not-reaching-tigray and https://apnews.com/article/international-news-coronavirus-pandemic-ethiopia-massacres-united-nations-e6f32b038f6d6a27b6a3be59a9d3343f

[70] https://twitter.com/meronina/status/1335158866288537600 and https://eritreahub.org/refugees-abducted-from-tigray-camps-and-returned-to-eritrea-families-say and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-refugees-in-tigray-continue-to-experience-hunger-attacks-mugging-beatings-and-abductions/ and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-20-09-December.pdf and https://taz.de/Krieg-in-Aethiopien/!5736994/ and https://eritreahub.org/more-than-10000-eritrean-refugees-forcibly-returned-to-eritrea-report and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-24-13-Dec_2020.pdf and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-55277843 and https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2020/12/16/reports-of-forcible-return-of-eritrean-refugees-in-ethiopia-cause-for-alarm and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-30-19-December.docx.pdf and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-32-21-December.docx.pdf and https://www.voanews.com/africa/rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safety-eritrean-refugees-ethiopia and https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/rights-groups-concerned-over-safety-of-eritrean-refugees-in-ethiopia/5709423.html and https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/world/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-Tigray.html and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-40-29-December.docx2_.pdf and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-refugees-left-to-starve-for-five-weeks-in-tigray-camp/ and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-53-12-January-2021.pdf and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-55-14-January-2021.pdf and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-56-15-January-2021.pdf and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-57-16-January-2021-.pdf and https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/1/29/refugees-international-calls-for-urgent-intervention-in-ethiopia and  https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-72-31-January-2021-1.pdf  and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-refugees-from-two-camps-deported-at-gunpoint-by-eritrean-soldiers-to-the-country-they-fled-from-unarmed-civilians-and-refugees-shot-dead/ and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-91-24-February-2021.pdf and https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/2/24/time-is-running-out-urgent-action-needed-to-address-humanitarian-crisis-in-tigray and  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Refoulement_of_Eritrean_refugees ; also The America Team, on multiple dates

[71] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fd3ab2d4/statement-attributable-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-situation.html and https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html

[72] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26795&LangID=E

[73] https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26806&LangID=E

[74] https://taz.de/Krieg-in-Aethiopien/!5736994/

[75] https://eritreahub.org/the-eritrean-resistance-on-the-state-of-eritrean-troops-inside-tigray

[76] The America Team, March 9 and March 18, 2020

[77] The America Team, March 23, 2021

[78]  https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-refugees-in-tigray-continue-to-experience-hunger-attacks-mugging-beatings-and-abductions/ and https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-conflict/ethiopias-war-scarred-tigray-region-regains-some-services-idUSKBN28O1N8?il=0 and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-28-17-December.pdf and https://www.voanews.com/africa/rights-groups-sound-alarm-over-safety-eritrean-refugees-ethiopia and https://eritreahub.org/first-journalist-reports-from-inside-tigray-evidence-of-eritrean-involvement-looting-and-treatment-of-refugees

[79] https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-refugees-in-tigray-continue-to-experience-hunger-attacks-mugging-beatings-and-abductions/ and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-91-24-February-2021.pdf

[80] https://eritreahub.org/eritrean-refugees-flee-camps-in-tigray-seeking-safety-in-ethiopian-cities  and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-19-08-December.pdf and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrea-refugees-in-tigray-continue-to-experience-hunger-attacks-mugging-beatings-and-abductions/ and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-20-09-December.pdf and https://eritreahub.org/first-journalist-reports-from-inside-tigray-evidence-of-eritrean-involvement-looting-and-treatment-of-refugees and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-91-24-February-2021.pdf

[81] The America Team, December 8 and December 11, 2020; also https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-20-09-December.pdf

[82] https://eritreahub.org/photographs-of-eritrean-being-forcibly-returned-to-tigray-war-from-addis and https://eritreahub.org/ethiopia-returning-eritrean-refugees-to-tigray-camps-u-n-calls-move-unacceptable and https://apnews.com/article/kenya-united-nations-ethiopia-31241097189daa353af87e99945652e3 and https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/11/un-slams-ethiopia-for-returning-eritrean-refugees-in-tigray and https://hrc-eritrea.org/eritrean-refugees-in-ethiopia-human-rights-denied-enduring-assault-gunshot-injuries-arrest-imprisonment-and-deportation/ and https://eritreahub.org/after-an-epic-journey-eritrean-refugees-who-fled-war-in-tigray-are-back-in-camp-under-armed-guard

[83] https://eritreahub.org/hundreds-of-eritrean-refugees-held-at-addis-airport-threatened-with-deportation

[84] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-23-12-December.pdf

[85] The America Team, December 31, 2020 and January 8 and January 24, 2021; also https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-42-31-December-2020.pdf

[86] The America Team, December 31.

[87] The America Team, January 10, 2021; also https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-48-07-January-2021.pdf

[88] https://eritreahub.org/finally-aid-arrives-at-adi-harush-refugee-camp-tigray and https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201216-delayed-un-humanitarian-convoys-reach-ethiopia-s-tigray and https://www.wfp.org/news/united-nations-agencies-deliver-lifeline-food-assistance-25000-eritrean-refugees-tigray ; also The America Team, December 15, 2020

[89] The America Team, December 19, 2020 and January 11, 2021

[90] The America Team, December 19, 2020 and January 11, 2021

[91] The America Team, December 21, 2020; also https://hrc-eritrea.org/refugees-in-camp-in-tigray-attacked-and-robbed-by-criminals-the-ethiopian-government-is-doing-nothing-to-protect-them/

[92] The America Team, January 1 and 2, 2021

[93] The America Team, December 25, 2020

[94] https://eritreahub.org/extreme-urgent-need-starvation-haunts-ethiopias-tigray

[95] The America Team, January 27 and January 28, 2021

[96] The America Team, January 27, 2021

[97]  https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210201-eritrean-refugees-caught-in-crossfire-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-war  and The America Team, December 19, 2020

[98] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-30-19-December.docx.pdf

[99] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-32-21-December.docx.pdf and https://twitter.com/vercrus/status/1340628458062360578?s=11

[100] https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20-%20Tigray%20Region%20Humanitarian%20Update%20-%206%20Jan%202021.pdf

[101] https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/28/world/africa/Ethiopia-Eritrea-Tigray.html

[102] https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20210201-eritrean-refugees-caught-in-crossfire-of-ethiopia-s-tigray-war and https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/satellites-show-ethiopia-carnage-showing-conflict-continues-1.1545990

[103] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/15/major-violations-of-international-law-at-tigray-refugee-camps-un and https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2021/1/19/ethiopia-hesitant-to-allow-aid-agencies-into-tigray?__twitter_impression=true

[104] https://eritreahub.org/as-evidence-of-eritrean-involvement-in-tigray-war-mounts-eritrea-responds-with-denial-and-abuse

[105] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-62-21-January-2021.pdf and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-67-26-January-2021.pdf  and https://www.vice.com/en/article/93wmbz/refugee-camps-in-ethiopia-appear-to-have-been-systematically-destroyed and https://africanarguments.org/2021/02/ethiopian-government-must-allow-full-humanitarian-access-to-tigray/ and https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html and https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/february/buildings-belonging-to-nrc-destroyed-in-ethiopias-tigray/ and https://www.wionews.com/world/refugee-group-condemns-damage-at-camps-hit-by-tigray-war-362236 and https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2021/04/Starving-Tigray-report-final.pdf at page 46

[106] https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html

[107] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-74-02-February-2021.pdf

[108] The America Team, January 23, 2021

[109] The America Team, January 24, 2021

[110] https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-regional-update-10-ethiopia-situation-tigray-region-13-january-1-february

[111] https://eritreahub.org/un-says-20000-refugees-missing-after-ethiopian-camps-destroyed and https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2021/2/6019584e4/remarks-un-high-commissioner-refugees-filippo-grandi-press-conference-addis.html

[112] https://eritreahub.org/ethiopia-plans-to-close-refugee-camps-in-tigray

[113] https://hrc-eritrea.org/the-hidden-truth-of-ethiopias-plan-to-close-two-refugee-camps-in-tigray/

[114] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-82-11-February-2021.pdf

[115] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/11/ethiopia-shuts-two-tigray-camps-housing-eritrean-refugees and https://english.ahram.org.eg/News/403887.aspx

[116] https://www.nrc.no/news/2021/march/ethiopia-hunger-and-disease-rife-among-displaced-as-aid-workers-gain-access-to-new-parts-of-tigray/

[117] https://news.sky.com/story/ethiopias-tigray-conflict-the-twisted-joke-of-denial-of-the-violence-is-finally-laid-bare-12254742#

[118] https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2021/3/605da0564/unhcr-reaches-destroyed-camps-northern-tigray.html and  https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%20%237%20-31Mar21.pdf

[119] https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-regional-update-11-ethiopia-situation-tigray-region-1-14-february

[120] The America Team, February 19, February 20 and March 2, 2021

[121] The America Team, February 27, 2021; also https://hrc-eritrea.org/brutal-militias-attacked-refugees-in-mai-ayni-camp-in-tigray/

[122] The America Team, February 27 and March 2, 2021

[123]https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%20%237%20-31Mar21.pdf

[124]https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%20%238%20-APR%201-15%202021.pdf

[125] The America Team, April 8, 2021

[126] The America Team, April 10, 2021

[127] The America Team, April 10, 2021

[128] http://awate.com/eritreans-ethiopia-fear-safety/

[129] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Situation-Report-EEPA-Horn-No.-89-22-February-2021.pdf

[130] The America Team, April 16, 2021 and April 19, 2021

[131] As this chapter goes to press in mid-June, 2021

[132] https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Situation%20Report%20-%20Ethiopia%20-%20Tigray%20Region%20Humanitarian%20Update%20-%2014%20May%202021.pdf

[133]  https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20%28Tigray%29%20Situation%20External%20Updates%20%2316%2001-14%20May%202021%20.pdf

[134]  https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/UNHCR%20Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Update%20%2310%20-May21.pdf

[135] The America Team, on multiple dates.

[136] https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Voices-From-Tigray-Special-Briefing-Webinar-Voices-from-Tigray.pdf at page 4 and https://www.eepa.be//wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Testimonies-Eritrean-Involvement-in-the-War-in-Tigray-2021.pdf at pages 18 and 24

[137] https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/3b66c2aa10

[138] https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A_HRC_47_21_E.pdf at pages 13-15

[139]https://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id_article=69380#:~:text=Eyewitnesses%20in%20the%20border%20area,in%20the%20northern%20Tigray%20Region  and https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-tigray-minority-ethnic-cleansing-sudan-world-news-842741eebf9bf0984946619c0fc15023

[140]https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Ethiopia%20Tigray%20Situation%20External%20Updates%2012%20-%2030%20April%202021.pdf

JULY 10, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

Tigrayan residents of the towns of Humera and Alamata say they are being singled out, attacked and driven from their homes by Amhara Special Forces.

The city of Humera, close to the tri-point of Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan, has been at the forefront of the Tigray war since it began in November last year.

Attacks from Ethiopian troops and Amhara special forces from the South and by the Eritrean army from the North drove the Tigrayan forces from the city. But many Tigrayans remained. Now, as the Tigray Defence Forces are reportedly advancing from their strongholds in central Tigray westwards and southwards, the Tigrayans living in Humera are again under severe threat.

Tigrayans in Alamata say they are also being attacked.

This information has come from several sources.


Many Tigrayans in Humera and surrounding area say they are trapped and threatened.
Amhara Special Forces have been going door to door, warning Tigrayans to get out of what they call “their land”. Tigrayans say they have been given just 24 hours to leave their homes. Some people have been beaten and the community is traumatised.
“We told the Amhara that we don’t have a safe route to leave: the border with Sudan is closed and we are prevented from moving to Amhara or Tigray. They replied by telling us to go to Eritrea, but we said we can’t and won’t go to Eritrea.”
An appeal for help
The community says the situation is really urgent. They say they are being starved, abused, traumatized and have no hope.
Residents of Humera are appealing for the Red Cross, and other International Humanitarian Organisations, to come to their aid. They fear that unless a route out of the town is found along which Tigrayans can escape from Humera they will be abused or killed by the Amhara.
Alamata
Similar reports are coming from the town of Alamata and surrounding areas.
Many Tigrayans are taken from their home by Amahra force at gunpoint, without warning. There is a report that 9 young Tigrayan men were killed in public on Friday – accused of being supporters of the Tigrayan “junta”.
Tigrayans in the town are terrified, with many taken to prisons where they are being held. Older people and children have been taken to Mokeoni and left there – told they can walk into territory held by the Tigray Defence Forces, some 25 kilometres away.
These displaced people are being forced to leave their homes without money, clothes, or documents.
The UN Ocha recently reported that: “The road from Mekelle to Alamata, in Southern Zone, was also cleared but access beyond it has been denied by Amhara Security Forces (ASF), who are still in control of areas south of Korem toward Alamata and beyond.”
The Tigrayans of Humera and Alamata are appealing to the International Committee of the Red Cross to arrange safe routes along which these threatened people can escape to safety.

Resurgent Tigray and Horn of Africa Politics

Friday, 09 July 2021 12:33 Written by

JULY 9, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

“As for Eritrea, Isaias has pulled back his forces to northern Tigray. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border is disputed, but Eritrean troops are still farther south of areas Asmara claims (and which an international tribunal ruled in 2002 are Eritrean). Isaias himself is in an interesting spot. Only a few years ago, he was isolated in the region, subject to harsh UN and Western sanctions. The ostracism owed mostly to his support for Islamist militants in Somalia, but Meles’ lobbying and U.S. hostility to Asmara contributed, too. Abiy had brought, at least until now, a sharp reversal in Isaias’ fortunes. Not only did ties with Ethiopia improve, but he also drew closer to Somali President Farmajo. The three countries formed a “tripartite alliance” that Isaias has touted as an alternative to the existing regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, which he saw as Meles’ creature (in reality, with Abiy and Farmajo consumed by domestic crises, the new alliance has done little concrete). Isaias has also adroitly cultivated relations in the Gulf. A resurgent Tigray could put the Eritrean dictator on the back foot again.”

 
Interim President – International Crisis Group

The war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region just took an unexpected turn. Seemingly isolated in mountainous reaches of central Tigray only weeks ago, Tigrayan rebels last week overran regional capital Mekelle and other cities and towns they had left last November when federal troops moved in. They were met by dancing and cheering crowds. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who had promised a short clash in Tigray and declared victory late last year, pulled federal forces back after a run of battlefield defeats. It’s a stunning turnabout in a brutal war.

So, is the fighting over? Sadly, probably not. If Abiy and Tigrayan leaders can somehow reach agreement on a ceasefire and getting urgently needed aid into Tigray, that would calm things down. More likely is that the war enters a new phase, one that carries even graver danger of triggering a wider crisis in the Horn of Africa.

Just a couple of years ago, things looked different for Ethiopia and the region. Abiy came to power in 2018 on the back of mass protests spearheaded by two of the country’s biggest ethnic groups, his own Oromo and the Amhara. He promised more inclusive politics that would turn the page on decades of repression. A revolution in neighbouring Sudan appeared to surmount even steeper odds. Months of dogged demonstrations prompted the Sudanese military to oust Omar al-Bashir, who had held power for almost 30 years. After arresting Bashir, security chiefs tried to stamp out the protests. But reinvigorated demonstrations and concerted foreign pressure, particularly after a massacre of over 100 protesters in Khartoum, forced them to share power with civilians in a transitional government led by former UN official Abdalla Hamdok.

Abiy and Hamdok got along well at first. Shortly after coming to power, Abiy had visited Sudan, helping broker the deal that saw Hamdok become premier. Ethiopian leaders, notably long-serving ruler Meles Zenawi (who died in 2012), had long wooed Sudan, hoping to curb Sudanese resistance to the mighty dam Ethiopia planned to build on the Nile. Sudan, together with Egypt, feared that without an accord on how the dam would work, it would create water shortages downstream. Khartoum did recognise benefits the project could bring, including more electricity, irrigation and flood control. Meles’ diplomacy with Bashir helped soften Sudan’s reservations. But the Nile waters dispute had remained an intermittent source of friction, particularly as Khartoum had to balance relations with Cairo – which was more fiercely opposed to the dam – and Addis Ababa. The Abiy-Hamdok rapport seemed to cement better ties between the two countries.

Abiy’s early flurry of regional diplomacy also brought dramatic change to Ethiopia’s relations with Eritrea. In 2018, Abiy signed what seemed back then to be a historic peace deal with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, putting aside these two countries’ longstanding enmity. Abiy won the Nobel peace prize in large part thanks to his pact with Isaias.

 Momentous changes … suggested that a brighter future might be on the cards. Two years on, things have taken a darker turn. 

All in all, things seemed to be looking up. To be sure, there was still plenty of trouble in the region. Somalia was embroiled in a protracted crisis amid bitter tensions between President Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” and his rivals. South Sudanese leaders had signed a peace deal but remained bitterly at odds and violence continued to wrack much of the country. Hostility among Gulf Arab powers was spilling into the region. The Horn still hosted more UN peacekeepers than anywhere else in the world and had among the highest numbers of displaced. But the momentous changes in Ethiopia and Sudan – seemingly promising transitions away from authoritarian rule in two vital countries – suggested that a brighter future might be on the cards.

Two years on, things have taken a darker turn.

Sudan’s transition is stuttering. Khartoum signed a peace deal last year with some rebels, paving the way for representatives of battle-scarred peripheries to join the government (see Crisis Group’s paper on the deal). But its economy is in dire straits. Grievances that brought people into the streets two years ago – declining living conditions, spiralling inflation and shortages of bread, water and electricity – still fester. Many Sudanese blame Hamdok. Military leaders jostling with their civilian rivals arguably have the upper hand. Factions in the security forces are also feuding among themselves.

If Sudan’s transition has hit bumpy ground, Ethiopia’s has gone off the rails. Resurgent ethno-nationalism threatens to tear the country apart. Abiy’s new ruling party is expected to win a recent vote convincingly – the authorities have not yet announced complete results – but violence shut down polling in about a fifth of the country’s constituencies. In Oromia, Ethiopia’s most populous state, the opposition boycotted, crying foul. Oromo rebels have been stepping up operations. Ethnic violence plagues several other corners of the country.

Worst of all has been the Tigray war (again see our recent report). Eight months ago, Abiy pledged a quick law enforcement operation to oust the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) from Mekelle. The TPLF – Meles’ party – had dominated Ethiopia’s politics for decades until the protests that brought Abiy to power downsized its national role. Tigrayan leaders and Abiy quickly fell out, with Abiy claiming that the TPLF was obstructing reforms and Tigrayans accusing the new premier of using the state’s legal authority to settle scores. A dispute over the constitutionality of a COVID-19-related election delay escalated. In November 2020, Tigrayan forces, claiming to be pre-empting a federal invasion of Tigray, overran a federal military base in the region. Abiy then sent in the Ethiopian army.

At first, things went Abiy’s way. As federal forces, apparently supported by a drone campaign, rolled into Tigray, the TPLF pulled out of Mekelle and other towns. Paramilitaries and militiamen from the Amhara region, just south of Tigray, surged into territory in western Tigray that the Amhara claimed the TPLF had stolen from them three decades ago. Tens of thousands of Eritrean troops also entered the fray. Isaias, with whose forces the TPLF-led Ethiopian government in the late 1990s fought a bitter and bloody two-year border war, hoped to deal his old Tigrayan foes a lethal blow.

 The UN estimates that hundreds of thousands are already in famine conditions. 

The war saw horrific suffering. All sides stand accused of atrocities. Eritreans’ scorched-earth tactics, with credible reports of massacres, rapes, looting and crop burning, have been especially cruel, casting Abiy’s 2019 peace deal with Isaias in a much less flattering light. The tactics fuelled rage among Tigrayans and support for the TPLF, which was pivotal to Tigrayan forces’ later advances. Humanitarian agencies say Eritrean and Ethiopian troops blocked aid destined for rebel-held areas. The UN estimates that hundreds of thousands are already in famine conditions. Millions more are short on essential supplies.

If that wasn’t bad enough, Ethiopia-Sudan relations are on the rocks. Sudan’s military leaders, who have close ties to Egypt, have always viewed Abiy more warily than their civilian counterparts. But even Hamdok chafes at how dismissive Addis Ababa has been of Sudanese anxiety about the dam, notably around the transparency of safety standards and reservoir filling. Khartoum wants to be sure the Ethiopian project won’t leave Sudan thirsty or harm its own dams and turbines.

With Ethiopian troops busy in Tigray, Khartoum seized the fertile agricultural border region of al-Fashaga, ignoring a relatively amicable land-use arrangement Meles and Bashir had forged and that had governed the area for more than a decade (our briefing last month covers the crisis). Sudanese forces evicted thousands of Ethiopian – mainly Amhara – farmers. Ethiopia sent in its own troops, along with Amhara militias, resulting in skirmishes with the Sudanese. Sudan’s army has dug in. The two sides face each other in a tense standoff across front lines adjacent to the western Tigray flashpoint.

Pic 1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Horn of Africa, with Tigray, al-Fashaga and Ethiopia’s dam (the GERD) marked up.
Domestic politics on both sides complicate things. By upsetting the peaceful status quo in al-Fashaga, the Sudanese partly hope to strengthen their hand in the Nile waters dispute and perhaps buttress the ailing Sudanese economy. But security chiefs also see their offensive, which many Sudanese cheer on, as a way to burnish their popular credentials. As for Abiy, any sense he is soft on Sudan could rile the Amhara, a key support base within his ruling party.

So, does the dramatic reversal of fortunes in Tigray change things? That depends on what happens next.

Abiy himself has put a brave face on the Ethiopian army’s rout. He claims that he pulled out troops having achieved his main war aims, though the TPLF’s return to power in Mekelle and Tigrayan forces’ parading thousands of federal army prisoners of war through the streets make that hard to believe. Abiy has also declared what he calls a humanitarian ceasefire. But the federal government still appears to have the region in a stranglehold, denying Tigray electricity, telecommunications services and banking, and doing little to support ramped up aid shipments to the stricken population. The UN has pointed to Amhara militiamen as the probable culprits in the destruction of a bridge along a key thoroughfare into Tigray, which further hinders access (Addis Ababa denies the charge and blames the TPLF). If Abiy’s pending election win could, in principle, empower him to be more magnanimous, his standing will undoubtedly take a hit from defeat in a war that, for all its horrors, has been popular among Ethiopians outside Tigray. Reports of security forces rounding up Tigrayans elsewhere in the country hardly suggest his government is leaning toward compromise.

 A resurgent Tigray could put the Eritrean dictator on the back foot again. 

As for Eritrea, Isaias has pulled back his forces to northern Tigray. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border is disputed, but Eritrean troops are still farther south of areas Asmara claims (and which an international tribunal ruled in 2002 are Eritrean). Isaias himself is in an interesting spot. Only a few years ago, he was isolated in the region, subject to harsh UN and Western sanctions. The ostracism owed mostly to his support for Islamist militants in Somalia, but Meles’ lobbying and U.S. hostility to Asmara contributed, too. Abiy had brought, at least until now, a sharp reversal in Isaias’ fortunes. Not only did ties with Ethiopia improve, but he also drew closer to Somali President Farmajo. The three countries formed a “tripartite alliance” that Isaias has touted as an alternative to the existing regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, which he saw as Meles’ creature (in reality, with Abiy and Farmajo consumed by domestic crises, the new alliance has done little concrete). Isaias has also adroitly cultivated relations in the Gulf. A resurgent Tigray could put the Eritrean dictator on the back foot again.

Tigray’s leaders have reacted to Abiy’s ceasefire declaration with conditions for their own. These include Eritrean and Amhara forces’ withdrawal from Tigray and a credible probe into war crimes. A Tigrayan spokesman has also said Tigray forces will chase the Eritreans across the border, though TPLF leader Debretsion Gebremichael afterward played down that threat. More likely is that the Tigrayans concentrate first on areas held by the Amhara in western Tigray. Tigrayan forces appear to be gearing up for an offensive, which will likely run into fierce resistance and could be particularly bloody. Beyond recapturing land the Tigrayans view as theirs, the operation would put Abiy in a bind, testing his relations with the Amhara if they believe he hasn’t done enough to protect them. Moving west could have the added benefit, in Tigrayan eyes, of opening supply lines to Sudan – all the more important if Addis and the Eritreans continue to block aid deliveries.

That brings us back to Sudan. If Tigrayan forces get to the border, it would be hard to argue against Khartoum opening it up, given the terrible conditions in Tigray. But Sudan’s motives may go beyond the humanitarian. There is a risk that Sudanese military leaders, maybe with a nudge from Cairo, see backing the Tigrayans as a way to ratchet up pressure on Abiy as leverage in the dam dispute. Already Ethiopian authorities allege – and UN officials and diplomats in the region confirm– that the Sudanese military is supporting anti-government militias elsewhere in Ethiopia, while Sudanese officials say Ethiopia is backing rebels in Sudan. Leaders in Addis Ababa or Khartoum don’t want a wider fight between their two countries. But they’re headed down a path – especially in interlinking the Nile waters, al-Fashaga and potentially Tigray disputes – that takes them in precisely that direction. It’s easy to see how things heat up from here.

All sides could take steps to dial things back. Getting vital aid into Tigray requires that Addis Ababa resume basic cooperation with Mekelle and that Tigrayan leaders focus on preventing famine rather than new offensives. Beyond Tigray, Abiy almost certainly needs some form of wider national dialogue to bridge the divisions that threaten to pull the country apart. The fix for al-Fashaga would be for Sudan to readmit Ethiopian farmers and restore the soft-border arrangement that worked just fine for years. With Ethiopia now filling its dam’s enormous reservoirs, it should be readier to share information on a project that will have huge impact on its downstream neighbours, while all three parties to the Nile dispute should pursue a longer-term settlement on the dam’s coordinated management.

For now, though, a belligerent mood prevails. Nobody appears to see the dramatic turn of events in Tigray as a moment for pause. Reviving the optimism of a few years ago in the Horn would be a tall order, especially given Ethiopia’s turbulence. Fundamental changes are afoot, as the pillars of regional order partly orchestrated by Meles – a strong and influential Ethiopia, an Ethiopia-Sudan détente and a boxed-in Eritrea – crumble. As yet it’s far from clear what will replace them. The imperative is to avoid a wider war in figuring that out.

JULY 8, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

The draft text apparently calls for the three parties concerned to pursue a negotiated solution and to reach a binding agreement within six months; rejects unilateral actions, including the filling of the dam; and suggests that third parties which are currently observers to an ongoing AU-led tripartite negotiation process (such as the EU and the US) play a more active role.

Source: In the Blue

Meeting on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Regional Relations

Tomorrow (8 July) afternoon, the Security Council will convene for an in-person briefing on an ongoing disagreement involving Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), under the agenda item “Peace and security in Africa”. The expected briefers are the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa, Parfait Onanga-Anyanga; the Executive Director of the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), Inger Andersen; and a representative of the Permanent Mission of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to the UN, as the chairperson of the AU. Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan are expected to participate in the meeting and will be represented at ministerial level by Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Hassan Shoukry; Ethiopian Minister for Water, Irrigation and Energy Eng Seleshi Bekele; and Sudanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The dispute over the dam dates back to 2011, when its construction commenced. The hydroelectric structure is said to be the largest in Africa and, once filled, will reportedly double Ethiopia’s power supply. Egypt and Sudan, as countries located downriver from Ethiopia, have repeatedly voiced concern that the dam is threatening their own water supply. On 23 March 2015, the three countries signed a Declaration of Principles on the GERD in Khartoum. The agreement was built around ten principles, which included prioritising cooperation, agreeing not to cause significant harm, peaceful settlement of disputes, and equitable and reasonable utilisation, among other things. The agreement also called for Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan to agree on guidelines and rules on the first filling of the GERD. While that was seen as a positive step, it did not translate into technical agreements that would have a practical impact.

In June 2020, an AU-led tripartite process was put in place aimed at finding an agreement between the three countries. The latest meeting took place in Kinshasa between 3 and 6 April but concluded without any concrete outcomes. In recent weeks, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan have been bringing developments surrounding the GERD to the Security Council’s attention, as Ethiopia has signalled that it expects to start the second filling of the dam during this year’s rainy season. According to media reports, Ethiopia conveyed to Egypt on 5 July that it had started the second filling of the dam.

Tomorrow’s meeting will be the second time the Security Council meets to discuss the GERD, having last convened on 29 June 2020. At that time, non-Council member Egypt had requested the meeting by invoking article 35 of the UN Charter, allowing any UN member state to “bring any dispute, or any situation referred to in article 34 [that is, one that may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute] to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly”. Council member Tunisia requested tomorrow’s meeting and circulated a draft resolution on the issue on 2 July. The draft text apparently calls for the three parties concerned to pursue a negotiated solution and to reach a binding agreement within six months; rejects unilateral actions, including the filling of the dam; and suggests that third parties which are currently observers to an ongoing AU-led tripartite negotiation process (such as the EU and the US) play a more active role. It seems that the draft text further states that the Council remains seized of the matter. If a draft resolution including this sentence is adopted, it will officially place the dispute on the Council’s agenda. The first round of negotiations on the draft text was held on 6 July, and a second round is planned for tomorrow (8 July).

At tomorrow’s meeting, Egypt, Sudan and Ethiopia are likely to echo views they have conveyed in recent weeks in numerous letters they have sent to the Security Council. In its letters, Egypt has said that previous negotiation efforts involving Ethiopia had been “fruitless”; stated that Addis Ababa had not consulted with downstream countries; and highlighted Egypt’s dependency on the Nile River for the “livelihood and for the survival of its 105 million citizens”. Egypt called for a Council meeting in a letter dated 25 June.

Echoing similar views, Sudan in its letters informed the Council of the possible adverse effects of the dam’s filling; denounced Ethiopia for proceeding without having reached an agreement with the downstream riparian countries or having devised “cross-border environmental and social management and plans to mitigate harms”; and assessed that such action presents a risk to regional security and stability. It also highlighted that the curtailing of water streams through the dam has had negative effects on its own dams and water supply. In a letter dated 21 June, Sudan called on the Council to seize itself of the matter under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which addresses the peaceful settlement of disputes. Egypt and Sudan both stated in their correspondence that Ethiopia is disrupting an AU-led tripartite negotiation process.

In response, Ethiopia has written several letters to the Council, saying that Egypt and Sudan are unwilling to continue the AU-facilitated process. Addis Ababa further claimed that it was under no obligation to seek consent of the lower riparian countries to fill the dam and that the GERD would “augment regional socio-economic integration and support peace and stability in the entire region”. In its 23 June letter, Ethiopia criticised the request for a Council meeting, expressing hope that the Council will defer the matter to the AU for continued tripartite talks. It also suggested the appointment of focal points in the respective countries for enhanced data-sharing on matters relating to the GERD.

The League of Arab States (LAS)—which includes Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia among its members—has also been active on the matter. Following a 15 June meeting on the GERD in Doha, the organisation adopted a resolution calling for Security Council action.

During tomorrow’s meeting, the representative of the DRC may brief Council members about the status of the AU-facilitated talks and call for a return to negotiations under AU auspices. Since Egypt, Sudan and Tunisia are members of both the AU and the LAS, finding common ground between the positions of both regional organisations may prove difficult. This dynamic might be reflected in efforts to find a common “A3 plus one” (Kenya, Niger, Tunisia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines) approach to the matter.

As was the case during the Council’s last meeting on the GERD in 2020, several members may express their preference for the AU to address the matter. Several Council members, including the European members, are likely to call on the three disputing parties to pursue a negotiated solution to the issue. In a 1 July press conference, Ambassador Nicolas de Rivière (France) noted that the Council’s role was that of a convener and said that its members should encourage a return to the negotiation table. The US is likely to echo this position. In a 6 July press encounter, a spokesperson for the US State Department said that the US supported collaborative efforts by the three parties and expressed support for the AU-led process.

JULY 5, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

Ethiopia: ‘Opportunity Must Not Be Lost’ – Five Former U.S. Ambassadors to Ethiopia on Events in Tigray

The UN and human rights groups have warned seven months of fighting has hampered food security in Tigray with a real risk of famine.
30 JUNE 2021

Washington, DC — This statement was provided to AllAfrica by five former American ambassadors who led U.S. representation in Ethiopia for 13 of the past 25 years. The career diplomats welcome the cease-fire declaration by the Ethiopian government and issue an urgent call for humanitarian relief to the strife-torn Tigray region.

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We the undersigned former U.S. Chiefs of Mission to Ethiopia, having closely followed the tragic conflict in Tigray which erupted in November 2020, were greatly relieved at the chance for an end to the suffering and a hope for peace offered by the Ethiopian Government’s declaration of a cease fire on June 28, 2021.

We believe this is an opportunity which must not be lost, and in that regard urge the following:

  • All sides involved in the conflict should immediately accept the offered cease fire.
  • Immediately open all areas which suffered conflict to humanitarian relief agencies to provide assistance to those in need.
  • Withdrawal of all outside forces from the conflict zone.
  • All sides involved in the conflict should also use the opportunity offered by the cease fire to undertake serious discussions to make peace permanent, and also negotiate the future status of Tigray acceptable to all parties.
  • Strongest support possible to advance peace and reconciliation from the international community including bilaterally from all of Ethiopia’s partners and neighbors and from multilateral institutions and civil society.  In this regard, as soon as peace is established, we call for an international conference to bring together all stakeholders to discuss joint relief and rehabilitation efforts in all areas which have been impacted by the conflict.
  • Encourage the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to move forward quickly with their joint investigation into the human rights violations and abuses allegedly committed by all parties in the Tigray conflict.

JULY 4, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

“Five UNICEF trucks with water, sanitation, hygiene, health and nutrition supplies are waiting to enter Tigray pending approval from federal authorities. There are still no flights in and out of the region though the Government of Ethiopia has today announced the possibility of UNHAS flights resuming this weekend.”

Source: CNN

People try to shake hands with soldiers of Tigray Defence Force (TDF) as they arrive in Mekelle, the capital of Tigray region, Ethiopia, on June 29.

(CNN)Food and fuel is running out in the capital of Ethiopia’s war-torn northern Tigray region, a CNN producer on the ground in Mekelle reports.

A communications blackout in the region, in place since Ethiopian forces withdrew and announced a unilateral ceasefire last week, has made it difficult to determine the situation in Tigray and its capital Mekelle. But on Saturday, CNN was able to reach its producer on the ground who reports a blockade on Tigray by Ethiopian forces has been ongoing since June 25.
All air travel into Mekelle has been halted by the federal government and eyewitnesses tell CNN that Amhara militia and Ethiopian government forces are obstructing roads out of the city. There has been a full services blackout there — power, phone, internet — for nearly a week, CNN’s producer reports.
Because of the power outage most homes have no running water. Banks cannot operate as their network is down, so people have no access to their own money, CNN’s producer added.

A destroyed bridge crossing the Tekeze River is seen in the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia Thursday, July 1.

UN spokesman Stéphane Dujarric said in a statement on Friday the World Food Programme (WFP) had been able to resume some of its operations in Tigray after fighting halted the emergency response.
“However, serious challenges are threatening the entire humanitarian response in the region,” he said. “Electricity and telecommunications remain cut off and banking services are still not available. While road access from and to Tigray for humanitarian supplies remains blocked, staff movement from Mekelle to Afar was possible yesterday [Thursday],” Dujarric said.
“Meanwhile, five UNICEF trucks with water, sanitation, hygiene, health and nutrition supplies are waiting to enter Tigray pending approval from federal authorities. There are still no flights in and out of the region though the Government of Ethiopia has today announced the possibility of UNHAS flights resuming this weekend,” he added.
With the destruction of the Tekeze Bridge on Thursday, and the months-long destruction of farms and agricultural implements that prevent farmers from planting, by Ethiopian, Eritrean and Amhara militia forces — as attested to by the UN and other aid agencies — there are real worries that food will start to run out.

Ethiopian porters unload food aid bound for victims of war after a checkpoint leading to Tigray in Mai Tsebri town, Ethiopia June 26.

“The destruction and vandalization of vital infrastructure are seriously threatening the provision of humanitarian assistance to people in need and access of civilians to essential services, goods and livelihoods. All parties to the conflict must protect civilians and civilian infrastructure in compliance with international humanitarian law,” the UN spokesman urged following the destruction of the Tekeze bridge.

Risk of hunger

There are extensive fuel lines at the few gas stations across the city that are still open but most stations have already closed, CNN’s producer on the ground added.
“It is urgent to get additional staff and supplies into Tigray, restore electricity, telecoms, and ensure the availability of cash and fuel for the continuity of humanitarian operations,” a UN OCHA (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) spokesperson in Tigray told CNN on Saturday.
In a statement ahead of the UN Security Council’s first open meeting on Tigray on Friday, Oxfam said: “There are now more than 350,000 people in a hunger catastrophe in Ethiopia, and this is a crucial time for farmers to plant crops. If they aren’t safe to do so, it will continue the cycle of hunger and have deadly consequences for months to come.”
At the UN Security Council meeting on Friday, United States ambassador to the United Nations, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, said: “Humanitarian workers are reporting that it is more difficult to reach desperate people in Tigray now than it was just a week ago. Such acts, if verified, are not an indication of a humanitarian ceasefire, but of a siege. The Ethiopian government can and should prove this analysis wrong by providing unhindered movement of humanitarian supplies, commodities, and personnel into, and throughout Tigray. If they do not we believe hundreds of thousands of people could starve to death.”
Thomas-Greenfield said “a meaningful ceasefire deal would affirm the redeployment of forces and the complete withdrawal of Eritrean troops, and Amhara regional forces, it would facilitate unhindered humanitarian access. It would affirm neither the internal nor external borders of Ethiopia will be changed by force, and in contravention of the Constitution, and it should lay the groundwork for discussions toward political solutions to the crisis.”
A UN Humanitarian official, Ramesh Rajasingham, told the Security Council: “WFP has enough food for only 1 million people for the next month in Mekelle. This is a fraction of what we need for the 5.2 million people who need food aid. However, we have also almost run out of health, water, sanitation and other non-food items kits. Food alone does not avert a famine. Water, sanitation and nutrition supplies are essential in such a response. We also desperately need to prevent a cholera outbreak or people dying from other communicable diseases.”
The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a Friday statement that the international community should urge Tigrayan forces to abide by the unilateral ceasefire, adding that Ethiopia cannot afford to guarantee the protection of humanitarian operators in Tigray “unless the terrorist element in the region is forced to accept the ceasefire.”
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s Ambassador to the UN, Taye Atske Selassie, told the Security Council “the decision to cease military operation is hoped to create a conducive environment for humanitarian operations in Tigray and also pave the way for an inclusive national dialogue.”