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Why apparently blame Tigray for the failings integral to the politics of Eritrea and Ethiopia? This is a strangely mistaken approach. The bottom line is that Eritrea’s President Isaias loathes the TPLF and is determined to destroy the party, which he believes has designs on Eritrean land.

But the division is far deeper. Ideology, traditional animosity and the terrible decision by Eritrea to close off access aid to Tigray from Sudan during the 1984-85 famine run deep. Finally: it was Eritrea that sponsored, trained and directed Ethiopian rebels that attacked Ethiopia when Tigrayans ran Ethiopia under Prime Minister Meles Zenawi.

It’s a complex history – not easily summarised. But I do support the conclusion: “The priority is to de-escalate tensions between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray region. Consultation and confidence building is equally important between Eritrea and Tigray’s leadership and people. Only then will the new peace deal stand a chance of bringing much-needed stability to the people of both countries and the region.”

Martin

Source: ISSafrica

The Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal is yet to show dividends

Tensions in both countries relating to Ethiopia’s Tigray regional state are hampering progress.

It’s been over two years since the much-heralded rapprochement between Eritrea and Ethiopia culminated in a peace and friendship agreement in July 2018. The deal, brewed personally by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, symbolised an end to the 20 years of no war, no peace situation and the start of cordial relations between the two countries.

The settlement was internationally praised for its potential to stabilise the region beyond improving the two countries’ affairs. Abiy even received the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to build bridges with Eritrea.

Two years later, positive steps have been taken in some areas, but not in others due to tensions between Ethiopia’s federal government and Tigray regional state, and unresolved animosity between Tigray and Eritrean leaders.

The dispute over the small border town of Badme, which both Eritrea and Ethiopia claimed as their own, is often cited as the reason for the outbreak of the 1998-2000 border conflict. However the root causes go deeper.

They include historical rivalry, political and economic differences and hegemonic competition between the ruling elites of both countries. These were the Eritrean leadership, and the ruling party in Ethiopia’s Tigray State – the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) – Ethiopia’s dominant political party until Abiy came to power.

The Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC), established to resolve the border issue, decided in 2002 that Badme should belong to Eritrea. A failure to implement the EEBC’s decision led to the stand-off between the two countries.

In the 2018 peace deal, the leaders agreed to begin political, economic, social, cultural and security cooperation. They decided to resume diplomatic, transport, trade and communication ties that had been frozen for two decades. The leaders resolved to implement the EEBC decision and jointly ensure regional peace, development and cooperation.Twenty years after the border war, and despite the peace deal, the main protagonists are still fightinghttps://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; outline: none; color: rgb(0, 147, 194); text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out 0s; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);">https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends&via=ISSAfrica" rel="noreferrer noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; outline: none; color: rgb(0, 147, 194); text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out 0s; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);">https://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends" rel="noreferrer noopener" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; outline: none; color: rgb(0, 147, 194); text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out 0s; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);">

Since then, progress in reconnecting the two countries has been made in key areas. Numerous high-level leadership visits took place, diplomatic relations were normalised and embassies reopened. Daily flights between Addis Ababa and Asmara were established and phone connections resumed. Four border posts were opened, although they were closed after a short period.

Talks about infrastructure and transport linkages, such as Ethiopia’s use of Eritrean ports (including a feasibility study for a railway between Massawa and Addis Ababa) and rebuilding of roads, dominated discussions. Other symbolic soft power and people-to-people interactions took place. United Nations sanctions on Eritrea were lifted.

The high-profile start of the rapprochement raised expectations, both at home and internationally, that 20 years of tension and mistrust could be eroded. Two years later, this potential has waned, paralysing anticipated socio-economic gains for people in both countries. And the cause is mostly tensions between Ethiopia’s federal and Tigray officials, and ongoing conflict between the TPLF and Eritrean leadership – just like old times.

Ethiopia’s Tigray regional state and Eritrea share the border that was contested. Badme is also under Tigray administration, and so the region’s TPLF leaders share responsibility for implementing the EEBC’s decision. But the peace process was initiated from Addis Ababa, and there wasn’t adequate consultation and consensus building among stakeholders like the TPLF. The peace process failed to adequately consult some stakeholders like the TPLFhttps://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; outline: none; color: rgb(0, 147, 194); text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out 0s; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);">

This exclusion – together with other political differences relating to ideology, foreign policy, governance and elections – have worsened the division between Abiy’s government and the TPLF’s rule in Tigray. One point of contention involves how to engage with Eritrea.

Abiy, in his April 2018 inaugural speech, announced his administration’s unconditional acceptance of the stalled Algiers agreement signed in 2000 and aimed at ending the border war. In February 2020, Debretsion Gebremichael – the TPLF’s highest official – said a structured peace process was needed that included all relevant sides, not just the two national leaders.

Implementation of the 2018 deal cannot occur without buy-in from all relevant government actors in Tigray. Consensus is also needed within the respective agencies of both Ethiopia and Eritrea and all other relevant stakeholders.

The four border posts that were opened and quickly closed symbolise the lack of consensus among federal and state agencies on both sides around regulating movement and trade across national boundaries. Proper consultations would have allowed time to develop harmonised positions and enact new regulations.Implementation of the 2018 deal requires buy-in from all the relevant government actors in Tigrayhttps://issafrica.org/iss-today/the-eritrea-ethiopia-peace-deal-is-yet-to-show-dividends" style="box-sizing: border-box; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; outline: none; color: rgb(0, 147, 194); text-decoration: none; transition: all 0.1s ease-in-out 0s; border-bottom: 1px solid rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2);">

Unresolved hostility between Eritrea’s and the Tigray region’s ruling elites also hampers progress. Isaias accused the TPLF of complicating implementation of the EEBC’s decision, which the TPLF denied. Isaias also claims the TPLF created division among Eritreans, organising ethnic-based opposition and spreading misinformation to spoil relations between Eritreans and Ethiopians. The TPLF in turn accuses Eritrea of interfering in Ethiopia’s internal affairs and threatening regional security.

Twenty years after the bloody border war, and despite the new peace deal, the conflict’s main protagonists – the TPLF and the Eritrean leadership – are still fighting.

Given the increasingly serious confrontation between Mekele and Addis Ababa and the unresolved animosity between Mekele and Asmara, the TPLF feels unfairly targeted from both sides. Without political will and confidence building between the TPLF, Abiy and Isaias, the peace deal may not bear fruit.

Resolution of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea is imperative for advancing economic and development prospects in the Horn. Sustainable peace and the benefits that it will bring can only be achieved if the 2018 agreement is implemented.

The priority is to de-escalate tensions between the Federal Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray region. Consultation and confidence building is equally important between Eritrea and Tigray’s leadership and people. Only then will the new peace deal stand a chance of bringing much-needed stability to the people of both countries and the region.

Selam Tadesse Demissie, Research Officer, Horn of Africa Security Analysis, ISS Addis Ababa

SEPTEMBER 7, 2020 ERITREA HUB NEWS

Prosecutors appeal acquittal of men who lynched migrant mistaken for terrorist

Supreme Court to discuss case of IDF soldier and Prisons Service officer filmed beating Eritrean man Haftom Zarhum in aftermath of 2015 terror attack in Beersheba

Source: Times of Israel

By MICHAEL BACHNER 6 September 2020

Security camera footage showing an Eritrean man being shot in the Beersheba central bus station on October 18, 2015, after he was thought to be a terrorist. (screen capture: Channel 2)

State prosecutors on Sunday appealed a July court decision that acquitted two men, Israel Defense Forces soldier Yaakov Shimba and Israel Prisons Service officer Ronen Cohen, over their roles in the 2015 lynching of an Eritrean migrant who was mistaken for a Palestinian terrorist.

In the minutes after a terror attack at the Beersheba bus station on October 18, 2015, Haftom Zarhum, 29, an innocent bystander, was shot by two soldiers and a security guard who thought he was the perpetrator. As he lay bleeding on the ground, a crowd of angry passersby — believing him to be the terrorist — beat him, some of them delivering powerful blows to his head and pummeling him with a metal bench. He died hours later in a hospital, and an autopsy ruled that the primary cause of death was the gunshot wounds.

The attack was carried out by Muhanad Alukabi, 21, from an unrecognized Bedouin village in the Negev. He first opened fire with a pistol, killing IDF soldier Omri Levi, then took Levi’s service rifle and used it to wound 11 others. He was killed in a shootout with police after holing up in a bathroom.

Citing reasonable doubt, the Beersheba District Court in July accepted the argument presented by Shimba and Cohen that they had genuinely thought Zarhum was the terrorist.

On Sunday, the prosecution appealed the district court’s decision, taking the matter to the Supreme Court.

The reasoning for the appeal must be submitted to the country’s top court within 15 days.

Shimba, Cohen and two other men, who were caught on security cameras beating Zarhum, had been accused of “causing injury with grave intent,” an offense potentially carrying a punishment of up to 20 years in jail. Unlike the two other defendants, they did not agree to a plea deal that would downgrade the charge and offer a relatively lenient punishment.

The indictment said that in the aftermath of the attack, Shimba kicked Zarhum in the head and upper body with force. It said Cohen threw a bench onto him, and after another man removed the bench he took it and again dropped it on the prone man.

Cohen also shoved a civilian who asked him to stop his attack, according to the charges.

Haftom Zarhum, 29, died of his wounds on October 19, 2015, a few hours after he was shot and beaten by a mob that mistook him for an assailant in the terror attack in Beersheba on October 18, 2015. (Courtesy)

Despite the fact that Zarhum was already critically injured, Justice Aharon Mishnayot ruled that the pair’s argument — that they beat him because they genuinely thought he was the terrorist — was enough to merit an acquittal.

Cohen’s attorney, Zion Amir, called him a “hero.”

Commenting on the ruling, Amir said: “There is no doubt that this is a big day for an officer who acted heroically during the incident, and instead of an award got an indictment. I am glad that the court acquitted him after an almost five-year legal battle.”

The two other defendants in the lynching, Evyatar Dimri and David Muial, were convicted in 2018 in plea bargains that downgraded their charges to “abusing the helpless,” a lesser crime carrying a maximum prison sentence of seven years.

Dimri was sentenced to four months in prison and Muial got 100 days of community service and eight months of probation and was ordered to pay NIS 2,000 (approximately $550) compensation to Zarhum’s family.

Zarhum’s family has sued the state for damages, claiming negligence and failure to follow proper procedure caused his death.

The lawsuit, filed in 2017 at the Beersheba District Court, demanded NIS 3 million ($780,000) in compensation and that the National Insurance Agency recognize Zarhum as a victim of terror, entitling his family to additional state benefits.

The National Insurance Agency rejected recognizing Zarhum as a terror victim because the Eritrean had entered the country illegally.

Times of Israel staff contributed to this report.