In writing about Eritrea – indeed, in writing about the Horn of Africa as a whole – every author and journalist has to be on their guard against the disinformation spread by the Eritrean regime.

This systematic propaganda system is known by the term that was coined during Eritrea’s thirty year fight for independence (1961 – 1991). This is “Zero Three.”

When Isaias wanted to remove his enemies inside the Eritrean liberation movement he sometimes had them executed.

It would then be suggested that they had “committed suicide.”

One of EPLF’s liquidation tactics was “suicide,” which were never announced officially—but passed through “Bado Seleste” (Zero Three), the radio frequency for the party’s rumour mill.

As the BBC’s correspondent in Asmara, Alex Last wrote during the tragic border war with Ethiopia in 2000, Zero Three was spreading misinformation in an attempt to bolster Eritrean morale as its troops were in full retreat.

The news of the fall of Barentu has had a devastating effect on the mood in the Eritrean capital, Asmara.

It was announced on Eritrean TV late on Wednesday evening,

“I don’t think anyone slept last night” said one Eritrean businesswoman. The city remains calm, but people are very depressed.

For many Eritreans, the news had came as a shock. The local rumour mill, known as “Bado Seleste” meaning “03” – a reference to the unofficial news during the war of liberation – had been full of stories of counter-attacks and the recapture of villages right up until Wednesday night.

As with most countries which are facing an overwhelming invader, the rumours tend to be what people want to hear, not necessarily the truth.

When President Isaias faced real dissent after his disastrous handling of the border war and was challenged by some of his closest allies – the ‘G15’ – he reacted by locking them up.

The president also closed all independent media and arrested journalists.

Ever since there has been no free media inside Eritrea – none whatsoever.

Propaganda across the world

The Eritrean diaspora is under constant surveillance by the regime.

Sometimes this is done through the structures of the only legal party – the PFDJ.

Sometimes it is done through the Eritrean embassy.

Sometimes it is done by thugs who use brute force.

Every Eritrean living abroad knows that he or she are being monitored from Asmara. It hampers their lives, limits their ability to use democratic structures to resist the regime.

This article highlights some of these measures.

Dissent is managed partly by force, and partly by a rumour mill, known as Bado Seleste — Zero Three — a reference to a wartime propaganda service. The government has let it be known that there is an informant in every house, and that every phone is tapped.

Zero Three extends into the diaspora. Refugees refuse to speak on the record or be photographed for fear of reprisals against them or their families. Those that do put their heads above the parapet are targeted. Activists in London report being followed, having their tyres slashed and receiving late night phone calls.

Every independent journalist needs to be aware of this network of misinformation and repression.

It needs to be constantly guarded against, while ignoring the social media attacks by these state agents, and establishing reliable sources of information.

APRIL 16, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

United States Mission to the United Nations
Office of Press and Public Diplomacy
For Immediate Release

April 15, 2021

Statement by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield on the Situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray Region

Today the United States raised again in the Security Council its grave concern regarding the deteriorating humanitarian and human rights situation in Ethiopia’s Tigray region and credible reports that Eritrean forces are re-uniforming as Ethiopian military in order to remain in Tigray indefinitely. The Eritrean government must withdraw its forces from Ethiopia immediately.

We are horrified by the reports of rape and other unspeakably cruel sexual violence that continue to surface. The degradation and trauma associated with these attacks will have long-term effects on the affected communities. We condemn all sexual violence and demand perpetrators be brought to justice.

We acknowledge Prime Minister Abiy’s commitment to hold accountable all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses, and atrocities. The Eritrean government must make a similar commitment. We welcome the joint investigation by the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights and the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission in Tigray and urge them to complete this investigation as thoroughly and swiftly as possible.

An estimated 5.2 million people in Tigray are food insecure and require assistance and are at risk of famine. There remain challenges accessing populations in need, and some of these restrictions have been imposed by Eritrean forces. We continue to call for unhindered humanitarian access in Tigray. The United States has committed an additional $152 million to help address humanitarian needs in Tigray. We call on other international donors to increase assistance to meet the growing needs.

We call again for an end to hostilities and for the Ethiopian government to deliver upon a political settlement of the crisis; permit unhindered humanitarian access; allow for independent, international investigations into human rights abuses and violations; protect civilians; enact the immediate withdrawal of Eritrean and Amhara regional forces from Tigray; and hold those responsible for human rights violations accountable.

This crisis demands our attention and our action. It’s time for the Security Council to speak with one voice.

###

By Martin Plaut

Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, determined to use every available force in an attempt to crush the Tigrayan resistance, has reportedly turned to former Tigrayan fighters who were trained and armed by the Eritrean government.

These fighters belonged to the Tigray People's Democratic Movement [TPDM] - known as Demhit in Tigrigna.

Former members of the TPDM have been instructed to assemble in Mekele. Transport has reportedly been sent to collect them from as far as Humera on the Sudanese border.

They are apparently being promised cash and positions in the Prime Minister's party - the Prosperity Party.

When the Tigray war broke out in November 2020 many members of the Tigray opposition, including former TPDM members, joined the Tigray Defence Force to resist the attack on their homeland.

Those members of the TPDM who did not join the resistance are now being recruited by the government, but some have spoken out, saying they don't believe this is a genuine offer from the prime minister.

Members of TPDM returned to Tigray after Abiy Ahmed came to power in 2018 and a the peace deal between Eritrea and Ethiopia was signed.

While in Eritrea the TPDM were reportedly used by President Isaias to provide security in and around Asmara.

In September 2015 the Sudan Tribune reported that General Mola Asgedom, who led TPDM, had crossed into the Sudan, arriving in the border town of Hamdait.

It was reported that Asgedom escaped to Sudan after armed clashes broke out with the Eritrean army on the outskirts of the Eritrean city of Omhajer. Asgedom and 683 of his supporters crossed into Sudan and handed over their weapons to the Sudanese authorities.

The clashes apparently arose after the arrival of other Ethiopia rebels – Gimbot 7 of Berhanu Nega – who were allegedly being given preferential treatment by the Eritrean government.

General Mola Asgedom subsequently crossed into Ethiopia and was interviewed about his experiences in Eritrea on Ethiopian television.

Below is a background article on the TPDM by Global Security.

Tigray People’s Democratic Movement

The Tigray People’s Democratic Movement [TPDM] remained the most significant Ethiopian opposition group being trained, financed and hosted inside Eritrea as of 2015. The UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea. reported extensively on the continued support by Eritrea for TPDM in violation of paragraph 15 (b) of resolution 1907 (2009) (see S/2014/727 and S/2012/545).

TPDM, also known by its Tigrinya acronym “Demhit”, is an armed Ethiopian opposition group founded in 2001 by dissidents from the Ethiopian ruling party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. TPDM says on its website that its aim is “to establish a popular democratic government of Ethiopia where the rights of nation and nationality are respected”. In 2014, the UN Monitoring Group found that TPDM was being trained on Harena, an island in the Red Sea off the eastern coast of Eritrea, as well as in smaller military training outposts close to the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Moreover, in 2014, the Group reported that TPDM had become the most important Ethiopian opposition group inside Eritrea, with a dual function as an Ethiopian armed opposition group and a protector of the current regime. Its fighters, who hail from the same ethnic group as the President, are seen to be personally loyal to him. The support of Eritrea for TPDM appears to be more sustained and organized than its support for other Ethiopian armed groups (see S/2014/727).

In its report of June 2015, the commission of inquiry on human rights in Eritrea noted the presence of TPDM in Eritrea and reported its role in round -ups against Eritrean citizens who had failed to report to their national military (A/HRC/29/CRP.1, para. 1213). The findings were echoed by Europe-based activists in contact with Eritreans inside Eritrea who told the UN Monitoring Group that TPDM foreign fighters were involved in sweeps to round up people for conscription as recently as February 2015.

The Government of Eritrea facilitated and supported a move to unite a disparate group of armed Ethiopian opposition groups ahead of the Ethiopian general election that was held on 24 May 2015. The Group also received reports that a conference bringing together a number of Ethiopian opposition groups was held in western Eritrea. During the meeting, the groups, which included TPDM, the Patriotic Front, Ginbot Sebat and Arbegnoch, agreed to unify politically and militarily. The level of success and internal cohesion of the newly formed group is unclear.

ርእሰ-ዓንቀጽ ሰዲህኤ

ሓደ ተርእዮ ክኽሰት እንከሎ፡ ከከምቲ ኣብ ጉዳይካ ዘሕድሮ ጽልዋን ዝፈጥሮ ተጽዕኖን ምምዛኑ ንቡር እዩ። እዚ ዝኾነሉ ቀንዲ ምኽንያት ከኣ ኣብቶም ነቲ ምዕባለ ዘሳወሩ ኣካላት ካብ ዘለካ ናይ ምድጋፍን ምቅዋምን ስምዒት ጥራይ ዝነቅል ዘይኮነ፡ ኣብ ልዕሌኻ እውን ዘሕድሮ ዘይስገር ጽልዋ ስለ ዝህልዎ እዩ። እዚ ጽልዋ ኣብ ጥቓ እቲ ምዕባለ ዝፍጠረሉ ከባቢ ክትህሉ እንከለኻ ዝያዳ ይዓዝዝ። ከምኡ ስለ ዝኾነ ኢና ከኣ ብዛዕባ ኣብ ጐረባብትና ሃገራትን ህዝብታትን ዝፍጠር ጽቡቕ ይኹን ሕማቕ ክንግደስ እንግደድ። እቲ ኣብዚ እዋንዚ ኣብ ልዕሊ ህዝብን ንብረትን ትግራይ ዝካየድ ዘሎ ኣዝዩ ዘስደምምን ዘሕዝንን ጉድኣትን ብርሰትን ዘኸትል ዘሎ ውግእ እዋናዊ ኣሻቓሊ ኣጀንዳና ምዃኑ ከኣ ብመንጽርዚ ዝረአ እዩ። በቲ ኣብ መንጎ ህዝብታት ኤርትራን ትግራይን ኣብ ርእስቲ ጀኦግራፍያዊ ጉርብትና፡ ዘሎ ሕውነትን ብዙሕ መዳያዊ ምቅርራብን ከኣ ዝያዳ ቆላሕታ ክንህቦ ዘገድደና እዩ።

ሓደ ከምዚ ኣብ ትግራይ ዝካየድ ዘሎ ውግእ፡ ዝኣመሰለ ተርእዮ ምስ ተፈጥረ፡ ኣብ መንጎ ነቲ ተርእዮ ዘንብቡ ኣካላት ኣይኮነንዶ ኣባና ኣብ ዞባና እውን ፍልልያት ከም  ዝፍጠር ዘይትጽበዮ ኣይኮነን። እዚ ነቲ ተረኽቦ ኣብ ኣመዛዝና ዝፍጠር ፍልልይ ናይ ብዙሓት ፍልልያት መንቀሊ ክኸውን ዝኽእል እዩ። ካብ ተመኩሮና ክንነቅል እንከለና ኤርትራዊ ናይ ለውጢ ሓይልታት በብእዋኑ ብዙሓት ጉዳያት ኣብ ምምዛን ፍልልያት ከነመዝግብ ጸኒሕና ኢና። መሰረታዊ ባህርያትን መቖሚታትን ናይቲ ኣንጻሩ ንቃለስ ዘለና ጸረ ህዝቢ ጉጅለ ህግደፍ ኣብ ምልላይ’ኳ ፍልልይ ኣለና። ገሌና ብዓይኒ ሃይማኖት ንርእዮ። ገሌና ብዓይኒ ብሄር ንገልጾ። ገሌና ከኣ ካብዚ ጫፋትዚ ወጻኢ ብዓይኒ ወጽዓ፡ ጸረ ህዝባውነትን  ዲክታተርነትን ንዕቅኖ። ኣብ ኣወዳድባና ብዙሓት ክንከውን ካብ ዝድረኹ ምኽንያትት ሓደ ከኣ እዚ ኣብ ኣመዛዝና  እንታይነትን ባህርያትን ናይቲ ሓሙስ ሓሙስ ዝብል ዘሎ ጉጅለ ዘለና ፍልልይ እዩ።

በብእዋኑ ኣብ ከባቢና ክምዕብሉ ኣብ ዝጸንሑ ምዕባለታት እውን ከምዚ ኣቐዲሙ ዝተጠቕሰ፡ ዝተፈላለዩ ጫፋት ብምሓዝ ክንዋጠጥ ጸኒሕና ኢና። እቲ ተርእዮታት ኣብ ምምዛን ፍልልያት ምምዝጋብና እምብዛ ዘሰንብድ ኣይኮነን። እቲ ከጸግመና ዝጸንሐን ክሳብ ሕጂ ዘይገደፈናን፡ ነዚ ጫፋት ኣማእዚንካ ናይ ሓባር ሚዛን ናይ ምውናን ዓቕምና ኣዝዩ ድሩት ኮይኑ ምጽንሑን፡ ክሳብ ሕጂ እውን ክንሰግሮ ዘይምኽኣልና እዩ። እዚ ከኣ ከም ሓደ ናይ ኤርትራዊ ሓይልታት ለውጢ ብቕዓት ውሱንነት መርኣያ ኮይኑ ዘሎ እዩ። ምኽንያቱ እዚ፡  ፍልልያት ናይ ምክእኣል፡ ንመፍትሕታት ኣርሒቕካ ናይ ምርኣይ፡ ንናይ ሓሳብ እንካን ሃባን ግቡእ ቦታ ዘይምሃብ፡ ንናይ ተወዳዳሪኻ ርኢቶ ቦታ ናይ ምሃብ ክእለትና ዝብድህ ስለ ዝኾነ።

ኣብዚ እዋንዚ እውን ከም ወትሩ ብሓፈሻ ኣብ ጉዳይ ጐረቤትና ኢትዮጵያን ዘንጸላልዋ ዘሎ ስግኣታትን ብፍላይ ከኣ ኣብ ትግራይ ይካየድ ብዛዕባ ዘሎ ውግእ ዝተፈላለየ ሚዛናት ነንጸባርቕ ኣለና። ኣብዚ ጉዳይዚ ብጽሒትና እንታይ ይኹን ኣብ ዝብል እውን ከምኡ ኣብ ሓደ ኣንፈት የለናን። እዚ ፍልልያትዚ ነቲ ክሳብ ሕጂ ኣብ ኤርትራዊ ናይ ለውጢ ሓይሊ ኣጥሪናዮ ዘለና ምቅርራብ ብኣሉታ ከይጸልዎ ዘየስግእ እውን ኣይኮነን። ንጉዳይ ትግራይ ልክዕ ከም ጉዳይና ወሲድና ጠቕሊልና ኣካሉ ኮይና፡ ብኽንድኡ ደረጃ ነበርክተሉ ዝብል ርኢቶ ኣብ ብዙሓት መድረኻት ይንጸባረቕ ኣሎ። ብኣንጻሩ ነቲ ኣብ ልዕሊ ህዝቢ ትግራይ ኣዝዩ ዘስካሕክሕ ጉድኣት ዘውርድ ዘሎ ውግእ ዝድግፉን በቲ ዘለዎ ክቕጽል ዝደፍኡን ኣካላት እውን ኣለዉ። ክልቲኦም ኣካላት ናብዚ ጫፋትዚ ወሲዱና ዝብልዎ ምኽንያታት ኣለዎም። እዚ ጫፋትዚ በበይኑ ኣብ ዘዘለዎ እናተመዓዳደወ፡ ዘምጸኦ ኤርትራዊ ኮነ ትግራዋይ ፍታሕ የብሉን። ክልቲኡ ማዕረ ሓቂ ክኸውን እውን ኣይክእልን እዩ። ምኽንያቱ ብዛዕባ ሓደ ጉዳይ ክልተ ወይ ካብኡ ንላዕሊ ሓቅታት ክህሉ ስለ ዘይክእል። ቅሩብነትን ርትዓውነት እንተልዩ ግና፡ ነዚ ጫፋት ብዝተፈላለየ ኩርነዓቱ መዚካን  ኣማእዚንካን ብሓባር ከሰልፍ ዝኽእል መዋጸኦ ምርካብ ዘይከኣል ኣይምኾነን። ኮታ “ጉዳይ ትግራይ ጉዳይና ድዩ፡ ጉዳይ ጐረቤትና?” ዝብል ሕቶ ኣብ ቅድሜና ተገቲሩ ዘሎ እዩ ዝመስል። ብሰንኪ ኢድ ኣእታውነት ጉጅለ ህግደፍ ኣብዚ ኣብ ትግራይ ዝካየድ ዘሎ ውግእ፡ ኣብ ልዕሊ ህዝቢ ኤርትራን ትግራይን ዝወርድ ዘሎ፡ እቲ ጉጅለ እምበር ህዝብና ዘይሕተተሉ ጉድኣትን ቀጻሊ ኣሉታዊ ስንብራቱን “ተራ ጉዳይ ጐረቤት እዩ” ኢልና ክንሓልፎ ዘኽእለና ከምዘይኮነ ብሩህ እዩ። እቲ ኣብ ልዕሊቶም ኣብ ትግራይ ተዓቚቦም ዝነበሩ ኤርትራውያን ስደተኛታት ዝወረደ ግህሰታት እውን ተራ ጉዳይ ጐረቤት ጌርና ከይንወስዶ ዘገድደና እዩ።

እዚ ጫፋትዚ ደድሕሪ ዘዝተፈጥረ ሓድሽ ምዕባለ እንዳጐየኻ ዝውገን ዘይኮነ፡ ኣቐዲሙ  ትካላዊ መስርዑ ሓልዩ ብዝተሓንጸጸ መትከልን ካብኡ ብዝምዕብል መጽናዕትን እዩ ክግራሕ ዝግበኦ። ሰልፊ ዲሞክራሲ ህዝቢ ኤርትራ (ሰዲህኤ) ንኣብነት፡ ኣብ ፖለቲካዊ መደብ ዕዮኡ፡ ምስ ዝዀነ ሃገር ዝህልወና ዝምድና ሓባራዊ ረብሓ ንምዕዋት ዝዓለመ እዩ። ብፍላይ፡ ምስ ጐረባብትና ሃገራት ዝህልወና ዝምድና ኣብ ሓባራዊ ዕብየትና ኣገዳሲ ግደ ክጻወት ስለ ዝኽእል፡ ልዑላውነት ሕድሕድ ብምኽባር፣ ኣብ ውሽጣዊ ጉዳያት ሕድሕድ ብዘይምትእትታው፡ ንሰላምን ቍጠባዊ ዕብየትን ብሓባር ክንስርሕ ይግባእ።” ካብ ዝብል መሰረታዊ መበገሲ ነቒሉ፡ 10.3 ምስ ኩለን ሃገራት፡ ኣብ ሕድሕድ ረብሓታት፡ ምክብባርን ጣልቃ ዘይምትእትታውን፡ ዓለም-ለኻዊ ውዕላት ምኽባርን ዝተሰረተ ዝምድናታት ምፍጣር፤ 10.6 ኣንጻር ዝዀነ ይኹን ኣድልዎን ጭቆናን ዝቃለስ ፖሊሲ ምኽታል፤” ዝብሉ ዝርዝራት ኣስፊሩ ኣሎ። ስለዚ ከምዚ ኣብዚ እዋንዚ ኣብ ትግራይ ኣጋጢሙ ዘሎ ክረአ እንከሎ፡ በዚ ንዝምድናኡ ዝቕይስ ፖሊሲኡ ክጥምቶ ናይ ግድን እዩ። ነዚ ጨቢጡ ከኣ ምስ ካለኦት ኣብ ናይ ሓሳብ እንካን ሃባን መድረኽ ይኣትው።

Saturday, 17 April 2021 20:56

Radio Dimtsi Harnnet Sweden 17.04.2021

Written by

By Michelle Nichols

NEW YORK, April 16 (Reuters) - Eritrea told the United Nations Security Council on Friday that it has agreed to start withdrawing its troops from Ethiopia's Tigray region, acknowledging publicly for the first time the country's involvement in the conflict.

The admission in a letter to the 15-member council - and posted online by Eritrea's Ministry of Information - comes a day after U.N. aid chief Mark Lowcock said the world body had not seen any proof that Eritrean soldiers have withdrawn.

"As the looming grave threat has been largely thwarted, Eritrea and Ethiopia have agreed - at the highest levels - to embark on the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and the simultaneous redeployment of Ethiopian contingents along the international boundary," Eritrea's U.N. Ambassador Sophia Tesfamariam wrote.

Eritrean forces have been helping Ethiopian federal government troops fight Tigray's former ruling party in a conflict that began in November. However, until now Eritrea has repeatedly denied its forces are in the mountainous region.

Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed last month acknowledged the Eritrean presence and the United Nations and the United States have demanded that Eritrean troops withdraw from Tigray.

"Neither the U.N. nor any of the humanitarian agencies we work with have seen proof of Eritrean withdrawal," Lowcock told the Security Council on Thursday. "We have, however, heard some reports of Eritrean soldiers now wearing Ethiopian Defense Force uniforms."

The conflict has killed thousands of people and forced hundreds of thousands more from their homes in the region of 5 million.

Lowcock said there were "widespread and corroborated reports of Eritrean culpability in massacres and killings." Eritrean soldiers opened fire in an Ethiopian town on Monday, killing at least nine civilians and wounding more than a dozen others, a local government official told Reuters.

The Security Council has been briefed privately five times since the conflict began. According to Lowcock's briefing notes on Thursday, he told the body that sexual violence is being used as a weapon of war, the humanitarian crisis has deteriorated in the past month and people are now dying of hunger in Tigray.

"We heard false allegations of the 'the use of sexual violence and hunger as a weapon'," Tesfamariam wrote on Friday. "The allegations of rape and other crimes lodged against Eritrean soldiers is not just outrageous, but also a vicious attack on the culture and history of our people."

She said the priority should be the delivery of aid to civilians in Tigray. (Additional reporting by the Nairobi newsroom; editing by Jonathan Oatis)

Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles.

APRIL 17, 2021  NEWS

Somalia Women
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Women take part in a demonstration against the Somali President Mohamed Abdulahi Farmajo in Mogadishu on December 15, 2020 accused of interferences in the electoral process. STRINGER / AFP
 
 
STATEMENT AFRICA 16 APRIL 2021

u-fs50@l u-lh1 u-wbbw ]" dir="ltr" lang="en" style="box-sizing: inherit; margin-bottom: 1.5em;">Tensions are running high following the Somali parliament’s decision to extend the incumbent president’s mandate by two years. External partners should urgently convene – and mediate – talks among the country’s bitterly divided elites, to prevent its worst political crisis in years from escalating.

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Somalia’s long-running political crisis has entered a new, dangerous phase. In a hastily convened session on 12 April, members of parliament overwhelmingly endorsed a bill that would delay elections by two years, in effect extending the term in office of President Mohamed Abdullahi “Farmajo”. The move is an alarming escalation of a dispute that could well spiral into widespread violence unless Somalia’s political elites return to the negotiating table. The opposition is said to be considering forming a parallel government; cracks have deepened in a security apparatus long divided along clan lines; and the president’s opponents have vowed to resist extension of his rule. But even though the hour is late, it is not too late for the parties to reverse course. Somalia’s external partners, led by the African Union (AU) and backed by the U.S., the UN Security Council and the European Union, should step in to organise – and lead – fresh talks among all stakeholders to craft a roadmap to timely elections. All external actors should unambiguously signal readiness to impose sanctions on parties who obstruct a new initiative to find a consensual path forward.

The distrust that has prevented Somalia’s politicians from preparing elections has been on full display over the last few months. President Farmajo and leaders of Somalia’s subnational units, known as federal member states, agreed on a framework for indirect elections on 17 September 2020. But despite several rounds of subsequent talks, they have repeatedly failed to work out the voting system. Following the expiry of Farmajo’s four-year term on 8 February, the opposition demanded that he hand power to an interim government headed by the prime minister. An attempt by Farmajo’s rivals to hold demonstrations to press home this point was met with lethal force, with clashes between police and demonstrators leaving at least eight people dead. Somalia’s external partners then urged talks to resolve the deadlock. But the parties argued bitterly over the venue, the agenda and the security arrangements. When they finally convened on 3 April at Mogadishu’s international airport, which is guarded by AU troops, negotiations collapsed after four days.

In response, Farmajo and his supporters decided to raise the stakes by summoning parliament to initiate the term extension his opponents had consistently accused him of planning. During a special session convened by lower house Speaker Mohamed Abdirahman Mursal, MPs argued that the failure to reach a compromise made the 17 September agreement impossible to fulfil. They subsequently mandated the National Independent Electoral Commission to hold elections by universal suffrage in two years. The president signed the bill into law two days later.

The parliamentary decision has sent political tensions soaring to levels not seen in Somalia for years – and which could snowball into violence due to two key factors. First, the de facto term extension has shattered already low levels of trust among Somalia’s rival political actors. Farmajo’s opponents have rallied under the banner of the Council of Presidential Candidates, an alliance that includes two former presidents and a former prime minister. They represent important clan constituencies, including in Mogadishu, and have vehemently denounced the extension of Farmajo’s mandate, pledging unspecified action. These opposition candidates are allied with the presidents of the Puntland and Jubaland federal member states. Farmajo, for his part, enjoys the support of leaders from the federal regions of Galmudug, Hirshabelle and South West. With lines of communication cut between duelling parties and with the opposition said to be considering formation of a parallel government, the risk is high that parties will use force to secure political concessions.

 The crisis has sorely tested the cohesion of Somalia’s fragile army and police. Secondly, the crisis has sorely tested the cohesion of Somalia’s fragile army and police. Hours before parliament convened to vote on the term extension, Mogadishu police chief Sadiq “John” Omar condemned what he described as a power grab and ordered his men to block the entrance to the building, arguing that parliament’s term had expired. Police Commissioner General Hassan Hijar Abdi immediately dismissed Omar and sent forces to secure the venue. Well-placed security sources told Crisis Group that a number of soldiers from Somalia’s elite Turkish-trained Gorgor army units have since abandoned base and retreated to their clan strongholds. Elders from these clans also told Crisis Group that any attempt by authorities to disarm their troops will trigger full-scale fighting. The longer the crisis lasts, the greater the danger that these rifts will grow, raising the spectre of a return to civil war.

Resolving the crisis will not be easy. Farmajo has dug in, warning outside actors to stay out of Somalia’s internal affairs. The timing of the parliamentary decision – two days before the Muslim holy month of Ramadan began – was likely designed to limit the opposition’s capacity to hold demonstrations at a time when most Somalis are observing the fast. Publicly, the opposition has reacted with restraint. Privately, however, it is working to ensure that Farmajo does not get his way. If opposition politicians go ahead to form a parallel government, they will add fuel to the fire and send tensions soaring higher.

As Crisis Group has consistently advocated, there is no alternative to concerted third-party mediation to break the electoral impasse, given the distrust among Somalia’s actors. In the past, the reluctance of external partners to engage directly was understandable, not least due to Mogadishu’s insistence that it could broker a compromise through Somali-led talks. That claim no longer holds. Instead, the spiralling crisis threatens to undo all the progress made in establishing a degree of political stability in Somalia over the last two decades. Moreover, the political stalemate and the wrangling among security forces have offered an opening to Al-Shabaab militants. Emboldened by the partial withdrawals of Ethiopian and U.S. troops at the end of 2020, militants have already stepped up attacks and resumed the large-scale assaults on Somali and foreign military targets that outside forces had prevented them from staging for several years. The crisis has also offered a propaganda coup for the militants, who have boasted that it vindicates their depiction of elites as power-obsessed incompetents.

Somalia’s key external partners need to do more. They have shown admirable unity in rejecting the term extension, with the U.S., UN, AU, EU, UK and regional bloc IGAD all issuing strong statements to express opposition. Now they should urge all Somali actors to resume talks. Ideally the AU, through the office of Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security Bankole Adeoye, who has already shown interest in resolving the standoff, would mobilise external partners to step up their diplomacy. First, the AU, with the backing of key external partners, should appoint an envoy who, working in concert with the UN envoy, should meet the main parties separately and urge a return to talks. In particular, these emissaries should emphasise to Farmajo that he will need to accept external mediation, given that the opposition will not agree to talks under his supervision. To improve the chances of Farmajo shifting his position, the U.S. could engage directly with his key backers in Qatar and Turkey and urge them to prevail on the president to show greater flexibility, given the risk the crisis poses to Somalia’s stability.

 External actors should make clear that they are prepared to impose targeted sanctions. Next, external actors will need to coordinate with Somalia’s political elite in calling for an inclusive summit to discuss a pathway to elections. Convened by the AU, with the U.S., EU and UN acting as guarantors, such a meeting should focus on delivering a timeframe for elections within weeks, rather than months. Talks could build on the 17 September agreement, but would not necessarily be bound by it, as only a narrow section of the political elite – Farmajo and the presidents of federal member states – crafted the document. Realistically, however, any election would need to broadly follow the contours of the 17 September agreement, given that an indirect election is the only feasible way to hold a vote in today’s security environment, in which Al-Shabaab controls swathes of territory in the south-central Somali countryside. Ideally, new talks would involve more participants, particularly representatives of the Council of Presidential Candidates and civil society.

To ensure that parties stick to their commitments, external actors should make clear that they are prepared to impose targeted sanctions. The U.S. has signalled a willingness to take action and urged key actors to change course in response to the latest developments. The EU has also promised to take “concrete measures” if authorities do not reverse the term extension. These are positive early steps. Somalia’s elites crave the legitimacy that comes with international recognition. Many use foreign passports to travel, hold assets outside Somalia, and keep their families in the U.S. or EU countries. Credible threats to impose visa bans and asset freezes might well concentrate minds.

Despite its many domestic challenges, Somalia has managed to establish a degree of political stability in the past decade and a half. Most strikingly, political elites have fashioned consensus on election management in past electoral cycles and found a way to both hold regular votes and oversee peaceful transitions of power. The current impasse – which could easily tip into major violence – threatens to unravel those gains. Somalia’s elites must return to dialogue.

APRIL 16, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

Source: Al Jazeera

UN’s top humanitarian official warns conflict ‘is not over’ and says ‘vast majority’ of northern Ethiopian region ‘is completely or partially inaccessible’ for aid agencies.

15 Apr 2021

The United Nations and its aid partners have seen no proof of a declared withdrawal of Eritrean troops from Ethiopia’s Tigray region, according to the world body’s top humanitarian official, who also warned the situation in the embattled region has deteriorated.

The comments by Mark Lowcock during a closed-door UN Security Council meeting on Thursday came more than two weeks after Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed said Eritrea had agreed to withdraw the allied forces it had sent into the northern Ethiopian region during the conflict that broke out there in November 2020.

“Unfortunately, I must say that neither the UN nor any of the humanitarian agencies we work with have seen proof of Eritrean withdrawal,” the under-secretary general of humanitarian affairs told the council, according to a text of his speech seen by Al Jazeera.

After months of tension, Abiy sent government forces into Tigray on November 4 to detain and disarm leaders of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the then-regional ruling party that for decades dominated Ethiopia’s politics.

The winner of the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize said the move came in response to TPLF-orchestrated attacks on federal army camps. The TPLF said Abiy’s government and its longtime foe Eritrea launched a “coordinated attack” against it.

Abiy declared victory after federal forces entered the regional capital, Mekelle, on November 28 but fighting has continued and analysts warn of a prolonged deadlock in a conflict that is believed to have killed thousands of people and left more than five million people in need of aid.

“The humanitarian situation in Tigray has deteriorated,” said Lowcock, adding that the “vast majority” of the region of some six million people “is completely or partially inaccessible” for humanitarian agencies.

“The conflict is not over and things are not improving,” he continued, calling the “reports of systematic rape, gang rape and sexual violence … especially disturbing and alarmingly widespread”.

Civilians have been experiencing “targeted violence, mass killings and executions, and systematic sexual violence as a weapon of war”.

Thursday’s closed-door meeting was the latest in a number of similar sessions since the start of the conflict more than five months ago, but the Security Council has yet to release a statement.

“The Security Council has listened to these reports, it had closed-door meetings but it has been absolutely silent,” said Al Jazeera’s diplomatic editor James Bays, reporting from the UN headquarters in New York. “Security Council members have not managed to agree to a single statement on the situation.”

Asked by Al Jazeera what should be done to improve the situation in Tigray, UN spokesman Stephane Dujarric called for an increase in humanitarian access as well as “real movement” on human rights investigations into the “horrific reports” of atrocities and a “real reconciliation within the different groups in Tigray”.

After months of denials, Abiy last month admitted publicly that Eritrean troops had entered Tigray. UN chief Antonio Guterres once said the prime minister had “guaranteed” Eritrean forces were not there.

This week, Amnesty International said Eritrean troops on Monday had opened fire on civilians in Tigray’s Adwa town, in an “unprovoked” attack that killed at least three people and wounded 19 others.

The rights group’s regional director, Sarah Jackson, described the shooting as “yet another unlawful attack by Eritrean troops on civilians in Tigray”.

Forced Migration Unit, School of Law, University of Nottingham, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UK
Laws 202110(2), 28; https://doi.org/10.3390/laws10020028
Received: 8 February 2021 / Revised: 28 March 2021 / Accepted: 29 March 2021 / Published: 13 April 2021
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Refugees and International Law: The Challenge of Protection)
Despite the overwhelming evidence of human rights violations within the Eritrean Military/National Service Programme (“MNSP”), adjudication of asylum applications made by Eritreans remains a challenge. Narrow interpretations of “slavery” have created obstacles for protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1951 Refugee Convention”).
This article discusses MST and Others, the latest Country Guidance case on Eritrea issued by the UK Upper Tribunal Immigration and Asylum Chamber (“UTIAC”), and also the lead case E-5022/2017 of the Swiss Federal Administrative Court (“FAC”), which to a large extent replicated the UTIAC’s approach. The article focuses on how “slavery,” “servitude” and “forced labour” under article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) have been interpreted in the British and Swiss case-law. While both, the British and the Swiss Courts, had recourse to the European Court of Human Rights’ (“ECtHR”) interpretation of article 4(1) ECHR (the right not to be subjected to slavery or servitude), they refused the applicability of international criminal law notions to this provision, and thus to the concept of “persecution” in article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
In doing so, the UTIAC and the FAC set unreasonable requirements to satisfy article 4(1) ECHR. Due to the very limited case-law pertaining to slavery by the ECtHR, the ECHR does not offer an appropriate framework for examining asylum applications of victims of slavery. It is therefore suggested that slavery cases are considered against a wider legal framework, which involves the examination of concepts developed by international criminal law (“ICL”). ICL has indeed developed a significant body of jurisprudence on the interpretation of the international law concept of “slavery” and its application to contemporary situations.
The article contrasts the British and Swiss Courts’ position to develop an interpretative approach that connects different areas of international law, including not only international refugee law and international human rights law (“IHRL”), but also ICL. If applied in line with the principle of systemic integration and according to the overall purposes of the 1951 Refugee Convention, this approach would yield consistent results. Ultimately, this article seeks to assist asylum decision-makers and practitioners in the interpretation and application of the refugee definition to asylum applications of persons from Eritrea. View Full-Text

APRIL 15, 2021  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

Source: African Arguments

The Tale of Eritrean Withdrawal from Tigray: But Where is the Border?

Debating Ideas is a new section that aims to reflect the values and editorial ethos of the African Arguments book series, publishing engaged, often radical, scholarship, original and activist writing from within the African continent and beyond. It will offer debates and engagements, contexts and controversies, and reviews and responses flowing from the African Arguments books.

Issaias and Abiy

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 Credit: All Africa

During a session in parliament on March 23, 2021 Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia publicly acknowledged Eritrean involvement in his country’s ongoing civil war in Tigray but indicated that it would take some time for Eritrea’s forces to withdraw. Three days later, the Prime Minister issued a statement announcing that the government of Eritrea had “agreed to withdraw its forces out of the Ethiopian border” and that the Ethiopian army “will take over guarding the border area effective immediately”. This begrudging admission – after four months of unconvincing denial – that Eritrea was in fact waging war inside Ethiopia was, in large measure, a result of sustained pressure from the European Union and the Biden Administration in the United States. However, the announcement raises several important questions, one of which has been at the heart of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict all along and could determine its conclusion or continuation.

Selling reorganizing and rotating units as withdrawal

In responding to questions from members of the Ethiopian House of Representatives, Abiy Ahmed explained away Eritrea’s crossing of the border into Ethiopia as a response to TPLF provocations and because the suddenly weakened Ethiopian military could not give security guarantees to Eritrea. He assured the parliamentarians that once Ethiopia rebuilds its pre-war military capacity to guard its own borders, the issue of Eritrean troop presence in Tigray would cease to exist. One is then compelled to ask how it is that in three days Ethiopia regained its pre-war military strength to guard its borders, give Eritrea the needed security guarantees, and execute Eritrean military withdrawal. Ethiopia is in no position to demand withdrawal of Eritrean military; without whose support it could not contain – much less defeat – the TPLF. Nor would President Isaias give in to such demands as he seeks total demise of the TPLF.

The Prime Minister’s announcement of Eritrean withdrawal from Tigray is nothing more than public relations theatrics. Troop movements on the ground show that Isaias’ regime, with the connivance of the Ethiopian government, is merely reorganizing and reinforcing its units and repositioning them for plausible deniability while it continues with its scorched earth campaign against the TPLF/TDF, and indeed the people of Tigray. Before the Prime Minister’s announcement, six brigades had returned from Tigray to Eritrea. These brigades belonged to three infantry divisions that carried out the bulk of fighting and bore the brunt of casualties. Their return to Eritrea had more to do with their need to recuperate and replenish their personnel than an intent to withdraw from Ethiopia.

Since Prime Minister Abiy’s announcement, confidential sources on and near the ground report that there has indeed been large-scale movement of Eritrean troops within Tigray and between Eritrea and Tigray. Accordingly, as of late March 2021, an entire division composed of popular militia has returned to central Eritrea. A unit of the 23rd Division has also reported back and has been sighted in western Eritrea. The fast-changing developments make it hard to conclusively establish final position or deployment destination. But while a few units have returned to Eritrea and a few others have been rotated to the border area, credible reports from the ground indicate that the Eritrean government has in fact reinforced its forces in Tigray rather than drawn them down. On balance, confidential sources from the area are reporting that Isaias Afwerki has as of late March/early April committed some 40 percent of Eritrean military personnel in a last-ditch effort to finish off what remains of the TPLF.

Partially because of that troop build-up, fighting has intensified across many parts of Tigray. The other reason for the intensification of fighting is because Tigrayan forces are ambushing Eritrean government forces on the move and attacking their rear as they are rotated to new positions. Two such rotated brigades of the 16th Division, for example, travelled in a large convoy from areas of active fighting in Tigray’s lowlands and arrived in Biyara and Badme at the end of March 2021. These two villages were once contested between the two countries and Ethiopia held them until the outbreak of the current war because the TPLF refused to relinquish them to Eritrea. Even if one were to assume the remaining Eritrean troops were to be similarly rotated to the border between the two countries, the exact location and legality of that border remains unresolved.

The unresolved border dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia

Following the 1998–2000 border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, an international arbitral court ruled on the delineation of the border between the two countries. The TPLF-led government in Ethiopia first rejected the ruling and later demanded to negotiate its implementation, i.e. physical demarcation of the border. President Isaias Afwerki rejected all attempts at negotiations and insisted, instead, that the border ruling is first upheld to the letter and the border demarcated. Eritrea bore hefty consequences of the ensuing sixteen years of no-war no-peace.

The rise of Abiy Ahmed to power in 2018, and his offer of peace with Eritrea that included full acceptance of the International Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the border, presented an opportunity to settle the issue for good. Instead of demanding the demarcation of the border as he had done during the TPLF era, President Isaias dropped his steadfastly held position and altogether bypassed the neighboring Tigray region to make common cause with the young, inexperienced but hugely ambitious new Prime Minister in Addis Ababa. The two leaders travelled regularly to each other’s capitals, scheming the eradication of their common enemy, the TPLF, which took precedence over the permanent settlement of the border issue. The Eritrean leader especially betrayed his country’s best interests in pursuit of vengeance against his enemies now confined in the Tigray region of Ethiopia.

One wonders about the usefulness of the conflict even if it is aimed at the existential necessity of eliminating the TPLF. Are we better off today, even if we assume for a moment that the TPLF is gone, which has not yet happened? How much more useful would it have been to find some form of a compromise, some give-and-take, an accommodation with a little loss of face and pride in the interest of avoiding war, than the disaster and generational calamity we find ourselves in today? The tenor of these questions also applies to the TPLF, which is an equal party to the ongoing war.

Conclusion

The border issue between the two countries remains unresolved, and an interstate or irredentist confrontation could keep flaring up unless the boundary is demarcated on the ground and the issue is settled once and for all. It would, therefore, be critically important for the United States, the European Union, the African Union and the United Nations to bring the border issue back to the table and help resolve it permanently. Resolving the contention between the current or future governments and other actors in the two countries is paramount as such a resolution would deny President Isaias (or future leaders in either country) any pretext to cross a mutually accepted and clearly defined international border. In the context of the current conflict, without a mutually agreed upon clear delineation and demarcation of the border, the Ethiopian Prime Minister’s declaration rings hollow. So do the grand ideas about cooperation between the two countries on a wish-list of mutually beneficial initiatives.

Recommendations:

First, the current conflict in Tigray must end immediately. Not only is it an unwinnable war but also the issues that led to it can only be resolved through political means. Therefore, the following four things need to happen expeditiously:

  1. The immediate, complete, unconditional and internationally verified withdrawal of Eritrean forces from Tigray and any other parts of Ethiopia.
  2. An internationally monitored ceasefire in Tigray, unfettered humanitarian access and protection of civilians and refugees.
  3. The urgent demarcation of the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
  4. A political dialogue on all aspects of the conflict, including matters related to the Tigray’s relations with Eritrea.
  5. An independent investigation of all the alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Tigray.

I have no illusions about the difficult work this will involve. The nature of the conflict, the current alignment of interests, the level of political and military investments by all (including the scale and size of their deployments), and above all, the obdurate nature of President Isaias, offer little hope, if any, of an Eritrean withdrawal anytime soon. But the alternative is the continuation of this horrendous war with even ghastlier consequences for civilians and for regional stability. The regional impact of the Tigray war is already being felt, and far greater risks loom on the horizon. The international community simply cannot allow this conflict to continue. As an immediate measure, it must put concerted, constant pressure on both Addis Ababa and Asmara to effect an Eritrean withdrawal that is subject to independent verification through the United Nations or another multilateral mechanism. This is positive pressure for peace, not interference. And we know that the two governments are not impervious to such pressure when the message is firm and unambiguous.

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