For those who don’t live in Israel, Hotline for Refugees and Migrants has for years been a critical source of support for refugees. Their work has helped countless Ethiopian, Eritrean and Sudanese who fled to Israel, hoping for asylum. Sadly, the Israeli state regards them as “infiltrators” and only a handful are granted full refugee status.
Hotline for Refugees and Migrants fights for their rights.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
“Forces from neighboring Eritrea have joined the war in northern Ethiopia, and have rampaged through refugee camps committing human rights violations, officials and witnesses say.”
Source: New York Times
Forces from neighboring Eritrea have joined the war in northern Ethiopia, and have rampaged through refugee camps committing human rights violations, officials and witnesses say.
Declan Walsh and
NAIROBI, Kenya — As fighting raged across the Tigray region of northern Ethiopia last month, a group of soldiers arrived one day at Hitsats, a small hamlet ringed by scrubby hills that was home to a sprawling refugee camp of 25,000 people.
The refugees had come from Eritrea, whose border lies 30 miles away, part of a vast exodus in recent years led by desperate youth fleeing the tyrannical rule of their leader, one of Africa’s longest-ruling autocrats. In Ethiopia, Eritrea’s longtime adversary, they believed they were safe.
But the soldiers who burst into the camp on Nov. 19 were also Eritrean, witnesses said. Mayhem quickly followed — days of plunder, punishment and bloodshed that ended with dozens of refugees being singled out and forced back across the border into Eritrea.
For weeks, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia has denied that soldiers from Eritrea — a country that Ethiopia once fought in an exceptionally brutal war — had entered Tigray, where Mr. Abiy has been fighting since early November to oust rebellious local leaders.
In fact, according to interviews with two dozen aid workers, refugees, United Nations officials and diplomats — including a senior American official — Eritrean soldiers are fighting in Tigray, apparently in coordination with Mr. Abiy’s forces, and face credible accusations of atrocities against civilians. Among their targets were refugees who had fled Eritrea and its harsh leader, President Isaias Afwerki.
“Abiy has invited a foreign country to fight against his own people,” said Awol Allo, a former Abiy supporter turned outspoken critic who lectures in law at Keele University in Britain. “The implications are huge.”
Mr. Abiy insists he was forced to move his army quickly in Tigray after the region’s leaders, who had dominated Ethiopia for 27 years until Mr. Abiy took over in 2018, mutinied against his government. But in the early weeks of the fight, Ethiopian forces were aided by artillery fired by Eritrean forces from their side of the border, an American official said.
Since then, Mr. Abiy’s campaign has been led by a hodgepodge of forces, including federal troops, ethnic militias and, evidently, soldiers from Eritrea.
At Hitsats, Eritrean soldiers initially clashed with local Tigrayan militiamen in battles that rolled across the camp. Scores of people were killed, including four Ethiopians employed by the International Rescue Committee and the Danish Refugee Council, aid workers said.
The chaos deepened in the days that followed, when Eritrean soldiers looted aid supplies, stole vehicles and set fire to fields filled with crops and a nearby forested area used by refugees to collect wood, aid workers said. The camp’s main water tank was riddled with gunfire and emptied.
Their accounts are supported by satellite images, obtained and analyzed by The New York Times, that show large patches of newly scorched earth in and around the Hitsats camp after the Eritrean forces swept through.
Video
Later, soldiers singled out several refugees — camp leaders, by some accounts — bundled them into vehicles and sent them back across the border to Eritrea.
“She’s crying, crying,” said Berhan Okbasenbet, an Eritrean now in Sweden whose sister was driven from Hitsats to Keren, the second-largest city in Eritrea, alongside a son who was shot in the fighting. “It’s not safe for them in Eritrea. It’s not a free country.”
Ms. Berhan asked not to publish their names, fearing reprisals, but provided identifying details that The New York Times verified with an Ethiopian government database of refugees.
Mr. Abiy’s spokeswoman did not respond to questions for this article. However, a few weeks ago the United Nations secretary general, António Guterres, bluntly asked Mr. Abiy if Eritrean troops were fighting in his war. “He guaranteed to me that they have not entered Tigrayan territory,” Mr. Guterres told reporters on Dec. 9.
Those denials have been met with incredulity from Western and United Nations officials.
The Trump administration has demanded that all Eritrean troops immediately leave Tigray, a United States official said, citing reports of widespread looting, killings and other potential war crimes.
It remains unclear how many Eritreans are in Tigray, or precisely where, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss delicate diplomacy. A communications blackout over Tigray since Nov. 4 has effectively shielded the war from outside view.
But that veil has slowly lifted in recent weeks, as witnesses fleeing Tigray or reaching telephones have begun to give accounts of the fighting, the toll on civilians and pervasive presence of Eritrean soldiers.
In interviews, some described fighters with Eritrean accents and wearing Ethiopian uniforms. Others said they witnessed televisions and refrigerators being looted from homes and businesses. A European official, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss confidential findings, said some of those stolen goods were being openly sold in the Eritrean capital, Asmara.
The reports of Eritrean soldiers sweeping through Tigray are especially jarring to many Ethiopians.
Ethiopia and Eritrea were once the best of enemies, fighting a devastating border war in the late 1990s that cost 100,000 lives. Although the two countries are now officially at peace, many Ethiopians are shocked that the old enemy is roaming freely inside their borders.
“How did we let a state that is hostile to our country come in, cross the border and brutalize our own people?” said Tsedale Lemma, editor in chief of the Addis Standard newspaper. “This is an epic humiliation for Ethiopia’s pride as a sovereign state.”
Mr. Abiy has already declared victory in Tigray and claimed, implausibly, that no civilians have died. But last week his government offered a $260,000 reward for help in capturing fugitive leaders from the regional governing party, the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front — a tacit admission that Mr. Abiy has failed to achieve a major stated goal of his campaign.
In fact, the biggest winner so far may be his Eritrean ally, Mr. Isaias.
Since coming to power in 1993, Mr. Isaias has won a reputation as a ruthless and dictatorial figure who rules with steely determination at home and who meddles abroad to exert his influence.
For a time he supported the Islamist extremists of the Shabab in Somalia, drawing U.N. sanctions on Eritrea, before switching his loyalties to the oil-rich — and Islamist-hating — United Arab Emirates.
The peace pact signed by the two leaders initially raised hopes for a new era of stability in the region. Ultimately, it amounted to little. By this summer, borders that opened briefly had closed again.
But Mr. Abiy and Mr. Isaias remained close, bonded by their shared hostility toward the rulers of Tigray.
They had different reasons to distrust the Tigrayans. For Mr. Abiy the Tigray People’s Liberation Front was a dangerous political rival — a party that had once led Ethiopia and, once he became prime minister, began to flout his authority openly.
For Mr. Isaias, though, it was a deeply personal feud — a story of grievances, bad blood and ideological disputes that stretched back to the 1970s, when Eritrea was fighting for independence from Ethiopia, and Mr. Isaias joined with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front to fight an Ethiopian Marxist dictator.
Those differences widened after 1991, when Eritrea became independent and the Tigrayans had come to power in Ethiopia, culminating in a devastating border war.
“It’s typical Isaias,” said Mr. Plaut. “He seeks to project power in ways that are completely unimaginable for the leader of such a small country.”
Aid groups warn that, without immediate access, Tigray will soon face a humanitarian disaster. The war erupted just as villagers were preparing to harvest their crops, in a region already grappling with swarms of locusts and recurring drought.
Refugees are especially vulnerable. According to the United Nations, 96,000 Eritrean refugees were in Tigray at the start of the fight, although some camps have since emptied. An internal U.N. report from Dec. 12, seen by The Times, described the situation at Hitsats as “extremely dire,” with no food or water.
Farther north at Shimelba camp, Eritrean soldiers beat refugees, tied their hands and left them under the sun all day, said Efrem, a resident who later fled to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital.
“They poured milk on their bodies so they would be swarmed with flies,” he said.
Later, Efrem said, the soldiers rounded up 40 refugees and forced them to travel back across the border, to Eritrea.
Declan Walsh reported from Nairobi, Kenya, and Simon Marks from Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. contributed reporting from Washington, an Christiaan Triebert from New York
Gradually, as the two-month-old war in Ethiopia unfolded, the evidence of the involvement of Eritrean Forces in the Tigray conflict has mounted. Despite attempts by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s Government to restrict access to the war zone, news has filtered out. On Sunday, 20 December 2020 and for the first time, an independent Belgian news outlet confirmed in gruesome detail the atrocities committed by Eritrean Forces. We now have first-hand reports of what is taking place. These reports are supported by parties in Tigray like the Assimba Democratic Party, that opposes the ruling Prosperity party. Eritrean Forces are deep inside Ethiopia and fighting alongside Federal Forces and Amhara Militia. This war has become an international conflict with catastrophic ramification across the whole region and beyond.
We, the undersigned, acknowledge with heavy hearts and great sadness the evidence that Eritrean Forces have undertaken and participated in what can only be described as war crimes. Atrocities, including the killing of civilians and rape of women, have been perpetrated. This has been accompanied by widespread looting, including centuries-old religious artifacts, by organised groups that are coordinated from Eritrea. We hear of lorries being sent to accompany Eritrean units whose specific mission is to remove anything of value that they can lay their hands on. This loot has been taken to Eritrea, most of it stockpiled with some appearing in local markets.
These are illegal acts. They are a stain on the great values and tradition of the Eritrean people who fought with such courage for so many years for our independence. They bring shame to the memory of our martyrs who laid down their lives for our nation. They will also put a further strain on the relationship between Eritreans and Tigryeans that is yet to fully heal from the 1998-2000 bloody border war. We commend our people for refraining from purchasing this loot. We support the Catholic Church’s and other community leaders’ call on people not to buy stolen goods.
These vile and despicable acts are coordinated and conducted on behalf of President Isaias Afwerki and those around him. Those that carried out these crimes must be held to account. We encourage Eritreans to come forward with the names of people involved and the specific types of crimes they committed.
These crimes go against Eritrean core values of decency, respect for fellow human beings, honesty and integrity. Theft and looting are frowned upon and thieves treated as ‘outcasts’ in our society. These values are ingrained in Eritrean society and make us who we are. The abuses, looting and killings that are now being perpetrated in Tigray are a clear manifestation of the atrocities our people endured in the hands of President Isaias over the last three decades. They are cowardly, disgusting, abhorrent and shameful acts.
We call on Prime Minster Abiy, who started this war in the name of “law enforcement” to protect his own people from abuses, looting and killings by a foreign power. If the Prime Minister is unwilling or incapable of protecting his own people, we ask the international community to head the call by the UN Human Rights Commission for an international investigation into these heinous crimes. We plead with the international community to intervene before it is too late.
As Eritreans, we say this unequivocally: the people of Tigray, like all the people of Ethiopia, are our brothers and sisters. We are determined to build an Eritrea that is at peace with itself and its neighbours.
May 2021 bring peace and prosperity for the long-suffering people of the Horn of Africa.
WWW.HRC – Eritrea – Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (hrc-eritrea.org)
————————– ENDS ————————
The UN refugee agency said it had received “an overwhelming number of credible reports” that refugees had been killed, abducted and forcibly returned to the one-party state during the current conflict. Although it did not say who was behind the abductions, a refugee told the BBC that it was Eritrean soldiers who loaded them onto lorries in the town of Adigrat and took them across the border to Adi Quala town.
Source: BBC
In a sign of the changing political fortunes of a man who was once a pariah, Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki has proven to be a staunch ally of Ethiopia’s Nobel Peace Prize winner and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, giving his troops much-needed support to fight the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Tigray.
In a recent address to the Ethiopian parliament, the Nobel laureate revealed that Eritrea, a highly militarised one-party state, had fed, clothed and armed retreating Ethiopian soldiers when the TPLF first attacked them and seized their bases in Tigray, an Ethiopian region which borders Eritrea.
Mr Abiy said this made it possible for them to return to fight the TPLF, a former guerrilla movement with about 250,000 forces, until it was ousted from power in the region on 28 November.
“The Eritrean people have shown us… they are a relative standing by us on a tough day,” he added.
IMAGE COPYRIGHTGETTY IMAGESThis was a significant acknowledgement by Mr Abiy, though he did not go as far as to admit claims that Mr Isaias, had also sent troops to help defeat the TPLF, a long-time foe of the Eritrean leader who has been in power since 1993.
The claim that Eritrean troops are fighting in Tigray was made by the TPLF, civilians fleeing the conflict, and Eritreans inside and outside the country.
“Isaias is sending young Eritreans to die in Tigray. The war will also further weaken the economy. But Isaias will be in power for a long time. He lets people fight for their survival so that they do not fight for their freedom,” said Paulos Tesfagiorgis, an Eritrean human rights campaigner who was forced into exile by the regime in Asmara.
A US state department spokesperson also said there were “credible reports” of the presence of Eritrean troops in Tigray, and called it a “grave development”.
Both governments deny the reports, with Eritrea’s foreign minister, Osman Saleh Mohammed, describing them as “propaganda”.
As for UN chief António Gueterres, he said Mr Abiy had assured him there were no Eritrean troops in Tigray, except in territory that Ethiopia had agreed to hand over following a historic peace deal between the two nations in 2018.
The deal ended the “no war-no peace” situation that had existed between the two nations since their 1998-2000 border war, which left up to 100,000 people dead. It earned Mr Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize, though the territory had not been transferred to Eritrea by the time the conflict in Tigray had started in early November.
Mr Abiy’s government has heavily restricted access to Tigray for the media, UN agencies and human rights bodies, making it difficult to verify reports or to investigate allegations of atrocities made against all sides in the conflict – including the shelling of a hospital from Eritrean territory.
Eritrea has not commented on the alleged shelling, mentioned in a statement by the UN human rights chief. Mr Abiy denies that his troops have killed a single civilian in Tigray.
“This war has been fought in absolute darkness. No-one knows the true scale of the conflict or its impact,” said Kenya-based Horn of Africa analyst Rashid Abdi.
US-based analyst Alex de Waal said he had been informed by a UN source that the conflict had caused the “large-scale displacement” of people in the region, the poorest in Ethiopia with a population of about five million.
“If it goes on like this, there will be mass starvation in Tigray, and a population that is embittered and angry,” Mr de Waal said.
He added that he had also learned from reliable sources in Tigray, including clerics, that Eritrean forces were involved in looting.
“We are hearing that they are even stealing doors [and] bathroom fittings,” he said.
Other Eritreans said that soldiers, including their relatives, were fighting TPLF forces on several fronts, and some of them were even wearing Ethiopian camouflage.
Eritrea insists that it does not have troops in Tigray, with its foreign minister quoted as saying: “We are not involved.”
But exiled former Eritrean diplomat Abdella Adem said he personally knew soldiers who had been wounded in combat, while a source at the public hospital in Eritrea’s southern town of Senafe told the BBC that both Eritrean and Ethiopian troops had been treated there.
Other sources in Eritrea said that Ethiopian troops had also been seen regrouping around the central town of Hagaz, and taking their wounded to the nearby Gilas Military Hospital.
UK-based Eritrean academic Gaim Kibreab said he believed that Mr Isaias had sent troops to Tigray to pursue the “liquidation” of the TPLF, which, he added, has been the Eritrean leader’s key objective since the 1998-2000 border war.
The TPLF was in power at the time in Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray regional government.
“In the war of 1998-2000, the TPLF humiliated the president [Mr Isaias] by taking over the small village of Badme. Even when an international tribunal ruled that the village belonged to Eritrea, the TPLF refused to withdraw from the occupied place for 18 years.
“The president has been waiting for this moment and the TPLF underestimated his craftiness and patience at its own peril,” Mr Gaim added.
Mr Isaias’ supporters insist that Eritrean troops have not crossed into Tigray, saying they had only pursued the objective of regaining sovereign territory by taking over Badme, and surrounding areas, without causing casualties.
Expressing a different view, Mr Paulos said: “Badme is back in Eritrean hands, but there has been no public announcement about it because that is not Isaias’ main concern. He is still pushing on to crush the TPLF.
“Abiy started as a peacemaker and a reformer, but he then fell into the trap of seeking revenge against the TPLF, which is what Isaias wanted.”
Celebrations broke out at the Ethiopia-Eritrea border when it reopened in 2018Mr Abiy says he tried to resolve differences with the TPLF peacefully, but was forced to act against it after it seized military bases in a night-time raid on 3 November, convincing him that it wanted to overthrow his government.
Although Mr Isaias rallied to his aid at the time, Eritrean state media has kept its audiences in the dark about the conflict, failing to even report on the TPLF-fired missiles that landed on the outskirts of the capital Asmara in early November, causing loud explosions that were heard by residents.
“Eritrean TV talks of bombs in Syria but when the missiles landed in Asmara, it said nothing,” noted exiled Eritrean former government official Dawit Fisehaye said.
In a tweet, Eritrea’s information minister Yemane Meskel said it was “pointless to amplify its [the TPLF’s] last-ditch, predictable, though inconsequential acts”.
Internet access in Eritrea is limited and the country has no independent media and no opposition parties – the fate of 11 politicians and 17 journalists detained almost 20 years ago remains unknown.
Furthermore, military conscription is compulsory while job opportunities are limited, resulting in many people – especially youths – fleeing the country. About 100,000 had been living for years in UN camps in Tigray.
Eritrea has a population of more than 5.5 millionThe UN refugee agency said it had received “an overwhelming number of credible reports” that refugees had been killed, abducted and forcibly returned to the one-party state during the current conflict.
Although it did not say who was behind the abductions, a refugee told the BBC that it was Eritrean soldiers who loaded them onto lorries in the town of Adigrat and took them across the border to Adi Quala town.
Eritrea has not commented on its alleged involvement, but it has previously accused the UN agency of “smear campaigns” and of trying to depopulate the country.
Mr Dawit said he did not believe that the regime would ever reform.
”There was no change in Eritrea up to now because the leadership did not want it and the demise of the TPLF will not change that. Expecting reform is a pipedream,” he added.
![A Sudanese military personnel seen in Khartoum, Sudan on July 21, 2020 [Mahmoud Hjaj / Anadolu Agency]](https://i1.wp.com/www.middleeastmonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/20200721_2_43552309_56880166-1200x800.jpg?resize=840%2C560&ssl=1)
Source: Memo
The Sudanese Minister of Information Faisal Mohamed Saleh has accused the Ethiopian army of being behind the attacks targeting Sudanese territory over the past few days, constituting the latest escalation in the discourse between the two countries on the ongoing border crisis.
The Sudanese minister confirmed that intelligence reports indicate that the weapons used in the attacks belong to the army, in a clear reference to Addis Ababa which denied any involvement in the attacks.
However, at the same time, Saleh expressed: “The Sudanese government welcomes any friendly and diplomatic solution to the differences with Ethiopia.”
Sudanese military sources confirmed that the Sudanese army had deployed additional military units in the eastern region of Wad Aroud, adjacent to the Ethiopian border, reported local media.
The Ethiopian militias also deployed military reinforcements, including troop carriers and artillery, west of the Abd Al-Rafia area near the Sudanese border, in anticipation of an upcoming military confrontation between the two sides.
Read: Ethiopia, Sudan agree solution to end unrest at border
The border negotiations between Sudan and Ethiopia have reached a dead-end, following the failure of bilateral talks that took place in Khartoum.
The sources added that the two delegations would convey to their leadership the results of the talks and the obstacles facing the two parties during the negotiations that started last Tuesday, in light of the ongoing clashes.
Sources have previously indicated that the distance separating the two parties to the conflict does not exceed three kilometres. It has been suggested that the situation on the ground warns of a possible confrontation, especially after units of the Sudanese army responded on Wednesday to attacks launched by the militias targeting the Jabal Abu Tayyour area.
The Sudanese army launched a large-scale military operation in early November to recover agricultural lands seized by the Ethiopian militias with the support of the Ethiopian army.
Source: Xinhau
UNITED NATIONS, Dec. 24 (Xinhua) — One of the two UN teams tasked to assess the humanitarian needs in Ethiopia’s Tigray region is being stranded, said Stephane Dujarric, spokesman for UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, on Thursday.
One team is now in Mekelle, capital of Tigray, waiting to proceed to Adigrat. The other team, however, had not proceeded to Shire as planned due to additional permissions requested by the authorities, the spokesman quoted UN humanitarians as saying.
The Ethiopian Ministry of Peace is expected to facilitate the clearance as soon as possible, he told a press briefing.
Health, nutrition, food, water, sanitation and hygiene as well as non-food items are the priority needs, said Dujarric.
The spokesman said Wednesday that humanitarian assistance started to gradually trickle into Tigray although access was limited in areas where conflict was ongoing.
Since Nov. 4, the Ethiopian government has been undertaking military operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which rules Ethiopia’s northernmost Tigray state. The federal government’s operations followed the TPLF’s attack on a command base of the Ethiopian Defense Force in Mekelle. Enditem
Source: Middle East Institute
December 23, 2020
The Biden Administration is set to face a series of challenges in the Horn of Africa. Given growing Russian and Chinese involvement in this strategically important region, U.S. policymakers should be attuned to the historical background and current dynamics in the relevant countries. In the Horn of Africa, the U.S. can ameliorate the COVID-19 pandemic, stem ongoing civil strife, and ease intraregional tensions. To achieve these objectives, the U.S. will need to adopt bold strategies based on lessons from the past. This article provides essential context about the region and proposes policy measures for the incoming administration.
1. Introduction
2. The Unfolding “Triple Threat” Humanitarian Crisis
3. Country Profiles from the Horn of Africa
4. The Return of Russia to the Horn of Africa
5. Failing Horn of Africa Integration
6. Where the U.S. and EU Are Getting It Wrong
As Joe Biden prepares to take office on Jan. 20, 2021, the U.S. and the world are facing multiple crises. Now is one of the worst times in American history as the country struggles through a major economic recession and a pandemic that has taken more than 300,000 American lives. Biden is no stranger to economic crises, having served as vice president under the Obama administration during the Great Recession in 2009. Undoubtedly, Biden’s experience as a senator and VP makes him ready to tackle America’s domestic challenges and to reset relations with its allies.
In the Horn of Africa, his upcoming administration will grapple with longstanding challenges. However, this time, he will have to deal with the emboldened and unchecked leaders of the Horn of Africa — Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, President Mohamed Abdullahi (Farmaajo) of Somalia, and President Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea. Recently, the three leaders have formed an axis through the Horn of Africa Cooperation (HoAC) deal to consolidate security, stability, and economic integration.1
The main driver of the HoAC is PM Abiy, who wants to access Somali ports for trade and promote military and economic integration in order to influence Somali politics and economy. More multilateral agreements and initiatives may come on the heels of the HoAC. In the long term, integration may become possible once the three countries stabilize and resolve their border issues.
In terms of foreign involvement in the region, the Horn of Africa could become a theater for the escalating Cold-War-like dynamic between the U.S and Russia. With its increasing power and influence, Russia could repeat strategies from Syria in the Horn of Africa and help prop up leaders of the Horn of Africa Axis who are desperate to stay in power, regardless of the results of democratic elections. Because the incoming Biden Administration will advance human rights and democratic elections, Horn of Africa leaders may turn to Russia for protection instead.
The Horn of Africa has suffered multiple disasters since the start of 2020, including the COVID-19 pandemic, recurring deadly floods, and devastating locust attacks. Several donors and humanitarian agencies have increased calls for support to tackle the “triple threat” in the region. Even before the current crises, Somalia, one of the world’s most fragile states, suffered droughts in 2017 that impacted more than 6 million inhabitants. In 2018 and 2019, the Shabelle and the Juba river riparians had already experienced recurring cycles of drought and floods. And now for the first time in recorded history, the Shabelle River, which is Somalia’s breadbasket, is under a locust attack. A swarm of locusts can occupy 460 square miles and consume up to 6,000 metric tons of food daily. The current swarms can inflict the equivalent of more than 120,000 hectares of crop damage within the Shabelle River Basin. Combined with flood damages this year and previous instability, Somalia could experience catastrophic food insecurity and mass starvation similar to the horrific 1974 drought.
In Ethiopia, another full-scale humanitarian crisis is unfolding due to the ongoing civil war between the government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in the Tigray region. Locust attacks have also compounded the impact on citizens. The current invasion of desert locusts is the worst that Ethiopia has experienced in 25 years. Furthermore, the COVID-19 pandemic has hurt economic conditions by restricting the agricultural supply chain, productivity, and cross-border trade. On top of these external factors, agriculture export revenue is already negatively impacted by Ethiopia’s currency devaluation. These conditions could push Ethiopia into starvation, mass migration, and multilateral ethnic conflict, and thus threaten overall regional stability.
The Post-Cold War Horn of Africa is fragile and susceptible to cyclical crises as a result of conflicts and increased climate change. This region also suffers from the legacy of ruthless dictators, such as Mengistu Mariam of Ethiopia and Siad Barre of Somalia. After both dictators were overthrown, new governments adopted systems of fragile ethnic federalism and decentralization that are now destabilizing the region.
Ethiopia
Ever since Abiy was selected as prime minister in April 2018, violence driven by ethnic tensions has gripped Ethiopia and displaced 1.8 million people. Abiy’s vision of a centralized power controlling the political process and economic development appears to be irreconcilable with the ethnic federalism enshrined under Article 39 of the Ethiopian Constitution. While nationalism has kept Ethiopia together for the past 30 years, it has also created division and hostility between Abiy’s reformist government and the TPLF and Oromo opposition leaders who have returned from exile.
With his political reforms intended to promote Ethiopian nationalism failing, he has also hastened economic liberalization through privatization and currency devaluation. The U.S. dollar has appreciated against the Ethiopian birr by more than 35% as the country simultaneously faces a severe export decline, yearly debt payments surpassing $1 billion, and declining domestic borrowing. Overall, this trend has forced Ethiopia to print money at an unsustainable rate. “Abiynomics” will burden Ethiopia with unpayable IMF loans and Chinese loans to finance dam projects. Furthermore, borrowing has increased the debt-to-GDP ratio to over 50%, a rate that is unsustainable, especially for a country that experiences annual major droughts. This rate of borrowing ultimately forced Ethiopia to reschedule 60% of its loan repayment.
To divert public attention from the impending economic crisis and unrest that have tarnished Abiy’s image, he has turned the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute with Egypt and Sudan into a nationalist rallying cry and canceled an agreed-upon deal. Similarly, opposition groups have accused him of taking advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to unconstitutionally delay the national election, extending his term for almost another year. These actions have incited major opposition, especially from militias in Oromo and Tigray, which threatened to form a caretaker government following Article 60, Section 5 of the Ethiopian Constitution. Abiy took this threat seriously and decided to jail the outspoken Oromo opposition leader Mohamed Jawar. Furthermore, the federal government declared the regional Tigray elections illegal and imposed an economic embargo, which contributed to the civil war. Despite Abiy claiming victory at the end of November, 2020, the war rages on, with thousands displaced and effects that could destabilize the entire region.
Somalians use a makeshift raft to cross the Juba River to meet their families in Ethiopia. (Cem Genco/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
Somalia
In Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo became president in February 2017 through indirect elections by tribal chiefs. His election was marred by corruption even though he ran on an anti-corruption platform.5 Despite his promises, Somalia has been named the world’s most corrupt country three times in a row by the Corruption Perceptions Index. Furthermore, despite his anti-Ethiopian platform, Farmaajo became President Abiy’s reliable ally during his tenure.6 Abiy even seem to have convinced Farmaajo of the idea of “Greater Horn of Africa Economic Integration.” The two leaders also have similar political preferences. Both are against federalism and for centralized government, despite the weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) that only controls parts of the capital with the help of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Somalia donors fund. Instead of cooperating with federal member states (FMS), he started dismantling the federal system through electioneering that installed his allies as state leaders. Starting with Southwest State, his forces arrested the likely winner, clearing the path to victory for his hand-picked candidate. This move caused a backlash that was particularly intense in Baidoa, where the Somali National Army along with Ethiopia violently cracked down on protests in December 2018.
In response, UN Somalia Special Representative Nicholas Haysom requested an investigation. Haysom was allegedly expelled so that the Ethiopian Army and Somalia National Army could conceal their crimes and avoid potential prosecution.7 The FGS succeeded in further electioneering by installing their preferred candidate in Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. The FGS was unable to pull off the same feat in Puntland.8 In Jubbaland state, Kenyan AMISOM troops almost clashed with Ethiopian AMISOM troops who are pro-Farmaajo.
Mogadishu, which is in the Benadir region, has become the city with the most internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa due to local conflicts. The FGS has paralyzed the city’s economy and mobility, essentially turning it into an open-air prison where IDPs are more than 25% of the population. Not only do the residents of Mogadishu live under difficult circumstances, they also provide taxes to the federal government without enjoying political representation in the Senate. This is because Mogadishu is not recognized as a federal state, which entails less autonomy.
The general condition of Somalia has declined under Farmaajo, The security improvements created by his predecessor, Hassan Sheikh, have vanished. The robust GDP growth of 4% has dropped below 2% and export revenue dropped by 70%, a figure unseen since the 1980s. Foreign direct investment decreased and domestic revenue was below 2016 levels. While not attributable to Farmaajo’s policies, Somalia has also seen a decline in remittances. In an apparent reflection of its corruption, the federal government has camouflaged aid from donors like Qatar as domestic revenue in order to meet debt relief obligations and improve its image abroad.9 Despite Somalia’s lack of financial accountability and illegitimate tax revenue increases, the IMF and World Bank determined that the country has reached the “decision point,” at which heavily indebted poor countries are considered to have met the obligations for interim debt relief. The U.S. has further enabled Farmaajo by supporting debt relief and turning a blind eye on FGS human rights abuses, their war against FMSs, media repression, and deteriorating security. However, the U.S has suspended military aid over corruption concerns.10
As a primary foreign donor to the FGS, Qatar is another important player in the region. Beyond propping up FGS, Qatar has allegedly encouraged violent extremism and instability. A cellphone call obtained by the New York Times captured the Qatari ambassador to Somalia stating that a terrorist bombing in Bosaso was carried out to further Qatari interests.11 Similarly, Somali intelligence chief Fahad Yassin Hajji Dahir, who is alleged to have ties with al-Qaeda, is currently said to be engineering the re-election of Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo.12 This major foreign interference could have serious consequences, such as igniting public unrest and possibly even a civil war similar to that in 1991, which overthrew Siad Barre, Farmaajo’s uncle.13
Eritrea
While there are no major violent conflicts in Eritrea, the government shows many of the same pathologies as Ethiopia and Somalia. Although Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has rehabilitated his image through the historic peace deal with PM Abiy, he remains a ruthless authoritarian who has been starving his people for the past 20 years. With the peace deal, Isaias Afwerki merely showed the EU a false soft side in order to gain aid and assistance. Thus, the EU diplomats are in essence ignoring the regime’s record of human rights violations and forced labor in order to fund projects that will further Europe’s interest in keeping migrants in Eritrea. The EU has funded infrastructure projects serviced by forced conscript labor, perpetuating a system that the U.N. has defined as “tantamount to slavery.”14 Thus, it seems that the EU has chosen to “hire” a dictator at a low price rather than solve the core issues that cause migration in the first place. This is why the EU Horn of Africa policy is failing: it emboldens dictators to oppress their citizens at the expense of EU taxpayers.
Afwerki is widely unpopular, so he is vulnerable to a potential coup. While Afwerki is a brutal dictator, a coup would certainly be destabilizing. In the past, he narrowly escaped previous coup attempts from dissatisfied armed forces, such as in 2013. It is highly likely that he will face another coup because of his alliance with Abiy, who is particularly disliked among the ethnic Tigray in Eritrea.15
“In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.”
Russia has been steadily making inroads with the region’s leaders. While hosting the Sochi Olympics in 2017, Russia seized the opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Africa by organizing the 2019 Russia-Africa summit that saw trade, aid, and military deals offered with no political preconditions. Russia’s goal is to project its power and influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea by providing arms and nuclear technology for energy development in exchange for mining natural resources like uranium and gold. Russia is also interested in securing the rights to rare earth elements (REE), which are key ingredients in batteries for electric cars, cell phones, high-tech weapons, and wind turbines. Russia has been steadily accumulating REE to the point where it now has the 4th largest reserves in the world, significantly ahead of the U.S.16
Just outside the Horn of Africa, former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir signed bilateral agreements with Russian President Vladimir Putin during his November 2017 visit to Russia that included the establishment of a military base in the Red Sea, a nuclear agreement, and modernization of the Sudanese army.17 Similarly, Bashir asked Putin for protection from the U.S.and hired Russian mercenaries to quell citizen uprisings before his overthrow in a military coup.18 It is noteworthy that Bashir’s visit to Russia came after the Trump administration lifted the trade embargo on Sudan and removed it from the travel ban list. This suggests that both the U.S. and Russia are competing for Sudan’s favor.
In the Horn of Africa, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced the opening of a logistics center in Eritrea in 2018, but gave few details about its purpose.19 The lack of information likely indicates a larger strategic aim. A Russian logistics center in Eritrea, however, now looks improbable due to the Eritrean government’s realignment toward the UAE and Saudi Arabia, two countries that are loathe to see Russian encroachment in the Red Sea. Opposition from these two Gulf countries will be an obstacle to Russia’s quest to gain influence in the Horn of Africa.
The extent of Russia’s influence on Somalia will largely depend on the results of upcoming elections. One of the candidates for the Somali presidency is former Prime Minister Hassan Ali Khaire, who cofounded Som Oil & Gas. For various reasons, Russia is hoping for his victory. The majority stakeholder in Som Oil & Gas is the Russian national Georgy Djapridze, who is also a close ally of Putin. In November of 2020, Khaire met with Foreign Minister Lavrov to discuss the upcoming elections and the prospects for strengthening Russian-Somali cooperation, particularly trade and economic ties. Such a meeting seems to validate suspicions that Khaire is seeking to obtain Russian assistance in the elections. Given Somalia’s instability, if Khaire wins the presidency he may invite Russian mercenaries to restore order.
In November of 2020, Russia and China indicated their support for the Somali government by abstaining on a vote to renew the UN panel of experts on Somalia, which includes an arms embargo.20 Russia justified its abstention by comparing the vote to lifting the Eritrea embargo in 2018, and China reasoned that the embargo hindered the Somali government’s ability to combat al-Shabab. The true intention behind Russia’s abstention was to protect its interest in selling arms to Somalia, however. China, for its part, wanted to maintain a strong relationship with Somalia, especially as it has received an unmonitored and controversial fishing license from the Somali government. China also supports Somalia on the question of Somaliland.21 China sees Somaliland, a de facto independent state, as analogous to Taiwan. Recognition of Somaliland would thus set a precedent that would undermine the “One China” policy.
The U.S. has left an opening for these powers. The inaction and disengagement of the Trump administration allowed Russia to preemptively protect the region’s new authoritarians. In contrast, the upcoming Biden-Harris administration will likely hold the Horn of Africa Axis accountable for human rights violations and their destabilizing anti-democratic ways. Russia may be a latecomer to the 21st century version of the “Scramble for the Horn of Africa” but won’t mind claiming its spot as a competitor against China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s initiatives in the Horn of Africa.
Chinese special operations soldiers wave farewell as they depart from a port in Zhoushan and head toward the Gulf of Aden to patrol waters off the coast of Somalia.(Xinhua/Jiang Shan via Getty Images)
The idea of integrating the various territories of the Horn of Africa has a long history. Current Horn of Africa integration initiatives echo the idea of “Greater Somalia.” This concept was championed by Benito Mussolini, who hoped to capture British-Somaliland, part of Ethiopia, and Italian Somalia to achieve the grandiose idea of an Italian East Africa empire. Mussolini imagined Italians settling in the territory. He also wanted to connect Assab (a port city in Eritrea) to Mogadishu in order to reduce the export cost of cotton, bananas, and other valuable commodities. In post-colonial times, this vision of integration has been revived and modified. Fidel Castro, for example, proposed a communist federation between Ethiopia and Somalia before the two countries went to war in 1977.
In the 21st century, the EU and the U.S. have pushed for Horn of Africa integration in three key areas: politics, economics, and security. This encouragement is an important reason why Horn of Africa Axis leaders pursued forming a new regional organization bloc. However, these initiatives have been dead on arrival for various reasons.
Events show that the region is disintegrated from a military and political point of view. To give a stark example of regional strife, the Ethiopian army committed war crimes in Somalia in 2006. Ethiopian forces have also not produced tangible results in the war against al-Shabab as a part of the AMISOM force. For its part, the Eritrean government is a former funder of the terrorist group al-Shabab, which has wreaked havoc in Somalia.
Destabilizing actions by Ethiopia and Eritrea in Somalia have precluded political integration. As a former Somali president said, “Simply put, neither Ethiopia nor Somalia is ready for deeper integration. Ethiopia is sliding toward instability and preoccupied with both internal ethnic conflicts and border disputes with Somalia and Eritrea.”22
From an economic point of view, the countries of the Horn of Africa have negligible engagement. This is the case for Eritrea and Somalia. As for Somalia and Ethiopia, several economic barriers currently stand between them. Ethiopia is foreclosing on Somalia’s future water rights by building more dams without consultation, which negatively impacts the Juba and Shabelle rivers. The two countries also do not have a transboundary water agreement, and Ethiopia is notorious for not sharing its river flow data. Already, these actions have contributed to recent floods and droughts according to regional water experts. While cross-border electrification initiatives are pushed by the World Bank and foreign donors to Somalia, they come with high risks such a lack of institutional oversight, infrastructural unpreparedness, and energy security politicization. Furthermore, the two countries have economies that are largely informal and affected by multiple problems such as high inflation, lack of security, indebtedness, high unemployment, and poor infrastructure with limited interconnectedness.
“Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years.”
The U.S. has promoted misguided policy in the Horn of Africa region. For example, it supported an Ethiopian incursion into Somalia that resulted in war crimes against residents of Mogadishu in 2006.23 To date, victims have not been awarded any compensation and justice has not been served. In 2010, while speaking at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, current U.S. ambassador to Somalia and former ambassador to Ethiopia(2006-2009), Donald Yamamoto said, “We’ve made a lot of mistakes and Ethiopia’s entry in 2006 was not a really good idea.”
Ambassador Yamamoto would do well to recognize that China poses a threat to U.S. interests in Somalia and to the region as a whole. One way that the U.S. could counter Chinese designs on Somalia is by encouraging the ties between Taiwan and Somaliland. So far, Yamamoto has remained silent about this bilateral relationship even though the U.S National Security Council sent out a congratulatory tweet about this emerging bond between Taiwan and Somaliland. U.S. inaction has emboldened President Farmaajo to align with Beijing.
EU policy toward the Horn of Africa has also yielded mixed results. It is wholly fixated on keeping migrants away from EU shores, making the region a hub for IDPs. The significant presence of IDPs tends to spur conflict. Africa watchers have argued that EU funding without proper checks and balances merely finances kleptocratic authoritarians. This model has already been tested with Turkey in order to keep Syrian refugees outside Europe. A negative consequence of this policy was to give Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan leverage over the EU. While EU leaders claim to want stability for the Horn of Africa, they continue sell arms to the region. In Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel is pushing arms sales to the region and the continent to counter Russia and China.24 Similarly, French President Emmanuel Macron is helping Abiy develop a navy, despite Ethiopia being landlocked.25
The EU approach to migration, cyclical conflicts, and the impacts of climate change in the Horn of Africa is not working. Rather than throw money at problems, the EU must seek to cultivate good governance and institutions. Perhaps it is time to support an approach to sustainable development that takes power away from dictators and puts it in the hands of local actors. Current strategies have only resulted in mass migration and vulnerable youth who can easily be recruited by extremists. It is not surprising to see recurrent cycles of destruction and humanitarian crises in the region.
A woman whose son was reportedly killed by Ethiopian Defense Forces poses in front of her house in Bisober, a farming village in southern Tigray. (Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images)
How can the Horn of Africa become peaceful and secure despite high levels of instability, mistrust, and unresolved border issues inherited from colonial times? With the rise of authoritarianism, repressive rule, terrorism, ethnic cleansing, nationalism, economic stagnation, and mass migration, this goal seems to be moving further away. Without decisive and sustainable policy moves, geopolitical dynamics in the Horn of Africa could sow the seeds for further turmoil within the next 20 years. What should the Biden administration do?
America can no longer sit on the sidelines and allow Russia and China to influence regional leaders, who have become addicted to Chinese predatory loans and Russian AK-47 diplomacy. Biden should implement a strategy that is designed by regional planners and economists, one that is based on strong, democratic institutions with the principle of “one person, one vote” and focuses on capacity building and tangible economic development.
Biden has a difficult task ahead if he is going to de-escalate tensions in the Horn of Africa. His administration has a chance to rectify the mistakes of American presidents over the past half century, who too often turned a blind eye to the destabilizing actions of dictators in the region. It is now or never, and as John F. Kennedy said, “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.”
[1] Henneberg, Ingo and Stapel, Sören. “Cooperation and Conflict at the Horn of Africa: A New Regional Bloc Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia and Its Consequences for Eastern Africa,” Africa Spectrum, (August 2020). https://doi.org/10.1177/0002039720936689.
[2] Nyabiage, Jevans. “China’s Allies at Loggerheads Over Ethiopia Dam — Will Beijing Intervene?” South China Morning Post, July 26, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3094650/chinas-allies-loggerheads-over-ethiopia-dam-will-beijing.
[3] Atoma, Bekele. “Jawar Mohammed: The Ethiopian Media Mogul Taking on Abiy Ahmed,” BBC News, July 9, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-53306091.
[4] Elbagir, Nima, Arvanitidis, Barbara, and McSweeney, Eoin. “Forces From Ethiopia’s Tigray Region say Eritrean Troops are Part of the Conflict and the War is Far From Over,” CNN, December 4, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/04/africa/ethiopia-war-tplf-exclusive-intl/index.html.
[5] Gettleman, Jeffrey, “Fueled by Bribes, Somalia’s Election Seen as Milestone of Corruption,” The New York Times, February 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/africa/somalia-election-corruption.html.
[6] “Corruption Perceptions Index,” Transparency International, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019.
[7] “UN Special Representative to Somalia and Head of UNSOM is “Persona Non Grata” – Somalia’s Foreign Ministry,” Somaliland Chronicle, January 1, 2019, https://somalilandchronicle.com/2019/01/01/un-special-representative-to-somalia-and-head-of-unsom-is-persona-non-grata-somalias-foreign-ministry/.
[8] Hassan, Abdiqani. “Leader of Somalia’s Jubbaland, at Odds With Mogadishu, Wins New Term,” Reuters, August 22, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-politics/president-of-somali-state-of-jubbaland-re-elected-in-divisive-vote-idUSKCN1VC15B?il=0.
[9] Gundel, Joakim. Debt Relief and the Political Marketplace in Somalia. London: London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, November 2, 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/107125/1/CRP_debt_relief_and_political_marketplace_somalia.pdf.
[10] Rubin, Michael. “U.S. Ambassador Wasted $1B in Somalia and is Now Funding a Coup,” The Washington Examiner, February 7, 2020, https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/us-ambassador-wasted-1b-in-somalia-and-is-now-funding-a-coup; “Somalia: Journalists Under Attack,” Human Rights Watch, May 3, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/05/03/somalia-journalists-under-attack#; Houreld, Katharine. “Exclusive: U.S. Suspends Aid to Somalia’s Battered Military Over Graft,” Reuters, December 14, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-military-exclusive/exclusive-u-s-suspends-aid-to-somalias-battered-military-over-graft-idUSKBN1E81XF.
[11] Bergman, Ronen and Kirkpatrick, David D. “With Guns, Cash, and Terrorism, Gulf States Vie for Power in Somalia,” The New York Times, July 22, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/22/world/africa/somalia-qatar-uae.html.
[12] Rubin, Michael. “Somalia’s Intelligence Chief Worked With an al Qaeda Affiliate, so Why Do We Fund Him?” American Enterprise Institute, November 16, 2020, https://www.aei.org/op-eds/somalias-intelligence-chief-worked-with-an-al-qaeda-affiliate-so-why-do-we-fund-him/; Ali, Abdullahi Mohamed. “Somalia Must Save Itself From Qatar,” The National Interest, June 22, 2020, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/somalia-must-save-itself-qatar-163233.
[13] Henry, Neil. “Rebels Force Somali Leader Out of Capital,” The Washington Post, January 1, 1991, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/01/01/rebels-force-somali-leader-out-of-capital/7e7267ef-139c-4108-bf67-73687a26a243/.
[14] Stevis-Gridneff, Matina. “How Forced Labor in Eritrea is Linked to EU-Funded Projects,” The New York Times, January 8, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/08/world/europe/conscription-eritrea-eu.html.
[15] Gettleman, Jeffrey. “Coup Attempt by Rebel Soldiers is Said to Fail in Eritrea,” The New York Times, January 21, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/22/world/africa/coup-attempt-fails-in-eritrea.html.
[16] “How is Russia Developing Rare Earth Metals?” Mining World Russia, March 3, 2020, https://miningworld.ru/Articles/how-is-russia-developing-rare-earth-metals#:~:text=As%20of%20June%202019%2C%20Russia,and%201.4m%20tons%20respectively.
[17] “Russia to Establish Military Base in Sudan,” Middle East Monitor, November 13, 2020, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20201113-russia-to-establish-military-base-in-sudan/.
[18] “Sudan’s President Bashir Asks Putin for ‘Protection’ From ‘Aggressive U.S.’” France 24, November 23, 2017, https://www.france24.com/en/20171123-sudan-president-bashir-asks-putin-protection-aggressive-us.
[19] Solomon, Salem. “Russia-Eritrea Relations Grow With Planned Logistics Center,” Voice of America, September 2, 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/russia-eritrea-relations-grow-planned-logistics-center.
[20] “Adopting Resolution 2551 (2020) by 13 Votes in Favour, 2 Abstentions, Security Council Extends Mandate for Expert Panel on Somalia, Renews Partial Lifting of Arms Embargo,” United Nations Security Council, November 12, 2020, https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14355.doc.htm.
[21] “Report: Somali Fishermen Object to ‘Shocking’ Deal Allowing China in Their Waters,” Stop Illegal Fishing, February 8, 2019, https://stopillegalfishing.com/press-links/report-somali-fishermen-object-to-shocking-deal-allowing-china-in-their-waters/.
[22] Mohamud, Hassan Sheikh. “Somalia Must Learn to Stand Alone,” Foreign Affairs, November 25, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/africa/2020-11-25/somalia-must-learn-stand-alone.
[23] “Somalia: War Crimes in Mogadishu,” Human Rights Watch, August 13, 2007, https://www.hrw.org/news/2007/08/13/somalia-war-crimes-mogadishu
[24] “Ethiopian Invasion of Somalia, a Debacle U.S. Official Says,” ECADF Ethiopian News, March 13, 2010, https://ecadforum.com/blog1/ethiopian-invasion-of-somalia-a-debacle-u-s-official-says/.
[25] Shelton, Jon. “Angela Merkel Calls for Weapons Exports to Africa,” DW, November 27, 2019, https://www.dw.com/en/angela-merkel-calls-for-weapons-exports-to-africa/a-51441421.
[26] Irish, John. “Ethiopia, France Sign Military, Navy Deal, Turn ‘New Page’ in Ties,” Reuters, March 12, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ethiopia-france/ethiopia-france-sign-military-navy-deal-turn-new-page-in-ties-idUSKBN1QT2W3.
[27] Marks, Simon. “Ethiopia Withdraws Thousands of Troops From Neighboring Somalia,” Bloomberg, November 13, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-13/ethiopia-withdraws-thousands-of-troops-from-neighboring-somalia.
[28] Grane, Allen. “What is the African Growth and Opportunity Act?” Council on Foreign Relations Africa in Transition, February 17, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-african-growth-and-opportunity-act.
[29] U.S. Trade and Investment with Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Trends and New Developments. Washington D.C.: U.S. International Trade Commission, March 2020, https://agoa.info/images/documents/15766/pub5043-usitc-report.pdf.
[30] Robinson, Colin D. and Matisek, Jahara. “Assistance to Locally Appropriate Military Forces in Southern Somalia,” The RUSI Journal 165, no. 4 (December 8, 2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071847.2020.1830711?journalCode=rusi20&.
1. Cover Photo: A boy runs with a balloon in the village of Bisober in southern Tigray. (Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images)
2. Contents Photo: Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed addresses a crowd in Bonga, the main city in Kuffa province, on September 15, 2019. Members of the Kafficho ethnic group have been calling for the formation of their own federal state. Ethiopia’s southern region includes multiple ethnic groups hoping to obtain independent states. (Michael Teweled/AFP via Getty Images)
Guled Ahmed has more than 15 years’ experience in hydropower, water resources management, and highways infrastructure projects in developing and developed countries. His water resources experience includes drainage and storm water management design, green and sustainable infrastructure planning, H&H modeling of floodplains, bridges and culverts, and GIS-based watershed assessments and planning. Guled has also been incredibly involved as an advocate on Horn of Africa (HoA) water transboundary treaties, cross-border energy and water security, climate change, and Paris Agreement reforms. As an entrepreneur he has founded two renewable energy companies, Power OffGrid and Jiko Biogas, in Somalia. He has developed disruptive, innovative, and affordable smart hybrid renewable energy and asset financing systems, increasing access to electricity, adequate clean water, and clean cooking, improving productivity in sectors in rural and urban areas in Somalia. He is also certified as a Global Juror of SDG11.
“The United States is also deeply concerned for the safety and security of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. The United States joins calls by the UN for the Ethiopian government to uphold its obligations under international law and to take appropriate measures to ensure the protection and safety of all refugees in Ethiopia. Those responsible for egregious abuses or violations against civilians must be held accountable.”
The United States is providing more than $18 million in assistance to respond to the growing humanitarian needs caused by conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. This assistance will help our international humanitarian organization partners respond to the needs of more than 52,000 new refugees in Sudan, refugees and displaced persons in Ethiopia, and possible needs in Djibouti, in addition others displaced by conflict in the Horn of Africa region already being assisted by USG partners. These resources will help provide access to critical humanitarian protection, shelter, essential health care and nutrition, emergency food aid, education, water, sanitation, and hygiene services for refugees, internally displaced people, and vulnerable host communities.
We remain gravely concerned by the humanitarian impact of the conflict in Tigray. We call on the government to allow immediate, full, safe, and unhindered access so humanitarian organizations can provide timely, needs-based assistance to those affected by the conflict. We stand with the international community in condemning the intimidation and killings of humanitarian aid workers in Tigray as well as the looting of relief supplies and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. All parties must respect international humanitarian law.
The United States is also deeply concerned for the safety and security of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. The United States joins calls by the UN for the Ethiopian government to uphold its obligations under international law and to take appropriate measures to ensure the protection and safety of all refugees in Ethiopia. Those responsible for egregious abuses or violations against civilians must be held accountable.
More than a month of conflict has compounded the preexisting humanitarian crises in the region. The COVID-19 pandemic, historic levels of flooding, and desert locust swarms have increased economic hardship and threatened food security and the basic needs of refugees and civilians in Tigray.
In addition to providing life-saving assistance, the United States, along with our international partners, remains ready and willing to assist in dialogue and reconciliation and to stand with the people of the region to bring a complete end to the fighting and to build a brighter, more hopeful future. We welcome the contributions already provided by current donors and call on others to support the international response to help meet the immediate humanitarian needs in Sudan and Ethiopia.
SudanTribune December 23, 2020 (GADAREF) - The Sudanese army came under a new attack from Ethiopian army and Amhara militias near the border strip, military sources told the Sudan Tribune on Wednesday.
Meanwhile, the joint political committee between the two countries wrapped up meetings in Khartoum without tangible results on the border issue.
"A Sudanese army force in Jabal Abu Teyyour was heavily shelled by the army and militiamen, which from the other side of the border area," said the source who declined to be identified because he is not authorized to speak to the media.
"The Sudanese forces deterred the attack," he further said.
Also, a second clash occurred in the east of the "Wad Koli" area where a Sudanese military patrol clashed with a mobile Ethiopian reconnaissance force.
For his part, the visiting Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonen returned to Addis Ababa without making any progress in the talks on the border issue.
Mekonen demanded that the Sudanese army evacuate cultivated by Ethiopian farmers inside Sudan and compensate them for any damage caused during the clashes with the Ethiopian troops.
The senior official who is from the Amhara region also refused to discuss the border demarcation before to settle the farmers� plight.
The Sudanese government spokesman on Tuesday said that his government wants Ethiopia to accept border demarcation before any further discussions.
The Ethiopian army forces from the Amhara region and Fano militiamen continue to play a significant role in the armed conflict with the TPLF fighter in Tigray as they also have land claims in their region.
A committee of Sudanese affected by the attacks of Ethiopian forces in Fashaga area called on the Sudanese government to suspend any talks with the Ethiopian side before to fully retake every parcel of the national territory.
"We are the ones who know well the policy of procrastination and unfulfilled promises pursued by the Ethiopian over the past years," said Rasheed Abdel Gadir the head of the committee.
To understand this news it is useful to read this story posted a few days ago.
Sudan army reports victories on Ethiopian border
Source: Dabanga
The Sudanese armed forces report that they recaptured areas and camps in the Salam Bir and Mahaj areas in El Gedaref from the Ethiopian army and armed militia.
In video clips, soldiers from the armed forces said that they would continue their operations until all the occupied areas have been recaptured. At the same time, Ethiopian troops and militias launched a series of new attacks in which a local shepherd was injured.
Last week, the Sudanese army stated that Ethiopian forces ambushed Sudanese troops, killing four and wounding 27.
Earlier this month, the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) regained control of the area of Khor Yabis in El Fashaga locality in eastern El Gedaref after the area had been occupied by Ethiopian farmers and gunmen (called shifta in the region) for over 25 years.
The 1,600 kilometre border between Sudan and Ethiopia was drawn in colonial times. No clear demarcation of the border has been made since Sudan became independent in 1956. The lack of clear border markers has made it easy for Ethiopian militants to occupy fertile farmlands in eastern El Gedaref.
Ethiopian farmers have been cultivating crops for decades along the border. These lands are protected by Ethiopian gunmen. Farmers in El Fashaga, backed by the El Gedaref governor, demanded in July that these lands be returned to them.
Border demarcation talks
A delegation headed by the Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Demeke Mekonnen arrived in Khartoum yesterday for border demarcation talks that will last for two days. The Security Affairs Adviser of the Ethiopian Prime Minister is part of the delegation.
During his address at the opening session of the meeting, Omar Manis, Minister of Cabinet Affairs and head of the Sudanese delegation, affirmed that there is “a strong political will” on both sides to demarcate the border between the two countries.
Ethiopian Deputy Prime Minister Demeke Mekonnen stressed that the current border tensions should not disturb the deep-rooted relations between the two countries. He also warned that any escalation “could damage these relations and disrupt the daily activities of Sudanese and Ethiopian people”.
Mekonen added all border issues will be discussed through existing frameworks and mechanism, on the basis of previously signed documents. He also proposed that a date would be set to begin the border demarcation field work.
