English Articles

Key Members Differ over Neighbour’s Support for Al-Shabaab Terror Group, Release of Djibouti Prisoners Taken during 2008 Border Clashes

The Security Council today extended the arms embargo on Somalia until 15 November 2017, while reaffirming that country’s sovereignty over its natural resources. It also reaffirmed its arms embargo on Eritrea.

Adopting resolution 2317 (2016) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter — by a vote of 10 in favour none against, with 5 -abstentions (Angola, China, Egypt, Russian Federation, Venezuela) — the Council also extended the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group until 15 December 2017, and urged the Government of Eritrea to facilitate the Group’s entry into that country.

By terms of the text, the Council underlined the need for Member States to follow strictly the notification procedures for providing the assistance needed to develop Somalia’s security sector institutions, and urged increased cooperation by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in documenting and registering all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations.

Reiterating concerns that the petroleum sector could be driving increased conflict, the Council underlined the vital importance of the Federal Government of Somalia putting a resource-sharing agreement and a credible legal framework in place. It also expressed serious concern about the Al-Shabaab terrorist group’s increasing reliance on revenues derived from natural resources, including taxes on the illicit sugar trade, agricultural production and livestock. The Council reaffirmed the ban on the import and export of charcoal into or out of Somalia, and requested that AMISOM support and help the Federal authorities implement a total ban.

Further by the text, it expressed serious concern about the deteriorating humanitarian situation and condemned, in the strongest terms, increased attacks against humanitarian actors. The Council also demanded that all parties allow and facilitate unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across the country, encouraging the Federal Government to improve the regulatory environment for aid donors.

The Council also expressed concern about continued reports of corruption, diversion of public resources and financial impropriety involving members of the Federal Government Administration and the Federal Parliament, underlining that individuals engaged in acts that threatened Somalia’s peace and reconciliation process might be listed for targeted sanctions.

Also by the text, the Council demanded that the Government of Eritrea allow access or provide information, including to the Monitoring Group, on the Djiboutian prisoners missing in action since clashes between the two countries between 10 and 12 June 2008.

Following the vote, a number of countries expressed their support for the resolution, which targeted causes of instability in the Horn of Africa. The United Kingdom’s representative said the renewal of the sanctions regime would cut off Al-Shabaab’s funding and protect Somalia’s natural resources. Regarding Eritrea, he declared: “We don’t welcome the progress because nothing has changed,” while emphasizing that the lack of cooperation on the part of the country’s authorities had “tied the international community’s hands”. The representative of the United States echoed that sentiment, stressing that non-cooperation was not the path to getting the sanctions lifted. While no evidence had been found that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab, that was difficult to corroborate because the Monitoring Group had not been allowed into the country, she said.

The Russian Federation’s representative noted the Monitoring Group’s affirmation that there was no evidence of Eritrean support for Al-Shabaab, and that its support for regional armed groups no longer existed.

Similarly, Angola’s representative said that, while a constructive proposed roadmap for changing the sanctions regime would encourage Eritrea to engage with the international community, that proposal had not been considered.

Djibouti’s representative said it was regrettable that, although Eritrea’s release of prisoners in March had raised hope, its past practices continued. Djibouti supported extending the sanctions regime, he added.

Also speaking today were representatives of China, Egypt, and Venezuela.

The meeting began at 10:05 a.m. and ended at 10:50 a.m.

Statements

MATTHEW RYCROFT (United Kingdom) said Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to peace and stability in the region, and the sanctions regime’s renewal would cut off the group’s funding and protect Somalia’s natural resources. Turning to Eritrea, he said the lack of cooperation by that country’s authorities had tied the international community’s hands. “We don’t welcome the progress because nothing has changed,” he declared, adding that the Council had engaged with regional stakeholders in order to balance views on the text.

WU HAITAO (China) said his country would continue to help Somalia’s State-building efforts. Encouraging countries in the region to take the “big picture” into account, he called on them to strengthen neighbourly relationships and avoid confrontation. China hoped that the Security Council would pay close attention to changes on the ground and make timely adjustments, while remaining responsive to the legitimate concerns of States, he said.

JULIO HELDER MOURA LUCAS (Angola) said his delegation had abstained from the vote because the Monitoring Group had found no evidence of Eritrea’s support for Al-Shabaab. While a constructive proposed roadmap towards changing the sanctions regime would encourage the Government of Eritrea to engage with the international community, that proposal had not been considered, he noted.

ISOBEL COLEMAN (United States), emphasizing her strong support for the resolution, which targeted causes of instability in the Horn of Africa, said that sanctions regimes were an important part of the international community’s response to the situation there. Eritrea had called for an end to the sanctions but its lack of cooperation was not the path to lifting them, she said. While no evidence had been found that Eritrea supported Al-Shabaab, that was difficult to corroborate because the Monitoring Group had not been allowed to visit the country. No information had been provided on the fate of Djiboutian prisoners of war. Somalia, however, had transitioned from being a failed State to building a State, she said.

PETR V. ILIICHEV (Russian Federation) said his delegation had been forced to abstain from the vote because the Monitoring Group had affirmed that there was no evidence of Eritrean support for Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The allegations of its support for regional armed groups simply did not exist anymore, he emphasized, suggesting that a roadmap be drawn up on the matter.

AMR ABDELLATIF ABOULATTA (Egypt) emphasized that the resolution’s wording should have been more balanced. Acknowledging positive developments, including the absence of support for Al-Shabaab, he called upon Council members to use clear criteria when determining sanctions, adding that it should be done in such a way as to promote peace and security, while resolving regional concerns. Stressing that sanctions must not continue forever, he said they must be flexible enough to be responsive to changes on the ground.

RAFAEL DARÍO RAMÍREZ CARREÑO (Venezuela) said he had abstained from voting on the resolution because the section on Eritrea was unfair. The Sanctions Committee’s workings were a clear example of imposing sanctions as an end in itself, he said, speaking in his capacity as Chair of that subsidiary body. Such measures should not be used for the collective punishment of a country, he said, emphasizing that the sanctions imposed on Eritrea had no further political purpose beyond serving the national interests of permanent members. The Monitoring Group had submitted a professional opinion that pointed to the case for lifting the sanctions, he said, pointing out that for three years in a row, no evidence had been found of Eritrea lending support to Al-Shabaab. Qatar was working to obtain the release of a number of prisoners of war and to settle the dispute between Eritrea and Djibouti, and a roadmap was needed for lifting the sanctions. China’s proposal to address that issue had won the support of five members, but the penholder seemed to believe it was not appropriate, he noted. Venezuela supported the resolution’s elements on Somalia, he added.

AMANUEL GIORGIO (Eritrea) said the Council had committed a grave injustice against his country’s people, declaring: “There is no reason to maintain sanctions against Eritrea.” The Monitoring Group had proven the justification for the measures non-existent, he pointed out, emphasizing that the sanctions had been detrimental not only to Eritrea, but also to the wider Horn of Africa region. Sanctions encouraged zero-sum approaches and imparted a sense of impunity on the part of some countries, he said. Turning to Djibouti, he said Eritrea supported the State of Qatar’s mediation, which had resulted in the release of all prisoners of war.

MOHAMED SIAD DOUALEH (Djibouti) expressed concern about his country’s combatants missing in action since the 2008 clashes with Eritrea. That country’s release of prisoners in March had raised hope, but unfortunately, its past practices continued. Furthermore, Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to peace and stability in Somalia, he noted, expressing support for extending the sanctions regime.

Resolution

The full text of resolution 2317 (2016) reads as follows:

“The Security Council,

“Recalling all its previous resolutions and statements of its President on the situation in Somalia and Eritrea, in particular resolutions 733 (1992), 1844 (2008), 1907 (2009), 2036 (2012), 2023 (2011), 2093 (2013), 2111 (2013), 2124 (2013), 2125 (2013), 2142 (2014), 2182 (2014), and 2244 (2015),

“Taking note of the final reports of the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (the SEMG) on Somalia (S/2016/919) and Eritrea (S/2016/920) and their conclusions on the situations in both Somalia and Eritrea,

“Reaffirming its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of Somalia, Djibouti and Eritrea respectively,

“Condemning any flows of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia and to Eritrea in violation of the arms embargo on Eritrea, as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region,

“Expressing concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace and stability of Somalia and the region,

“Welcoming the further improved relationship between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), regional administrations, and the SEMG, and underlining the importance of these relationships improving further and strengthening in the future,

“Welcoming the efforts of the FGS to improve its notifications to the Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea (‘the Committee’), looking forward to further progress in the future, particularly in relation to post-delivery notifications, and recalling that improved arms and ammunition management in Somalia is a fundamental component of greater peace and stability for the region,

“Taking note of the preliminary efforts of the FGS to restore key economic and financial institutions and progress achieved on financial governance and structural reforms; and welcoming the passing of anti-money-laundering legislation and the establishment of a Financial Reporting Centre;

“Underlining the importance of financial propriety in the run-up to, and conduct of, elections in Somalia in 2016, and stressing the need for further efforts to fight corruption, promote transparency and increase mutual accountability in Somalia,

“Expressing serious concern at reports of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in waters where Somalia has jurisdiction, underlining the importance of refraining from illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, welcoming further reporting on the matter, and encouraging the FGS, with the support of the international community, to ensure that fishing licenses are issued in a responsible manner and in line with the appropriate Somali legal framework,

“Expressing serious concern at the ongoing difficulties in delivering humanitarian aid in Somalia, and condemning in the strongest terms any party obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance, as well as the misappropriation or diversion of any humanitarian funds or supplies,

“Recalling that the FGS has the primary responsibility to protect its population, and recognizing the FGS’ responsibility, working with the regional administrations to build the capacity of its own national security forces, as a matter of priority,

“Taking note of the two meetings and six letters between the representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, expressing concern that the SEMG has not been able to visit Eritrea since 2011 and fully discharge its mandate, and underlining that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council be better informed about Eritrea’s compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions,

“Taking note that during the course of its current and two previous mandates the SEMG has not found any evidence that the Government of Eritrea is supporting Al‑Shabaab,

“Expressing concern over reports by the SEMG of ongoing Eritrean support for certain regional armed groups, and encouraging the SEMG to provide further detailed reporting and evidence on this issue,

“Expressing serious concern at ongoing reports of Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes in 2008, urging Eritrea to share any available detailed information pertaining to the combatants, including to the SEMG,

“Welcoming the release of four prisoners of war by Eritrea in March 2016, expressing support for mediation efforts by the State of Qatar and encouraging further mediation efforts by the State of Qatar in order to reach a final and binding solution to resolve this issue as well as the border dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea,

“Underlining the importance it attaches to all Member States complying with the terms of the arms embargo imposed on Eritrea by resolution 1907 (2009),

“Determining that the situation in Somalia, as well as the dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,

“Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Arms Embargo

“1. Reaffirms the arms embargo on Somalia, imposed by paragraph 5 of resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated upon in paragraphs 1 and 2 of resolution 1425 (2002) and modified by paragraphs 33 to 38 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraphs 4 to 17 of resolution 2111 (2013), paragraph 14 of resolution 2125 (2013), paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014), and paragraphs 2 to 10 of resolution 2244 (2015) (hereafter referred to as ‘the arms embargo on Somalia’);

“2. Decides to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) until 15 November 2017, and in that context reiterates that the arms embargo on Somalia shall not apply to deliveries of weapons, ammunition or military equipment or the provision of advice, assistance or training, intended solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces , to provide security for the Somali people, except in relation to deliveries of the items set out in the annex of resolution 2111 (2013);

“3. Reaffirms that the entry into Somali ports for temporary visits of vessels carrying arms and related materiel for defensive purposes does not amount to a delivery of such items in violation of the arms embargo on Somalia, provided that such items remain at all times aboard such vessels;

“4. Reiterates that weapons or military equipment sold or supplied solely for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may not be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any individual or entity not in the service of the Somali National Security Forces, and underlines the responsibility of the FGS to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles;

“5. Welcomes in this regard the commencement, by the FGS, of a more rigorous weapons registration, recording and marking procedure, expresses concern at reports of continued weapons diversion from within the FGS, notes that further improved weapons management is vital in order to prevent the diversion of weapons, welcomes the efforts of the FGS to develop detailed Standard Operating Procedures for weapons and ammunition management, and urges the FGS to finalize and implement these procedures as soon as possible;

“6. Further welcomes the efforts of the FGS in establishing the Joint Verification Team (JVT) and urges Member States to support improved weapons and ammunition management to improve the capacity of the FGS to manage weapons and ammunition;

“7. Welcomes the improvement in FGS reporting to the Security Council pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015), calls on the FGS and regional administrations to prioritize a sustainable and comprehensive agreement on the composition of the Somali Security Forces based on the National Security Policy and requests the FGS to report to the Security Council in accordance with paragraph 9 of resolution 2182 (2014) and as requested in paragraph 7 of resolution 2244 (2015) on the structure, composition, strength and disposition of its Security Forces, including the status of regional and militia forces by 30 March 2017 and then by 30 September 2017;

“8. Recalls that the FGS has the primary responsibility to notify the Committee, pursuant to paragraphs 3 to 8 of resolution 2142 (2014), welcomes the efforts of the FGS in improving its notifications to the Committee;

“9. Calls upon the FGS to improve the timeliness and content of notifications regarding the completion of deliveries, as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2142 (2014) and the destination unit upon distribution of imported arms and ammunition, as set out by paragraph 7 of resolution 2142 (2014);

“10. Stresses Member States’ obligations pursuant to the notification procedures set out in paragraph 11 (a) of resolution 2111 (2013), underlines the need for Member States to strictly follow the notification procedures for providing assistance to develop Somali security sector institutions, and encourages Member States to consider the Implementation Assistance Notice of 14 March 2016 as a guide;

“11. Recalls paragraph 2 of resolution 2142 (2014) and notes that support for the development of the Somali National Security Forces may include, inter alia, building infrastructure and provision of salaries and stipends solely provided to the Somali National Security Forces;

“12. Urges increased cooperation by Africa Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), as set out in paragraph 6 of resolution 2182 (2014), to document and register all military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates, involving other Somali National Security Forces as appropriate;

“13. Calls upon the FGS and regional administrations to enhance civilian oversight of its Security Forces, to adopt and implement appropriate vetting procedures of all defence and security personnel, including human rights vetting, in particular through investigation and prosecuting individuals responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, and in this context recalls the importance of the Secretary-General’s Human Rights and Due Diligence Policy in relation to the support provided by the United Nations to the Somali National Army;

“14. Underlines the importance of timely and predictable payment of salaries to the Somali security forces and calls on the FGS to implement systems to improve the timeliness and accountability of payments and supply of provisions to the Somali security forces;

“15. Recalls the need to build the capacities of the Somali National Security Forces, in particular the provision of equipment, training and mentoring, in order to build credible, professional security forces to enable the gradual handing-over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, and encourages further donor support in this regard;

“16. Further reaffirms the arms embargo on Eritrea imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of resolution 1907 (2009) (hereafter referred to as ‘the arms embargo on Eritrea’);

Threats to Peace and Security

“17. Expresses concern at the continued reports of corruption and diversion of public resources which pose a risk to State-building efforts, expresses serious concern at reports of financial impropriety involving members of the FGS, regional administrations, Federal Member States and Federal Parliament, which pose a risk to State-building efforts, and in this context underlines that individuals engaged in acts which threaten the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia may be listed for targeted measures;

“18. Welcomes the efforts which the FGS has made in order to improve its financial management procedures including continued engagement between the FGS and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), encourages the Somali authorities to maintain the pace of reform and continue the implementation of IMF-recommended reforms to support the continuation of a Staff Monitored Programme and increased transparency, accountability, comprehensiveness and predictability in revenue collection and budget allocations, and expresses concern at the generation and distribution of counterfeit Somali currency;

“19. Reaffirms Somalia’s sovereignty over its natural resources;

“20. Reiterates its serious concern that the petroleum sector in Somalia could be a driver for increased conflict, and in that context underlines the vital importance of the FGS putting in place, without undue delay, resource-sharing arrangements and a credible legal framework to ensure that the petroleum sector in Somalia does not become a source of increased tension;

“21. Expresses serious concern at Al-Shabaab’s increasing reliance on revenue from natural resources including the taxing of illicit sugar trade, agricultural production, and livestock and looks forward to further SEMG reporting on this issue;

Charcoal Ban

“22. Reaffirms the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal, as set out in paragraph 22 of resolution 2036 (2012) (‘the charcoal ban’), welcomes the decrease in exports of charcoal from Somalia and increased efforts of Member States to prevent the import of charcoal of Somali origin, reiterates that the Somali authorities shall take the necessary measures to prevent the export of charcoal from Somalia, and urges Member States to continue their efforts to ensure full implementation of the ban;

“23. Reiterates its requests in paragraph 18 of resolution 2111 (2013), that AMISOM support and assist the Somali authorities in implementing the total ban on the export of charcoal from Somalia and calls upon AMISOM to facilitate regular access for the SEMG to charcoal exporting ports;

“24. Welcomes the efforts of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in their efforts to disrupt the export and import of charcoal to and from Somalia, and further welcomes the cooperation between the SEMG and CMF in keeping the Committee informed on the charcoal trade;

“25. Expresses concern that the charcoal trade provides funding for Al‑Shabaab, and in that context reiterates paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution 2182 (2014), and further decides to renew the provisions set out in paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014) until 15 November 2017;

“26. Encourages the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to continue its work, within its current mandate, under the Indian Ocean Forum on Maritime Crime to bring together relevant Member States and international organizations to develop strategies to disrupt the trade in Somali charcoal;

Humanitarian Access

“27. Expresses serious concern at the acute humanitarian situation in Somalia, condemns in the strongest terms increased attacks against humanitarian actors and any misuse of donor assistance and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid, and reiterates its demand that all parties allow and facilitate full, safe and unhindered access for the timely delivery of aid to persons in need across Somalia and encourages the FGS to improve the regulatory environment for aid donors;

“28. Decides that until 15 November 2017 and without prejudice to humanitarian assistance programmes conducted elsewhere, the measures imposed by paragraph 3 of resolution 1844 (2008) shall not apply to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance in Somalia, by the United Nations, its specialized agencies or programmes, humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance, and their implementing partners including bilaterally or multilaterally funded non-governmental organizations participating in the United Nations Humanitarian Response Plan for Somalia;

“29. Requests the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report to the Security Council by 15 October 2017 on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and requests relevant United Nations agencies and humanitarian organizations having observer status with the United Nations General Assembly and their implementing partners that provide humanitarian assistance in Somalia to increase their cooperation and willingness to share information with the United Nations;

Eritrea

“30. Welcomes the SEMG’s ongoing and significant efforts to engage with the Government of Eritrea, in that context recalls the two meetings between the Representative of the Government of Eritrea and the SEMG, reiterates its expectation that the Government of Eritrea will facilitate the entry of the SEMG to Eritrea, to discharge fully its mandate, in line with its repeated requests, including in paragraph 52 of resolution 2182 (2014); and underlines that deepened cooperation will help the Security Council be better informed about Eritrea’s compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions;

“31. Urges the Government of Eritrea to facilitate a visit of the SEMG to Eritrea, and thereafter to support regular visits to Eritrea by the SEMG;

“32. Calls on Eritrea to cooperate fully with the SEMG, in accordance with the SEMG’s mandate contained in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013);

“33. Stresses its demand that the Government of Eritrea allow access and make available any detailed information, including to the SEMG, pertaining to the Djiboutian combatants missing in action since the clashes of 2008 so that those concerned may ascertain the presence and conditions of any remaining Djiboutian prisoners of war;

“34. Expresses its intention to review measures on Eritrea in light of the upcoming midterm update by the SEMG due by 30 April 2017, and taking into account relevant Security Council resolutions;

Somalia

“35. Recalls resolution 1844 (2008) which imposed targeted sanctions and resolutions 2002 (2011) and 2093 (2013) which expanded the listing criteria, and notes one of the listing criteria under resolution 1844 (2008) is engaging in acts that threaten the peace, security or stability of Somalia;

“36. Reiterates its willingness to adopt targeted measures against individuals and entities on the basis of the above-mentioned criteria;

“37. Reiterates its request for Member States to assist the SEMG in their investigations, reiterates that obstructing the investigations or work of the SEMG is a criterion for listing under paragraph 15(e) of resolution 1907 (2009) and further requests the FGS, regional authorities and AMISOM to share information with the SEMG regarding Al-Shabaab activities;

“38. Decides to extend until 15 December 2017 the mandate of the Somalia and Eritrea SEMG as set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013), and expresses its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding the further extension no later than 15 November 2017;

“39. Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures as expeditiously as possible to re-establish the SEMG, in consultation with the Committee, until 15 December 2017, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the SEMG established pursuant to previous resolutions, and further requests that administrative support to the SEMG be adjusted, within existing resources, to facilitate the delivery of their mandate;

“40. Requests the SEMG to provide monthly updates to the Committee, and a comprehensive midterm update, as well as to submit, for the Security Council’s consideration, through the Committee, two final reports; one focusing on Somalia, the other on Eritrea by 15 October 2017, covering all the tasks set out in paragraph 13 of resolution 2060 (2012) and updated in paragraph 41 of resolution 2093 (2013) and paragraph 15 of resolution 2182 (2014);

“41. Requests the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and in consultation with the SEMG and other relevant United Nations entities to consider the recommendations contained in the reports of the SEMG and recommend to the Security Council ways to improve the implementation of and compliance with the Somalia and Eritrea arms embargoes, the measures regarding the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as well as implementation of the measures imposed by paragraphs 1, 3 and 7 of resolutions 1844 (2008) and paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 10, 12 and 13 of resolution 1907 (2009) in response to continuing violations;

“42. Requests the Committee to consider, where and when appropriate, visits to selected countries by the Chair and/or Committee members to enhance the full and effective implementation of the measures above, with a view to encouraging States to comply fully with this resolution;

“43. Decides to remain seized of the matter.”

For information media. Not an official record.

Eritrea has become Africa's most repressive country since independence from Ethiopia in 1993.

https://d.europe.newsweek.com/en/full/66740/eighteen-eritrean-football-players-disappear-uganda.png?w=400&h=225&l=50&t=50&q=30); background-color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-size: 100%; background-position: 50% 50%; background-repeat: no-repeat;">

) 0% 0% no-repeat;" href="http://europe.newsweek.com/">

Eighteen Eritrean Football Players Disappear in Uganda

In this extract from“Understanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State,author Martin Plaut reflects on Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. The president led his people through most of the 30-year war with Ethiopia that culminated in independence in 1993. But the country has never held an election: President Isaias is an absolute ruler without a democratic mandate.

Note: Eritreans are known by their first names, so Isaias Afwerki is known as President Isaias on second reference.

How was it that Eritrea, which won its freedom at such a price, has sunk so far in just over two decades? Once hailed as a beacon of hope for the Horn of Africa, it is now mired in poverty, repression and bitter recriminations with almost all its neighbors. Thousands flee the country every month, braving the Sahara desert and drowning in the Mediterranean, to seek sanctuary on European soil.

The answer can be traced, in good measure, to the personality and policies of one man: Isaias Afwerki. At 70, he has been both the towering figurewho led his people to independenceand the dictator who now holds them in servitude. Yet, whatever his faults, Isaias has done little to encourage a cult of personality.

Asmara, the Eritrean capital, is not a city littered by his portrait or dominated by North Korean style statues of the "great leader" of the kind that can be found in other African capitals. But Isaias has made such an indelible imprint on his nation that it is impossible to understand Eritrea without grasping something about its president.

Eritrea president Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki reviews the honor guard during his welcome ceremony in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum, June 11, 2015.ASHRAF SHAZLY/AFP/GETTY

Isaias was born on February 2, 1946, in a working class suburb of Asmara. At school he became involved in secret nationalist politics, before leaving to study engineering in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa in 1965.

Isaias’s studies did not progress well and he failed his June 1966 exams and had to repeat his year. Without funding for food or lodging it was not a tempting prospect. Isaias decided to leave to join the liberation movement thenfighting for Eritrean independencefrom Ethiopia.

He travelled to eastern Sudan, from where the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) was launching attacks inside Eritrea. There he was joined by two friends: Mussie Tesfamikael and Haile Woldetensae, who later became Eritrean foreign minister. Haile, who had been with Isaias at university, described how he was received when he arrived in Sudan in December 1966.

“Isaias was the one who opened the gate—and the first thing he told me was that I have to shut my mouth, that he’s going to tell me a lot of things,” Haile recalls. “I was shocked. What’s happened to this guy? Why is he so afraid?”

The ELF had begun among Eritrean Muslims from the country’s lowlands and had few Christian highlanders like Isaias and Haile in its ranks. They had assumed it was an exemplary revolutionary organisation and were sadly disappointed. Its leadership was poor and sectarian—hostile to the Christians who joined it. Haile described the realisation as “a very dark moment for us.”

To confront this Isaias, Haile and Mussie formed a clandestine cell. Such activity was banned by the ELF and extremely dangerous. To seal their pact the three men took an oath signed in their own blood. They carved an E on their right arms—symbolizing their determination to live or die for Eritrea.

It was an act that marked Isaias out as the kind of driven revolutionary with real leadership potential. Not for him the slow climb through the ranks. Isaias would use secretive structures and personal dedication to take him to the top.

In 1967, Isaias and four others left for China to further their political and military studies. This was at the start of the Cultural Revolution and China was in ferment. President Liu Shaoqi was removed from power. Beaten and humiliated, Liu died in prison two years later. Factions of the Red Guard movement were battling for supremacy on the streets and the country was only saved from anarchy when Mao used the army to restore order.

The young Eritreans must have looked on amazed—but for someone of Isaias’s calibre there was much to grasp. Mao, an authoritarian leader, had turned his society upside down to strengthen his hold on power.

By the time Isaias returned to Sudan in 1968, the ELF was in turmoil. Isaias was sent to be political commissar of his mainly Christian home region, which surrounds Asmara. Isaias was deeply opposed to the religious segregation of the ELF and he joined a reform movement.

Its members were younger, more educated activists—including those who had been trained abroad. Isaias decided to leave the ELF, leading his group into an alliance with other breakaway factions.

Yet away from prying eyes, in the deserts of eastern Eritrea, an even more important event was taking place. This was the founding of a clandestine movement that became known simply as the People’s Party. Founded on April 4 1971, with a secret membership and a Marxist ideology, it would be the instrument through which Isaias would exercise control.

Even at this early stage he did not have things all his own way. Before Isaias could assert his supremacy he had to rebuff internal challenges. His old comrade, Mussie Tesfamikael, led a left-wing faction calling for more radical policies and more open decision-making. Mussie and his supporters met in secret late at night—earning them their nickname:menqa—the bats.

They underestimated Isaias. Denouncing his critics, he put themenqaon trial. The principle of innocent until proven guilty was reversed, becoming guilty until proven innocent. Up to eleven were jailed—some for years. Mussie and a colleague were executed.

Isaias had shown his true colors. Faced with internal challenges he was utterly ruthless, disposing of his closest associates. His supporters should have learnt from this, but few did. Instead, confronted with the exigencies of a long and bitter fight for independence, they rallied behind his charismatic leadership, suppressing concerns about his lack of accountability.

This is the background to the emergence in 1974-75 of the public movement Isaias used to lead the country to independence: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. Brave and resourceful, its fighters would trounce the much larger Ethiopian army, despite their foes being armed first by the United States and then the Soviet Union.

Eritrea tank An Eritrean tank destroyed in a battle with Ethiopian troops, near Barentu, Eritrea, May 20, 2000. Eritrea fought a 30-year war for independence from Ethiopia, and clashes occasionally flare up on the border between the two countries.ALEXANDER JOE/AFP/GETTY

It was an extraordinary achievement, which owes much to its president. But he is deeply flawed, with a personality aptly summed up in a leaked diplomatic cable from former U.S. Ambassador Ronald K. McMullen, on March 5, 2009: “Isaias is an austere and narcissistic dictator whose political ballast derives from Maoist ideology fine-tuned during Eritrea’s 30-year war for independence.”

This piece is an extract fromUnderstanding Eritrea: Inside Africa’s Most Repressive State,by Martin Plaut andpublished by Hurstin October.

Source=http://europe.newsweek.com/who-isaias-afwerki-eritreas-enigmatic-dictator-515761?rm=eu

Non-compliance on the part of States had hindered the ability of human rights rapporteurs to investigate violations in countries under their purview, the Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) heard today during its first day of interactive dialogue on area-specific situations.

Of the five Special Rapporteurs presenting reports to the Committee, only one, assigned to Myanmar, had been granted access to the territory under her mandate. In the absence of access, the other four — covering human rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Belarus and Eritrea — had gathered information remotely. The cooperation of all States was a fundamental obligation of United Nations membership, two of the experts recalled.

Sheila B. Keetharuth, Member of the Former Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea and Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in that country, said there were “reasonable grounds” to believe that its officials had committed crimes against humanity since 1991. The Government had failed to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and the Commission from the beginning. She encouraged the General Assembly to adopt a resolution submitting the Commission’s report to the Security Council for possible referral of the situation to the International Criminal Court.

In Belarus, there had been no substantial improvements in the human rights situation over the past decade, despite numerous United Nations recommendations, reported Miklós Haraszti, Special Rapporteur on that situation. The “smooth-looking” conduct of recent parliamentary elections should not eclipse the underlying systemic violations, he said. In the Occupied Palestinian Territories, a deepening occupation was stifling the economy and fostering an atmosphere of despair and hopelessness, reported Michael Lynk, Special Rapporteur for the territory.

In the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, there were mixed signs of progress, the Committee heard. Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana said political tensions and the prospect of instability continued to impede progress on the human rights agenda. However, there were positive signs, such as a five‑year economic plan to improve living standards and a new strategy to increase life expectancy at birth.

Yanghee Lee, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, commended the Government for its progress in recent years, while stressing that many human rights challenges remained. In Kachin and Shan states, humanitarian access to conflict areas was the worst it had been in recent years, while in Rakhine state, discriminatory policies and practices continued to deny Muslim communities of their most fundamental rights. “This is not what peace should look like,” she said.

During the discussions, several delegates expressed opposition to the raison d’être of the Special Rapporteurs, arguing that country-specific mandates and resolutions violated the principles of universality, impartiality and non-selectivity. Such interventions used human rights as a pretext to interfere in States’ internal political affairs and were better left to existing mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council, several said.

Making that point, Venezuela’s representative, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, said the selective adoption of country-specific resolutions exploited human rights for political purposes and that such matters were better left to existing mechanisms, such as the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council. Many called instead for engagement in a spirit of cooperation and dialogue. In that spirit, Singapore’s delegate said no draft resolution against Myanmar would be tabled in the Third Committee.

The observer of the State of Palestine spoke in a point of order.

The Third Committee will reconvene at 10 a.m. on Friday, 28 October, to continue its discussion of the promotion of human rights. It is expected to start with an interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied since 1967.

Background

The Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) met today to continue its discussions on the promotion and protection of human rights. For further information, see Press Release GA/SHC/4172.

Dialogue on Human Rights in Myanmar

YANGHEE LEE, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, commended the Government for progress it had made in recent years and thanked it for its cooperation throughout her mandate. Hundreds of political prisoners had been released, repressive laws had been rescinded and a major peace conference had been held. Yet, many human rights challenges remained, including the curtailment of the rights to assembly, association and expression. Despite a growing democratic space, she expressed concern about the continuing dominance of the military in politics. It still held 25 per cent of parliamentary seats and controlled several powerful ministries. Without constitutional reform — which would be challenging given that it required military approval — the transition from a military to a fully civilian Government would not be possible.

She also voiced concern that landmines continued to be laid, noting that Myanmar was the third most heavily mined country in the world. In Kachin and Shan states, humanitarian access to conflict areas was the worst it had been at any point in recent years. “This is not what peace should look like,” she said. In Rakhine state, discriminatory local orders, policies and practices continued to deny Muslim communities of their most fundamental rights. Restrictions on freedom of movement had impacted every area of life: access to education, livelihoods and health services. Birth registration had not taken place in conflict-affected areas in several years, placing children at risk of underage recruitment, trafficking and child labour. Ending the institutionalized discrimination of Muslim communities and accountability for alleged systematic human rights violations were urgent priorities.

The representative of Myanmar reiterated his opposition to country specific mandates, as they ran contrary to the principles of non-selectivity and non-politicization. Yet, Myanmar had fully cooperated with the Special Rapporteur and was the only country under the Human Rights Council’s agenda item 4 that had received the Special Rapporteur’s visits. Acknowledging that all the recommendations had been made in good faith, he expressed hope that Myanmar would receive the necessary international support to continue its efforts to promote the fundamental rights of all people and to uphold the rule of law. Describing the country’s progress, he also elaborated on persistent challenges in fostering peace and national reconciliation after decades of internal armed conflict. On the situation in Rakhine state, which had attracted international attention, he said Government actions had been taken in response to a violent armed attack on its security forces. He rejected distorted information reported in the media about the use of excessive force, explaining that security forces had been ordered to use maximum restraint unless confronted by armed resistance.

When the floor opened, several representatives, including those of Japan and Republic of Korea, asked the Special Rapporteur which of her extensive recommendations should be considered priorities. Others, such as the representatives of Eritrea, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and Cuba, among others, expressed their opposition to country-specific mandates. The United Kingdom’s representative, who noted that “Burma’s” relationship with the United Nations was changing, asked what the Special Rapporteur saw as the optimum level of support to the country’s authorities. Several delegations, including Norway’s representative, asked for reflections on how the international community could help improve the situation in the State of Rakhine.

Ms. LEE, responding, said the new Government had inherited many negative legacies from the military dictatorship, and underlined that the international community must be cognizant of that. Regarding attacks in some states, she said she had advocated for access to many areas but humanitarian access had been blocked. Where non-State media had been allowed some access, they had been prevented from reporting on the situation under the pretext of national security. Turning to the citizenship laws, she said they had to be reviewed, but the Government had not indicated any interest in that. She had raised objections with authorities about outdated and discriminatory laws, which required reform.

Protection of civilians was her major concern, she said, adding that humanitarian access had worsened in several states and that the human rights implications of increased military conflict were of great concern. Clashes had occurred in jade-mining areas, another sign that natural resources and conflict were linked. Opening an office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Myanmar with a full mandate was crucial and had been promised by the previous Government, yet not delivered. The last General Assembly resolution had included some benchmarks for the Government to address the rule of law and other issues. By discontinuing the resolution, she expressed concern that the Third Committee had signalled that Myanmar had met those benchmarks. She said she did not feel they had been met.

Also participating in the interactive dialogue were representatives of the United States, China, Thailand, Australia, Switzerland, Egypt (on behalf of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation), Russian Federation, Czech Republic, Jordan, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Viet Nam, and Iran, as well as the European Union.

Dialogue on Human Rights in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

TOMÁS OJEA QUINTANA, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, in his new capacity, said political tensions and the prospect of instability continued to impede progress on the human rights agenda amid reports of two nuclear tests and several missile launches by the Government, as well as increased military readiness among other countries and implementation of Security Council sanctions. As Council measures to deter nuclear proliferation should also protect civilians from the impacts of sanctions, he urged support for national relief efforts in the wake of Typhoon Lionrock, which had affected 140,000 in the country’s northeast. Describing a pattern of civil and political rights violations, he cited severe restrictions on freedom of movement, the conditions and treatment of prisoners and structural deficiencies in the public food distribution system.

He went on to note signs of a positive change in recent social and economic policies, including a five-year economic plan to improve living standards and a new strategy to increase life expectancy at birth. He also welcomed programmes in the health sector developed with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), noting that all such initiatives should be carefully monitored. He encouraged the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the international community to explore all venues for cooperation, conscious that a balance must be achieved between “situating” responsibilities for rights violations and engaging with duty bearers. Next month, he would visit Japan and the Republic of Korea, and anticipated future trips to China and the Russian Federation, with the aim of building regional and international platforms for cooperation. He regretted that the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was not in the room for the interactive dialogue.

When the floor was opened for questions, several countries expressed reservations about the practice of country-specific resolutions, which violated the principles of universality, impartiality and non-selectivity. They said such interventions used human rights as a pretext to interfere in States’ internal political affairs, arguing that such issues were better addressed through the Universal Periodic Review of the Human Rights Council. Many who supported the Special Rapporteur’s mandate wanted to know what more he could do to engage the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and gain access to the country. Several asked what could be done to ensure accountability for human rights violations.

Mr. QUINTANA expressed concern that the divergence of opinion had hindered genuine dialogue on human rights and said the General Assembly should bear the opinions of the Non-Aligned Movement in mind as part of a fruitful dialogue with delegations that supported such resolutions.

To questions about his ability to engage with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, he acknowledged that engagement would take time, patience and dedication. There were, as several delegates had pointed out, alternative human rights mechanisms. The Universal Periodic Review had made a series of recommendations, which he urged the Government to review. Thematic rapporteurs, such as the Rapporteur on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, could also be used to engage the Government on human rights issues.

To the concern raised by many delegates about accountability, he pointed to a forthcoming report by two independent experts on guidelines for accountability related to human rights. He stressed that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was not in a period of political transition and thus accountability there should not be dealt with in the same way as it was in transitional justice programmes.

Participating in the interactive dialogue were representatives of Venezuela (also speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Syria, Japan, Australia, Lichtenstein, Netherlands, United States, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, Belarus, Switzerland, Czech Republic, China, Republic of Korea, Germany, Cuba, Norway, Maldives, Iran, Ireland, Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Argentina, as well as the European Union.

Human Rights in Belarus

MIKLÓS HARASZTI, Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, discussing his findings, said that while had been only very few positive developments, one of them was the signing of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Much of his report focused on human rights in electoral processes in Belarus, especially parliamentary elections on 11 September 2016, which he said had been held without the violence by law enforcement that had marred previous elections. However, there had been no steps to either change the oppressive legal framework or modify restrictive practices, and the “smooth-looking” conduct of those polls should not eclipse the underlying systemic violations, he said.

The “guided” nature of electing a “token” opposition party member and an independent cultural activist to Parliament had made those choices a selection by the Government, he said. There had been no equal access to the media for the contestants. Neither the voter turnout nor the votes were verifiable, and the Chair of the Central Election Commission had been in place for 20 years. Describing a legal and administrative system of human rights restriction, he said the freedoms of expression and media continued to be violated. Belarus was the only country in Europe that lacked a privately-owned national media. Suppression of the freedoms of association and assembly persisted. Despite recommendations by various United Nations bodies, there had been no substantial changes in the human rights situation in the last decade, he said, urging Belarus to stop its use of the death penalty and engage with the Special Rapporteur.

The representative of Belarus said country-specific discussions could only “rip up controversy” and overburden the international community’s agenda. There was no need or context for such attention and Belarus had constantly conducted a dialogue with the human rights machinery. A national plan on human rights had been put in place based on recommendations from the Universal Periodic Review and treaty bodies, but that information had been distorted in the report. The views of observers had also not been taken into account. “We do not need to be taught how to live,” she said, stressing that after the Second World War and the Chernobyl nuclear accident, Belarus had created a strong State. It would remain a contributor to peace and agreement.

When the floor opened for interaction, a number of representatives, including those of Ecuador and Bangladesh, protested the existence of any country-specific mandates, while delegates of Eritrea, Venezuela and Lao People’s Democratic Republic suggested that the Universal Periodic Review was the correct venue for such discussions. Representatives of Norway, United Kingdom and Germany meanwhile, urged Belarus to place a moratorium on the death penalty as the first step toward abolition. Several others asked about space for civil society in Belarus, with Poland’s representative requesting an update in the context of elections.

Mr. HARASZTI, responding, described steps that could have “miraculous” effects on the human rights situation, such as the repeal of article 193.1 of the penal code, which was the chapter that criminalized all activity not permitted by the State. Under it, the most important human rights organizations had been made de jure criminal in everything they did because they were not registered. To questions on improving elections, he noted that although Belarus had invited observers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), parliamentary elections had not been complied with and only unimportant procedural recommendations had been heeded. Cooperation with OSCE should go beyond inviting observers into complying with their recommendations.

He expressed agreement with the representatives of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan that dialogue should be the basis for improving human rights, and urged those delegations to believe him and the Human Rights Council that his mandate was about cooperation, not about the other accusations lobbied at him. It would be a very important step forward if Belarus would send him their action plan, he said, adding that he would take it as a good gesture toward cooperation.

Participating in the interactive dialogue were representatives of the United States, Czech Republic, Cuba, Russian Federation, Lithuania, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Switzerland, Iran, Ireland, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Syria, and Bolivia (also speaking on behalf of Nicaragua), as well as the European Union.

Dialogue on Human Rights in Eritrea

SHEILA B. KEETHARUTH, Member of the Former Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea and Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Eritrea, presented that body’s final report (A/HRC/32/47), which had found reasonable grounds to believe that Eritrean officials had committed crimes against humanity since 1991, including enslavement, imprisonment, enforced disappearances, torture, other inhumane acts, persecution, rape and murder. Eritrea’s military/national service programmes included arbitrary and indefinite detention, often for years. The Commission documented extensive use of arbitrary arrest and detention, and numerous cases of enforced disappearances and rampant torture. There had been no material changes in the situation. The country still had no Constitution or Parliament, and indefinite national service persisted. While Eritrea had refused to allow the Commission to visit and have unhindered access to sites and locations, the Commission had been able to corroborate information provided by witnesses.

Turning to her mandate as Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea, she stated that the Government had failed to cooperate with the Special Rapporteur and the Commission from the beginning. The Commission had requested that the African Union establish an accountability mechanism to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals believed to have committed crimes against humanity. Additionally, it had recommended that Member States provide Eritrean nationals seeking protection with refugee status. “It is not safe to forcibly return those who have left Eritrea,” she said. She would continue to implement her mandate over the coming months, and expressed hope the General Assembly would adopt a resolution submitting the Commission’s report to the Security Council for a possible referral of the human rights situation in Eritrea to the International Criminal Court.

The representative of Eritrea said he saw little value of entering into dialogue with a biased Special Rapporteur. He preferred an approach marked by dialogue and understanding and which took note of Government achievements. The country mandate was unwarranted for Eritrea and an insult to Africa. The most appropriate venue for such discussions was the Human Rights Council and he rejected a politicized approach. The Government’s priority was to protect its people, live in harmony and build its political system. Political participation, including of women, was high. Eritrea was committed to development. It was an independent and modest regional actor and favoured engagement. Further, national ownership was an undeniable pillar for nation-building. Women’s and children’s rights were protected and remote areas were being developed. He acknowledged that achievements were modest and that Eritrea had a long way to go, but the Government shouldered its international obligations and cooperated with international human rights mechanisms. Yet, it was being treated unfairly, singled out for human rights violations, while those in other countries went unnoticed.

During the ensuing dialogue, delegates raised questions and concerns about ongoing human rights violations, impunity and engagement with the international human rights mechanisms. Several asked about follow-up to issues and recommendations, while others reiterated their opposition to the selective and politicized nature of country mandates, stressing that the Human Rights Council, particularly the Universal Periodic Review, were the most appropriate venues for the promotion and protection of human rights.

The representative of Ethiopia said the mayhem in his country was the result of the deployment of Eritrean terrorists. Eritrea had destabilized the Horn of Africa and committed crimes against humanity. Eritrea was on the Committee’s agenda, he said, not Ethiopia.

Ms. KEETHARUTH reiterated her commitment to “look at all comments” in the implementation of her mandate. She welcomed Eritrea’s engagement with the international community, which should lead to tangible improvements for its citizens, such as improved treatment of detainees. Building trust was required, internally and externally. Regarding forced labour, she said citizens must have a choice as to whether and how they wished to work. Development, while important, did not give license to violate human rights. Any engagement with the United Nations must work towards ending impunity, with human rights violators punished. Engagement with United Nations bodies should not be selective. Access to Eritrea had only been given to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights to a model prison and only for 15 minutes. More time was needed for a proper assessment.

Participating in the discussion were representatives of Venezuela (also on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement), Myanmar, Djibouti, United States, Zimbabwe, Germany, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, Ethiopia, China, Norway, Cuba, Belarus, Bolivia, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Switzerland, the Russian Federation, Pakistan, Burundi, Iran and Egypt, as well as the European Union.

Dialogue on Human Rights in Palestinian Territories

MICHAEL LYNK, Special Rapporteur on the Situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, presented his first report to the Committee, which was based on interviews with human rights non-Governmental organizations, Palestinian officials and United Nations officers in Jordan, as he had been unable to travel to the Occupied Palestinian Territories due to Israel’s noncompliance with his mandate and refusal to grant him access to the territories. He also had been unable to meet with activists in the Gaza Strip due to Israel’s restrictions on their movement.

He highlighted three areas of particular concern: violence and lack of accountability, collective punishment and forcible transfers and the right to development. On the first issue, he observed that, too often, Israel used lethal force as a first choice, rather than the last resort. In only the rarest instances did cases brought before Israeli military law enforcement result in indictment. Israel was increasingly using administrative detention and imprisoning Palestinian children. It continued to collectively punish Palestinians, through home demolitions, geographic closures, infringements on freedom of movement and the decade-long blockage of Gaza. Forcible transfers, in the form of repeated demolitions of Arab Bedouin communities, the refusal of housing permits to Palestinians and destruction of humanitarian aid facilities, also violated international law. Finally, the Israeli occupation was a violation of Palestinians’ right to development. “No other society in the world faces such an array of cumulative challenges,” he said, adding, “the result has been a stifled and disfigured Palestinian economy that Israel, the Occupying Power, decisively controls and exploits for its own benefit.”