South Sudan inches towards a unity government

Tuesday, 25 February 2020 22:52 Written by

South Sudan's leaders shake hands

Source: The Economist

After 12 deals failed to bring peace, will the 13th prove lucky?


ONCE FETED as liberation heroes, South Sudan’s ageing leaders are now better known for fighting each other and failing to make up. The country won independence from Sudan in 2011, after a referendum, and plunged into civil war two years later. Since then, President Salva Kiir and his former deputy-turned-nemesis, Riek Machar, have struck no fewer than 12 agreements, none of which brought lasting peace. On February 22nd the two sides are supposed to form an interim government of national unity—nine months and two missed deadlines behind schedule. Many observers worry it will be Groundhog Day for South Sudan. But as the deadline approaches there are tentative signs that this time it might not.

South Sudan's leaders shake hands

Mr Kiir and Mr Machar (pictured; Mr Kiir in a hat) both belonged to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, the political arm of the rebel army that fought for independence. Rivalries between the two men and their respective tribes—Dinkas and Nuers—have roiled the country for years. A peace deal signed in 2015 saw the return of Mr Machar to the capital, Juba, to take up his post as vice-president in a coalition government. But in 2016 fighting erupted again and Mr Machar fled. It has led to hundreds of thousands of deaths and the flight of more than a third of the population.

Since September 2018, when the latest peace agreement was signed, violence has subsided. Rebel generals visit government-held towns, aid reaches most of the country and civilians can move about more or less unhindered. The hope is that this will allow Mr Machar to return to Juba again as vice-president. Rebels and government forces are to be integrated into a national army of 83,000 men and elections are to be held in three years.

Prospects brightened following diplomatic pressure from neighbouring countries and threats of more sanctions from America. On February 15th Mr Kiir announced that he had cut the number of states from 32 to ten. This is seen as a big concession. The opposition has long decried the Dinka-dominated government’s unilateral division of South Sudan into 28 states (later 32) as ethnic gerrymandering. “Everyone is hopeful now,” says Jale Richard of Eye Radio, a broadcaster in Juba. It also helps that some rebel groups that were not part of the current peace agreement signed a truce last month.

But it is too soon to celebrate. Mr Kiir has not simply restored South Sudan’s ten original states, as Mr Machar had demanded. Instead he wants to form ten states and three “administrative areas”. One of these will be Ruweng, a Dinka enclave in Unity, Mr Machar’s home state. As it happens, Ruweng holds about 80% of South Sudan’s oil—the country’s only sizeable export.

On February 17th Mr Machar flew to Juba with Lieutenant-General Abdel Fattah Abdelrahman Burhan, the head of Sudan’s sovereign council, in a last-ditch attempt to reach a compromise with Mr Kiir. Even if one is reached, Mr Machar needs convincing that he can safely return to Juba. Wary of what happened in July 2016, when the government sent helicopter-gunships to kill him, Mr Machar wants a 3,000-strong joint protection force. “He considers having military manpower in Juba the same as having political power,” notes Ahmed Soliman of Chatham House, a think-tank in London. Although the government has agreed to this joint force, it is reluctant to remove its own troops from the capital. Alternatives such as peacekeepers supplied by African governments would require lengthy discussions.

The bigger issue is that the latest deal, like those before it, aims to do little more than restore the balance of power between the president and his rival. “We’re essentially trying to reset the button to 2013—back to the very problem which kick-started this war,” says Mr Martell.

Source=https://martinplaut.com/2020/02/20/south-sudan-inches-towards-a-unity-government/

Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years until he was deposed following mass protests

Hosni Mubarak in a cage in court during his trial in Cairo in 2012

Hosni Mubarak in a cage in court during his trial in Cairo in 2012. Photograph: STR/EPA

Hosni Mubarak, Egypt’s autocratic former president who ruled with an iron fist for three decades before being toppled during the Arab spring protests in 2011, has died aged 91.

Mubarak became a symbol of thuggish and brutal authority after taking power in 1981 following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. His reign was marked by the emergence of a paranoid and cruel police state supported by a network of sprawling military businesses and corrupt crony businessmen. Many Egyptians see echoes of Mubarak’s style of leadership in their current leader, the former general Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

The former president’s family said he had recently been taken to hospital and was in intensive care following an operation to remove a stomach tumour.

A statement from the office of the Egyptian presidency praised Mubarak’s military record in the 1973 war against Israel, naming him “one of the leaders and heroes of the glorious October war”. “He assumed command of the air force during the war that restored dignity and pride to the Arab nation,” it said.

Egypt’s armed forces also released a statement of mourning for the longtime air force officer and military leader. “The General Command of the Armed Forces mourns one of its sons, and one of the leaders of the glorious October war,” it said. Three days of mourning were announced.

Mubarak speaking to Barack Obama in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington in 2010.
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Mubarak speaking to Barack Obama in the Oval Office of the White House in Washington in 2010. Photograph: Jason Reed/Reuters

US administrations showered Mubarak with billions of dollars in military aid, viewing him as a bulwark against regional terrorism and a key driver of “cold peace” with Israel. In the west, Mubarak became seen as a draconian but businesslike leader who could be relied on to keep western interests intact and maintain peace with Egypt’s neighbours. Tony Blair once praised him as “immensely courageous and a force for good”.

Yet at home, unemployment, poverty and resentment about Mubarak’s lavish lifestyle continued to grow. A years-long loosening of some of the more draconian elements of his rule, allowing Islamists to obtain seats in Egypt’s parliament as independents in 2005 and allowing limited press freedom, could not stop a rising tide of discontentment.

In January 2011, following the ousting of Tunisia’s longtime ruler in the first act of what became known as the Arab spring, protesters overtook Tahrir Square in central Cairo and other major Egyptian cities demanding an end to Mubarak’s time in power.

His cronyism, his corrupt leadership and his security forces’ cruel treatment of the Egyptian populace galvanised a generation. Protesters called for “bread, freedom and social justice” and an end to military rule

Timeline

After Tahrir Square

25 February 2011

Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak steps down after almost 30 years in power amid anti-government Arab spring protests. Rallies continue all year.

25 January 2012

Islamist parties win drawn-out parliamentary elections.

25 June 2012

Mohamed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood wins presidential election. Mubarak sentenced to life in prison for complicity in killing 800 protesters in 2011.

25 July 2013

Army overthrows Morsi.

25 August 2013

Security forces kill hundreds in pro-Morsi camp.

25 May 2014

Former army chief Abdel Fatah al-Sisi wins presidential election.

25 May 2015

Morsi sentenced to death. Egypt's appeal court orders retrial in 2016.

25 October 2015

Isis claims responsibility for bombing Russian plane in Sinai. Crew and 224 tourists killed.

25 November 2016

IMF approves three-year $12bn loan to Egypt designed to help country out of economic crisis.

25 April 2017

Suicide bombers kill dozens at two churches as worshippers celebrate Palm Sunday.

25 November 2017

Egyptian airstrikes on northern Sinai after militants assault on a mosque kills 305 people.

25 January 2018

Sisi announces he will run for a second term.

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Mubarak oversaw a violent response that resulted in the deaths of at least 846 people, according to a later government inquiry. After 18 days of protests, his 29-year reign was ended in a 30-second video message from the then vice-president Omar Suleiman. “My fellow citizens, in the difficult circumstances our country is experiencing, President Muhammad Hosni Mubarak has decided to give up the office of the president of the republic,” he said. Protests rapidly became celebrations, as demonstrators chanted “we have brought down the regime”.

“Hosni Mubarak was the first Egyptian president since Nasser to leave office standing. He lived long enough to go from experiencing disgrace to witnessing an even more brutal dictator replace him that has left many in Egypt missing his presidency despite how reviled he once was,” said Timothy E Kaldas of the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy.

Mubarak was the first of the leaders toppled in the wave of Arab uprisings to face trial. In scenes that captivated Egyptians, he appeared in a courtroom cage on a range of charges.

Mubarak being taken into the Cairo courtroom on a gurney in September 2011.
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Mubarak being taken into the Cairo courtroom on a gurney in September 2011. Photograph: AP

In 2012 he was jailed for life for conspiring to murder protesters and sent to Cairo’s Tora prison, though he was occasionally moved to the Maadi military hospital nearby amid claims of failing health.

In 2015, he was sentenced in a separate case to three years in prison, accused along with his two sons, Gamal and Alaa, of embezzling public funds for the renovation of presidential palaces, part of a long and protracted set of corruption charges, as well as attempts to reclaim money held in Switzerland. His sons were acquitted this month over a separate set of charges concerning illicit trading.

In 2017, Mubarak was acquitted by Egypt’s highest appeals court of conspiring to kill protesters. He was freed from the Maadi military hospital, where small crowds of supporters routinely gathered outside his bedroom window in support.

Mubarak’s reign was seen by critics and supporters alike as a prototype for that of Sisi, who seized power in a military coup after a brief rule by Egypt’s only democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi. Morsi died in court last June following allegations of prolonged medical neglect in prison.

Many of those who rose to prominence in the uprising against Mubarak have since been imprisoned or left the country amid a crackdown on civil society and free speech under Sisi.

Asked to comment on Mubarak’s release from prison in 2017, the human rights lawyer Mahienour El Massry, who was rearrested in a crackdown after fresh protests last year, said: “In the eyes of those who believe in the revolution he will always be a criminal killer and the godfather of corruption. This might be another round that we have lost, but we will keep on fighting to change the inhuman regime that releases criminals and imprisons innocent people.”

Source=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/25/hosni-mubarak-egyptian-president-ousted-during-arab-spring-dies-at-91?CMP=share_btn_link

Eritrean-Swiss association in Geneva, which has been helping in the integration of refugees since its creation in 2015, decided at a congress held on 22 February 2020 to expand its future activities, including the establishment of a new Eritrean centre where community members can meet frequently.

  Eritrean Community Holds Congress in Geneva 1

Known as ASEPE (Association Suisse-Erythree pour l’Entraid), the Eritrean-Swiss charity has been supporting through volunteers newly arriving Eritreans who were in urgent need of assistance for starting new life in Switzerland. 

The ASEPE chairman and committee members presented activity reports at the congress and stated that ASEPE’s major achievements included providing basic language training to young refugees, guidance in administrative and paper-works that were essential in starting an integrated-life in Geneva. The association also obtained legal recognition and support from the Geneva authorities and succeeded to create a network of contacts that can help ASEPE grow further.

Congress members, including young beneficiaries of the programme, thanked the committee members and teaching volunteers for their dedicated work for the benefit of vulnerable refugees. The congress also decided that the ASEPE continue with expanded programmes in the future.

To this end, the outgoing ASEPE executive committee members were requested to continue cooperating with a newly elected provisional committee till the next extraordinary congress this year at which a revised work programme can be debated and adopted.

Eritrean Community Holds Congress in Geneva 2

The outgoing committee members were ASEPE chairman Tedros Eyasu and his team composed of Sophia Ammar, Olivia Heller, Awet Aregay and Tedros Teklemariam.  Their close collaborators in different association responsibilities and activities included Merachew Berhe, Tseggai Tesfaldet, Ahmed Surur and Abdalla Mohammed Ali.

The successfully ended congress finally elected a new provisional committee consisting of Ghenet Tewelde, Tekle Tesfamariam,  Denden Ghebre, Medhine Estefanos and  Bereket Andemariam. Merachew Berhe will also work with the transitional team.

 

Desert Locust situation update - 17 February 2020

Wednesday, 19 February 2020 07:02 Written by

Report

Widespread breeding in progress in the Horn of Africa

The situation remains extremely alarming in Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia where widespread Desert Locust infestations and a new generation of breeding threatens food security and livelihoods in the region. The situation is less worrisome in Uganda and Tanzania.

Kenya. Swarms continue to mature and lay eggs in northern and central counties where hatching and band formation are increasing. At least one swarm arrived in a tea plantation in the southwest county of Kericho while other swarms have been seen further north in Turkana county. There have been no new reports of swarms near Mt. Kilimanjaro. Aerial and ground control operations continue in most areas.

Uganda. Several mature swarms moved northwards within 12 northeastern districts from 9–13 February. Although a few swarms were desperately laying eggs on the surface of the ground, there is a possibility of successful laying in a few limited areas. Control operations were undertaken by the military in one area.

Tanzania. There have been no new reports of swarms after those that entered from the north on 9 February and moved towards Arusha and Moshi.

South Sudan. On 17 February, a mature swarm entered Magwi county in the southeast from Lamwo district in northern Uganda and was moving towards Torit west.

Ethiopia. Ground and aerial control operations continue against mature swarms in the Somali, Oromiya and SNNPR regions, including the Rift Valley. Cross-border swarm movements with Kenya continue to be reported. Breeding is underway but more details are awaited concerning its scale and geographical spread.

Somalia. Breeding is in progress in central areas near the Ethiopian border between Beled Weyn and Gaalkacyo where groups of hoppers and adults are present. Breeding is also underway in the northeast where late instar hopper bands were seen earlier in the month near Garowe.

Red Sea area. Breeding is in progress along both sides of the Red Sea in Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and Eritrea where hopper groups, bands immature adults groups have formed that is likely to cause swarms to form shortly. Several immature swarms have moved from the coastal plains to the interior in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Control operations are in progress in all countries but remains limited in Yemen.

Southwest Asia. Breeding continues on the southeast coast in Iran. The situation is calm along the India border in Pakistan while a few small swarms appeared in cropping areas in Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan. In India, control operations are underway against a few residual summer-bred swarms that persist in parts of Rajasthan.

Source=https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/desert-locust-situation-update-17-february-2020

Shadow report to the CEDAW Committee

Monday, 17 February 2020 08:09 Written by

February 16, 2020 Reports, UN Ocha, Uncategorized

Source: Network of Eritrean Women and Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights.

Submission to the 75th Session of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)

Screenshot 2020-02-16 at 08.26.03

                               Submitted 13 January 2020 

Joint Submission by the Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR)  And The Network of Eritrean Women (NEW)

Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR)

Report compiled by: N. Kidan

Approved by Executive Committee: 10 January 2020

Email: This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

Website: http://www.emdhr.net.za

Contents

  1. Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………………………………………..3
  2. Constitutional, legislative and institutional framework……………………………………………..4
  3. National service & gender-based violence against women………………………………………..6
  4. Women’s Human Rights Defenders & Freedom of Association………………………………….9
  5. Human Trafficking……………………………………………………………………………………………………..10
  6. Education…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..11
  7. Conclusions & Questions for GoSE………………………………………………………………………….….12

References and Bibliography………………………………………………………………………………………14

1.   Executive Summary

  • The Eritrean Movement for Democracy and Human Rights (EMDHR) is an    independent civil society organization (CSO), dedicated to advocating for democracy, human rights and the rule of law in Eritrea and the protection of refugee rights.  Founded in 2003 in the Republic of South Africa, the programmes of the EMDHR are primarily aimed at those within the country who are severely constrained by a lack of civil liberties, in addition to supporting Eritrean CSOs in the diaspora develop their organisational capacity.
  • The Network of Eritrean Women (NEW) is an independent, diaspora-based, non-profit organisation set up to support Eritrean women. NEW aims to help facilitate and provide the tools for Eritrean women to assert their human rights and pursue personal empowerment, development and social change. NEW provides cultural and linguistic specialist advice, information, advocacy, workshops and wellbeing drop-ins targeted to support Eritrean women.
  • In this shadow report, we provide a high-level critique of the Government of Eritrea’s (GoSE) sixth periodic report, submitted under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In the absence of an operational constitution, democratic institutions, transparency and accountability, the rule of law cannot be said to exist in Eritrea and any consideration of the protection of women’s rights must be viewed within this wider context. This literature review focuses on: i. Absence of rule of law; ii. Indefinite National Service and its impact on girls/women; iii. Curtailment of women’s right to freedom of association; iv. Human trafficking; v. Barriers to girls accessing education.
  • Eritrea formally gained its independence in 1993 following a protracted 30-year war with Ethiopia. In the years which immediately followed, there was a period of relative political openness. In 1994, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) transformed itself into the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the current ruling party. A Transitional National Assembly (legislature) was formed and a number of independent media and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) emerged. The Constitution was ratified in 1997, and to many, it appeared that Eritrea was on an upward trajectory towards constitutional governance.
  • These nascent democratic institutions were extinguished following the 1998-2000 war with Ethiopia, and the human rights situation in the country substantially deteriorated. The PFDJ refused to implement the ratified constitution, disbanded the transitional legislature in 2002, brutally cracked down on dissent, condemned Eritrean youth to indefinite military/national service, tantamount to slavery and consolidated the position of Isaias Afewerki as head of a totalitarian, one-party state.
  • In the 18 months since Isaias Afewerki and Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed signed the joint declaration during the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace summit in Addis in July 2018, no steps have been taken to institutionalize the agreement and the Eritrean people are yet to reap the dividends of ‘peace’. The GoSE have made no announcements regarding implementing the constitution or phased demobilization of Eritreans trapped in indefinite military/national service. Thousands of Eritreans, including women and underage girls remain incarcerated in Eritrea’s vast prison network having not received due process. The political space remains firmly shut for independent CSOs, media, associations and trade bodies.

2.   Constitutional, legislative and institutional framework

 

  • In 1994, a Constitutional Commission was established to draft Eritrea’s constitution (Selassie, 1998). The draft constitution laid out the organization of state apparatus, separation of powers, citizen’s rights and provisions for a multi-party system and national elections. The Constitution was ratified in May 1997 (Dirar and Tesfagabir, 2011) but subsequently shelved in 1998 following the outbreak of war with Ethiopia.
  • Post-independence, a Transitional National Assembly was formed to serve as the country’s legislative body until nationwide elections would be held to elect all 150 members of the Assembly. Assembly elections scheduled for December 2001 were postponed indefinitely, and to date, there is no sitting legislative body. Legislative powers have been completely subsumed by the GoSE who exercise legislative, judicial and executive functions, contrary to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers.
  • Laws are issued by Executive Order, implemented/enforced in a wholly arbitrary manner, and the judiciary lacks independence. Although low-level community courts exist, citizens are unable to file a complaint for human rights violations, and as such, there is no mechanism for Eritrean citizens to hold the GoSE to account. The Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea (COI) have stated: “In the absence of a constitution, an independent judiciary, a national assembly, and other democratic institutions, the Commission has found no progress in establishing the rule of law” (HRC, 2016).
  • Following the Eritrea-Ethiopia Summit in July 2018, the GoSE has taken no steps or provided any updates regarding implementing the constitution, despite assurances from Presidential Adviser Yemane Gebreab in 2016 that a Committee had been established to ‘consider’ drafting a new constitution (HRC, 2016). Eritrea remains in violation of Article 25 of the ICCPR and Article 13 of the ACHPR.

 

  • Whilst the GoSE has enacted proclamations in certain areas relating to the CEDAW Convention, in practice, these policies are often not implemented or fail to meet their objectives. Women’s rights are not protected because Eritrea doesn’t have an independent legislature or judiciary to provide checks and balances on the Executive. The COI have noted: “Without any meaningful reform, the Commission remains concerned about the political will of the Government of Eritrea to ensure the rational and effective implementation of any law, old or new.” (HRC, 2015).
  • In June 2019, the GoSE seized and shut down all 22 Catholic-run health clinics in the country, denying healthcare to thousands of vulnerable people in rural areas, including mothers with small children (Catholic Herald, 2019). To justify its decision, the GoSE cited a previously unenforced 1995 proclamation which stipulates that all social institutions (including clinics) must be operated by the State. The move was politically motivated and illustrates how the GoSE enforces the law in an inconsistent and arbitrary manner, with no mechanisms for affected parties to challenge the decision via the courts.
  • In para 18 of the GoSE submission to CEDAW, it states that “discrimination on the grounds of sex is prohibited in all national laws.” In paragraph 23, the submission goes on to list examples of proclamations enacted post-independence which “respect, protect and fulfil the rights of women and abolish gender-based discrimination.”  Nevertheless, the COI found that: “discrimination against women exists in various areas of Eritrean society and that some of the legal reforms which appear gender neutral, such as the new land tenure system, indirectly discriminate against women in practice” (HRC, 2015):
  • The land tenure system (Proclamation No. 58/1994) removed de jure discrimination against women owning land and property and at the surface appears to be gender-neutral; in practice, the system indirectly discriminates against women and girls who face disproportionate difficulties in accessing and owning land/property due to the barrier of citizenship, denial of their legal autonomy and traditional practices.
  • Article 4 of the land tenure proclamation states that “every Eritrean citizen shall have a usufruct right over land”. Those who fail to complete national service obligations or obtain a formal discharge are unable to obtain citizenship and, therefore have no rights to access land. Due to the fear of harassment and sexual violence in military/national service, many young women and girls enter early marriages or motherhood to avoid entering national service (HRW, 2019). Consequently, many fail to undertake or complete national service obligations and are unable to access land, social services or GoSE sanctioned employment, illustrating how discrimination against women intersects with other human rights violations (HRC, 2015).
  • At village level, the distribution of land is in most cases handled by land distribution committees, where traditional attitudes towards women’s land rights can prevent the equitable distribution of land. In Muslim communities, Sharia law takes precedence over domestic laws, limiting women’s inheritance to half of what a man is entitled.

3.   National Service and gender-based violence against women

Military/National Service

 

  • At the end of 2018, UNHCR reported 507,300 Eritrean refugees receiving protection under its mandate worldwide (UNHCR, 2018). Indefinite military/national service is frequently cited by as being the principal push factor driving Eritreans to flee the country. National Service Proclamation No. 82/1995 requires citizens between the ages of 18 and 40 years to participate in an 18-month active national service programme. The active programme is stated to comprise of six months of military training followed by 12 months of active military service and/or development work. In 2002, the national service programme was illegally extended from 18 months to an indefinite period, with many conscripts having served for decades. (HRC, 2015; HRW, 2019a);
  • Proclamation No.11/1991 provided the statutory basis for national service prior to the promulgation of the current National Service Proclamation (No. 82/1995); its provisions exempted married women and single mothers from national service duties. The 1995 National Service Proclamation removed these exemptions for married women and mothers, contributing to the disintegration of families. Whilst the GoSE claims that married women and single mothers are exempt, there is no legal basis for this claim and where they are exempted, this is done in an arbitrary manner and at the discretion of the recruiting officer (HRC, 2015).
  • The GoSE uses the secondary school system as a means to channel students (including underage children) into a life of indefinite service; since 2003, all secondary school students are rounded up to complete their final year (12th grade) at Sawa military camp, a harsh, isolated location near the border with Sudan. Every year, tens of thousands of students are forcibly separated from their families and transported to Sawa, where they undertake 5 months of military training in addition to preparing for their National Secondary Education Certificate Examination (the ‘matricula’). After one year at Sawa and depending on their performance in their exams, some are assigned to civil service positions, while most are placed in military units, where they work as forced laborers on private and public works projects for an indeterminate duration (HRW, 2019a).
  • The COI report documented a number of grave human rights abuses in the GoSE’s military/national service programme, including:
  • It’s indefinite and arbitrary duration which routinely exceeds 18 months;
  • The use of conscripts as forced labour in a wide range of activities, including private enterprises owned by the military and ruling elites’;
  • Rape and torture perpetrated in military camps and other inhumane and degrading conditions (HRC, 2015).
  • There is substantial evidence that rape and other forms of sexual violence is still prevalent in military/national service. Some young women are also forced to perform household chores for military officers in Sawa, Wi’a and other military training camps, with some reporting that they were forced into sexual acts and were subjected to physical and mental punishment if they didn’t comply, in some cases, the women are imprisoned or forced to have abortions (HRC, 2015; HRC, 2016; HRW, 2019a).
  • The COI has observed that “there [was] a complete denial by the State of the extent of violence against women within its borders,” which contributed to silencing Eritrean women and hindering their ability to seek recourse to justice. It concluded that Eritrea failed to protect, prevent, punish, and remedy acts of sexual violence committed against women, thereby facilitating a culture of impunity (HRC, 2015).
  • Eritrea’s military/national service programmes violate Article 565 of Eritrea’s Transitional Penal Code which criminalises enslavement. They also violate Article 8 of the ICCPR, Article 5 of the ACPHR, and the Slavery Convention of 1926. Aspects of the programmes also violate Articles 9, 10, 12, 17 and 22 of the ICCPR, Articles 8, 12, 15 and 18 of the ACHPR, and the 1930 and 1957 conventions on forced labour. The COI concluded that the programme constitutes the crime against humanity of enslavement (HRC, 2015).
  • In paragraph 11 of the GoSE concluding observations on the 5th periodic report, GoSE states that: “In times of peace, National Service members do not have any other obligations once they finish their military training and fulfil their duty of service.” In the 18 months since the declaration of peace was signed with Ethiopia, not a single announcement has been made regarding plans for phased demobilization and limiting national service to 18 months.

Arbitrary detention

  • Eritreans continue to be subject to arbitrary imprisonment without recourse to the courts. The thousands of detainees held in Eritrea’s vast prison network include political dissidents, journalists, members of unregistered religious denominations and other prisoners of conscience. Imprisonment is indefinite, often incommunicado and detainees are subjected to harsh punishment including torture (HRC, 2015). In 2017, The OHCHR Special Rapporteur noted: “The Commission found that there are reasonable grounds to believe that Eritrean officials have committed the crime of torture, against persons under their control. It concluded that the use of torture was, and remains, an integral part of the Government’s repression of the civilian population.” (OHCHR, 2017).
  • Many prisons are located underground or in shipping containers, which can result in extreme temperature fluctuations due to Eritrea’s climate. Prison cells are overcrowded and hygiene conditions are poor, with inadequate sanitary hygiene provision for women.  Women are generally kept in cells separate from men, though reports of sexual assault and rape are still rife e.g. prison guards (HRC, 2015).
  • Eleven former high-level officials have been detained incommunicado since 2001 for calling for the implementation of the Constitution. GoSE has ignored repeated calls by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Human Rights Council (to which Eritrea was elected a member in 2018) to release them or at least bring them to trial.
  • A. A., a U.S. citizen and daughter of former Information Minister A. A. A., has been detained incommunicado for over seven years. Now 22, C. was only 15 years old when she was arrested in December 2012 whilst attempting to cross the border into the Sudan. Her father had defected one month earlier and sought asylum in Australia following irreparable differences with the President. Ciham has never been charged with a crime, has not been brought before a court of law and has been denied access to lawyers and her family. Human Rights Watch (2019b) observed: “By holding C. A. A. incommunicado from the age of 15, the government has effectively disappeared her.”
  • Mother of three daughters, S. D. was arrested in Asmara on the 15th of November 2003 and detained incommunicado in Karchele prison. It is alleged that her arrest was instigated by her husband, B. R., with whom she had been engaged in divorce proceedings. She was arrested just days before she was due to attend court to file for custody of their children. To this day, her whereabouts and the state of her well-being is unknown.  In 2005, it was reported that S. was in poor health following a kidney operation (Amnesty International, 2005).  and S. are just two high-profile examples of how GoSE tramples on the rights of women and the Eritrean citizenry in general.
  • Detention continues to have a discriminatory effect on women. The COI noted that: “The special needs of pregnant and nursing mothers and women with children in detention continue not to be met; in some recent instances leading to miscarriage or an infant becoming seriously ill.” (HRC, 2015).

 

  • The GoSE issued a new criminal code in 2015, but its procedural safeguards, requiring warrants for arrest, access to defence counsel, and the right to habeas corpus petitions, remain largely unimplemented (HRW, 2018).

 

4.   Women Human Rights Defenders & Freedom of Association

  • The aversion of the GoSE to independent Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) goes back to 1996, when it dismantled the Eritrean Women War Veteran’s Association (BANA). Founded in 1994, BANA was created to help recently demobilised women fighters transition into civilian life. By 1996, its almost 1000 members had set up successful cooperatives and the association had raised significant revenue from international donors. When BANA refused to fall under the control of the state sponsored National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW) and later the government’s Demobilisation Agency, it was shut down and its assets seized (Connell, 2010). As of January 2020, the GoSE’s prohibition of independent CSOs persists.
  • Article 19 of the unimplemented Constitution of Eritrea guarantees the right to freedom of association. Furthermore, Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Eritrea has acceded, also guarantees the freedom of association.  Despite these commitments, the GoSE has failed to comply with its obligations.
  • In Paras 28-30 of the GoSE submission, it claims that women have the right to “association and assembly in various capacities and diverse interest groups.” The GoSE cites the Transitional Civil Code of Eritrea (Articles 404-482) as the relevant regulatory framework enabling the establishment of independent, non-profit associations, claiming these organisations have their own structure, leadership programme and source of income. In reality, the organisations which GoSE claim to be independent women’s associations in fact fall under the umbrella of the state controlled National Union of Eritrean Women (NUEW).
  • Proclamation No. 145/2004 of 2005 (Non-governmental Organization Proclamation) places onerous restrictions on the scope and operation of NGOs, empowering the authorities to exert control over their activities. Article 2(1) limits the definition of NGO to those engaged in relief and/or rehabilitation work, thereby excluding human rights CSOs and women’s associations. The proclamation states that any NGO wishing to operate inside Eritrea must apply to the Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare, who must inform applicants of the outcome of the application within 30 days. The Ministry has failed to process the application of any NGO not supportive of the actions of the GoSE, effectively banning the operation of any independent CSO inside Eritrea (Civicus, 2019). As a consequence, independent women’s associations, such as the NEW can only operate outside Eritrean borders; this state of affairs poses major challenges for CSOs in holding the GoSE to account.

5.   Human Trafficking

5.1           A large and increasing number of Eritrean women and girls, including unaccompanied children flee the country illegally to avoid national service, not least because they fear being sexually assaulted (HRW, 2018). As a consequence, women increasingly become victims of violence, human trafficking and smuggling (CEDAW, 2015; OHCHR, 2015). At the end of 2018, UNHCR recorded 507,300 Eritrean refugees receiving protection under its mandate – more than 10% of the country’s population – thus maintaining Eritrea’s position as the ninth largest country of origin for refugees (UNHCR, 2018). The true figure is in fact much higher, as these statistics don’t take account of pending asylum cases and those who have not come to the attention of UNHCR.

5.2           De jure restrictions make it notoriously difficult for Eritreans to leave the country legally.  A valid travel document, valid exit visa and a valid international health certificate are required in order to leave legally.  In order to obtain an exit visa, Eritreans must prove that they have completed national service duties or that they have been granted an official exemption from it, in addition to providing authorities with compelling reasons for leaving the country (EASO, 2016).  Since national service is indefinite, very few Eritreans receive the discharge papers required to leave the country legally.  Women under the age of 30 and men under the age of 54 are reportedly the groups most commonly denied exit visas (USSD, 2017).  These strict exit control procedures and limited issuance of passports, compel many Eritreans to leave the country illegally, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking abroad, primarily in Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Libya. When Eritrean girls and women become refugees, many are abused by traffickers, raped and tortured and go on to suffer further human rights abuses (HRW, 2014).

5.3           Despite the introduction of the Eritrean Penal Code of 2015 which criminalized some forms of trafficking in persons, the United States Department of State noted in its ‘Trafficking in Persons Report’ (2018): “The Government of Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so.”  Eritrea is one of 21 countries ranked as Tier 3, meaning they do not meet minimum anti-trafficking standards. The report noted that the government did not share information on its overall anti-trafficking efforts, or report any trafficking investigations, prosecutions, or the identification and protection of any victims. Moreover, the GoSE did not report holding any complicit officials accountable for trafficking crimes despite credible reports of such complicity (Also see: COI, 2015). GoSE has not reported any efforts to address the lack of formal procedures for identifying victims or referring victims to care, nor did the GoSE provide any services to victims (USSD, 2018).

6.   Education

  • Eritrea faces low enrolment and high dropout rates of girls throughout the education system. Enrolment rates are particularly low among school-aged girls, declining significantly in middle and secondary school. Between 2017 -2018, only 43.8% of children who graduated from middle school entered secondary education. In the same time period, over 50% of secondary school-aged students were not in school, with girls disproportionately affected (HRW, 2019a; MoE, 2018).
  • This state of affairs is aggravated by the policy of forcing high school students to complete their 12th grade at the notorious Sawa military camp. A significant number of Eritrean girls, often at the behest of their families, take the strategic decision to enter into early marriages and/or motherhood – dropping out of the school system before Sawa – as a means of avoiding indefinite national service. GoSE have made no efforts to address this direct consequence of the national service programme which presents a barrier to girls accessing education (HRC, 2016; HRW, 2019a).
  • Students at Sawa face harsh living conditions, military-style discipline, corporal punishment for minor infractions and forced labour, creating an environment unconducive with educational attainment. Students are: “beaten with sticks; made to roll in soil while being beaten; left in the sun for prolonged periods of time with their hands tied; and made to carry heavy water containers and do repeated physical exercises for minor infractions” (HRW, 2019a).  Recent evidence suggests that military officials continue to sexually harass and exploit female students at Sawa, validating the findings of the COI (HRW, 2019a).  All military officials and trainers at Sawa are men, which makes it difficult for girls to seek protection and have their specific welfare needs met.
  • In paragraph 77 of the GoSE submission, it states that: “All the teachers and supervisors (at Sawa Secondary School) are civilian staff of the ministry.” This is patently false; a 2019 report by Human Rights Watch found that national service conscripts make up the vast majority of teachers in secondary schools across the country and are given no choice on becoming a teacher, the subject(s) they teach or where they are located. Their service period is indefinite and they face stiff sanctions, including imprisonment if they attempt to leave their job. This lack of choice and meagre salaries have resulted in a demotivated teaching corps and poor quality instruction (HRW, 2019a). In its 2019 report, Human Rights Watch noted: “Many students experience poor quality of instruction due to an unmotivated or often absent teaching corps—with teachers skipping lessons and many teachers fleeing abroad—resulting in an unconducive learning environment. As a result, students miss lectures and units as there is no one to teach them, or classes are merged. On occasion, students are without any teacher at all for weeks on end” (HRW, 2019a).

7.   Conclusions and Questions for GoSE

The protection of women’s rights and their full participation in society can only be guaranteed by the full implementation of the Constitution, separation of powers, freedom of association (and other fundamental rights) and a shift from a climate of impunity, to one of justice. We propose the following high-level questions for GoSE:

  1. When will the GoSE set a clear roadmap for the full implementation of the ratified 1997 Constitution, reconvening the National Assembly and holding national and regional elections?
  1. When will the GoSE either bring to trial or release all those detained in its prison network without due process? Furthermore, what steps are being taken to guarantee the independence of the judiciary?
  • Does the GoSE intend to remove de jure and de facto restrictions on the operation of independent CSOs in Eritrea, particularly women’s associations?
  1. In relation to point iii, will the GoSE permit international organizations (including the UN Special Rapporteur) and independent CSOs access to the country to verify the human rights situation on the ground? This would include access to Eritrean’s held in detention incommunicado, in order to enable independent verification of their health and welfare? Pregnant women/girls and those with young children are a priority.
  1. When will the Government announce plans for the demobilization of military/national service conscripts, an end to the illegal extension of national service beyond 18 months and the conscription of those under 18 years old?
  1. Will the GoSE commit to ensuring that Grade 12 education does not incorporate compulsory military training? Will GoSE also commit to ensuring Eritrean youth have the option of completing secondary education at other secondary schools, since Sawa military camp poses disproportionate health/safety/welfare risks, particularly to young girls?
  • Will the GoSE commit to enhancing educational opportunities for women, including formal vocational training and creating an environment conducive to self-employment/entrepreneurship?
  • How does the GoSE intend to provide effective channels for women to raise issues of gender-based violence and discriminatory practices, particularly in the context of military personnel?
  1. How does the GoSE intend to strengthen its mechanisms for ensuring that the perpetrators of sexual violence against women, human trafficking and other serious crimes are reported and prosecuted? Furthermore, what steps will GoSE take to protect women and girls from human trafficking and what provision will be put in place for victims?
  1. Will the GoSE commit to reforming its restrictive policies governing the issuance of passports and also commit to ending the exit-visa system, to ensure that Eritrean’s, out of desperation, do not have to resort to clandestine methods of leaving the country, putting them at risk of human trafficking and the torture and sexual violence associated with it.

National Dialogue for Reconciliation

Monday, 17 February 2020 08:04 Written by

What is Dialogue and What are its benefits?

How can we perform dialogue?

Coming and Holding Together!

The Stockholm formula

Dialogue is the platform that encourages diversity of thoughts and opinions but not suppressing them. It leads to mutual understanding of problems and opportunities and search for common understanding. In practicing dialogue, there is an agreement that one person's concepts or beliefs should not take precedence over those of others, and common agreement should not be sought at the cost of the others.

We believe dialogue is the main instrument to discuss the opportunities and problems for democratic transition and to develop strategies to address the issues of common interest.

A dialogue to be effective must be built on certain principles that serve to guide and structure the discussions.

We , in the Eritrean opposition struggling from dictatorship to democracy need dialogue within ourselves and listen each other for a deeper awareness and understanding of what is actually taking place nationally, regionally and globally.

I think the conflict between the various political and civil society organizations is not about the main issues but of personalities and individuals. Our focus has been on personalities instead of issues. The methods of our communication were not based on the ideal theory of dialogue but it was a debate or negotiation. The word dialogue comes from the Greek language meaning dia- through and logus meaning thoughts. Let flow your thoughts freely. Look below the difference between the terms.

Debate                                                 Negotiation                                             Dialogue  

Get victorious                                   compromise                                 Exploring for common good

Blame                                                pressure                                       Listening

Mine best                                         mediation                                 crafting solution together

Twisting                                        suspending                                           inquiring  

The benefits of dialogue

  

  • generate momentum to reinforce the democratic process.
  • enables to assess the pace of the transition.
  • helps us the assess/ evaluate the experience of the past years in the opposition camp.
  • enables us to identify of issues of priority.
  • allows us to evaluate the impact of external democracy assistance.

Dialogue and conflict

Conflict in itself is not necessarily negative. It is unmanaged conflict, where stakeholders attempt to resolve their disputes through unconstitutional or even violent means, that poses the most complex problems

If we all believe in democracy, democracy is all about managing conflict peacefully. In the Eritrean opposition case, dialogue can also act as a mechanism to help prevent, manage and resolve conflict.

- As a mechanism for the prevention of conflict. By bringing various actors together for structured, critical and constructive discussions on the state of the nation, dialogue can result in consensus on the reforms that are needed to avoid confrontation and conflict.

I urge the leaders of all political organizations avoid confrontations and come together round table discussion.

  • As a mechanism for the management of conflict. Dialogue can help put in place democratic institutions and procedures that can structure and set the limits of political conflict. Democratic leaders provide mechanisms for political consultation and joint action that can peacefully manage potential conflicts.
  • As a mechanism for the resolution of conflict. Political dialogue can defuse potential crises by proposing appropriate peaceful solutions. Democratic institutions and procedures provide a framework to sustain peace settlements and prevent the recurrence of conflict.

What should be the guiding principles for the dialogue in national reconciliation between the opposition forces

I  hope all the opposition forces believe in these principles

  • Partnership and cooperation promoting democratization.
  • Disseminating democratic principles in all areas of the cooperation
  • Deepening the dialogue at both national and international level
  • Assessing the democratic struggle
  • Assisting the democratic development

Dialogue framework

  • We in the Eritrean opposition the capacity and will of the dialogue to identify the challenges, analyzing the participants, evaluating available resources.
  • Participants: political society, civil society, national and international experts both at the national and international dialogue promoting the Eritrean peoples aspirations and expectations.
  • Objectives: Analysing the dynamics of the transition, seeking a national consensus on priorities and searching for effective cooperation.
  • Assessing results and monitoring the implementation.

Who can be the actors and their roles at the intra-Eritrean National Dialogue ?

Three key functions to be fulfilled in the dialogue for democratic change at the national level

Analysis function. By providing a comprehensive analysis of the constraints and opportunities for further democratization, the dialogue contributes to diagnosing the flow of events and experiences at the national and regional level.

Dialogue function. By providing a platform for change of experiences and lessons learned and a forum for building consensus on the challenges and opportunities for democratic change, the dialogue contributes in itself to the consolidation of democracy. It should ultimately lead articulation a democratic reform agenda with specific policy recommendations primarily defined by the national participants and thus owned by them.

Brokering function. By providing international institutions and donor agencies involved in and committed to democratization with a reference framework, the dialogue contributes a mechanism to assist the international partners to identify concrete support measures, better target their interventions and co-ordinate their assistance.

The national dialogue for democratic change could be structured around three main groups with specific roles:

The Dialogue Group: Composed of prominent national experts and key players in the process of democratic change in Eritrea .

The dialogue group should be sufficiently representative and have legitimacy and leverage to make the dialogue meaningful and sustainable. The members of the dialogue group should hence be carefully selected, based on their professionalism, reputation and willingness to enter into a genuine dialogue.

The Expert Group. Composed of international experts with undisputed credentials and reputation, the expert group provides the national participants with comparative experiences and lessons learned in other contexts which could be of assistance in the design of democratic change in Eritrea.

The Support Group: Both National and international organizations Composed of representatives of the international community involved in and committed to the democratic process in Eritrea represented as observers of the dialogue. The support group constitutes a structure assisting the democratization process in Eritrea. External partners or facilitators should not dictate but can only support the process of democratic change.

It is of utmost urgency that all the opposition political organizations convene a conference- platform where they can come out with one national political charter and form one leadership.

 The recent joint communiques of the four political organizations –

 

  1. ENCDC
  2. EPDP
  3. Eritrean Unity for Democratic Change
  4. Eritrean Unity For Justice

Is appreciable and hope it will gradually include the remaining organizations

It is a political maturity to create a political space for a national dialogue that would lead us to reconciliation instead of confrontation.

Ending the conflicts in the opposition camp requires more political courage than simply neglecting each other in minor things.

I urge all the political organizations regardless of their affiliations to come to their minds and take responsibility and show political courage.

References and further readings

  1. Lijphart, Arend. 1977. Democracy in plural societies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
  2. Horowitz, Donald L. 1985, Ethnic Groups in conflict. Berkeley. CA: University of California.
  3. Dialogue for Democratic Development, by IDEA- International Institute Electoral and Assistance

Source: Assena

Fetsum: The Sudanese Constitutional Charter to Genuine Democracy (extension of part 1)

Fetsum: The Sudanese Constitutional Charter to Genuine Democracy (extension of part 1) Dedication: I dedicate this article to the very promising ERITREA FOCUS for its latest strategy to diffuse the dictator and democratize the nation through

Fetsum: The Sudanese Constitutional Charter to Genuine Democracy (extension of part 1)

Dedication: I dedicate this article to the very promising ERITREA FOCUS for its latest strategy to diffuse the dictator and democratize the nation through genuine transitional phase.

I strongly believe we have to rally behind this group’s strategy which I consider the most significant development as of today considering its brain power and diplomatic essence on the fundamental question of the Eritrean people.

I feel more relaxed now as a result because self- respect is something we should earn through excellence to use it as a foundation for respect from others. In the meantime, I strongly suggest that ERITREA FOCUS give maximum  attention to the Sudanese democratic journey as one of its research materials and good luck!

It seems like many Eritreans are worried about their sovereignty in the relationship between Abiy and Isaias. But this should not stop us from researching more for bright future. In my case, I am not worried as much and I know the situation is at our disposal. We can change it and that is what matters to me. I am not going to waste my time thinking about it for Democracy cannot wait because of fear and we should continue learning to achieve it through knowhow and unity. In so saying, neither does a challenge appear without impact nor can it be confronted without considering its destination. We have a challenge (dictatorship) and its inherent destination (genuine democracy); we cannot overcome the challenge to face the destination empty handed. We need to remove the dictatorship as our main challenge while simultaneously crystallizing the destination through basic knowhow. One does not have to wait for the other and both can be simultaneously executed without destructive interference. I think we have started moving forward in this regard, the latest ERITREA FOCUS’s press release being the witness to this effect.

This article is about the legalized form of the last article and my last effort on the matter. You may find it monotonous in a way but I could not help it.

Introduction: The Sudanese “Draft Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period” disclosed on 6 August 2019 was an agreement between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change and has 16 Chapters but I will only discuss it partially in this opportunity and enjoy.

Chapter 1: General provisions

  • Repeal and Exemption

[2]      (a.) The Transitional Constitution of Sudan of 2005 and the constitutions of provinces is repealed, while the laws issued thereunder remain in force, unless they are repealed or amended.

Comment: It was not about reformation but total transformation of the system. There was a transitional constitution in 2005 whose CHAPTER II [57] says: “The tenure of office of the President of the Republic shall be five years, commencing from the date of assumption of office, and the same President may be re-elected for one more term only”. But Bashir did not allow it to be implemented until his downfall in 2019. The constitution had then to be amended to accommodate reality while partially repealed as a result. Here, the signatories disqualify the old transitional and provincial constitution keeping the laws conditionally active while open for amendment.

Chapter 2: Transitional period

[6]      (a.) The duration of the transitional period shall be 39 Gregorian months, starting from the signing of this Constitutional Charter.

  • Mandate of the Transitional Period (in compact form)

[7]  During the transitional period, state agencies perform the following duties:

(3-8)  Hold accountable members of the former regime by law, carry out legal reform, rebuild and develop the human rights and justice system, and ensure the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law, Guarantee and promote women’s rights in Sudan in all social, political, and economic fields, and combat all forms of discrimination against women. Establish mechanisms to prepare to draft a permanent constitution for the Republic of Sudan, hold a national, constitutional conference before the end of the transitional period, enact legislation related to the tasks of the transitional period.

Comment: All past transitional governments failed to answer the society’s democratic call except the current one that the world considers genuine and scientific. This transition is real and has the responsibility to legally draft the country’s permanent constitution within its legal time limit. Ours is a lot simpler because the dictator neither ratified nor changed the constitution to serve his interest unlike in the Sudanese experience where the consecutive dictators kept changing it through the years. The 1997 Constitution was produced by our best Lawyers and Social Scientists of the time and quite a few international scholars, and ratified by then people’s Assembly. All we have to do is amending it if necessary through legal procedures and utilizing it forever.

Chapter 3: Transitional period bodies

[9]  The bodies of the transitional government consist of the following: (a) The Sovereignty Council , which is the head of state and symbol of its sovereignty and unity; (b)  The Cabinet, which is the supreme, executive authority of the state; (c) The Legislative Council, which is the authority responsible for legislation and oversight over the executive’s performance.

Chapter 4: Sovereignty Council: Composition of the Sovereignty Council

[10]    (a.) The Sovereignty Council is the head of state, the symbol of its sovereignty and unity, and the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, Rapid Support Forces, and other uniformed forces. It is formed by agreement between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change.

(b.) The Sovereignty Council consists of 11 members, of whom five are civilians selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change, and five are selected by the Transitional Military Council. The eleventh member is a civilian, selected by agreement between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change.

(c ) Over the first 21 months of the transitional period, the Sovereignty Council is chaired by someone selected by the military members, and in the remaining 18 months of the transitional period, starting from ……. 2021, it is chaired by a civilian member selected by the five civilian members who were selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change.

Comment: Whatever they agreed on in the last few months (see the last article) has now become the country’s law within the transitional phase. The Sovereignty Council serves as the coordinator of the entire process behind the unified support of the people and the intellectual and professional associations of the country.  The situation necessitated a POWER SHARING arrangement between the Army and the people but they collectively decided the Council to be 100% independent of the political parties and to consist 45% (5 individuals) from the Army and 55%  (6 individuals) from the people. Yet, the Civilian side had to have a leverage over the Army by at least 10% more power and they legally assured that privilege in this grassroots based confident ride to democracy .

  • Competencies and Powers of the Sovereignty Council

[11]    (a.) The Sovereignty Council exercises the following competencies and powers:

  • (i) Appoint the Prime Minister selected by theforces of Freedom and Change;
  • (ii) Confirm the Cabinet members appointed by the Prime Minister, from a list of candidates provided by the Forces of Freedom and Change;
  • (iii)  Confirm the heads of regions or governors of provinces, according to the case, after they are appointed by the Prime Minister;
  • (iv)  Confirm the appointment of members of the Transitional Legislative Council after they are selected in accordance with the provisions of Article 23 (3) of this Charter.

Chapter 5: Transitional Cabinet

[14]    (a.) Composition of the Transitional Cabinet: The Cabinet is composed of a Prime Minister and a number of ministers not exceeding 20 from national talent of independent counsel, appointed by the Prime Minister from a list of candidates from the Forces of Freedom and Change, and confirmed by the Sovereignty Council, except for the Ministers of Defense and Interior, who is nominated by the military component of the Sovereignty Council.

(b.)  The Forces of Freedom and Change selects the Prime Minister, and he is appointed by the Sovereignty Council.

Comment: The Sudanese people have decided to go for Prime Minister and the Cabinet as the superior power in the country. This is the EXECUTIVE body of the government. Through the articles, the independent Sovereignty Council (the 11 individuals) appoints a neutral Prime Minister exclusively selected by the FFC “Forces of Freedom and Change” without the involvement of the Transitional Military Council in the government as well discussed in the last article. The Prime Minister then selects his Cabinet.

Chapter 6: Common provisions for constitutional positions

  • Financial Disclosure and Prohibition of Commercial Activities

[18]  (a.) Upon assuming their positions, members of the Sovereignty Council, Cabinet, governors or ministers of provinces or heads of regions and members of the Transitional Legislative Council submit a financial disclosure including their properties and obligations, including those of their spouses and children, in accordance with the law.

(b.) The chairman and members of the Sovereignty Council and ministers, governor and ministries of provinces or heads of regions undertake to not practice any profession or commercial or financial activity while occupying their positions. They do not receive any financial compensation, gifts, or work of any type from any non-government entity, whatever the case may be.

Comment: This is one of the most mandatory procedures in any transitional arrangement as such to avoid corruption during the transition period and that is what we have to do in our situation. They did it in many countries including Liberia and ready to do it in Sudan.

  • Prohibition on Candidacy in Elections

[19] The chairman and members of the Sovereignty Council and ministers, governors of provinces, or heads of regions, are not be entitled to run in the public elections that follow the transitional period.

Comment: All transitional government elements are restricted from running for political office in the upcoming democratic election. This is to further avoid conflict of interest in the system and to have a clean electoral committee for the democratic election ahead. They did it in many countries including Liberia and ready to do it in Sudan.

Chapter 7: Transitional Legislative Council [Assembly]

  • Composition of the Transitional Legislative Council

[23]  (a.)  The Transitional Legislative Council is an independent, legislative authority. The number of members therein shall not exceed 300 members, and it represents all forces participating in change, except for members of the National Congress and political forces that participated in the former regime until its downfall;

(b.)  The participation of women is not be less than 40% of the membership of the Transitional Legislative Council;

Comment: The 40% translates to guaranteed 120 sits at minimum but still offers unlimited opportunity for women in the most important branch of the government. Gender equality was guaranteed to certain extent by that many women in the Assembly but to full extent considering the open ended opportunity in the clause. We need to empower our women as such to have a decent and prosperous society in our country.

(c.)  67% of the members of the Transitional Legislative Council are selected by the Forces of Freedom and Change, and 33% are selected by other forces who did not sign the Freedom and Change Declaration. The appointments take place and the percentages of each force are determined in consultation between the Forces of Freedom and Change and the military members of the Sovereignty Council; 

Comment:  Most of the Sudanese opposition forces had signed the Declaration with the exception of few that I did not find important to research for this discussion. But Sudan has about 20 political parties where few of them signed the document. I am not sure here but part of the 33% of the Legislative Council could have been assigned to the political parties which is normal in a situation as such; a part of it given to the other portion of the society that did not sign the document. In any case, the people at minimum occupy 67% of the sits in the parliament in this situation without other sits in the rest of the council (out of the 33% sits).

Chapter 8: I have avoided many case laws so far but Chapter 8 deals with the formation of the independent Judiciary Council.

Chapter 9:

[47] Equality before the law

People are equal before the law, and have the right to the protection of the law without discrimination between them because of ethnicity, color, gender, language, religious faith, political opinion, racial or ethnic origin, or any other reason.

[55]  Freedom of belief and worship

Every person shall have the right to freedom of religious belief and worship. They shall have the right to profess or express their religion or belief through worship, education, practice, performance of rituals, or celebrations, in accordance with the requirements of the law and public order. No one shall be compelled to convert to a religion they do not believe in or to practices rites or rituals they do not voluntarily accept.

Comment: People have the freedom to worship, educate and learn, practice, perform rituals and celebrations related to their beliefs but “in accordance with the requirements of the law and public order”. The freedom given in [55] is not out of the control of the regime and so cannot be used to politicize them in the country. Believers must respect law and order to enjoy their belief and worship because freedom comes with responsibility directed towards the benefit of a society as a unit (peaceful coexistence, nationalism, territorial integrity and equality, etc.). in my opinion, the clauses manifest the emergence of secular democracy in Sudan; the separation of religion from politics, which I think signifies the end of Sharia and other religious means of politically controlling the people.

[57]  Freedom of assembly and organization

(a.)  The right to peaceful assembly shall be guaranteed, and every person shall have the right to free organization without others, including the right to form political parties, associations, organizations, syndicates and professional unions, or the join the same in order to protect their interests.

(b.)  The law shall regulate the formation and registration of political parties, associations, organizations, syndicates and professional unions, in accordance with what is required by democratic society.

(c.)  No organization shall have the right to work as a political party, unless it has the following:

(i) Open membership for all Sudanese, regardless of religion, ethnic origin or place of birth;

(ii) Democratically elected institutions;

(iii) Transparent and open sources of funding.

[58] The right to political participation

Every citizen has the right to political participation in public affairs, as regulated by law.

Comment: The 22 political parties in the country and new political parties must respect the laws associated with Chapter 9 [57]. The upcoming Independent Election Commission is expected to crystalize the preliminary clauses in here  but they suggest the minimum requirements for political party qualification in the country.

In our case, there were 13 organizations including the liberation movements (Kunama and Afar) listed as members of EDA (Eritrean Democratic Alliance) in 2008. We shall see what happens but it is clear that we cannot accommodate ethnic and religious political parties like many other societies in the classification. The subject in relation to the people vis-à-vis political parties is clear but some kind of agreement has to be reached between the people and our liberation fronts with maximum concern and respect for us to make it together to the end. There is no doubt genuine democracy that empowers our minorities should help the unity built on trust and nationalism.

Chapter 16: Miscellaneous provisions

[70] (b.)  The Transitional Military Council [TMC] shall be dissolved once the constitutional oath is sworn by the members of the Sovereignty Council.

Comment: With this case law, the 5 members of the government from the Army (TMC) are legally conditioned to melt into the people and they did after they took the oath on 17th  August 2019. The African Union Commission Chairperson Moussa Faki Mahamat, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, and representatives from Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, President Kenyata of Kenya, President Salva Kiir (South Sudan), President Idriss Deby Itno (Chad) and President Faustin-Archange Touadéra (Central African Republic), attended the ceremony. The parasite was hibernating in Adi Hallo singing the blues by then when President Kenyatta said “the nation’s structure of government should reflect its heterogeneity to guarantee inclusion for all [and that] a peaceful and united Sudan is in the best interest of the region and the whole of Africa”.

In conclusion, the Sudanese style of democratizing the country is indeed in “the best interest of the region and the whole of Africa”. The situation will greatly influence our region for the better. It will be impossible for Isaias to continue his absolute dictatorship without a good partner to that end. Abiy is just a survivor that deals with him in fear of the Weyanes and may be in dreaming state about our ports but he played a good role in Sudan, meaning that he is potentially part of the democratic environment in the region. Being in the middle of Democracies in Kenya, Somalia (excluding the Alshabab effect), Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan should then feel like swimming in the ocean with no land in sight for that paranoid dictator with thick mustache under his nose (symbol of dictatorship in a way (Hitler Sadam, Bashir, etc.). No one can rely on him as a strategic ally in the near future. Even that privilege is becoming very hard for him to sustain. In short, there is no better regional situation for us to change the situation and everything will change if we change the way we do things.

To wrap it up, the nature of transition to democracy is known to many societies on planet earth and we can keep on discussing a nation at a time to that effect. But I believe Liberia’s and Sudan’s experience would be enough to give us the head start towards the basic knowledge of the matter so we can confidently apply it in the very near future. This article completes my thesis on Transitional Government leaving the best of the subject for ERITREA FOCUS to deal with.  Thank you and good luck.

Source: Al-Jazeera

Abraham T Zereby Abraham T Zere

On January 31, US President Donald Trump expanded his controversial travel ban to include Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Sudan, Tanzania and Nigeria [Reuters]

On January 31, US President Donald Trump expanded his controversial travel ban to include Eritrea, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar, Sudan, Tanzania and Nigeria [Reuters]

MORE ON ERITREA

On January 31, US President Donald Trump expanded his controversial travel ban to include six additional countries, including my home country, Eritrea.

Reportedly, Eritrea was included in the ban for three reasons: the Eritrean government's lack of cooperation with the US in its efforts to remove Eritrean nationals living in the country without proper documentation; widespread visa overstays by Eritrean nationals; and the African country's inability to comply with the US information-sharing criteria on matters of national security and safety. 

The decision was a devastating blow for thousands of already beleaguered Eritreans. Without the possibility of seeking safety in the US, they are now left to make an impossible choice between embarking on a deadly journey towards an unwelcoming Europe, facing gross abuses in Sudan, shuttered opportunities in Ethiopia, or tolerating what passes for life in the open-air prison that is Eritrea. 

By expanding its travel ban to include Eritrean nationals, the US not only condemned thousands of innocent people to a life of oppression, uncertainty and pain, but it also signalled that it would do nothing to censor their oppressors.

Acting Secretary of Homeland Security Chad Wolf said the ban would see the United States suspend the issuance of visas that can lead to permanent residency for nationals of affected countries, but would not hinder the issuance of non-immigrant visas, such as those given to tourists, students and businesspeople.

Eritrea does not issue passports to its citizens except for in extraordinary circumstances, and most Eritreans who manage to leave the country only have refugee travel documents. This means there is almost no chance for them to score a non-immigrant visa and enter the US.

The perpetrators of repression in Eritrea, who hold official passports, however, will almost certainly be unaffected by the new travel restrictions. Politicians, military leaders and other supporters of the regime who are wreaking havoc in the country will continue to travel to the US whenever they need and want to conduct seminars, attend meetings, give music concerts, collect donations and even enjoy holidays. The new travel ban also spares holders of diplomatic passports, which means the Eritrean diplomats will be allowed to continue visiting the US and delivering their vicious propaganda. Ordinary Eritreans who have been forced to escape their homes due to the regime's flawed policies, however, will continue to suffer.

In response to the travel ban, the Eritrean Ministry of Information issued a statement, indicating that while they have no problem with the newly introduced travel restrictions on their citizens, they are disappointed with the reasoning behind them.

The government of Eritrea "has consistently opposed 'automatic asylum' and other misguided measures invoked by certain countries in the past 20 years for ulterior reasons of 'strategic depopulation' against Eritrea", the statement said, adding that it had lodged protests against previous US administrations that followed similar asylum policies. But it nevertheless criticised the Trump administration's travel ban, only because the ban does not appear to stem from the concerns repeatedly voiced by the Eritrean government, and hence sends a "negative signal" to the Eritrean leadership.

The statement all-but-proved that the Eritrean government has no intention of negotiating with the US government to help reinstate its citizens' right to travel and immigrate to the US.

Now, many Eritrean citizens' only hope is that regional powers who have strong relations with the Trump administration, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, will intervene to help Eritreans, as they have previously done by helping lift UN sanctions on Eritrea. Without such help, Eritreans will continue to be punished both by their own government and the governments of countries that they seek asylum in, simply for the misfortune of being born in Eritrea.

Escaping repression, not posing a threat

Trump's travel ban implies that Eritrean immigrants pose a threat to the US government and its people. This, of course, could not be further from the truth. Over the years, Eritrean immigrants made invaluable contributions to American society.

Many Eritrean-American artists made significant contributions to the US cultural scene, such as Tiffany Haddish and Nipsey Hussle, whose fathers fled from war and settled in the US. Olympian medalist and "one of the most accomplished distance runners in American history," Mebrahtom "Meb" Kiflezghi, was born in Eritrea to Eritrean parents. Haben Girma, the first deaf and blind person to graduate from Harvard, who was named "White House Champion of Change" by President Obama, was born to Eritrean parents who fled war. The list of influential Americans of Eritrean origin also includes Dr Haile Debas, who was once described as a "one person transformer for global health in California, at UCSF, in America, and around the world." Colorado Congressman Joe Neguse, who has condemned the travel ban, is also the son of Eritrean immigrants.

One may argue that while Eritrean immigrants are clearly not a threat to the US, they should still be banned because they ignore US laws by overwhelmingly overstaying their visas. It is true that Eritrean immigrants are more likely than immigrants from other nations to violate their visa conditions: Overall only 1.9 percent of visitors to the US overstay their visas, while the rate among Eritrean visitors is 24 percent. But before making a judgement, it is necessary to ask some important questions: Who are these Eritreans who have overstayed their visas and why did they do so?

I can easily provide examples: I overstayed my visa. My sister, who is now a registered nurse in California, did, too. My younger brother, who is now a software engineer in the Silicon Valley, also did the same. Why did we overstay? Because we had no other option. Staying in the US was our only chance to escape repression. If we returned home when our visas expired, we'd be thrown into a dungeon. The fact that most Eritreans who overstay their visas are eventually granted asylum should be seen as confirmation that they have legitimate reasons to do so.

Caught up in indefinite transit

Since 2010, 17,564 Eritreans have resettled in the US as refugees according to the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration.

As mentioned before, the Eritrean state rarely issues passports to its citizens and allows them to leave the country officially. As a result, almost all Eritreans who were lucky enough to resettle in the US have many family members who have been stranded in Eritrea. The dreams of all these people of one day reuniting with their relatives in the US have been crushed by the Trump administration's new extended travel ban.

The 2018 peace deal with Ethiopia and the resulting easing of border restrictions had renewed many Eritreans' hopes for leaving the country and joining their loved ones in the West. The US's very long and convoluted vetting process for issuing family reunification visas, however, made this almost impossible for many. As the US embassy in Asmara stopped issuing immigrant visas, many who want to immigrate to the US moved to neighbouring countries to complete the process. Now, they are stranded in limbo indefinitely, as they do not want to return to Eritrea and continue living under unbearable oppression.

Trump's travel ban also devastated Eritrean nationals in the US, like me, who were hoping to be reunited with their family members. As they do not have a government acting on their behalf and fighting for their rights, they do not know where to seek help. Following the announcement of the extended ban, I have no idea when and if I will be able to see my mother, who is still in Eritrea, again.

While facing tremendous external challenges, the Eritrean regime seems to care very little about improving conditions inside the country, something that's been the case for a very long time. Eritreans continue to flee their country at an alarming rate. Those left in the country face mounting challenges with little hope for improvement or redress.

I thought I had escaped from a repressive regime that retaliates against families for others' perceived wrongdoing. Yet, the sad, familiar story has followed me and many of my countrymen/women. Now I must figure out how to explain to my daughter and nieces - who are Americans - why their government banned them from seeing their grandparents

February 13, 2020 News

For some time now it has been clear that Eritreans are finding it increasingly difficult to escape the dictatorship and make and new life for themselves by travelling to Europe.

Once this was possible. But the evidence is mounting that Eritrean refugees find the route blocked. Some are trapped in extremely dangerous detention centres in Libya, but overall the flow of asylum seekers is drying up.

These statistics are from Frontex – the EU’s official border guards.

They are for the numbers using what Frontex calls the Central Mediterranean Route

2015        2016         2017        2018

38,791     20,721      7,055       3,529

The figure for 2018 is one tenth of what it was just four years earlier.

The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, produced data which bears out this trend.

It can be seen here.

Screenshot 2020-02-13 at 11.21.01

Screenshot 2020-02-13 at 11.21.38

This is a trend that has been developing since 2016 – if not earlier.

Lower numbers are leaving Eritrea

Eritrea has been described as one of the world’s fastest emptying nations. The widely quoted estimate – first stated by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Eritrea in 2012 – is that 4,000 to 5,000 Eritreans are leaving their country every month. Since then, this number has been quoted in numerous articles and reports. This includes a 2014 study by the RMMS, which tried to shed more light on this estimate by exploring the ‘ jigsaw’ of numbers from different sources and concluded that, although plausible, the number could be slightly overestimated.

One explanation for the lower number of Eritrean arrivals in Italy in 2016, could be that indeed lower numbers have been leaving Eritrea in 2016 compared to the years before. Earlier in 2016, RMMS reported on a deterioration of the living conditions in Eritrea. Reduced purchasing power and reduced access to cash from remittance flows could have limited the ability of many to fund migration.

As I warned three years ago: Europe’s “wall” across the Mediterranean is almost complete.

Africa

Source: Bloomberg

Why Ghana Is Africa’s Top Candidate for an Economic Leap

The country scores high on development metrics; it just needs to break free of dependence on commodities.

10 February 2020, 00:00 GMT
Noah Smith is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He was an assistant professor of finance at Stony Brook University, and he blogs at Noahpinion.

Every time a region of the world goes from being poor to being rich one country tends to be responsible for getting the process started. In Europe that was the U.K., which was the first to industrialize. In East Asia it was Japan. In West Africa it could be Ghana.

Ghana has a number of big advantages over other countries in the region in terms of geography, institutions and human capital. It’s on the coast and has plenty of ports that can be used to ship and receive goods. With about 31 million people, it has a large enough population to create a substantial domestic market but small enough that providing jobs and food won’t be too insurmountable of a challenge.

Members of the Akan ethnic group make up about half of the population, meaning that Ghana has less of the ethnic fragmentation plaguing many post-colonial states. It scores well on international indicators of governance quality, freedomdemocracy, ease of doing business and corruption. Ghana has lower child mortality than its neighbors, indicating a relatively healthy populace. It also has a head start in terms of literacy rates and education:

The Education Advantage

Mean years of education by country

Screenshot 2020-02-10 at 08.39.37

Source: Our World in Data

These advantages have helped to make Ghana one of the fastest-growing countries on the continent. Although its 2019 growth rate ended up being only 7% rather than the world-beating 8.8% forecast by the International Monetary Fund, that is still very solid growth.

But to become the Japan of West Africa, Ghana is going to have to undergo a structural transformation. The country’s main exports are all commodities:

Too Dependent on Commodities

Share of Ghana’s exports in 2018

Screenshot 2020-02-10 at 08.39.54

Source: World Top Exports

Specializing in commodities is not necessarily a economic death sentence for a nation. Ghana doesn’t have the resource endowment of Norway or Saudi Arabia, but with wise and stable policy it could aspire to the comfortable middle-income status of Namibia, Botswana or perhaps even Chile.

Indeed, Ghana in recent decades has done a good job of moving in this direction. Agricultural productivity has increased, which allowed many Ghanaians to move from farms to cities, where they have been mostly employed in the service sector. This has been a typical pattern in a number of commodity-rich developing countries. In a 2016 paper, economists Douglas Gollin, Remi Jedwab and Dietrich Vollrath found:

In countries that are heavily dependent on resource exports, urbanization appears to be concentrated in “consumption cities” where the economies consist primarily of non-tradable services.

But the service sector isn’t great at creating secure, well-paying jobs. Much of this employment is informal and precarious. And a large share of the gains from the commodity boom have flowed to the wealthy, worsening inequality. Gollin and his co-authors find that the residents of so-called consumption cities do considerably worse than residents of cities with economies based on manufacturing.

But when a country is strong in natural resource industries, it can be hard to ignite the kind of manufacturing boom that countries such as South Korea rode from rags to riches. Strong commodity exports raise the value of a country’s exchange rate, making manufactured exports more expensive. They also make wages in the industrial sector uncompetitive.

This helps explain why Ghana’s laudable efforts to switch to manufacturing haven’t yet borne fruit. The country tried establishing export-oriented special economic zones similar to those of China. But these ended up specializing in commodities rather than manufacturing.

Ghana needs to keep trying. One idea is to provide subsidies specifically to manufactured exports. If these subsidies were stable, reliable, large and long-lasting, they might tilt the balance of comparative advantage. This could include subsidizing wages for workers in export-oriented manufacturing; that would allow workers to earn a decent living while factory investors save on costs.

It could also mean providing export-oriented factories with cheap dedicated sources of electric power, because generation has been a problem in Ghana. That would help make the country more attractive to investors from China, as well as a place where domestic entrepreneurs can flourish. Taking in skilled immigrants, especially from nearby Nigeria or the African diaspora, could also help build a pool of expertise that makes the country an attractive destination for investment.

The raw materials for a Ghanaian manufacturing boom are there. The country has entrepreneurial and innovative talent, as demonstrated by the introduction a few years ago of the first Ghana-made car. And both China and other industrialized nations are clearly interested in Ghana as a production base for the burgeoning West African market. To get there, the country’s leaders will simply have to refuse to be satisfied with the recent boom driven by commodities and urbanization. Ghana has enjoyed great success; sustaining that progress will require a new model.

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