English Articles

Sudan’s war is home-grown, but risks drawing in outsiders

Sunday, 07 May 2023 21:55 Written by Martin Plaut

Martin Plaut

May 4

"Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the RSF."

Source: Economist

The Horn of Africa sits astride key trade routes

May 3rd 2023 | KHARTOUM AND NAIROBI

Four days after war began in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, armed men stormed the home of Muhammad. Ordering the businessman (whose name we withheld for his safety) and his family to leave, the soldiers mounted anti-aircraft guns on the roof of the apartment. Muhammad’s family moved in with relatives in a quieter neighbourhood nearby. But that, too, was soon unsafe as the fighting spread, leaving the streets strewn with bodies.

The battle may have started as a narrow power struggle between the official army, known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (saf), and the Rapid Support Forces (rsf), a militia-turned-paramilitary organisation. But the longer it continues, the greater the risk that it may draw in outsiders because of Sudan’s geopolitical importance.

For Sudan sits astride the Nile, Egypt’s lifeline. It also has ports close to the Horn of Africa, which controls the southern chokepoint of the Red Sea and is close to the Persian Gulf. These arteries of the world economy are watched over by America, China and France, which all have military bases in Djibouti. “The Horn is highly strategic, and a microcosm of other international disputes,” says Comfort Ero, the president of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank. It is a place where “the West meets the East, where the Gulf meets Europe.”

For now the two sides seem evenly matched. The saf is commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who seized and then consolidated power as de facto leader of Sudan in coups in 2019 and 2021. It started the conflict with considerable conventional military power, including tanks and fighter jets. Though the rsf is ostensibly the underdog, its commander, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti), has substantial private wealth, because the rsf is said to control elements of Sudan’s gold trade. He also leads tens of thousands of loyal troops.

It was these assets which enabled Mr Dagalo to vie with General Burhan for control of the transition that followed the overthrow of the brutal Islamist regime under the former dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and later saw him become the country’s vice-president. Guns and money may also have helped him to emerge in recent years as a semi-autonomous figure on the international stage, cutting deals with foreign powers. The rsf is not simply an “insurgent militia”, notes Sharath Srinivasan, a Sudan expert at Cambridge University. “It’s a state actor.”

After nearly three weeks of fighting in Khartoum and elsewhere, in particular in West Darfur, neither side has a decisive advantage. The rsf lacks tanks and air power but is compensating by digging into residential neighbourhoods in the capital. There its men are raping women and forcing them to cook for them, according to a Sudanese woman, whose four female cousins escaped through an air-vent after the rsf had occupied their home.

Civilians in Khartoum also have to contend with air strikes by the saf. On May 1st three women selling tea opposite a hospital were killed by a bomb blast. According to the un, more than 500 civilians have already been killed and many more injured in the fighting (the true figure is likely to be much higher). As many as 800,000 refugees are expected to cross Sudan’s borders in the coming weeks and months.

The rsf, whose troops are also better paid and have more recent combat experience that those of the saf, has managed to secure key parts of the capital including the international airport and the country’s largest oil refinery. It also appears to control the presidential palace and the state broadcaster. “For the past two weeks they were roaming around like they owned the place,” says Waleed Adem, a resident of a rsf-controlled district of east Khartoum.

The rsf also dominates Mr Dagalo’s home region of Darfur and controls two of the region’s three air bases. Bloody clashes in el-Geneina, which began when Arab tribal militias affiliated to the rsf attacked non-Arabs in the town, may have subsided.

The army remains in charge pretty much everywhere else. Thousands of Sudanese and foreign citizens have been evacuated from the Red Sea city of Port Sudan, in the country’s troubled east, which was secured by the saf early in the war. The countryside around Khartoum is also more or less peaceful. “It’s business as usual,” reports a university professor who recently fled the city with his family.

Though the rsf is waging a guerrilla campaign of raids on army units and facilities in the capital, the saf’s control of the skies is taking a toll. “We hit all their supply stores around Khartoum,” says a mid-ranking soldier in the saf. Several convoys of rsf reinforcements from Darfur have reportedly been destroyed by air strikes.

The question is whether either side can quickly break the deadlock. The saf has decades of experience fighting insurgencies in distant regions, but never before in the capital. It cannot simply bomb its way to victory there as it has done elsewhere. “Khartoum is going to be a bit of a meat-grinder for a while,” predicts a Western security analyst. He adds that internal divisions within the saf’s leadership may be hampering its ability to press home its sizeable advantage in heavy weapons.

The rsf, too, finds itself in a quandary. It will struggle to supply and rearm its forces as the fighting continues. Even in the unlikely event of a victory, Mr Dagalo is loathed in Khartoum by residents who hold him responsible for a massacre of hundreds of protesters there in 2019 perpetrated by a combination of forces from the rsf, the police and the intelligence service. His troops’ current conduct has only alienated them more. “The people have the army’s back,” says Mr Adem.

The prospects for a protracted war depend on how Sudan’s neighbouring countries react. Due to its size as well as its strategic location on the Red Sea, Sudan has long been seen as strategically valuable within the region as well as by China, Russia and the West. It overlooks the shipping lanes leading to the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which around 10% of the world’s sea trade passes.

The Gulf countries, in particular the United Arab Emirates (uae) and Saudi Arabia, eye economic interests at play. In December an Emirati firm inked a $6bn deal to develop a port and economic zone on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. The Saudis and the Emiratis supported General Burhan and Mr Dagalo after the joint coup, handing out some $3bn in emergency aid. But neither country has an obvious interest in fuelling the conflict. Saudi Arabia has already evacuated thousands of Sudanese fleeing via Port Sudan. Much as Europe does, it fears a sudden influx of refugees.

Complicating matters, though, is the Emiratis’ murky relationship with Mr Dagalo, who received cash and arms in return for sending his rsf to aid their war in Yemen in 2017. He has since cultivated ties in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the uae’s two main statelets. Still the Emiratis do not have “any particular affection for Hemedti”, says Harry Verhoeven of Columbia University. Since the war began there has been little evidence that the uae has continued to supply his forces.

So the Gulf countries may be “hanging back and hedging their bets to see which way the cards fall”, suggests Ms Ero. That may also be the approach of Russia, whose murky mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group, is said to be involved in gold mining in Sudan while helping arm the rsf. The Kremlin’s main aim is to “thwart a democratic transition in Sudan”, says Samuel Ramani, author of “Russia in Africa”. This is because its ambition to build a naval base on the Red Sea is better served by a military government in Khartoum than a civilian, democratic one. And it does not care whether the saf or the rsf prevails.

The civil war in Sudan is not yet a proxy one like those in Syria, Libya or Yemen. But the country shares long and porous borders with conflict-racked neighbours, including the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya and South Sudan. Each has its own bewildering array of militias and rebel groups, many with ethnic or business ties to the rsf or to its rivals. Some may watch for a chance to profit from Sudan’s chaos. “The longer the conflict continues, the more external actors will meddle,” warns Suliman Baldo, who heads the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a conflict-monitoring group.

Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the rsf.

Mr Dagalo’s rsf and Mr Haftar’s Libyan National Army (lna), which controls much of eastern Libya, have worked together in the past. In 2019 rsf troops were sent to support the lna, which was also backed by the uae, in its assault on Tripoli, Libya’s capital. Two days before Sudan’s civil war erupted, Mr Haftar’s eldest son arrived in Khartoum for talks with Mr Dagalo.

Whatever support Mr Haftar may offer, the rsf may be limited by the Libyan warlord’s need to keep in with Egypt, another of his foreign sponsors. Long Sudan’s most influential neighbour, Egypt is a staunch backer of the saf under General Burhan. It views Sudan as vital to its national security and is loth to see either a civilian government or Mr Dagalo in charge.

Early in the war an Egyptian jet was reported to have struck an rsf ammunition dump. On May 1st Mr Dagalo accused Egypt’s air force of hitting targets in Khartoum North. Though the extent of its military involvement is unknown, Egypt is likely to step up its support for the saf if it is flagging. “Egypt is the most serious factor,” says Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute. “The Egyptian goal now is to save central power in Sudan as they know it.”

A wider conflagration may still be avoided. Despite ethnic clashes in Darfur, the conflict has so far been generally limited to fighting between the two armed factions. On May 2nd both sides agreed to a seven-day ceasefire brokered by South Sudan’s president. Peace talks in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, could soon begin.

All the while, a humanitarian disaster is mounting. Food and water supplies in Khartoum are dwindling. Almost no hospital in the capital is functioning. Pregnant women have died on route to give birth. “If there is no ceasefire, everything will collapse,” warns Mohamed Lemine, who heads the un’s sexual and reproductive health agency in Sudan.

Eritrea.Liberty Magazine Issue Nr.79

Monday, 01 May 2023 22:36 Written by EPDP ForeignOffice Affairs

PRESS RELEASE Eritrean Political Forces’ Concerns on the Military Conflict in Sudan

Friday, 21 April 2023 10:50 Written by EPF Diplomacy Coordination Committee

Libyan Militia and Egypt’s Military Back Opposite Sides in Sudan Conflict

Thursday, 20 April 2023 23:17 Written by Martin Plaut

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Martin Plaut

Apr 20

"Khalifa Haftar, the commander of a faction that controls eastern Libya, dispatched at least one plane to fly military supplies to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces"

Source: Wall Street Journal

Involvement of regional forces raises risk that fighting between warring Sudanese generals could widen and set back cease-fire efforts

Army soldiers loyal to Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country’s de facto leader, in the Red Sea city of Port Sudan on Sunday.PHOTO: AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES

By

Benoit Faucon ,

Summer Said and

Jared Malsin

April 19, 2023 1:03 pm ET

A powerful Libyan militia leader and the Egyptian military have sent military support to rival generals battling for control of neighboring Sudan, people familiar with the matter say, an illustration of how the fighting threatens to draw in regional powers.

Khalifa Haftar, the commander of a faction that controls eastern Libya, dispatched at least one plane to fly military supplies to Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, these people said. Meanwhile, Egypt sent warplanes and pilots to back the Sudanese military, they added.

The involvement of outside forces raises the risk of a dangerous escalation in the fighting that could widen the conflict and undermine efforts by the U.S., the United Nations and others to mediate a cease-fire.

Sudan’s strategic position on the Red Sea, its access to the Nile River and vast gold reserves have long been coveted by outside powers. Since toppling Sudan’s longtime dictator, Omar al-Bashir, in 2019, the two warring generals have used these assets to build alliances with regional and global powers that have an interest in the outcome of their battle for military and political supremacy.

On Wednesday, the Sudanese military led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the country’s de facto leader, continued to strike the positions of the Rapid Support Forces, a state-sponsored militia led by Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo. The airstrikes, along with intense street battles between the two rival factions, have thrown Sudan’s capital Khartoum, a metropolis on the Nile River, into chaos.

Khalifa Haftar, the commander of a faction that controls eastern Libya, has previous ties with the Sudanese militia led by Lt. Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo.PHOTO: ALI HAIDER/SHUTTERSTOCK

The World Health Organization says at least 296 people have been killed and more than 3,000 injured since fighting began on Saturday. Millions remain trapped in their homes with diminishing supplies of water and food, and hospitals are unable to treat the wounded.

As international pressure grew in recent months for Gens. Burhan and Dagalo to hand power to a civilian government, the two generals jostled over the integration of the RSF into the regular military and the ownership of swaths of Sudan’s economy controlled by the two factions. They are now locked in a lethal struggle for political and military supremacy over the country of more than 45 million people.

Mr. Haftar, who is backed by Russia and the United Arab Emirates, sent at least one shipment of ammunition on Monday from Libya to Sudan to replenish supplies for Gen. Dagalo, the people familiar with the matter said. The Sudanese army said Monday that Gen. Dagalo was mobilizing a large force at a northern air base “to secure the landing of a military aid plane from regional sides.”

Gen. Dagalo and Mr. Haftar have come to each other’s aid before. The Sudanese commander sent fighters to assist the Libyan militia leader as Mr. Haftar launched a failed attempt to seize Libya’s capital Tripoli from the internationally-recognized government in 2019.

Both men have allied with the U.A.E., which assisted Mr. Haftar militarily to fight political rivals and hired Gen. Dagalo’s men to fight in Yemen. The two have also worked with the Kremlin-backed private military contractor Wagner. Mr. Haftar hosts the paramilitaries at his bases in Libya, and Gen. Dagalo has struck lucrative gold mining partnerships with the group, which is headed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a Russian businessman and close associate of President Vladimir Putin.

There was no immediate indication that Mr. Haftar’s involvement in Sudan was backed by Russia or the U.A.E.

This satellite photo shows fires burning at Khartoum International Airport in Sudan’s capital on Wednesday.PHOTO: PLANET LABS PBC/PLANET LABS PBC/ASSOCIATED PRESS

Spokespeople for Gen. Burhan, Mr. Haftar and the Egyptian and Emirati foreign ministries didn’t return requests for comment. A public-relations official for Gen. Dagalo couldn’t immediately comment.

Egypt, which has officially called for an end to the fighting, sent jet fighters just before the fighting started and additional pilots soon after to support Gen. Burhan, the people said. A Sudanese army official said one Egyptian jet fighter destroyed an ammunition depot controlled by Gen. Dagalo on Monday afternoon.

“If you are a neighbor looking at the violence and you have the risk of a warlord taking over, it makes sense from an Egyptian perspective to get involved,” said Cameron Hudson, a former chief of staff to the U.S. special envoy for Sudan who is now a senior associate at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Over the weekend, Gen. Dagalo’s men detained Egyptian troops that had been deployed at a Sudanese base, suspecting they could intervene to back Gen. Burhan. They later transferred them to Khartoum, where the Sudanese air force has been striking RSF positions, these people said. They noted that the detained Egyptian soldiers included military intelligence officers. Egyptian planes already in the facility that had been heavily damaged were also seized.

Cairo has long backed Gen. Burhan, a key ally for Egypt in its dispute with Ethiopia, which is expanding a giant dam that the Sisi government says threatens to choke off the waters that run into the Nile.

The coup led by Gen. Burhan, which halted Sudan’s democratic transition in October 2021, was greenlighted by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al Sisi, The Wall Street Journal has previously reported.

An Appeal for the Protection of Eritrean Refugees in Sudan

Saturday, 08 April 2023 08:21 Written by EPF Diplomacy Coordination Committee

UN accuses Switzerland of handing refugees over to torture

Tuesday, 28 March 2023 14:18 Written by Martin Plaut

UNCATEGORIZED

Date: 14/06/2022Author: Martin Plaut0 Comments

Eritreans who are sent back to their country are threatened with ill-treatment. This is the third time in one year that Switzerland has been reprimanded for this by the UN. Now the parliament is reacting.

Source: “Der Bund“, 13.06.2022

Author: Nina Fargahi

Asylum seekers from Eritrea are often trapped in emergency centres: they cannot return, but are not allowed to stay either

The situation is complicated. Eritrean nationals who are not granted asylum in Switzerland cannot be deported to their country. The necessary agreement is missing. At the same time, Eritrean refugees can neither work nor complete an education here. In 2020, 653 Eritrean nationals thus lived in emergency centres.

The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) hopes that they are going to leave voluntarily. But according to a new report by the UN Special Rapporteur, deserters are “at risk of torture and inhuman treatment as well as extrajudicial killings” if they return. The UN Special Rapporteur is currently in Switzerland. He presented his new report yesterday at the session of the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva.

In addition, Switzerland has been reprimanded once more by the UN Commitee against Torture (CAT) at the end of May. In fact, it was the third time in one year. The reason: Switzerland wanted to deport a woman to Eritrea who, as a deserter, ran the risk of being tortured if she returned to her home country.

Tarig Hassan, a Zurich-based lawyer who brought this case before the CAT, says: “The multiple reprimands show that Switzerland is misjudging the situation in Eritrea. It must change its practice and recognise asylum seekers from Eritrea as refugees.” The SEM contradicts this view writing that the asylum and expulsion practice will only be adjusted if there are new findings on the threat situation or if the Federal Administrative Court corrects a decision of the SEM in a general way.

No individual cases, but a practice

New findings? Sarah Frehner, a lawyer who has been working on Eritrea for many years, says: “It is contradictory: Switzerland has decided to tighten its practice without new and reliable findings that would allow the conclusion that the situation in Eritrea has changed, and is now waiting for new findings to possibly defuse the practice again.”

The Federal Administrative Court admits in its reference judgements that obtaining information on the situation in Eritrea is problematic. “Nevertheless, the impossible is demanded of the persons concerned, namely to prove that a risk of a human rights violation in each individual case does really exist”, the lawyer explains. If the UN Anti-Torture Committee finds that the prohibition of torture has been violated three times in series, then it is not a case-by-case decision, but rather a fundamental questioning of the Swiss practice, says Frehner.

“A humanitarian solution is needed”: National Councillor Aline Trede, member of the Green party.

Swiss Parliament is also dealing with Eritrea these days. Three interpellations are pending. One of the interpellations has been submitted by National Councillor of the Green Party, Aline Trede. Her Eritrean trainee with two daughters had received a negative asylum decision. The parliamentarian states: “A humanitarian solution is needed.” The Eritreans in Switzerland are mainly refugees who entered under the old asylum law and have been here for years. “There are hardly any new asylum applications from Eritrea these days as the persecuted are trying to reach Germany, Belgium or the Netherlands.”

In 2021, only 386 Eritrean nationals applied for asylum in Switzerland, while 1642 people were included in the asylum status due to births or family reunifications.

Back in 2019, the Former State Secretary Mario Gattiker stated that of the approximately 2825 Eritrean asylum applications, only 492 concerned people who had initially fled to Switzerland. All the others were births and family reunifications. This means that they are not newly arrived Eritreans.

Many women with children in emergency aid

Jürg Schneider, an emeritus professor of economics who is involved in various organisations for asylum seekers, says: “The Swiss policy of deterring Eritreans has been extremely effective, but Switzerland has not only deterred those they had targeted, but also many who should be entitled to protection from persecution, torture and slavery in the Eritrean national service.”

The proportion of rejected asylum seekers who end up in emergency assistance and receive emergency assistance for more than a year increases with each passing year. After the first quarter of 2018, 58 per cent of emergency assistance cases were long-term cases, but by the end of 2020, the figure has risen to 74 per cent, according to the 2020 emergency assistance monitoring report. Almost half of the people in emergency assistance are women, children and adolescents. Why? Firstly, living as clandestines is more difficult for women with children than for men. Secondly, those who receive emergency aid on a long-term basis have no other way out.

She wants Eritreans with a temporary admission to be enabled to work more easily: National Councillor Yvonne Feri (Social democratic Party, SP).

A motion by National Councillor Andrea Geissbühler of the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) demands that Switzerland should start to renegotiate with Eritrea to make forced repatriations possible. Geissbühler says: “Eritrea’s president must grant that asylum seekers rejected by Switzerland will not be tortured if they return.” To obtain such a guarantee, however, the Federal Councillors would have to travel there in person, she adds.

At the same time, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights does not consider such diplomatic assurances to be an efficient protection against torture and says: “If a government disregards the prohibition of torture, it cannot be assumed that it will abstain from it after having made such an agreement.

The third proposal comes from SP National Councillor Yvonne Feri. She was in Eritrea in 2016 and says that the Eritrean citizens who are already here must be regularised so that they can integrate and work. “We have a shortage of skilled workers in Switzerland, and at the same time Eritrean refugees lack work permits.”

What will the federal government do? Eritrea is not in the focus of Swiss politics because of the few new asylum applications. The reprimands of the Anti-Torture Commission, the parliamentary initiatives and the new report of the UN Special Rapporteur could now change this.

The Hemeti – Isaias alliance: dangerous for Sudan, dangerous for Eritrea

Monday, 20 March 2023 21:13 Written by Martin Plaut

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Martin Plaut posted: " A week ago President Isaias welcomed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally referred to as Hemeti, to Asmara. Today Hemeti is Deputy Chairman of Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council and on the face of it this was just a meeting between two neighbouring " Martin Plaut

Martin Plaut

Mar 20

A week ago President Isaias welcomed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, generally referred to as Hemeti, to Asmara.

Today Hemeti is Deputy Chairman of Sudan's Transitional Sovereignty Council and on the face of it this was just a meeting between two neighbouring leaders. But a great deal is at stake - including the potential use of Eritrean refugees living in Sudan by Hemeti.

It is important to understand just who Hemeti is and what he stands for. He was the leader of the notorious Janjaweed - the Arab militia who terrorised African tribes in Darfur. It was for the part he played in a series of massacred that he has been accused of war crimes by the International Criminal Court.

As Eric Reeves, who covers Sudan for years, put it:

It is likely that over the past decade, Hemeti has accumulated more Sudanese blood on his hands in conflict in Darfur and South Kordofan—as well as in Khartoum and elsewhere—than any other man in the country.

This is the man whom President Isaias warmly embraced.

Hemeti is currently in a fierce struggle with other Sudanese leaders. As Reuters reported on Sunday:

General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo commands tens of thousands of fighters in the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and has amassed considerable mineral wealth. He is also deputy leader of Sudan's ruling council, which took power in a coup more than a year ago.

Recently however, Dagalo, widely known as Hemedti, has pulled away from military colleagues and found common ground with a civilian political alliance, in moves that could establish him as a major figure even after the democratic transition.

Central to Hemedti's disagreement with the military is his reluctance to set a clear deadline to integrate the RSF into the army, two military sources said, referring to a stipulation within the outline deal signed in December that paves the way for a two year civilian-led transition to elections.

The sources said the standoff led Hemedti to bring additional RSF forces in recent weeks to bases in Khartoum from Darfur, the western region where the group emerged from the so-called Janjaweed militias accused of atrocities during the early 2000s.

Concerned about his intentions, the army under ruling council leader Abdel Fattah al-Burhan stationed more soldiers in the capital on a state of alert, the sources said.

Speaking to RSF troops earlier this month, Hemedti said his forces would never fight the army, but "our problem is with these people who are clinging to power" - an apparent reference to Islamist-leaning elements of the former regime that retain influence in the army and civil service.

The reasons for the troop movements have not been previously reported. Spokespeople for the military and RSF did not respond to requests for comment.

While tensions have since cooled, Hemedti's underlying differences with the army have not been resolved, and the risk remains of a confrontation that could tip Sudan, which sits in a volatile region between the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, into deepening instability.

Hemedti and other military men are unlikely to be able to stand for election in the short term. But in a country where power has long been held by the Khartoum elite, Hemedti, from a nomadic camel-herding background, is trying to become "a force to be reckoned with in the national power structure," said Suliman Baldo, head of the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, an independent think-tank.

In a BBC interview last year, Hemedti said he would not stand by and watch the country fall apart, but denied having leadership ambitions. His office did not respond to questions submitted by Reuters.

A handover of power to civilians under the outline deal could restore billions in Western aid and restart an economic and democratic opening that was halted when, in October 2021, army and RSF officers deposed the fledgling civilian government that had followed the overthrow of former president Omar al-Bashir.

The main signatories to the outline agreement are Burhan's military and Hemedti's RSF on one side and the civilian Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) coalition on the other. The two sides had shared power in the aborted transition between Bashir's overthrow and the coup.

Hemedti has increasingly aligned himself with the pro-democracy civilian movement in speeches. On the other hand, Burhan has delayed a final signing of the transition agreement by pushing to broaden it and bring in former rebel groups and pro-military civilian factions.

On March 11, the army said accusations it was reluctant to hand over power were "open attempts to gain political sympathy, and obstruct the process of transition". Later that day, Hemedti and Burhan met, according to a statement by the ruling council.

Under pressure from Western and Gulf powers, the process of finalising a framework for forming a new transitional government before elections has since shown renewed signs of momentum.

The sides are due to meet this month to thrash out details of military restructuring, but there has so far been no indication of when the RSF will be merged with the army, and what role Hemedti would play in the enlarged armed forces.

The army wants to see the RSF, which by some estimates has up to 100,000 fighters spread across one of Africa's largest countries, integrated under their control by the end of the new transitional period, the two military sources said.

The Isaias-Hemeti relationship

The two men have a good deal in common.

· Both have established strong relations with the Russians. Isaias recently welcomed Russia's powerful Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to Eritrea earlier this year.

· According to the New York Times, Hemeti has linked up with another force: the Russian Wagner Group, run by a close ally of President Putin. The paper describes Hemeti has the Wagner Group’s “main military ally in Sudan.”

· The report continues: “Two senior Western officials said that Wagner organized General Hamdan’s February visit to Moscow, where he arrived on the eve of the war in Ukraine. Although the trip was ostensibly to discuss an economic aid package, they said, General Hamdan arrived with gold bullion on his plane, and asked Russian officials for help in acquiring armed drones.”

What might the Isaias - Hemeti alliance lead to?

According to the UN Refugee Agency there are some 128,000 Eritrean refugees living in camps in Eastern Sudan, between Kassala and Gadaref. Others live in Khartoum and towns and villages across Sudan.

They are frequently targeted by the authorities, mostly to extract money from them. But now they could face a far greater threat.

President Isaias long resented the presence of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, some 100,000 of whom were housed in camps run by the United Nations. When the Tigray war erupted Eritrean forces attacked the camps.

Early in the conflict, Eritrean troops entered Ethiopia and destroyed Ethiopia’s northern Eritrean refugee camps of Hitsats and Shimelba. Tens of thousands of Eritrean refugees were forced to flee further into the Tigrayan warzone.THE CONVERSATION: NOWHERE TO RUN: THE PLIGHT OF ERITREAN REFUGEES IN ETHIOPIA

Some Eritreans were forced to join the Eritrean army, others kidnapped and returned to Eritrea, from which they had fled.

Might Isaias now be planning to link up with Hemeti to deal with the Eritreans living in Sudan? It has long been speculated that the relationship between the two men might threaten the refugees.

It is even possible that Eritrean youngsters, many of whom have had military training, might be enlisted by Hemeti who could use them for his own ends.

This could mean using Eritreans to fight on the streets of Sudan. Or it could result in Eritreans being taken into Chad or even Libya. As Al Jazeera pointed out:

A report by the UNSC Libya sanctions committee in November accused Sudan and the head of Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, widely known as Hemeti, of violating UN sanctions by deploying 1,000 troops to Libya.

The BBC once described Hemeti as "the warlord who may control Sudan’s future." It would be a tragedy if he became the warlord who controlled the destiny of Eritrean refugees as well.

Eritrea’s forgotten Ethiopian refugees

Tuesday, 14 March 2023 20:38 Written by Martin Plaut

Martin Plaut

Mar 12

Amid the attention on the plight of the Tigrayans, Amhara, Afar and others who were caught up in the war that was launched against Tigray in November 2020, it is easy to overlook what has happened to the Eritrean refugees who had been sheltering in camps in Tigray.

As early as December 2020 the BBC was carrying reports that the 100,000 Eritreans were running desperately short of food.

Thousands of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia's conflict-hit northern region of Tigray have run out of food, the UN's refugee agency, UNHCR, has said.

It appealed for urgent access to the region to provide emergency assistance.

Communications and aid access have been blocked since the conflict between the federal army and fighters loyal to Tigray leadership began a month ago. Nearly 100,000 Eritrean refugees are in Tigray. They fled political persecution and compulsory military service. A lot of focus has been on the tens of thousands who have fled to Sudan from Tigray during the fighting, but there is also concern about these Eritreans.

Their situation was terrible and deteriorated further. Refugees International carrying this report in March 2022.

BBC

Since the destruction of the northern camps of Hitsats and Shimelba that displaced 20,000 Eritrean refugees early in the conflict, and attacks on Eritrean refugees and the civilian population elsewhere in Tigray, thousands more Eritrean refugees have been repeatedly displaced. Some have moved multiple times in Tigray. Others have sought safety in Addis Ababa. In one instance in December 2020, Eritrean refugees who had reached Addis Ababa, were forcibly escorted back to Tigray. To date, aid groups are unclear of what has happened to many of the 20,000 Eritrean refugees who left Hitsats and Shimelba.

Refugees International

Those Eritreans who fled from the Tigrayan camps, but were unable to reach Addis, or forced to leave the capital, are now being housed in a "refugee settlement" at Alemwach. It is worth noting that the UNHCR is not calling it a camp.

Below is a summary of the UNHCR report from Alemwach now home to over 22,000 Eritreans.

The Tigrayan crisis led to difficult humanitarian conditions including limited access to basic social and life-saving services for refugees in the Mai Tsebri camps. Coupled with the security breakdown, many refugees opted to move from the Mai Ani and Adi Harush camps to Alemwach, Dabat in the Amhara region.

Prior to spontaneous movements, UNHCR had conducted an intention survey whereby, 90% of refugees concerned about their security situation indicated their willingness to be relocated elsewhere.

Over 15,000 refugees spontaneously relocated from the Tigray camps to Alemwach between February and July 2022, going through difficult transit. Following the cessation of hostilities in November 2022 with improved access to Mai Tseberi, UNHCR, RRS, and IOM relocated 7,080 refugees to Alemwach.

UNHCR’s response strategy in Alemwach is an integrated area-based approach with refugees and the host community sharing services such as WASH, education, and health.

UNHCR plans on strengthening existing facilities instead of building new ones.

UNHCR

U.S. Weighs Offering Economic Lifeline to Ethiopia Despite War Atrocities

Saturday, 11 March 2023 22:25 Written by Martin Plaut

Martin Plaut

Mar 10

The internal administration debate comes ahead of Blinken’s plans to visit Africa.

Source: Foreign Policy

By Robbie Gramer

MARCH 9, 2023, 5:37 PM

The Biden administration is weighing plans to lift restrictions on aid and financial assistance to war-battered Ethiopia in a move that has drawn backlash from human rights advocates and some factions within the administration.

The plan, if confirmed, is expected to be announced by Secretary of State Antony Blinken during an upcoming visit to the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa later this month, according to multiple current and former officials familiar with the matter.

The debate playing out within the administration over its Ethiopia policy reflects a concern among top aid and human rights officials as well as lawmakers in Congress that U.S. President Joe Biden hasn’t done enough to acknowledge or hold Ethiopia accountable for atrocities, ethnic cleansing, and possible war crimes it committed during a devastating two-year war against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) rebel group in the country’s northern Tigray region. That war cost hundreds of thousands of lives and destabilized Africa’s second-most-populous country.

“The U.S. very likely knows the nature of the crimes and the extent to which the government of Ethiopia at the top levels ordered the violence on its own civilians,” said one former senior U.S. official familiar with the matter, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the internal administration deliberations.

“Mass killing never stays buried. Everyone in the victim community and the atrocity-prevention community will remember which U.S. policymakers made this call to ignore its own information and move forward with these economic packages.”

This policy debate was described to Foreign Policy by five current and former officials, all of whom spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive internal government deliberations.

Some officials—including Biden’s top envoy for African affairs, Molly Phee, and Victoria Nuland, undersecretary of state for political affairs—are pushing for the administration to begin renormalizing ties with Ethiopia after a peace agreement was signed to end the war in November 2022.

Officials in the camp for reviving relations argue that the move is necessary for U.S. engagement across Africa, given Ethiopia’s outsized economic and political influence on the continent. They also argue that Ethiopia’s economy is teetering on the brink and only international assistance such as loans from the International Monetary Fund and debt restructuring can help repair the war-torn economy. Blocking the Ethiopian government from sorely needed economic relief after it signed a peace deal, these officials argue, could ultimately undermine the fragile peace and overall stability in the country.

Officials in the other camp, including U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) chief Samantha Power, have argued in internal policy debates that the administration needs to extract more commitments from the Ethiopian government on human rights and accountability for war crimes and other atrocities before agreeing to fully open access to economic and trade lifelines.

“We should not trade our long-held values on human rights for perceived near-term stability in East Africa,” said Cameron Hudson, an expert on U.S. Africa policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “The question is how much does this administration think they can achieve across the region without having Ethiopia as a strategic partner?”

The State Department declined to comment, and USAID did not respond to a request for comment. The Ethiopian Embassy in Washington also did not respond to a request for comment.

Among the policy proposals administration officials are discussing are supporting plans for an International Monetary Fund loan to restructure the country’s debt, lifting restrictions on some U.S. aid that had been halted during the war, and eventually allowing Ethiopia to rejoin the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) trade pact with the United States. AGOA provides African countries with duty-free access to U.S. markets. The Biden administration cut Ethiopia out of AGOA in January 2022 for “gross violations of internationally recognized human rights being perpetrated by the Government of Ethiopia and other parties amid the widening conflict in northern Ethiopia.”

Between November 2020 and November 2022, the Ethiopian military and forces from neighboring Eritrea fought a war in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region against the TPLF, a guerrilla force and former ruling political party in Ethiopia. The conflict was marked by widespread atrocities on all sides. Forces from Ethiopia and Eritrea were accused of war crimes including mass rape, sexual slavery, torture, and extrajudicial killings of civilians. The war may have killed as many as 600,000 people, as some peace mediators estimated, which would make it the deadliest conflict of the 21st century.

The Ethiopian government and TPLF signed a peace deal, brokered by the African Union, in November 2022 to end the conflict. The peace accord brought immediate relief to the country but sidestepped critical issues to end the cycle of violence. Left unanswered were questions on when, if at all, Eritrean forces would leave Tigray and whether the Ethiopian government would completely lift its de facto blockade on Tigray that left millions without access to humanitarian aid. Many Western officials and aid workers are also worried about a spike in violence in Ethiopia’s Oromia region—separate from the settlement of the conflict in Tigray—that risks further destabilizing the country and kick-starting another cycle of violence.

Some human rights advocates and U.S. lawmakers have criticized the Biden administration for not holding Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s government to account for the human rights violations committed during the war and say Washington should use its economic and political levers of power more forcefully to cement and expand the peace deal.

“Yes, the agreement brought some relief to a population that was suffering for too long. But let’s be clear that five months on, the suffering continues,” said Sarah Yager, the Washington director at Human Rights Watch, a nonprofit advocacy organization.

The administration set up new sanctions authorities in September 2021, specifically for the Ethiopia conflict, but it has so far only used that authority to sanction Eritrean officials for their role in the conflict. Human rights advocates have also criticized the administration for withholding a formal atrocities designation on Ethiopia. Blinken in March 2021 stated that acts of “ethnic cleansing” had been carried out in the conflict in Ethiopia. The State Department drafted a declaration in 2021 that the Ethiopian government’s atrocities in Tigray constituted a genocide, according to three U.S. officials familiar with the matter, but it never released the declaration.

The State Department, these officials said, played an important role in facilitating the peace talks between Ethiopia and the TPLF and has brought up concerns on human rights violations in virtually every meeting with senior Ethiopian officials over the course of the conflict. But Yager said there’s more to be done.

“The reality is that any peace is tenuous at best without credible investigations and accountability for what’s been committed there, past and present,” Yager said. “We want to see U.S. officials take seriously how fragile Ethiopia is at this moment and why its people need to see justice. History has never looked kindly on the papering over of horrors of this magnitude.”