“Like the Tigrayan population, an estimated 25,000 Eritrean refugees subsisting in the two remaining UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray – Mai Ayni and Adi Harush – are suffering acutely from the Ethiopian government’s blockade of the region. Food and medicine have run out; relief organizations lack the cash and fuel they need to operate; and UNHCR itself has limited access to the camps.”

By Mike Slotznick, Counsel for The America Team for Displaced Eritreans

February 15, 2022

Summary

Like the Tigrayan population, an estimated 25,000 Eritrean refugees subsisting in the two remaining UNHCR-supported camps in Tigray – Mai Ayni and Adi Harush – are suffering acutely from the Ethiopian government’s blockade of the region. Food and medicine have run out; relief organizations lack the cash and fuel they need to operate; and UNHCR itself has limited access to the camps. In recent weeks, some camp residents have died from hunger, thirst, childbirth and treatable medical conditions. Some have died at the hands of federal forces or vengeful Tigrayan actors. As a consequence, some are fleeing south to new UNHCR facilities in Amhara. But the residents are reported as being held hostage within the camps by indeterminate Tigrayan actors. (Tigrayans are in control of the area). Their immediate evacuation from the two camps is essential.

Background

At the beginning of the war, in late November 2020 and the weeks following, Eritrean forces invaded the two more northerly camps in Tigray for Eritrean refugees, known as Hitsats and Shimelba. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations fled. Some refugees were killed in the crossfire among warring parties. The Eritrean forces also intentionally killed some of the refugees, and they forced or cajoled thousands of others to return to Eritrea. Their fate there is largely unknown. But observers fear that many were imprisoned or worse; and the conscription of some of the refugees by the Eritrean army – possibly to fight in the Tigray campaign – was reported. Just as shockingly, beginning in late December 2020, Eritrean forces entirely destroyed the two camps. The refugees who had been living there and who had not already fled scattered across Tigray, sought refuge in Mai Ayni and Adi Harush, or migrated to Addis. But occasional abductions by Eritrean forces were occurring in those two southern camps as well, continuing into the spring.

Two other UNHCR-supported camps exist for Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia: in the Afar region, at Berhale and Asayta. In the fall of 2021, after the war had progressed into Afar, reports emerged that the refugees there felt gravely insecure – fearing the fighting, or possibly being targeted by the local Afar population or the invading Tigrayan troops. For some weeks in September and October, UNHCR was unable to access Berhale, and it expressed deep concern for the refugees’ safety.

As for Addis, it was teeming with Eritrean security agents; and they were hunting Eritrean refugees there door to door – kidnapping some to Eritrea – as the Ethiopian government forced others back to Adi Harush. Reports of that abuse seem to have subsided in the summer of 2021. Indeed UNHCR undertook to re-register in Addis some thousands of those who had fled from the camps in Tigray, and thus to provide a semblance of protection for them. But deep feelings of peril continued to haunt the refugees there.

In all – applying a global view – the invasion, repatriation, punishment and destruction visited upon the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia, as perpetrated by forces from the very country from which they had fled, are seen as legally and morally extraordinary. Those events cemented the reputation of the Eritrean regime as one of the most vicious on the face of the earth. The events also established that the Ethiopian government, which had long protected the refugees, now would not or could not protect them from the Eritrean regime with which it had come to be allied since 2018; and thus that the refugees were simply not safe anywhere in Ethiopia.

But Eritrean forces were not the refugees’ only assailants. Although for many years they had felt tolerated and even welcomed by local Tigrayans in the neighborhoods of the camps there – they now felt Tigrayan wrath as well. Apparently seeking vengeance against even Eritrean refugees for the atrocities that Eritrean forces were committing across Tigray, from November 2020 through the spring of 2021 the refugees in the camps, and those fleeing the camps, suffered episodic killings, rapes and looting at the hands of largely indeterminate Tigrayans.

As a consequence of the refugees’ insecurity, UNHCR undertook to build a new camp for them at Alemwach, Amhara. The camp is still under construction, but several hundred refugees have found their way to the nearby Amhara towns of Dabat and Debark, where UNHCR has been able to provide for them.

Current Conditions in Tigray

As of January 2022, the combined population of Adi Harush and Mai Ayni was estimated at more than 25,000. But at that time reports emerged that the refugees there were suffering at the hands of both federal Ethiopian forces and Tigrayans. Tigrayan forces had retreated from Amhara and Afar and were now defending their home region. They had placed heavy military equipment, possibly cannons and the like, in the immediate camp vicinities, were firing them at federal and allied forces located in nearby Amhara, and were drawing reciprocating fire. Some refugees were killed and injured, including by way of a federal drone attack at Mai Ayni on January 5.

Meanwhile, by virtue of the blockade, the camps were without protection and outside communication; and indeterminate Tigrayans resumed episodic vengeance attacks against the refugees, including by way of killings, rapes and looting.

In addition, camp residents were dying of hunger and thirst – as UNHCR itself discovered, to its shock, upon returning to the camps after a three-week absence in January. Others were reduced to eating leaves to survive, and – through a near-total absence of medicine and medical services – deaths were occurring from malaria and during childbirth. Famished and terrified, some of the refugees have now tried to reach UNHCR protection in Dabat, and (as noted above) some hundreds of those have arrived safely. But others have been attacked by Tigrayans en route, with some of those fleeing having died or disappeared. Yet others have been prevented from fleeing the camps by Tigrayan threats to fine or imprison those who would make the attempt. The motives for that confinement are not apparent, but they may include such elements as using the refugees as human shields, or simply as targets for financial extortion.

Current conditions in Afar

In late January 2022, an organization representing the Eritrean refugees in Afar described the peril in which the refugees were finding themselves, and it urged the United Nations to quickly evacuate them all from the country.

Current conditions in Addis

In February 2022, a report emerged that the Eritrean embassy in Addis, in a menacing manner, had summoned some number of refugees to appear there. At the embassy they were interrogated – including about what they may have told UNHCR about the Eritrean regime – and they concluded that they had been the subjects of surveillance by the regime’s agents.

Current advocacy themes

Advocacy around these issues is mixed, particularly with respect to the refugees still in Tigray. Some voices urge a speed-up of the evacuation to UNHCR protection in Amhara; others urge an evacuation from Ethiopia altogether, whether immediately or in due course. (Even the Ethiopian government’s refugee agency, RRS, has urged their evacuation from Tigray.) Still others – certain refugees within the camps – reportedly maintain that the refugees are safest if they remain there. This last proposition is difficult to fathom, but it might be viewed within the context of several larger phenomena.

First, the global Eritrean diaspora is split as between those who seek to ally with the Tigrayans and who empathize with the Tigrayans’ suffering at the hands of federal, Eritrean and allied forces, versus those who cannot forgive the Tigrayans for the atrocities committed by a relative few of them against the refugees during the course of the war. Second, in the fog of war, one can expect vast realms of misinformation, disinformation, and even, on occasion, desperate individuals betraying their brethren in exchange for their own personal protection.

Conclusion

In the global scheme, elements of the atrocities committed against the Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia may be nearly without recent precedent. The humanitarian blockade of Tigray and the forced starvation there is likewise beyond extreme, and the Eritrean refugees are among the victims. But unlike the Tigrayan population, the refugees are defenseless and have no one to even attempt to protect or provide for them. Advocates for the refugees believe that extraordinary and immediate measures for their protection and sustenance – matching the extraordinary needs and injustices that have befallen them – are thus eminently in order.

The Central Council of the Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) on 29 January 2022 held an extraordinary meeting to review and take appropriate measures on the following three issues of central importance at this moment in time: 1. To once more discuss the dangerous  war that was ignited in Tigray and spread to several parts of Ethiopia; 2.to review the efforts of the Eritrean forces for change towards creating a common umbrella and the stage of their progress; and 3. to revisit the role of the EPDP in the two issues and take decisions on the basis of the existing Party positions and policies.

In this extraordinary meeting that lasted for several hours led by Party chairman, Tesfai Woldemichael (Degiga), the Central Council expressed deep concerns about worse consequences if the war is continued. It stressed that things could go out of hand in the entire region if hostilities continue in addition to the destruction so far witnessed in Tigray and other parts of northern Ethiopia as well as the long existing suffering inflicted upon Eritrea’s sons and daughters who were pushed into this war without their own will and decision.

At winding up discussions on the major two agenda times, the EPDP Central Council reached the following conclusions and decisions:

  1. The repressive Eritrean regime, which exported to Ethiopia the heinous crimes it has been inflicting upon the Eritrean people, must always stand condemned for its illegal interferences in the affairs of a neighbor and its criminal acts of igniting war by sharpening the differences between the Tigray region and the Federal authorities in Ethiopia. The tyranny in Eritrea has done this in addition to its unpardonable crime of causing untold suffering and destruction in Tigray. The unholy alliance of the Eritrean dictator with the Ethiopian PM Dr. Abiy Ahmed against the people and regional government of Tigray is irresponsible and extremely harmful to the future relations between the two peoples and has adverse implications to Eritrean sovereignty itself. As such, the EPDP Central Council condemns the unholy alliance with the strongest terms possible. Likewise, having learned that the Eritrean regime is extorting money from Eritreans with the false claim that Tigray is waging war of invasion on Eritrea, the Central Council advised and warned Eritrean nationals not to be accomplices in the regime’s continued war efforts. It stated that it was the Eritrean people who so far paid the heavy price for the war of interference in non-Eritrean affairs and it is now time to our people to defy all excuses and stand opposed to the regime’s war efforts. The meeting also reminds the Eritrean people to direct to world actors their demands for accountability against all those who perpetrated war crimes so that the perpetrators can face justice after their participation is investigated by independent and neutral bodies. The Central Council is of the firm belief that the Eritrean people are themselves victims of their own regime that shall solely be accountable for all crimes it commits in the name of the Eritrean people who had nothing to do with the regime’s criminal acts.
  2. The EPDP is of the conviction that the war started in Tigray and extended to other parts of Ethiopia is basically political with differing constitutional interpretations and cannot be solved with continued armed hostilities. It thus supports the peace initiatives being raised by several actors and urged the warring sides to accept a peaceful settlement of their differences. The CC meeting also called on the international community to respond adequately to the basic humanitarian needs of the Tigrayans and other peoples affected by the war in the region.
  3. The most urgent action required is to release without any further delay the supplies of electric power, water, banking facilities, communication lines and others which were interrupted long ago by the ill-intentions of the aggressive forces. The meeting expressed deep sorrow over the suffering and death of many innocent Tigray people because of lack of food and medical care and asked appropriate action by those concerned to prevent repeating such inhumane and brutal acts in Tigray and other Ethiopian regions.
  4. The CC meeting studied with deep sorrow and concern the criminal acts being perpetrated against Eritrean refugees and the aerial bombardments and related inhumane acts taken against displaced Tigrayans and once again called upon concerned bodies to investigate by independent bodies the criminal acts and grave violations against civilians and bring to accountability all their perpetrators.
  5. Furthermore, the meeting reminded that prisoners of war must be treated according to international conventions and laws and be considered innocent until their cases are reviewed by independent judicial bodies.
  6. The EPDP Central Council noted with measured satisfaction the approach towards finalization of the two-year coordination among sister political forces that are resolved to create a common umbrella. The Council insisted that joint work is not a choice but an obligation for Eritreans opposed to the regime in Eritrea and appealed to all concerned Eritrean forces to redouble their efforts towards finalizing the noble objective of creating one working national umbrella.

The CC extraordinary meeting also discussed about the unsettling political situation in the Sudan. While expressing serious concerns, the Central Council called upon all concerned parties to adopt peaceful means that guarantee the interests of the Sudanese people.

The EPDP Central Council took this opportunity to urge the Eritrean people to continue their struggle with added vigor against the tyrant regime which, on top of their existing bad situation, created new invasions against others to prolong its stay in power. We as a people are nowadays facing a national challenge that can only be resolved by a unified stand of a whole nation and not by one organization or community.  The meeting also once more calls upon its members and committed supporters to work hard as ever before and help promote the objectives and action plans of the EPDP through implementing the policies and decisions of the Party’s Central Council.

We Struggle for Democratic Governance and Progress!

The EPDP Central Council

29 January 2022

JANUARY 31, 2022  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

“If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated.”

Source: The Conversation

January 30, 2022 7.32am GMT

Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki (L) and Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed at an event in Ethiopia in 2018. Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images

The Eritrean military has been involved in the war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region since the conflict broke out in November 2020. Eritrea shares a 1,000 km border with Ethiopia, including with Tigray. It sent thousands of soldiers in support of the Ethiopian federal forces in their operations against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

These actions have both prolonged and worsened the hugely destructive conflict.

Eritrea’s involvement also has wider implications. It represents an attempt by Asmara to reassert itself on the regional stage, following two decades of relative diplomatic isolation.

The large-scale commitment of soldiers – as well as logistical and political support for Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed – is the result of a remarkable turnaround in relations between Asmara and Addis Ababa. After almost two decades of hostility, Abiy struck a peace deal with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki in July 2018 . This appeared to usher in a new era of stability and cooperation.

But that’s not what transpired. In the following months, Abiy intensified his programme of political reform in Ethiopia. He consolidated his power at the expense of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The movement had dominated politics in Ethiopia since 1991.

The front was also Eritrea’s bitterest enemy. There had been a troubled history of relations between it and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front dating back to the 1970s. This antagonism culminated in a war between Ethiopia and Eritrea between 1998 and 2000.

The outbreak of the war in Tigray served a number of purposes for Isaias. Firstly, it gave him the opportunity to end Eritrea’s long-standing international isolation. It did this by enabling him to exercise influence in a conflict which threatened to completely destabilise the region. This was a deeply worrying prospect to a range of international actors.

Secondly, it reasserted his influence in Ethiopia’s internal affairs.

And lastly it provided an opportunity to seek revenge on the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. The front’s leadership outwitted and outgunned Eritrea militarily in the 1998-2000 war. It also outmanoeuvred Eritrea diplomatically in the years following the conflict.

Eritrea’s opportunistic policy

The government in Asmara has pursued an opportunistic foreign policy. Its aim has essentially been to gain regional superiority at Ethiopia’s expense.

Eritrea has sought to exercise leverage by getting involved in others’ conflicts. For much of the 2000s and 2010s, for instance, Asmara defied the international consensus on Somalia. This consensus was primarily orchestrated by the government in Ethiopia, at the time led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front. Reaching the consensus involved the creation of a Transitional Federal Government with broad international support.

Ethiopian troops and African Union peacekeepers, supported in the air by the US, launched offensives against al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist group which Eritrea was accused of supporting.

This led to the 2009 imposition of sanctions on Eritrea. There were also interventions in Darfur and eastern Sudan by the Eritrean government.

Eritrea’s regional policy has largely been influenced by Ethiopia, its much more powerful southerly neighbour. But Ethiopia has represented both an obstacle and an opportunity in the pursuit of regional dominance.

In many respects, the single biggest obstacle facing the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime in Asmara is a strong, united Ethiopia. A country capable of dominating the region in economic, military and diplomatic terms – and especially one covertly or overtly hostile to Eritrea itself. This was the case under the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front regime led by the Tigray People’s Liberation Front.

A weakened and disunited Ethiopia – with at least some political actors who are easy to influence – therefore represents an opportunity for Eritrea’s interests. This is because the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front’s vision for the country is as regional gatekeeper and pivot – secure in itself, cohesive and militarily potent.

In search of that status, the best scenario is to have Ethiopia unstable enough to allow opportunities for intervention and influence. Asmara would also want to be able to justify prolonged militarisation, which has become the hallmark of independent Eritrean nationhood. But, it wants to avoid Ethiopia’s total collapse.

Asmara’s best-case scenario is a prolonged, unresolved conflict in Ethiopia in which the presence of Eritrean forces and political support are still required by Addis Ababa.

Abiy’s assent to power and the marginalisation of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front – combined with widespread and growing political protest in the preceding years – presented just such an opportunity.

Risky strategy

But this is a risky strategy.

Isaias has essentially harnessed his cause to that of Abiy. When things were going well against the Tigrayan forces – as in late 2020 and early 2021 – it looked like a justifiable policy, however catastrophic for the civilian population. But it could backfire.

There have been signs that negotiations between the Ethiopian government and Tigrayan leadership may be possible.

If there is to be serious dialogue between Addis Ababa and Mekele, the Tigrayan leadership will demand the withdrawal of Eritrean forces and Isaias’ removal from discussions over Ethiopia’s future. Abiy will need to concede this. In such a scenario, Isaias will quickly find himself isolated. This would take him back to the pariah status he has occupied for most of the last two decades.

Further, in the longer term, an Ethiopia where various parties are reconciled to one another’s legitimacy could once again become a hostile entity on Eritrea’s southern flank.

Involvement in other people’s wars is inherently risky business. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front regime has frequently played with fire. It has done so domestically and regionally. Yet, to date, it has seemingly defied geopolitical gravity.

But the Eritrean army’s disproportionately violent and inhumane intervention in Ethiopia in pursuit of payback against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front and the regional stature Isaias has long craved could result in the most destructive blowback imaginable: a coalescence of Ethiopian antagonists and domestic opposition that presents an existential threat to the Eritrean government itself.

JANUARY 28, 2022  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

“The leaked document says that the Ethiopian government should talk to TPLF from a position of strength; Without dialogue, the conflict will go on with serious economic repercussions. The document mentions the US desire to remove Eritrean ruler Isaias Afwerki from power. Eritrea is already under sanctions from the US and EU.”

Source: My views on news

A 51-page document of the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry has been leaked. The document outlines a re-engagement strategy to repair fractures ties with the US and Western countries.

After the start of the Tigray conflict in November 2020, Ethiopian relations with the US and western countries deteriorated. EU and US accused Ethiopia of human rights abuses and deliberately blocking aid delivery to Tigray. The Ethiopian government reciprocated by labeling US and others as backers of Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). US removed Ethiopia from AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) at the start of this year over human rights abuses.

After Tigray forces started their withdrawal from neighboring Amhara and Afar regions last month, Ethiopia-US relations saw an improvement. US President Joe Biden’s telephone conversation with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmad, in the 2nd week of this month, was a clear indication that the two countries wanted to repair their bilateral ties.

The leaked document says that the Ethiopian government should talk to TPLF from a position of strength; Without dialogue, the conflict will go on with serious economic repercussions.

The document mentions the US desire to remove Eritrean ruler Isaias Afwerki from power. Eritrea is already under sanctions from the US and EU.

Sudan and Egypt are untrustworthy, the leaked paper claims. Sudan took advantage of the Tigray conflict and captured the long-standing disputed territory Al Fashaga on the Sudan Ethiopia border. Egypt and Sudan have been threatening Ethiopia against starting the 2nd filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). But despite threats, Ethiopia completed the 2nd filling in July last year.

It seems that the Ethiopian government is planning talks to end the Tigray conflict. But before the start of these talks, it wants to weaken Tigray militarily and economically through drone strikes and continuous siege.

Secondly, the government wants to pacify dissenting voices against the dialogue. Last month when the Ethiopian government released a few TPLF leaders, the move was criticized by some Amhara groups/individuals and diaspora members.

Those news outlets, which are critical of the government, have leaked this document. The leakage of the document could be an attempt to put pressure on the Ethiopian government to stop it from starting any dialogue with TPLF.

 
 
From Left: General Bacha and General Hassen

Addis Abeba – President Sahle-Work Zewde has today appointed a total of 16 ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary, and 11 ambassadors to represent Ethiopia to various countries, the President’s Office said in a statement to state media.

Among the list of appointees are General Bacha Debele and General Hassen Ibrahim, two senior army generals of the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), who have become familiar faces following the war in Tigray which started in Nov. 2020.

General Bacha, then Lt. Gen, was reinstated to the army on November 04, the same day the war started, along with then Lt. Gen. Yohannes G/Meskel, & Lt. Gen. Abebaw Tadesse; the later who is now a full General, was subsequently appointed as deputy chief of staff.

As well as the two generals, today’s appointment also included Dr. Seleshi Bekele, former Minister of Water and Irrigation and currently the Chief Negotiator and Advisor on Transboundary Rivers and GERD to the federal republic of Ethiopia. The letter from the Presidents’ said she has appointed the ambassadors to various positions in accordance with Article 71, Sub-Article 3 of the FDRE Constitution.

Accordingly, the following is the full list:

Ambassadors extraordinary and plenipotentiary

1. Tefera Deribew

2. Dessie Dalke

3. Sileshi Bekele (PhD)

4. General Bacha Debelle

5. General Hassen Ibrahim

6. Shitiye Minale (Ms.)

7. Professor Fikadu Beyene

8. Rashad Mohamed

9. Ambassador Jemal Kedir

10. Feysal Aliye

11. Isayas Gota

12. Tsegab Kibebew

13. Tafa Tulu

14. Dr. Genet Teshome

15. Dhaba Dabale

16. Fekadu Beyene

Ambassadors:

1. Asaye Alemayehu

2. Hailay Birhane

3. Awel Wegris

4. Bizunesh Meseret (Ms.)

5. Anteneh Tariku

6. Aklilu Kebede

7. Seid Mohamed

8. Yosef Kassaye

9. Zelalem Birhan

10. Firtuna Dibako (Ms.)

11. Werkalemahu Desta

JANUARY 26, 2022  NEWS

Human Rights Concern-Eritrea wishes to Remind the World of the Continued Detention of Patriarch Abune Antonios, Head of the Eritrean Orthodox Church, since January 2006

26 January 2022

Since January 2006 Patriarch Antonios has endured in the Eritrean capital, Asmara. He continues to be held under duress, with state agents ensuring that he cannot leave the premises. There has never been an opportunity for him to question and challenge this illegal detention in a court of law. He is detained arbitrarily and without charge or trial, solely at the whim of the Eritrean President and ruling clique in government.  He is being held virtually incommunicado, and is deprived of all contact with clergy and friends.

His imprisonment since January 2006 makes him one of the longest serving prisoners of conscience in Eritrea. His courage in resisting calls by the regime to submit his church to total governmental control caused him to suffer prolonged persecution and enforced silencing within his own country.  His detention is neither recognised nor accepted by the legitimate church representatives and members, despite many government attempts to replace him with a more compliant priest.

The patriarch’s detention violates at least six fundamental principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, found in Articles 3(liberty of person), 8 (effective remedy), 9 (no arbitrary arrest or detention), 11 (presumed innocent until proven guilty),13 (freedom of movement), 18 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion), all of which have been denied him.

It is vital that the nature of his imprisonment is recognised by the international community for what it is – arbitrary detention. And it is important to note that this form of detention is similar to that used by the apartheid regime in South Africa, which instituted “Banning” Orders. Victims of these arbitrary legal measures could not leave their houses or meet with more than one person, or communicate with the outside world. At this stage in the history of Eritrea, it may be appropriate to note the similarities in the treatment of persons disapproved of by the regime: the same human rights abuses continue to this day as occurred in under apartheid—widespread use of torture, disappearances, unexplained deaths in detention, arbitrary illegal arrests and secret detention, and systematic police brutality unchecked by the law. The world must wake up to the fact that human rights abuses as severe and longstanding as under Apartheid are occurring in East Africa to this day.

Human Rights Concern-Eritrea (HRCE) appeals to the international community to stand up for this innocent and righteous religious leader on the 16th anniversary of his detention.

HRCE also calls upon all member states of the United Nations to put pressure on the government of Eritrea to release the 92-year-old Patriarch, who has been unjustly kept in isolation, away from the people and church he loves dearly.

Human Rights Concern – Eritrea (HRCE)

This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it.

+44 7958 005 637

www.hrc-eritrea.org

JANUARY 22, 2022  NEWS

Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country. In 13 cases, the residence permit has been revoked. Four will be deported. Others can stay.

Original Article: Asyljuks avslørt

Note: Google Translated

ERITREA TOP: At an event in Oslo in August 2019 for Eritreans, Yemane Gebreab appeared. The man in the blue suit is the closest political adviser to Eritrea’s dictatorial president, Isaiah Afewerki. Many Eritreans in Norway have fled his brutal regime. (Private)

By Bjørgulv K. Bjåen, journalist21 / 01/2022 18:03

Since the autumn of 2019, the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country.

As of today, 13 residence permits have been withdrawn.

The order for investigation came as an instruction from the Ministry of Justice (JD) and the then Minister of Justice Jøran Kallmyr (Frp).

The background was news headlines on NRK. They told about an event in Oslo in August 2019 “where Norwegian-Eritreans celebrated the national service in Eritrea together with a high-ranking person from the Eritrean government apparatus, and where Eritrean refugees may have been present”, writes JD.

Many of the Eritreans who have been granted residence in Norway have fled the national service.

Has received tips about cheating

The UDI selected 100 random cases and 50 cases where they had received tips or put on information that there was incorrect information when applying for asylum, says Christine Roca, unit leader control at the UDI.

After the first round, the UDI sat down with 60 cases. 90 were put away. Decisions have now been made in 24 cases:

  • 13 refugees have their residence permit revoked, either permanently or temporarily.
  • 11 cases have been dropped, the UDI did not find sufficient samples on incorrect asylum grounds – or no samples.

36 cases are currently under investigation, by the UDI and the police.

Participation in Eritrean party

When the UDI considers revoking residence permits, it does so mainly on three grounds: Giving incorrect information in the case, giving incorrect information about identity or violating the terms of the permit.

In the instruction, the Ministry of Justice emphasizes that when refugees participate in events in support of the same authorities that one fears persecution from, it may «indicate that a residence permit and asylum status in Norway should be revoked.

– In none of the cases where we have made a decision on revocation, participation in the event in August 2019 has been used alone. But in some decisions, participation has been considered, says Roca.

Norwegian Directorate of Immigration (UDI) has investigated the asylum cases of 150 Eritreans who have fled to Norway, sought protection and been granted residence in the country.

The consequences of the 13 decisions are very different. Even though the UDI has uncovered cheating – incorrect information has been revealed, or important information was withheld – nine will not be deported from Norway, as is usual.

They have received new intermediaries, residence permits.

– Eight of the nine have been protected. In addition, one has been given a stay on the basis of strong human care, says unit leader Roca in the UDI.

She explains the outcome:

– A common assessment in recall cases is that the person should be deported and returned to their home country, and if it were not for the fact that the 13 are from Eritrea, they would in principle have been met with these sanctions.

– In these cases, returning to the home country will mean a great danger of persecution. Therefore, they have received a new, interim residence permit.

Four are leaving Norway

Christine Roca admits that the reaction to the cheating that has been uncovered may be perceived as inferior, but points out that the legislation states that persons should not be returned if they risk inhuman treatment when returning to their home country.

The last four who have received revocation decisions face two different reactions:

– Two are sent to EU countries where they have legal residence. Two will be returned to Eritrea when their age indicates that they will not be called up for community service, Roca said.

Bondevik was paid for praising posts about Kazakhstan

Have complained about the decision

Anyone who receives a decision in the UDI can appeal the decision and in the next round have the appeal assessed by the Immigration Appeals Board (UNE) if the UDI does not review the decision.

Ten out of 13 decisions have been appealed. Three of those who lost their residence permit, but received a new one, have accepted the UDI’s decision.

The consequence of being able to revoke the residence permit, but still get a new one, is the zeroing of lit housing in Norway. Thus, it takes longer before one can apply for a permanent residence permit and, in the next round, citizenship.

AFRICAERITREAETHIOPIAHORN OF AFRICA

David Satterfield

It is far too early to be sure, but there are some signs that diplomacy could be making some progress in ending the Tigray war.

This statement from the UN Secretary General, Antonio Guterres is worth reading with care.

The United Nations secretary-general said Wednesday he was delighted to hear “there is now a demonstrable effort to make peace” in Ethiopia after more than 14 months of war, but he gave no details.

Antonio Guterres’ statement came after a call with African Union envoy Olusegun Obasanjo following the envoy’s latest visit to Addis Ababa and the capital of Ethiopia’s embattled Tigray region.

Guterres said Obasanjo “expressed optimism that there is now a real opportunity for political and diplomatic resolution of the conflict.” His statement did not describe efforts by Ethiopia’s government and the rival Tigray forces.

Obasanjo’s spokesman, the spokeswoman for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and the Tigray forces spokesman didn’t immediately respond to questions.

A new U.S. envoy for the Horn of Africa, Ambassador David Satterfield, is set to meet with Ethiopian officials on Thursday.

David Satterfield and Assistant Secretary of State Molly Phee are at the end of a trip that took them to Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

Little has been released about their negotiations, but it could be that they have asked the Saudis to use their good offices with Eritrea and Ethiopia to try to end the war in Tigray.

Let us not forget that the Eritrea-Ethiopia peace deal was signed in Saudi Arabia in 2018.

 

At the same time there are indications that point in the opposite direction.

There are reports of yet more drone attacks on the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle and unconfirmed reports of fighting in western Tigray.

Plus belligerent remarks by the Ethiopian military:

“Finishing chapter one literally means there is chapter two. But Mekelle…Tigray is the territory of Ethiopia. No one will stop us; we will enter, we will destroy the enemy. There is nothing controversial about it,” Gen. Abebaw Tadesse, Deputy Army Chief of Staff.

HTTPS://TWITTER.COM/ADDISSTANDARD/STATUS/1484155111492440066?S=20

Will it be more war, or a chance for peace? It’s too early to know, but the waiting may soon be over.

JANUARY 20, 2022  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

“Eritrea has lost tens of thousands of its citizens in Tigray not to realise a discernible national objective but to avenge some perceived wrong that Isaias suffered at the hands of Tigrayans and validate his delusions of grandeur as a regional heavyweight.”

Source: Africa Report

Ethiopia: To achieve peace, take Eritrea out of the game

By Debretsion Gebremichael

Posted on Thursday, 20 January 2022 14:09

Abiy Ahmed tours Sawa 19 July 2020

Since its independence three decades ago, Eritrea has been involved in international conflicts, ranging from minor border skirmishes with its neighbors, such as Sudan, Djibouti and Yemen, to a full-fledged conventional war with Ethiopia. Its notoriety as a regional troublemaker had resulted in the imposition of crushing sanctions lasting several years.

While the Eritrean dictator, with an assist from Abiy Ahmed of Ethiopia, had sought to rehabilitate Eritrea’s image as a rogue state, Eritrea’s direct involvement in the war on Tigray since November 2020 and the massive human rights violations its forces committed and continue to commit have reaffirmed this well-deserved image.

Eritrea has lost tens of thousands of its citizens in Tigray not to realise a discernible national objective but to avenge some perceived wrong that Isaias suffered at the hands of Tigrayans and validate his delusions of grandeur as a regional heavyweight.

As international human rights advocates and various institutions have amply documented, the Eritrean military has committed some of the most horrific violations of the laws of armed conflict, such as the brutalisation of civilians, the deliberate destruction of civilian installations, the plundering of private and public wealth, and the use of sexual violence as a tool of war.Eritrea’s brutal military campaign in Tigray has received the blessing of the Abiy regime and that of the expansionist Amhara elites.

Despite deep, historical animus towards the Amhara, the Eritrean dictator has struck up a tactical alliance with the expansionist Amhara elites, a marriage of convenience facilitated by a convergence of interests. Isaias sees Tigray as standing in the way of his dream to run wild in Ethiopia in particular and the wider region in general; similarly, Amhara expansionist elites see Tigray as impeding the restoration of a bygone era when unitarism reigned supreme.

In Western Tigray, this rogue state’s military muscle underwrites the annexation of a constitutionally established Tigrayan territory. Eritrea also illegally occupies parts of North-Western and Eastern Tigray.

Isaias’s alliance with Abiy and the expansionist Amhara elites has two purposes. First, by lending military support to the anti-Tigray coalition within Ethiopia, Isaias seeks to marginalise and ultimately eliminate TPLF and, by extension, Tigray as a potent force in Ethiopian politics.

Isaias has been harbouring revenge fantasies against Tigray for leading the military campaign that ended his dream of becoming the dominant political and military power on the Horn of Africa and beyond.

Specifically, Isaias had been nursing grudges against Tigrayan military and security elites, which he considers to be responsible for his embarrassing defeat on the battlefield and crushing his dream of becoming a regional kingmaker. Second, he would realise his vision of destroying the multinational federal dispensation that the people of Tigray played a major role in midwifing as well as preserving it over the past 3 decades.

All in all, Isaias saw the formation of an alliance with anti-TPLF forces as critical to removing one major stumbling block to his dream of transforming Eritrea into a regional “powerhouse” and breaking up Ethiopia into a number of mutually antagonistic units.

There is a stark irony in the alliance between the expansionist Amhara elites and the Eritrean dictator. On the one hand, Amhara elites rage against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) for presumably blessing Eritrea’s independence. On the other hand, the same rapacious elites have entered into a Faustian bargain with the Eritrean dictator to eliminate a “problematic” domestic rival.

The expansionist Amhara elites have sought to degrade and ultimately destroy Ethiopia’s multinational federalism, vociferously arguing in favour of, and working towards, a unitary system. By contrast, Tigrayans are adamantly opposed to this unitarist vision. A system designed to govern a diverse polity such as ours is bound to have shortcomings.

Ethiopia’s current federal system is no exception. But discarding a fundamentally sound political framework that, nevertheless, needs some tweaking in favour of a unitary system that disregards Ethiopia’s objective conditions is not a solution conducive to long-term peace and stability. The return of a unitary system, by reversing hard-won autonomy and self-administration and self-determination rights, would intensify centrifugal challenges to the central state, in the process unleashing a paroxysm of violence on every corner of the country.

As for Abiy, his alliance with Eritrea has had less to do with “ending” the Ethio-Eritrea war and ensuring regional stability than eliminating a nettlesome domestic rival. The convergence of Abiy’s interest in maligning, scapegoating and neutralising the TPLF and Isaias’s desire to see the TPLF removed from Ethiopia’s political scene led to a marriage of convenience between the authoritarian duo. This marriage of convenience was consummated in a formal agreement to “end” the border conflict between the two countries

Rather than seeing through this transparent subterfuge, the international community awarded Abiy the Nobel Peace Prize in 2019, which he interpreted as legitimising the broad contours of his domestic and foreign policy agenda. Having received the legitimacy of international acclaim for his apparent reform agenda, Abiy Ahmed took a series of actions that ultimately developed into one giant calamity that is the genocidal war on Tigray.

The international community, perpetually in search of the next generation of prophetic leaders in Africa, ignored clear warning signs and conferred an undeserved honour on a man whose armed forces would commit some of the most heinous violations of human rights in Tigray and who invited a foreign adversary to participate in an orgy of violence against Ethiopian citizens.

With battlefield losses piling up, and his regime teetering on the brink of collapse, Abiy Ahmed took a different but tired rhetoric for a test drive. According to this narrative, the war pitted a cabal of “neocolonial” forces against Ethiopians, who had fought against colonial encroachments and won a resounding victory at Adwa.

However, Abiy never invokes Pan-Africanism as a substantive principle that has the potential to enhance solidarity among African nations and revolutionise an indigenous conflict prevention and resolution mechanism but as a buzzword designed to shield himself from critical scrutiny of his horrific record on Tigray. In fact, Abiy conflates being asked not starve and bomb his citizens into submission with assaults on “Pan-Africanism.”

Despite the Abiy regime’s shameless framing of the war in terms of a Western neocolonial project, and presenting itself as valiantly resisting this neocolonial encroachment, the fact is that only the Abiy regime has actively solicited and received the support of non-African countries to wage a genocidal war on his own people. Designed to frame the conflict as the West versus Africa, and, through such framing, enlist the support of African countries, the disingenuous propaganda does not pass muster except with those that have already made significant investments in this genocidal campaign.

In light of Eritrea’s deep involvement in the genocidal war on Tigray and the counterproductive alliance it has formed with the expansionist Amhara elites, any possibility of ending the war through a negotiated settlement goes directly through Asmara. This is so not in the sense of Isaias having a peacemaking bone in its authoritarian constitution, but because he has a tremendous capacity to play the role of a spoiler—an actor that sees peace emerging from negotiations as a threat to its power, interests, and worldview, and uses violence or the threat of it to frustrate attempts to achieve peace.

Abiy enunciates lofty ideals that, if sincerely committed to, could help us end the current conflict through dialogue. But he may find it difficult to wean himself off the fateful alliance with the expansionist Amhara elites and that of the Eritrean dictator. As long as he remains hostage to these forces, he will have little room to manoeuvre and exercise a degree of policy autonomy required to take a bold step towards peace. Accordingly, breaking up this unholy alliance is necessary, if not sufficient, to give peace a chance.

The use or threat of sanctions against Abiy and his regime can still have an impact on bringing him to the negotiating table. But absent robust measures that significantly affect the Eritrean dictator’s cost-benefit calculus, the quest for peace will prove elusive. As an experienced leader of a rogue state, the Eritrean dictator has practically authored a manual for how to navigate a treacherous international diplomatic terrain.

Only sufficiently robust actions that create disincentives for the Isaias regime against continual involvement in the Ethiopian conflict have a reasonable chance of helping bring about a peaceful resolution of the current conflict.

JANUARY 20, 2022  ETHIOPIANEWSTIGRAY

The Globe and Mail has obtained eyewitness accounts of massacres by Somali troops embedded with Eritrean forces in Tigray in the early months of the war. The new evidence raises disturbing questions about a covert military alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia that has inflicted death and destruction on the rebellious Tigray region in northern Ethiopia.

Gebretsadik, a 52-year-old farmer from the village of Zebangedena in northwestern Tigray, said the dusty roads of his village were strewn with the bodies of decapitated clergymen in December, 2020, a few weeks after the beginning of the war.
Some of the priests and monks were people he recognized. Somali soldiers, working alongside Eritrean forces who had captured the village, had targeted churches and killed the clergymen, he said.
“They slaughtered them like chickens,” he told The Globe.

Source: Globe and Mail

LUCY KASSA
SPECIAL TO THE GLOBE AND MAIL
Villagers return from a market to Yechila town in south central Tigray walking past scores of burned vehicles, in Tigray, Ethiopia, July 10, 2021.GIULIA PARAVICINI/REUTERS
New revelations about atrocities by Somali soldiers in Ethiopia’s Tigray war are casting a spotlight on an emerging military alliance that has reshaped the Horn of Africa, weakening Western influence in a strategically important region.
The Globe and Mail has obtained eyewitness accounts of massacres by Somali troops embedded with Eritrean forces in Tigray in the early months of the war. The new evidence raises disturbing questions about a covert military alliance between Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia that has inflicted death and destruction on the rebellious Tigray region in northern Ethiopia.
Officially, the three governments have denied any alliance, and Somalia has denied that its troops were deployed in Tigray. But The Globe’s investigation has provided, for the first time, extensive details of civilian killings committed by Somali soldiers allied with Eritrean forces in the region.
Gebretsadik, a 52-year-old farmer from the village of Zebangedena in northwestern Tigray, said the dusty roads of his village were strewn with the bodies of decapitated clergymen in December, 2020, a few weeks after the beginning of the war.
Some of the priests and monks were people he recognized. Somali soldiers, working alongside Eritrean forces who had captured the village, had targeted churches and killed the clergymen, he said.
“They slaughtered them like chickens,” he told The Globe.
The Somali and Eritrean troops stayed in the village until late February, according to Gebretsadik, who often fled to the bushes and mountains around the village to escape attacks during that time.
The Globe talked to dozens of survivors who had witnessed atrocities in six Tigrayan villages where Somali troops had been stationed between early December, 2020 and late February, 2021. The Globe is not publishing their full names or their current locations because their lives could be in danger.
The survivors said the Somali troops were wearing Eritrean military uniforms, but they were clearly identifiable as Somali because of their language and their physical appearance. Unlike the Eritreans, they could not speak any Tigrinya, the language spoken in Tigray and much of Eritrea. The witnesses said they also heard the Eritrean troops referring to them as Somalis.
Last year, United Nations and U.S. officials said they had received information that Somali troops were present in Tigray, but few details were known. Somali parents held several protests in Mogadishu and other places in Somalia last year, complaining that their sons had been ordered to fight in Tigray after being originally sent to Eritrea for military training. Hundreds of Somali soldiers were reportedly killed in the fighting.
Up to 10,000 Somali troops were deployed in Tigray, according to current and former Ethiopian officials who spoke to The Globe. The Globe is not identifying the individuals because they face the threat of reprisals for their comments.
Until now, few details were known about the activities of the Somalis in Tigray. But the survivors told The Globe that the Somali troops had massacred hundreds of civilians in villages controlled by the Eritrean military, often beheading them. No Ethiopian troops were present in the villages, they said.
“They showed no mercy,” said Berket, a 32-year-old farmer in the Tigrayan village of Mai Harmaz. “The Eritreans interrogate you before they kill you. But the Somali troops were full of contempt for that.”
One of his neighbours, a 76-year-old priest, was among those killed by the Somali troops, he said.
Kibrom, a 37-year-old man who fled the village of Hamlo in January, said the beheadings by Somali troops became an “everyday reality” in his village.
“The churches were inhabited by the troops,” he said. “They burned the holy books and sacred objects. Churches became the most unsafe places. Villagers stopped going to churches because the Somali troops would kill anyone they found in churches.”
According to former Ethiopian officials, most of the Somali troops crossed the border from Eritrea into western Tigray in the early weeks of the war. They said the Somali troops, under the command of the Eritrean army, had already been stationed in trenches near the border before the war began.
“They undoubtedly have participated in the war,” said Gebremeskel Kassa, who was chief of staff in the interim administration in Tigray that the Ethiopian government appointed after seizing control of the region in the early months of the war. He later fled abroad, fearing for his safety when Ethiopian officials criticized him for Tigrayan military gains in the region.
Mr. Gebremeskel said he knew about the Somali deployment from his travels in Tigray and his private meetings with top Ethiopian officials and military generals.
“All of us who were top officials had knowledge of that,” he told The Globe. “The Somali troops took training in the Eritrean camp of Sawa as a result of a military deal between the three governments before the war started.”
When the deployment became politically controversial in Somalia, especially after the protests by the parents and questions by parliamentarians, the Somali soldiers were sent back to Eritrea, he said. They completed their withdrawal by March, the officials said.
The unofficial military alliance among Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, which is believed to date back to secret agreements after Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in Ethiopia in 2018, is a further blow to the declining influence of Western governments in the Horn of Africa.
Eritrea had already been long isolated on the international stage, but Ethiopia and Somalia had close relations with the United States and other Western governments in the past. Ethiopia’s relations with the West have deteriorated since the Tigray war began, largely as a result of Western pressure to halt the war.
Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki, the authoritarian ruler of his country for nearly three decades, is a key player in the three-country alliance. “He sees this as an opportunity to reshape the whole of the Horn of Africa in his direction,” said Martin Plaut, a British-based Eritrea expert and commentator.
“Getting these Somali troops involved was just the first instalment of this much longer, much more important relationship that he was trying to build in which he would be the king, with allies both in Somalia and Ethiopia,” Mr. Plaut told The Globe.
“He has pursued his ambition of destroying the Tigrayans since the 1970s. To achieve his ends, he would like to establish a transnational relationship in the Horn that allows the individual states to exist, but to support each other, while crushing local movements.”
With a report by Geoffrey York in Johannesburg

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