Source: the Conversation

July 22, 2019 3.31pm BST

Post-doctoral researcher, University of Trento

Disclosure statement

An Eritrean migrant leaves a detention facility near Nitzana in the Negev Desert in Israel, near border with Egypt. EPA-EFE/Jim Hollander

Isaias was 16 when he escaped from Sa’wa, the military training camp for final-year high school students in Eritrea. His parents came to know of his whereabouts only a few weeks after. From Sudan he tried to cross the Sinai to reach Israel. But he was kidnapped by bandits. His family paid a high ransom to save him.

Isaias returned to Addis Ababa, the capital of neighbouring Ethiopia, where I met him when he was 17. His family was supporting him financially and wanted him to remain there. But Isaias had different plans. A few months later he disappeared. As I was later to learn, he had successfully crossed from Libya into Europe.

This young man is part of a worrying statistic. Since around 2010, the flow of unaccompanied minors from Eritrea has significantly increased and has become the subject of international concern. In 2015, over 5000 unaccompanied minors from Eritrea sought asylum in Europe according to the Mixed Migration Centre. In 2018, the number was 3500.

Minors are only part of a wider exodus that involves mostly Eritreans in their twenties and thirties. The UN refugee agency calculates that at the end of 2018 there were over 500 000 Eritrean refugees worldwide – a high number for a country of around 5 million people.

Initially driven by a simmering border conflict with Ethiopia, this mass migration continues to be fuelled by a lack of political, religious and social freedom. In addition, there are little economic prospects in the country.

And generations of young people have been trapped in a indefinite mandatory national service. They serve in the army or in schools, hospitals and public offices, irrespective of their aspirations, with little remuneration. Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea have struck a deal to end their border conflict, there is no debate over the indefinite nature of the national service.

Brought up in a context where migration represents the main route out of generational and socio-economic immobility, most young Eritreans I met decided to leave. While unaccompanied minors are usually depicted as passively accepting their families’ decisions, my research illustrates their active role in choosing whether and when to migrate.

I explored the negotiations that take place between young migrants and their families as they consider departing and undertaking arduous journeys. But the crucial role of agency shouldn’t be equated to a lack of vulnerability. Vulnerability, in fact, defines their condition as young people in Eritrea and is likely to grow due to the hardships of the journey.

Context of protracted crisis

Young Eritreans often migrate without their family’s approval.

Families are aware that the country can’t offer their children a future. Nevertheless, parents are reticent about encouraging their children to take a risky path, a decision that can lead to death at sea or at the hand of bandits.

Young Eritreans keep their plans secret due to respect, or emotional care, towards their families. One 23-year-old woman who had crossed to Ethiopia a year before told me:

It is better not to make them worry for nothing: if you make it, then they can be happy for you; if you don’t make it, they will have time to be sad afterwards.

Adonay, another 26-year-old man, said:

If you tell them they might tell you not to do it, and then it would be harder to disobey. If they endorse your decision then they might feel responsible if something bad happens to you. It should be only your choice.

But that is not all. As a young woman told me,

The less they know the better it is in case the police come to the house asking questions about the flight.

Migration from Eritrea is mostly illegal and tightly controlled by the government, any connivance could be punished with fees or incarceration.

The journey

Eritrean border crossings are based on complicated power dynamics involving smugglers, smuggled refugees and their paying relatives, generally residing in Europe, US or the Middle East.

In this mix, smuggled refugees are far from being choice-less or the weak party.

Relatives are often scared of the dangers of border crossing through Libya to Europe. Moreover, some may not be able to mobilise the necessary funds. But young refugees have their ways to persuade them.

As payment to smugglers is typically made at the end in Libya and then after migrants have reached Italy, refugees embark on these journeys without telling their potential financial supporters in the diaspora. Once in Libya, they provide the smugglers with the telephone number of those who are expected to pay. This is an extremely risky gamble as migrants are betting on their relatives’ resources and willingness to help them.

Those who do not have close enough relatives abroad cannot gamble at all. Sometimes relatives struggle to raise the necessary amount and have to collect money from friends and larger community networks. Migrants then have to spend more time – and at times experience more violence and deprivation – in the warehouses where smugglers keep them in Libya. Migrants are held to hide them from authorities and ensure their fees are paid.

Even in these conditions, migrants don’t necessarily give up their agency. It has been argued that they,

temporarily surrender control at points during the journey, accepting momentary disempowerment to achieve larger strategic goals.

Moving beyond the common framing

Analysing the interactions between Eritrean families and their migrant children at different stages of their journeys can contribute to moving beyond the common framing of the “unaccompanied minor” characterised by an ambivalent depiction as either the victim or the bogus migrant.

These opposing and binary views of unaccompanied minors implicitly link deserving protection with ultimate victimhood devoid of choice. Instead, the stories of Eritreans show that vulnerability, at the outset and during the journey, does not exclude agency.

Source=https://eritreahub.org/i-asked-young-eritreans-why-they-risk-migration-this-is-what-they-told-me

  The Process of Democratization in Eritrea

Tuesday, 03 September 2019 17:45 Written by

The purpose of this article to problematize the current conceptions about the process of democratization in Eritrea. 

The process of democratization has two phases,

  1. The first aim is removal of the dictatorship and its roots from the ground.
  2. The second is to build a democratic society, thus transitional period.

 Most of the Eritrean Forces for democratic change focus only to the removal but the most hard and conflict ridden is the second stage after the removal of the dictatorship.

As some findings of studies confirmed that the outcome of the wave of democratization varied from,

  • genuine transformations and relative success,
  • Halted transitions,
  • backslides to authoritarianism,
  • military coups,
  • state disintegration like that of Libya and Yemen outbreak of armed conflicts after the fall of dictatorship.

The Eritrean Forces for democratic change must have a strategy avoiding intra-state conflict after the fall of dictatorship in Eritrea.

Today’s most pertinent question is not only removing the dictatorship but post dictatorship-transformation and state building.

Eritrean researchers, politicians and policy- makers should focus more on this issue. In this article, I will try to address some weaknesses of the Eritrean forces for democratic change.

  • Lack of skills and knowledge to build a powerful democratic opposition.
  • The presence of internal conflicts ( ethnic, religious and regional) personal rivalries and hostilities( agazian, Tigray-Tigrinyi politics) these opinions are disrupting  the operation of the forces for freedom.
  • Lack of a wise grand strategic plan for liberating the oppressed population and laying ground for durable democracy.
  • Lack of creating strong civil society movements both in diaspora and at home.
  • Lack of not standing upon your own determination by standing together and strengthening by uniting your efforts together.

The Eritrean opposition to win the dictatorship in Eritrea must be self-reliant force with wise strategy, disciplined and courageous looking forward towards genuine transformation that accommodates all Eritreans with different elements of identity. Eritrea is a country of diverse identities.

Democracy building requires a method of resolving societal conflicts in a non-violent manner, the route to it, that is, the process of democratization, is a revolutionary and conflict – generating process. This is because it involves dramatic changes. These changes include new methods of deciding who is to have political power, new methods for exercising political power and often, and as consequence, new balances of power sharing. It will be very difficult to build a democratic a system after the fall of the totalitarian regime in Eritrea with the attitude of chauvinists and ethnic nationalists dominating the Eritrean opposition in diaspora.

Let us change the old-age political culture of divisions and cross border relations, like that of today’s Agazian  and Tigray Tigrinyi discarding the Eritrean National identity. God/ Allah save the Oppressed people of Eritrea from these chauvinists who never have peace in themselves and with others.

                   

Since the Enough/Yi’akil campaign was launched about seven months ago, the campaign has garnered support from Eritreans across the world, including from inside Eritrea. The campaign is a grassroots public movement that has no affiliation with established opposition political parties or groups. The campaign is aimed at bringing about peace, justice and democracy in Eritrea by mobilizing and uniting the Eritrean public at home and abroad to participate in national politics and to speak up for their rights and freedom. For the first time in history, the movement has succeeded in breaking the silence and the cycle of fear of speaking up against the dictatorial regime in Eritrea. Tens of thousands of ordinary Eritreans from all walks of life, at home and abroad, are voicing their support for the enough campaign and calling for justice and democracy in Eritrea openly on social media.

As the Enough/Yi’akil campaign has gone viral on social media, it has enlightened the first generation of Eritreans born abroad. It has also raised their awareness about the political situation in Eritrea. Besides it has galvanized them to join the movement for justice and democracy in their ancestral country. The campaign has also sent shockwaves through the political nerves of the regime in Asmara. That is why during his interview on the occasion of Sawa’s 25th anniversary president Esayas Afeworki tried to downplay the Enough/Yi’akil campaign by labeling the movement as a group of disgruntled people from one region.

Even though it has scored unprecedented success in stimulating tens of thousands of Eritreans, including the silent majority and some former supporters of PFDJ, to call for political change in Eritrea, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign has also had its ups and downs. In grassroots campaigns such as the Enough/Yi’akil campaign, maintaining the momentum can be challenging. Promoting increased public participation needed to make a difference and to bring about political and social change in society is even harder. While the Enough/Yi’akil campaign is still alive, it seems the movement is losing its original zest. The movement’s leadership has been criticized for lack of inclusiveness and participation by all sections of the Eritrean society and implicated for regionalism and lack of transparency. The campaign is still young, and it is expected to face opposition from certain elements of the society and the regime in Eritrea. Moreover, the movement is still very loose and less organized. Its organizers/leaders also voice conflicting ideas about how to go forward. Having said that, the campaign has to find a way to keep its unprecedented momentum and overcome the challenges it has been facing so that to stay as a viable force for political change in Eritrea. One may ask about what can be done to build on the original momentum, gain the support of the majority of the public and succeed in bringing about justice and democracy in Eritrea? My recommendations are as follows:

1.Keep the Enough/Yi’akil campaign as public/mass movement

Unlike the other Eritrean opposition groups/political parties that have been working for political change in Eritrea, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign is a grassroots popular activism initiated by ordinary individuals who are passionate about political and social change in Eritrea. This popular activism has spread as a virus and managed to mobilize the public to drive the political change in Eritrea from the bottom-up. The cause of the Enough/Yiakil campaign is very personal for each and every Eritrean. As such, the campaign must maintain its nature as a popular campaign free from influence by specific political ideologies or political groupings. The movement will lose its popular support and fail to unite the majority of the Eritrea people if it is influenced by or takes sides with political parties/groupings. The Eritrean opposition parties & political organizations must not try to politicize and influence the Enough/Yi’akil campaign. Instead, they have to join this popular campaign as ordinary citizens and contribute their part in bringing about political change, justice and democracy in Eritrea. That doesn't mean to undermine the role of the opposition parties/groups & political organizations. The cause of those opposition parties and the Enough/Yi’akil campaign is the same. As such, the members of those opposition parties/groups can support the Enough/Yi’akil campaign as concerned individuals while they also continue their work for political change in Eritrea with their respective political parties/groups.

  1. Raise public awareness

Education and information are the backbone of any grassroots mass movement as people cannot participate in the movement if they do not have enough knowledge and awareness about it. Therefore, for the Enough/Yi’akil campaign to be successful it is imperative to raise awareness of the Eritreans in diaspora, especially the silent majority, about the dire political situation in Eritrea and the urgency for justice and democracy in the country. Eritrea is at a breaking point, and all Eritreans need to be informed about it and encouraged to participate to save their country from the brink of total breakdown. In particular, the campaign has to communicate effectively with those Eritreans who were born aboard because this generation lacks a deep understanding about the real political and social crisis in Eritrea. That is why many of them support the regime in Eritrea as members of YPFDJ. These young people should not be alienated and belittled just because they support the regime. Instead, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign has to try to reach out to them, raise their awareness and educate them about what is really happening back home. If majority of these young people join the Enough/Yi’akil campaign, it would be a big blow to the morale of the regime in Eritrea. Because they are well educated, they can also be a formidable force for change in Eritrea through advocacy and raising awareness about the political situation in Eritrea in their respective countries.

The Enough/Yi’akil campaign must strive to increase political maturity of its members, particularly the youth, by providing political and civic education programs through the use of social media and other communication avenues. Political change in Eritrea does not come by insulting the regime and its supports on social media. This is a war of political ideas that requires political maturity and enlightenment. In addition, the Enough/Yiakil campaign must effectively use all available social media outlets and other communication avenues to disseminate its message and to broaden its level of visibility so that to garner more public support. Unless the campaign is able to raise public awareness about the political situation in Eritrea, attract more public support, wins the hearts and minds of all Eritreans at home and abroad, including the supporters of the regime, through effective use of mass media and strong political campaign, the movement may not go far.

  1. Focus on diversity of ideas

In some regions of the world, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign has been criticized for not being inclusive, and lack of regional, ethnic and religious diversity. Diverse Eritrean communities must add their support to the campaign because diversity in religion, region, and ethnicity adds strength to the movement. But that kind of diversity must not be a sole requirement for participation in the campaign because it could lead to division within the movement. Previous movements for change in Eritrea such as Simer and Simret failed because of regionalism and internal divisions. The Enough/Yi’akil campaign must avoid mistakes made by its predecessors. Albert Einstein once said, “the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again but expecting different results.” If the Enough/Yi’akil campaign repeats same mistakes as its predecessors, it shouldn’t expect different results. It has to avoid regionalism, ethnic and religious divisions at any cost.

The most important diversity that the Enough/Yi’akil campaign should focus on is diversity in ideas. Diversity in ideas is a prerequisite for democracy. A movement with diverse ideas grows and achieves political unity. Plato, a Greek political philosopher, in his renowned work the Republic said, “Political unity is the greatest good for a city-state/society and political disunity is the greatest evil.” Political unity is a source of power and disunity is a source of weakness and failure. As such, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign must promote unity in diversity among all Eritreans. If the campaign manages to foster diversity in ideas and political unity, it will ultimately achieve its goal of bringing peace, justice and democracy in Eritrea.

  1. Have a clear political roadmap

The Enough/Yi’akil campaign is saying enough to the dictatorship and lack of rule of law in Eritrea. The campaign is calling for regime change and demise of the PFDJ political ideology. Yes, the campaign is calling for justice and democracy in Eritrea, but does it have a clear political alternative and political roadmap on how to achieve that goal from abroad? Does the campaign have a plan on how to spread its tentacles in Eritrea? What will the transitional period look like after regime change? What will be the role of the opposition political parties/groups? …and so forth. Ultimately, the success of the Enough/Yi’akil campaign lies with having a clear roadmap for political change in Eritrea. The campaign needs to involve professionals and experts who can draft a clear political roadmap for the movement. It has to have an operational guidelines/bylaws and political agenda. In addition, the different regional campaigns need to elect pragmatic and servant leaders who can form single international leadership and unite the campaign internationally. It seems a daunting task, but with conviction and commitment it is achievable. The servant leaders have to be democratic and accountable to their people. They must have transparency in all their activities and decisions.

  1. Effective advocacy and diplomacy

We are in the age of advocacy and diplomacy. Advocacy is a hidden power that works from behind the scenes to influence the people in position of political power to help with a cause of people to make their voices heard in the halls of governments and venues of mass media. For this reason, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign needs to work hard in the field of advocacy and diplomacy so that to attract attention of governments and influential people who can put pressure on the regime in Asmara. The campaign leadership has to identify people who have the expertise to lobby foreign governments, people in power, and influential people like celebrities to advocate for the cause of Eritrean people in their respective countries. For example, some activists of the Enough/Yi’akil campaign met with Congressman Joe Neguse, the U.S. House of Representative from Colorado and discussed ways he could help and advocate for justice and democracy in Eritrea. This is a commendable work and it should be replicated in other regions and countries. If such influential people speak up about the cause of the Enough/Yi’akil campaign, they can attract the attention of the local/international media and can influence the policies of their governments toward Eritrea.

Conclusion

In a nutshell, the Enough/Yi’akil campaign has achieved tremendous success in its short life time. The campaign succeeded in breaking the silence and fear of speaking up against the regime in Eritrea among tens of thousands of Eritrea. The campaign has given hope for Eritreans at home and abroad that political change and democracy may be coming in Eritrea. Yet, the campaign has a long way to go.  Unless the Enough/Yi’akil campaign wins the hearts and minds of the majority at home and abroad, organizes itself as a formidable force for change that has a clear political roadmap, influences people in the position of power who can support the campaign from inside of the political system in Eritrea, and be able to replicate the campaign at home, it can be difficult for the popular movement to make real progress towards political change and democracy in Eritrea.

Having said that, I want to leave you with food for thought. The campaign is calling for a total regime change. That is plan A. However, for a regime change you need resources, easy access to the target country, and young people who can be force for political change at home. Unfortunately, majority of the energetic young people who can initiate and lead the political change in Eritrea have either left the country, some are imprisoned, or others are in the military. In addition, there is no access to social media in Eritrea capable of organizing campaigns or demonstration effectively. In the worst-case scenario, what if the struggle for political change prolongs? What if life in Eritrea becomes even harder to bear worse than what it is now? What if Eritrea reaches at the brink of being a failed state? Do the Enough/Yi’akil campaign and the opposition groups/political parties have plan B or any other alternative political solution?  I will leave the answer to the readers.

Information about the author

Nuredin Netabay has BA in Political Science and MA in International Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution.  

 

August 31, 2019 News

Source: Jerusalem Post

Hopes ran high when Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Instead, it has become not only one of the poorest countries on Earth

By ATHANASIUS GHEBRE-AB, Yosef I. Abramowitz
August 29, 2019 23:33

 

 
 
 
eritrea jews
 
 
 

He is known by his people as His Holiness Abune Antonios. The 94-year-old prelate is the patriarch of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and has been imprisoned by Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki for the past 13 years. Last month in the Oval Office, US President Donald Trump was told of his suffering as part of a conference on religious persecution. Here is the story of his people’s enslavement, brutal suffering and fear, fully sanctioned by the international community.

Hopes ran high when Eritrea won its independence from Ethiopia in 1993. Instead, Eritrea has become not only one of the poorest countries on Earth, but labeled the “North Korea of Africa,” one of the most hostile and repressive regimes toward all religions.

Despite the enslavement by the military of about one in every 15 citizens with indefinite military service – which the UN described as “crimes against humanity” – last year the United Nations Security Council unbelievably lifted biting sanctions against Eritrea and its leadership. This was despite there being no improvement in Eritrea’s human rights record and without it releasing Antonios and thousands of religious prisoners. Christian leaders are imprisoned and tortured in Eritrea, and yet the Trump administration did not use its veto in the UN Security Council to pressure for their release. This can be corrected by the president immediately through an executive order freezing the assets of President Afwerki and his ruthless generals until these faith leaders and people of faith across the entire spectrum are freed.

The premature lifting of the UN sanctions last year was prompted by misplaced optimism after Eritrea and Ethiopia signed a peace agreement after 20 years of bloody war and hostilities. The state of war with Ethiopia was the pretext for lifetime forced conscription of its citizens. The treaty has been signed now for over a year, yet conscription has not been scaled back to its original 18-month limitation. Eritrea’s human rights record is actually deteriorating while its international standing, and the personal fortunes of its leader and his generals, are improving.

Indeed, the government has taken over the Eritrean Orthodox Church and is now run by dictates of the country’s national security agency and the Department of Religious Affairs, an arm of the government. Many of the leading lights of the Eritrean Orthodox Church and any clergy deemed to sympathize with the imprisoned patriarch have been languishing in prison, some since 2014.
Recently, with a tidal wave of support to the imprisoned patriarch, priests, monks and deacons, including five monks from the historic monastery of Debre Bizen, have been rounded up and imprisoned.

Earlier this summer, the military closed down 22 Roman Catholic medical centers. It had already closed down the only Catholic seminary, and is gunning next for the schools and nurseries, many in the least developed regions of the country. Indeed, a staggering two-thirds of the people live below the poverty line, largely because of government repression, incompetence, under-investment in the agricultural sector, enslavement for state purposes of working-age men and women, and a culture of fear that stymies any entrepreneurship.

And due to the complicity of the international community in allowing the widespread arrests, religious repression and state-sponsored slavery, Western nations have already absorbed hundreds of thousands of Eritrean asylum-seekers, and there will be many more. President Trump can only turn off the refugee tap from Eritrea to the United States and our Western allies by fixing the piping at the source, which can be achieved by organizing with our allies the freezing of the assets of Eritrea’s leaders and demanding the release of the religious leaders.
Meanwhile, the dictator’s personal fortunes have improved, with his assets unfrozen by the UN and now greater international investment in the country’s mining sector, which benefits from state-sponsored slave labor.

The prime minister of Ethiopia has released thousands of political prisoners and journalists in the past year, and Eritrea should follow with a grand gesture by September 12, the Geez New Year.

Otherwise, the US should lead the international community on freezing the assets of President Afwerki and his generals until the influential patriarch, His Holiness Abune Antonios, and the other religious and political prisoners, are released; state-sponsored slavery eliminated; and the military conscription reduced to back to its original 18 months. Let’s bring Patriarch Antonios to the Oval Office by the Geez New Year for a photo with President Trump, rather than just sympathetically hear his case and have it disappear, like the tens of thousands of prisoners in the country’s jails. And then let’s welcome him to the Holy Land on pilgrimage.

Fr. Athanasius Ghebre-Ab, PhD, is professor of history at the University of Cincinnati and a parish priest in the Eritrean Orthodox Church. Yosef I. Abramowitz is a green-energy impact investor in Africa and can be followed @Kaptainsunshine.

Liberty Magazine Issue No. 58

Saturday, 31 August 2019 11:37 Written by

Bi-Monthly English Organ of the Eritrean People’ s Democratic Party - EPDP

Picture showing the burning houses in the Nuba neighbourhood in Port Sudan on 21 August 2019 (ST photo)
August 28, 2019( KHARTOUM) - The streets of Port Sudan were calm on Wednesday after the resumption of intercommunal clashes on Tuesday evening in some residential area of the Red Sea coastal town.

The city has been the scene of days of fighting during which firearms and white arms were used in ethnic violence. Last week the intercommunal clashes lasted from Thursday until Saturday evening.

Sudanese authorities, on Tuesday, sent for the second time additional military reinforcements from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to the eastern Sudan city to control the security situation an put an end to the clashes between the Beni Amer and Nuba residents.

Eyewitnesses told "Sudan Tribune" that calm returned to the city on Wednesday, after a night of tension in the town as a result of renewed skirmishes between the two parties on Tuesday evening.

They confirmed that the burning of houses - free of residents - on Tuesday evening affected several houses in the neighbourhoods of Riyadh, Dar Al-Naeem and the Al-Mattar.

On the other hand, security sources confirmed the arrival of RSF troops to be deployed in the troubled areas to establish security.

The Central Committee of Sudan doctors (CCSD) announced on Monday that the clashes of Port Sudan left 37 dead and dozens of injuries.

The report said that the hospital emergency departments in Port Sudan received 126 injuries ranging from mild to moderate, and the critical injuries requiring surgical intervention were transferred to Osman Dagna Hospital.

The Red Sea Governor, Major General Essam Abdel Farraj, and the State Director of the Intelligence Service have been relieved by the Sovereign Council on Sunday after their failure to control the crisis.

(ST)

Source=http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article68023

 
August 25, 2019 Topic: Security Region: Americas Tags: MilitaryWarStrategyNational SecurityDefense Department

The United States need not leave Djibouti, but it is time to consider a Plan B for otherwise a single whisper from Beijing to Djibouti’s president could cripple America’s ability to defend itself and its allies.

by Michael Rubin
 
BERBERA, SOMALILAND—Djibouti’s role in U.S. national security has for decades been inversely proportional to its size. The tiny East African country has long been a logistical hub for the U.S. military. Its airfield helped supply U.S. forces in Somalia in the early 1990s, and U.S. Navy vessels visited its port frequently. Because Djibouti—a French colony or territory for nearly a century before its 1977 independence—hosted French forces, the U.S. military could utilize the French infrastructure when necessary.
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The real import of Djibouti to U.S. security calculations, however, came after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when the George W. Bush administration formed Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) first to coordinate and conduct regional stability operations and then to oversee counterterrorism operations in both Yemen and across the broader region. The Obama administration’s growing reliance on drone strikes—many of which it launched from Djibouti—only increased the country’s importance. Since formally arriving, the Pentagon has invested several billion dollars in Camp Lemonnier, today the largest U.S. military base in Africa and the keystone of U.S. Africa Command operations, hosting four thousand soldiers, sailors, and Marines spread over five hundred acres.
The United States, of course, has not been alone in recognizing Djibouti’s strategic position. The French initially carved what now is Djibouti out from greater Somalia because of its position and harbor. The British had established a coaling station in Aden to support the United Kingdom’s military and commercial interests in East Africa and the Indian Ocean. Djibouti—with a natural harbor just 150 miles away from Aden—served much the same purpose as the French sought to keep Madagascar, Mauritius, and other regional interests secure. The Suez Canal, of course, made the Bab-el-Mandab chokepoint adjacent to the country even more important. Over the decades, technology may have changed by Djibouti’s strategic position did not. Today, in addition to the United States, France maintains a presence and hosts German and Spanish troops at its base. Italy and Japan also have facilities, and both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates also rent space. China, meanwhile, has built a major new base in the country as it expands its interests in the Indian Ocean basin and Africa. Iran has, in the past, also sought to make inroads but was forced out because of U.S. and Western pressure.

What goes around comes around, however. To date, China has tolerated the presence of its geopolitical competitors in Djibouti, and the Djiboutian government has been happy to leverage its location to collect rents from as many outside powers as possible. But, not every investor in Djibouti is equal. China has financed a water pipeline for Djibouti, as well as a railroad to Addis Ababa, the capital of Ethiopia. While U.S. aid to Djibouti peaked at $31 million in 2017, a Chinese company signed a preliminary $4 billion natural gas deal with Djibouti that same year.

That aid disparity might be enough to tip the scales toward deference to Beijing’s interests, but Djibouti’s corruption makes a tilt toward China—should Chinese authorities demand it—more likely. Djibouti has had only two leaders since its independence—Hassan Gouled Aptidon ruled the country with an iron fist for the first 22 years after its independence. Upon his death, his nephew and handpicked successor Ismaïl Omar Guelleh took over, and has run the country ever since. Corruption remains a major problem in the country, with few deals able to proceeds without Guelleh or his relatives personally benefiting, if not in bribes then in business contracts which any Western country would consider a conflict of interest.

It seems, however, the Trump administration like the Obama administration before it remains in a state of denial. The Pentagon has invested so much money into its Djibouti facilities that it is hard to imagine let alone justify to Congress that those funds were in effect wasted. Inertia also remains a problem. For more than a decade, diplomats and the Defense Department turned a blind eye to the reality of Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for fear that to acknowledge reality would mean recognizing the vulnerability of the U.S. presence at Incirlik Air Base. The Pentagon likewise continues to treat its facilities at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar as a get-out-of-jail-free card for Qatari terror sponsorship for fear that holding Doha to account would risk U.S. access.

With time, however, U.S. military planners expanded U.S. access to facilities in Romania and Bulgaria, as well as northern Jordan in order to offset reliance on an increasingly erratic Erdoğan. While the Pentagon continues to double down on Qatar, nearby Bahrain could provide an alternative. Not only does it host the U.S. Fifth Fleet but, during Operation Desert Storm, Bahrain’s Isa Air Base hosted four times more American planes that Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base does now.

With China able to out leverage the United States in Djibouti at any time, it behooves the Trump administration to find an alternative to Djibouti now. Ethiopia is no recourse, both because it has no port and because Chinese investment and trade likewise ties it far more to Asia than to the West. Eritrea hosts a United Arab Emirates port and may cooperate with Israel as well, but an uncertain political transition, poor facilities, and a horrendous human rights situation make a U.S. presence untenable. Somaliland, however, could be an alternative. Its main port, Berbera, hosts one of the longest airstrips in Africa. During the Cold War, the United States maintained a military presence and, as one official in Berbera quipped during a recent trip, NASA’s contract for facilities on the airfield technically remains valid and so they could return “tomorrow.” While the United Arab Emirates is building a base, Somaliland authorities remain frustrated at the opacity of the UAE contract (signed with a previous government) which, 

regardless, is not exclusive. Berbera is a deep-water port able to accommodate most U.S. ships.

Most importantly, Somaliland authorities want the United States there. As China and Russia both make approaches to Somaliland, the democratically elected, Western-leaning Somaliland government has been holding out for the United States, although it cannot do so indefinitely. The problem to date has been the State Department. Somaliland has been functionally independent since 1991, when it revoked its union with Somaliland and reclaimed its 1960 independence. While the United States recognized Somaliland then, the State Department now pursues a bizarre and expensive one-Somalia policy, effectively cutting off direct dealings with Somaliland for fear that interaction with Somaliland might anger Mogadishu, whose government cannot even control its own capital city. This deference is ridiculous on many levels, both because the Somali government in Mogadishu is more theoretical than real in its ability to control and govern, has recently deferred to China itself, has flirted with terrorism and, last but not least, is neither equal to Washington nor should it defer its national interests to Mogadishu.

Rather than risk American security and interests, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Assistant Secretary of State Tibor P. Nagy, Jr., and U.S. Ambassador to Somalia Donald Yamamoto should recognize that military ties have never equated to formal diplomatic recognition: Just ask Syrian Kurds, Iraqi Kurds, or Taiwan. In both the Middle East and East Asia, however, a generation of officials recognized that they should prioritize American security and defense above more mundane and tendentious concerns.

Putting all America’s eggs in one basket—and an increasingly shaky one at that—is not a strategy to protect America’s interests in the fight against terrorism, Iranian proxy groups, Al Qaeda affiliates and the Islamic State. The United States need not leave Djibouti, but it is time to consider a Plan B for otherwise a single whisper from Beijing to Djibouti’s president could cripple America’s ability to defend itself and its allies.

Michael Rubin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute.

Source=https://nationalinterest.org/feature/it’s-time-pentagon-finds-alternative-djibouti-75966

EPDP 2019 - A Short Profile

Thursday, 22 August 2019 22:44 Written by

The 3rd and Unity Congress of Eritrean People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) and the Eritrean National Salvation/Hidri, convened between 29 July and 1 August 2019 in Wiesbaden, Germany, adopted political documents which, inter alia, agreed to continue calling the unified party as EPDP.

August 21, 2019 News

Source: Somali Affairs

Eritrea reportedly training secret Somali force

 

The Federal Government of Somalia transported 200 young men from the Aden Ade International Airport in Mogadishu to Eritrea yesterday morning.

The information received by Somaliaffairs says that the youth were part of 600 young men the government had been gathering in Shirbow in the past few days.

The plan is to have these young men, when they return from Eritrea, to secretly operate in Mogadishu and replace the (Shield and Spear) Force.

Their training in Eritrea is being kept secret but they will replace the existing force for heavy operations.

Security experts we asked about this issue say the development carries great risk for the country’s security, especially in Mogadishu, and that an already existing force is being destroyed.

Source=https://eritreahub.org/eritrea-is-secretly-training-somali-forces-report

 ዙር ፈንቅል + ይ ኣክል +  ሳዋ ኣይንወርድን + ቀዳሞት ተቃለስቲ ንደሞክራስያዊ ለውጢ= ኤርትራ

 The Eritrean conflict is intra-state conflict originating from early statehood and now after liberation in organizing state and governance. The Eritrean post- liberation state organization process was an exclusive not accommodating the Eritrean diversity. Eritrea today is ruled by a coterie political elites of the same interest preventing others from joining.

 The internal conflict is identity- based on differences of ethnics and combined by unjust policies political, economic, social and cultural rights. Most conflicts of the world today are intra-state conflicts much less amenable and emotionally charged by Eritrean political elites.

 This article will try to illustrate some tools for conflict management inside the opposition forces for democratic change.    

ኤርትራዊ ሓይልታት ንደሞክራስያዊ ለውጢ ኣብ ኤርትራ                                                                                                                                                  

The Eritrean democratization process is still in its initial phase or is only at its rhetorical stage. After more than ten years’ the outcome of these waves of accusations and blames led to more disintegration in the camp of the Eritrean opposition forces for democratic change.

Conflicts are escalating between different personalities and clientelist politics both inside the political and civic organizations. The Eritrean forces for democratic change are in uncertain and conflict-prone unable to work within the current situation and prepare for the future.

How can we descalate these conflict –prone attitudes? How can the Eritrean forces for democratic change build trust by joining their efforts? This article will argue on some approaches that can help us come together and reunite our efforts in the following fields:

- political approaches

- diplomatic relations

- popular mobilisation

- media

- economy

How can the opposition manage joint political affairs

The historical circumstances behind the renaissance of most of the Eritrean opposition organizations makes them closely related to their  respective old programs, and even a large number of the opposition leaders are historical leaders, to the extent that the spirit that influenced the political discourse and the leaders in the era of struggle against colonization still more or less reflected in the political performance of the Eritrea Government and the opposition alike, and this discourse undoubtedly instilled in the Eritrean people, particularly the  younger generation that has emerged in the beginnings of the 21st of the century, not to mention the  generation born after the independence of Eritrea at home who haven’t been acquainted with the opposition and its political discourse, consequently lacks the needed stimulus to participate and support the opposition, therefore the political  discourse of the opposition must undergo a radical change of mode or paradigm shift  through broader modernization in concepts and  terminologies, and that should be reflected in the practical performance of the political forces and civil rights’ organizations.

 The opposition today requires a political discourse that would combine the history with the present, highlighting that the values of democracy are fundamental rights that doesn’t allow compromise, founding its political discourse on the concepts of human rights, the political  discourse must attract the wishes of the  new generations to  encourage them participate in the bid to highlighting the benefits of the moral and material meaning of home, the opposition’s discourse must make use of the modern media communications which would surely attract our young generation, This discourse is based on: -

1- To stress the legitimate right of the Eritrean people to own their political decision and share the wealth of the country and to take their deserved part in ruling over their country, by the well-defined means of democracy methods and the right to enjoy justice by the virtues of the law that they established through their representatives in the parliament.

2- To focus on the concepts and values of democracy and human rights.

3- To pay much attention to the civil society, especially the associations of youth and women, and to involve them in the formulation of the political discourse so that they would be empowered enough, because they know how to conduct a successful dialogue to win over their peers.

How can the opposition gain the popular confidence?

- civil -disobedience------------- ይኣክል

 -Joint Popular mobilization.......ሓባራዊ  ሕዝባዊ  ምልዕዓል

Since the Eritrean  masses as stakeholders would directly benefit of the democratic change , then the opposition must mobilize the entire sectors of the Eritrean Public at home, as well as abroad in the process of change through the mobilization and raising public awareness, the political and civic organizations which are leading the endeavours  towards change  should recognize the differences in the political programs and coordinate a mechanisms and consolidate a unified political discourse to accelerate the project of democratic change in Eritrea

Today the Eritrean public needs a glimmer of hope that could encourage them to work for democratic change, they need a leadership that could convince them about the credibility of the struggle for change, alas the opposition leadership seemed to be dominated by the differences over secondary issues that dominate and hinder its unity on the key issues and consequently keeps the public away from any mass action, public mobilization must be based on the following:-

1- Build-up of credibility through positive attitudes and behaviour on the part of the political leadership interacting with the public.

2- Paying much attention to the suffering of the public and provide alternative solutions, especially the issues relating to the legal status of refugees and migrants, particularly with countries that have good relations with the opposition

3-Recruiting the public in the branch-offices of the opposition and mandating of leaders that can serve as role models to help the public come close up to the opposition, and not the kind of leaders that scare people away from the ranks of the opposition.

4- The establishment of service sectors, that could serve the public such as education and health services, wherever Eritrean communities exist, and to refrain from providing such public services according to one’s political or organizational affiliation.

5- Establishment of grass-roots associations such as youth, women, workers and other sectors and to give those institutions a real attention through professional understanding and practice.

6-Establishment of branches combined of members of collective umbrella of the Eritrean national council for Democratic change/ENCDC and EPDP to furnish information and programs for the public to ensure improving it beyond the organizational differences.

Joint diplomacy/international relations

Countries are no longer an islands isolated from each other in our era of intertwined interests, as the foreign policies of countries are driven by interests, therefore, it must be well-understood  that foreign counties would  have to take their respective positions towards Eritrea according to their political and economic interests, perhaps it is an ironic that the foreign policies of the Eritrean Regime had to play a  catalyst helpful role on the part of the opposition  to pursue a constructive productive and effective diplomacy in their struggle for change, but the Eritrean opposition ,despite the just and legitimate cause in the struggle to bring about democracy, but it has shown incapability to  win the sympathy and support of  foreign states, the opposition have to make use of the diplomacy based on the know-how of the modus operandi of international relations which had been administering the world today, the interests of countries with national sovereignty, and international organizations attends to the interests of international security, regional organizations that sponsor the security and interests of the countries in the region, as well as non-governmental organizations that has become of great influence in international politics and overseas companies with a significant impact on the process of political decision-making.

Therefore any formulation of diplomatic action plan must be based the above mentioned backgrounds, it would be helpful to point out some important guideline here bellow:

  1. A diplomatic action built on positive interaction, that is to say, there are parties in the world who have their respective stakes in Eritrea, who need to be convinced that the opposition can be faithful to their interests as long as not inconsistent with the national interests of Eritrea, therefore countries which their interests have been damaged by the Eritrean Regime will cooperate with the opposition, but first, the opposition must confirm its credibility and seriousness

2- A diplomatic action built on negative interaction, and we mean that there are parties in the world that Eritrean Regime constitutes a source of concern for their respective national security, whether serious or minimal concern, such forces would be more than happy to watch the Eritrean Regime disappearing, they have genuine interests in the disappearance of this Regime due to the keenness to their respective national security,  but these countries cannot risk to establish relations with the opposition unless ascertained in the seriousness of the opposition, for fear that the establishment of such a relationship might deteriorate the internal affairs of their respective countries, the Eritrean Regime is notorious in exploiting the internal contradictions of foreign countries, which constitute a threat to the security of those countries, the seriousness of the opposition would be associated with its political discourse and its mechanisms.

3- A diplomatic action built on bilateral policy and attitudes, where some countries are in harmony with opposition on their stance towards many issues, attitudes towards public issues is inconsistent with the positions of the Eritrean Regime, therefore compatibility with opposition or contradiction with the regime, is stimulus for diplomatic cooperation between the opposition and the foreign nations.

4- Diplomatic functioning based on lobbying through local communities, civic organizations and individual relationships, where every vote counts on the part of the Western countries in times of elections, the grouping of communities and activating civic organizations or take advantage of individual relationships can influence and stimulate the policies of Western states towards Eritrea.

5- Benefit from Non-governmental Organizations of certain areas of concern, such as human rights organizations, and organizations concerned with freedoms of religion or press, or transparency and those NGOs fighting corruption, and even the relief and health humanitarian organizations that the Eritrean Regime refused to give access to providing aid to the Eritrean people, all these factors could be valuable for the diplomatic advancement of the opposition if used properly.

The Eritrean opposition need to muster the factors that manipulate world politics through a specialized and skilful apparatus the make use of its political and administrative authority, and perhaps the most important aspect in this regard is appoint united-external-political unit composed of united delegation

The following points might be useful in this respect.

  • Formation of diplomatic apparatus for the Eritrean forces for democratic change to run the international relations with political and administrative competency and capabilities.
  • Consensus on the features of the external political discourse by all components of the opposition/ ENCDC and EPDP
  • Coordination of the foreign policies of the political organizations through a united committee consisted of the external relations officials of the ENCDC and EPDP organizations. With the task of making ENCDC- EPDP joint foreign policy a non-partisan policy through the evaluation of external policy functioning, exchange of information and proposal of plans, and benefiting from the relationships of organizations and individuals in this area.
  • Coordination with the civic organizations that support the overall objectives of the opposition, especially in Europe, America and Australia, and take advantage of their relations, and to mandate the civic organizations to implement and illuminate the foreign policy of the Eritrean opposition.
  • To draw a maximum benefit from the partnership’s presence in the capital of the African Diplomacy Addis Ababa, where the African Union Head Quarters is located, beside a high-ranking diplomatic missions of the most important powers, the ENCDC- EPDP joint diplomacy should approach these countries by taking advantage of the public events that these missions held as well as the occasional events held in the host country , Ethiopia, and to constantly send messages in the occasion of public National Holidays of diplomatic missions.
  • Establishing a joint website so that it could be a reference to all the questions that may arise in the mind of any policy-maker or a diplomatic mission, as well as writing leaflets carefully prepared and in different languages.

Joint  Media development strategy

In today's world, which is dubbed as the “age of information evolution”, though the media of the Eritrean opposition is not commensurate with the magnitude of the cause it is raising and the challenge it is facing, despite the progress that opposition media has registered in general, but that is not enough to deliver the message of opposition, especially when the regime it is opposing has an information outlets that are considered the most prominent strengths of the regime.

even the improvements that opposition’s media outlets have shown are due to efforts without any coordination which is not enough to deliver the message of the opposition , most of the oppositions media outlets lack professionalism, most of the member opposition organizations have their own media outlets which lessen the effectiveness of the spirit needed for change, even the oppositions media outlets are often used to highlight the secondary political contradictions between the various organizations , we could point out the following points in this respect:  

  • Formulation an information policy with clear goals and instructions to convey a convincing message through all available information means.
  • Tolerate secondary contradictions of political and civil forces, and focus on the overarching challenge of removing the dictatorial regime in Eritrea.
  • Coordination of work between media organizations and the signing of the Code of Conduct for the media outlets, so that the media war between the organizations, degradation or questioning of the principles, personal attack would be perceived as a red-line.
  • Development of the radio through the creation of an independent radio with working-hours for as long as possible pursuing a dynamic approaches in conveying the opposition’s message to resist the Regime and to deliver opposition’s message in an intelligent way.
  • Diligences in founding a TV-channel to convey the goals of the opposition and reflect the suffering of the Eritrean people, and work to highlight the abuse of the regime against our people.
  • Establishing opposition Satellite TV challenging the PFDJ’s ERITV.
  • Develop opposition websites on the web and make it more professional and more easily viewed, and more substantive and meaningful.
  • Pay much attention to the Internet to benefit from groups on facebook, Twitter and other tools that gains the attention of a large number of sympathizers.
  • The importance of training and the adoption of assigning media work according to individual competency and not organizational affiliation.
  • Opening up communication with TV channels, news agencies, global and regional newspapers and magazines and all that can contribute to delivering the message of the opposition.
  • Use the universal language in the media, in terms of focus on the concepts of human rights, democracy, transparency and good governance.
  • Documentation of the regime’s Violations, and reporting the evidences in figures and images because it makes the message of the opposition more credible and acceptable to the recipient.
  • adoption of mechanisms and means to evaluate the feedback such as surveys, questionnaires and others to determine the effect of the message on the recipient

Joint Economic Development strategy

The biggest dilemma of the opposition is how to finance its activities, as it is known , that,  those who lack financial sources cannot  fully own their decisions, The people of Eritrea have had an honourable history in financing and supporting the Eritrean revolution, therefore the opposition need to explore extraordinary alternative plans to attract support and to discover funding sources, its economic plans must not depend only on funding sources, but in drying-up the support of the Regime, especially as  the Regime draws-in support from neutral places where the opposition exists.

We can refer to the following points in this respect:

  • Authentication of the relationship between the opposition and the public, encouraging the people to bear the responsibility of regime change as the sole beneficiary of the change, this can be achieved only through a high degree of transparency and openness, and building bridges of trust between the opposition and the public.
  • Establishing a constructive relationship with countries that can accumulate with the political positions of the Eritrean opposition, then to make use of these relations in opening economic cooperation to finance the activities of the opposition
  • Presenting partnership projects with organizations that have relations with the Regime such as the European Union in order push them towards parallel treatment between the Regime and opposition, through pressure by voters in the European countries, and to benefit from these projects in financing the opposition in particular with regard to the entrenchment of the values that form the agenda fixed in the concerns of the European Union and organizations alike.
  • Cooperation with NGOs on human rights, freedoms, gender, transparency etc., and enter into partnerships with them to serve the common goals of the organizations and the opposition alike.
  • Search for investment projects, and not necessarily to be at the centre level, but can be done at the branch level, so that the opposition activities can be financed by its own projects.

The above points are relevant to improving the financial capabilities of the opposition; the following steps are to cut off the sources of financing of the Regime.

  • On the official level, by persuading countries and organizations that sponsor projects in cooperation with the Regime until it stops financing of such projects, or at least could proceed funding the Regime’s projects but after imposing its own terms and conditions,  to prevent the Regime from using such funds in the oppression of our people.
  • At the grassroots level to stop the tax imposed by the Regime on Eritrean nationals living in Diaspora, and projects that the Regime claims to support the families of martyrs and the disabled, especially since the Regime is using the means of blackmail and intimidation in the collection of such tax which contradicts the laws of the countries in which the Eritrean communities live.