AFRICA, HORN OF AFRICA, RUSSIA, SUDAN

“According to an Al-Monitor source from the security service of a Russian energy company operating in Africa, Wagner mercenaries had stopped training the RSF recently and Hemedti himself, among others, had spoken about it. “This is due to the fact that the US and European countries began to recognize Prigozhin’s structure as a criminal organization, but this hardly extended to shadow operations on the border with the Central African Republic,” the source said.” 

Source:Al Monitor

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov meets with Sudan’s paramilitary commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo also known as Hemedti in Khartoum, Sudan in February 2023. – Russian Foreign Ministry

Anton Mardasov @anton_mardasov

May 14, 2023

Events in Sudan would have perhaps gone unnoticed in Russian society, including by politicians and the media, if Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had not visited Khartoum two months before fighting broke out last week between Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti. 

Lavrov’s was his first visit to the country after a nine-year hiatus, during which he met with both sides in the current confrontation. 

The head of Russian diplomacy reiterated Moscow’s commitment to the agreement on the establishment of a Russian naval facility in Port Sudan. The agreement is awaiting ratification by the Sudanese civilian legislature which has now been blocked. This is despite the fact that at the time, as Al-Monitor’s source in the Russian parliament noted, “Many in Moscow had already given up hope of an official presence in the Red Sea amid a reshaping of trade logistics due to the conflict with the West and Ukraine.” 

This suspicion is in part due that many did not believe not only that the deployment of the facility was possible, or that Moscow would be able to negotiate a deal after the toppling of former Sudanese dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019. 

Russian naval port obsolete? 

As for logistics, because of the sanctions, there is a restructuring of supply chains with a focus on trade with Africa and Asia, making the port in Sudan of great importance to Russia in these conditions as a transshipment trading point.

After this visit, rumors began to circulate in the Russian military and diplomatic corps that the Sudanese had reduced their demands as representatives of Burhan stated that the conditions proposed by Russia were not in the economic interests of Sudan.  The “yes” that was given to Lavrov was because the Russian foreign minister had allegedly been able to agree on the possibility of deploying a forward operating facility in Eritrea on his visit in January 2023.

 Whether this was true or just a diplomatic trick by which Lavrov created a favorable atmosphere for negotiations remains to be seen, but it is clear that in Sudan he tried to alleviate the crisis. 

“Before the visit, it was clear that Khartoum was ready to continue playing up the Russian base factor in relations with both Egypt and the West, and the Russian Ministry of Defense could no longer resolve this issue [naval facility] on its own,” a Russian source close to the foreign ministry said.

“The Ministry of Defense could not agree on this issue from the very beginning under [former dictator] Omar al-Bashir despite the baggage of connections — as we know, negotiations on the official military facility were conducted unofficially by Yevgeny Prigozhin’s people, i.e., the Wagner Group,” said another Al-Monitor source close to the Foreign Ministry.  

Although Lavrov’s trip to Khartoum was a positive development, the negotiations didn’t yield any tangible breakthroughs, the source suggested. The ratification of the naval facility agreement is only possible if the power is passed on to the civil government in Sudan. Yet this in itself is the issue at stake in the ongoing conflict between Sudan’s military commanders.

In any case, once the Burhan-Hemedti conflict has shifted into a hot phase, Russia’s plans for a naval facility in Port Sudan can with certain confidence be considered obsolete and will remain unfulfilled for a long while, Al-Monitor’s sources say. Other Russian experts largely concur with that view. 

However, there is a growing conviction among Russian politicians that the failures over the base in Sudan have to do not with the principle of Russia’s choice of a base, but with the machinations of Western intelligence services, primarily American and French. Indirectly, Lavrov said the same thing. “Geopolitical engineering is not good for anything,” he said on the events in Sudan in April. 

The Russian State Duma habitually accuses the United States of destabilizing the situation in Sudan. The media, for example, which is associated with the Russian secret service, at least tried to make sense of it, albeit with far-fetched arguments. For example, they wrote in all seriousness that the military actions in Khartoum were not accidental but deliberate in order to prevent Russia from gaining a foothold in Sudan and Africa as a whole. 

As evidence, Russian media cited the news that on the eve of the hostilities, Sudanese authorities charged a Russian citizen with smuggling 5 kilograms of gold mined by Al-Sawlaj for Mining Ltd., a company affiliated with Wagner PMC. According to these media outlets, the trial was allegedly initiated in the interest of Western states in order to have arguments for further pressure on the mercenary Wagner Group in various countries on the continent. 

The founder of Wagner PMC, Yevgeny Prigozhin, predictably denied all accusations of “stealing from African countries” and stated that there had not been a single Wagner mercenary in Sudan for two years. However, many experts question this assertion, citing as evidence the posts from 2022 on Telegram channels associated with the Wagner Group that showed footage of training of local forces by Russian mercenaries.  

Wagner becomes problematic

According to an Al-Monitor source from the security service of a Russian energy company operating in Africa, Wagner mercenaries had stopped training the RSF recently and Hemedti himself, among others, had spoken about it. “This is due to the fact that the US and European countries began to recognize Prigozhin’s structure as a criminal organization, but this hardly extended to shadow operations on the border with the Central African Republic,” the source said. 

One of Russia’s experts on Africa, Alexei Tselunov, noted that Hemedti directly or indirectly controls 250 state-owned enterprises, including gold-mining companies that regularly fail to pay taxes to the budget. 

It is known that structures associated with Prigozhin’s mercenaries not only did not stop using Sudan to smuggle gold (resources were either flown out of Khartoum or trucked to the Central African Republic) as part of the fight against international sanctions, but also, according to Politico, expanded mining to finance military actions in Ukraine. 

Although Wagner PMC has longstanding ties with Burhan, that is precisely because of the smuggling business that the Wagner Group has recently worked more closely with the RSF, which ensured the safe removal of gold from Sudan by the Russians.  

As for the information about the supply of missiles and heavy weapons by Russian mercenaries to Hemedti’s forces, Al-Monitor’s sources admit the possibility of some arms deliveries but note that their extent may be exaggerated in the media because it would be a rather risky move both for Prigozhin — who publicly offered his mediation in the conflict between Burhan and Hemedti — .

Kirill Semenov, nonresident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, tells Al-Monitor that there has been little discrepancy between official Moscow and Prigozhin on the Sudanese track so far. He agrees that the information about extensive support for Hemedti by Wagner PMC may be greatly exaggerated, especially since Prigozhin’s people are well aware of the real balance of power. 

“First, Hemedti does not have the necessary power resources to take power in the country. At best, he can only participate in the division of it, and this will not bring Moscow any closer to solving the problem of establishing a naval facility there. Second, Russia’s unilateral support for Hemedti would lead to a further deterioration of relations with Egypt, which is much more important for Moscow in terms of economic cooperation,” Semenov said. 

Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar’s assistance in delivering goods in the interests of the RSF is often presented as evidence of Russian support for Hemedti. Yet there are other regional players supporting Hifter besides Russia, Semenov notes. “As far as one can judge, Hifter’s support for Hemedti is limited, and one cannot rule out that Hifter will try to distance himself from supporting the RSF and shift all the responsibility for that assistance to the Wagner Group,” the expert concluded.

"Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the RSF."

Source: Economist

The Horn of Africa sits astride key trade routes 

May 3rd 2023 | KHARTOUM AND NAIROBI

Four days after war began in Khartoum, Sudan’s capital, armed men stormed the home of Muhammad. Ordering the businessman (whose name we withheld for his safety) and his family to leave, the soldiers mounted anti-aircraft guns on the roof of the apartment. Muhammad’s family moved in with relatives in a quieter neighbourhood nearby. But that, too, was soon unsafe as the fighting spread, leaving the streets strewn with bodies.

The battle may have started as a narrow power struggle between the official army, known as the Sudanese Armed Forces (saf), and the Rapid Support Forces (rsf), a militia-turned-paramilitary organisation. But the longer it continues, the greater the risk that it may draw in outsiders because of Sudan’s geopolitical importance.

For Sudan sits astride the Nile, Egypt’s lifeline. It also has ports close to the Horn of Africa, which controls the southern chokepoint of the Red Sea and is close to the Persian Gulf. These arteries of the world economy are watched over by America, China and France, which all have military bases in Djibouti. “The Horn is highly strategic, and a microcosm of other international disputes,” says Comfort Ero, the president of the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based think-tank. It is a place where “the West meets the East, where the Gulf meets Europe.”

For now the two sides seem evenly matched. The saf is commanded by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, who seized and then consolidated power as de facto leader of Sudan in coups in 2019 and 2021. It started the conflict with considerable conventional military power, including tanks and fighter jets. Though the rsf is ostensibly the underdog, its commander, Muhammad Hamdan Dagalo (better known as Hemedti), has substantial private wealth, because the rsf is said to control elements of Sudan’s gold trade. He also leads tens of thousands of loyal troops.

It was these assets which enabled Mr Dagalo to vie with General Burhan for control of the transition that followed the overthrow of the brutal Islamist regime under the former dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019, and later saw him become the country’s vice-president. Guns and money may also have helped him to emerge in recent years as a semi-autonomous figure on the international stage, cutting deals with foreign powers. The rsf is not simply an “insurgent militia”, notes Sharath Srinivasan, a Sudan expert at Cambridge University. “It’s a state actor.”

After nearly three weeks of fighting in Khartoum and elsewhere, in particular in West Darfur, neither side has a decisive advantage. The rsf lacks tanks and air power but is compensating by digging into residential neighbourhoods in the capital. There its men are raping women and forcing them to cook for them, according to a Sudanese woman, whose four female cousins escaped through an air-vent after the rsf had occupied their home.

Civilians in Khartoum also have to contend with air strikes by the saf. On May 1st three women selling tea opposite a hospital were killed by a bomb blast. According to the un, more than 500 civilians have already been killed and many more injured in the fighting (the true figure is likely to be much higher). As many as 800,000 refugees are expected to cross Sudan’s borders in the coming weeks and months.

The rsf, whose troops are also better paid and have more recent combat experience that those of the saf, has managed to secure key parts of the capital including the international airport and the country’s largest oil refinery. It also appears to control the presidential palace and the state broadcaster. “For the past two weeks they were roaming around like they owned the place,” says Waleed Adem, a resident of a rsf-controlled district of east Khartoum.

The rsf also dominates Mr Dagalo’s home region of Darfur and controls two of the region’s three air bases. Bloody clashes in el-Geneina, which began when Arab tribal militias affiliated to the rsf attacked non-Arabs in the town, may have subsided.

The army remains in charge pretty much everywhere else. Thousands of Sudanese and foreign citizens have been evacuated from the Red Sea city of Port Sudan, in the country’s troubled east, which was secured by the saf early in the war. The countryside around Khartoum is also more or less peaceful. “It’s business as usual,” reports a university professor who recently fled the city with his family.

Though the rsf is waging a guerrilla campaign of raids on army units and facilities in the capital, the saf’s control of the skies is taking a toll. “We hit all their supply stores around Khartoum,” says a mid-ranking soldier in the saf. Several convoys of rsf reinforcements from Darfur have reportedly been destroyed by air strikes.

The question is whether either side can quickly break the deadlock. The saf has decades of experience fighting insurgencies in distant regions, but never before in the capital. It cannot simply bomb its way to victory there as it has done elsewhere. “Khartoum is going to be a bit of a meat-grinder for a while,” predicts a Western security analyst. He adds that internal divisions within the saf’s leadership may be hampering its ability to press home its sizeable advantage in heavy weapons.

The rsf, too, finds itself in a quandary. It will struggle to supply and rearm its forces as the fighting continues. Even in the unlikely event of a victory, Mr Dagalo is loathed in Khartoum by residents who hold him responsible for a massacre of hundreds of protesters there in 2019 perpetrated by a combination of forces from the rsf, the police and the intelligence service. His troops’ current conduct has only alienated them more. “The people have the army’s back,” says Mr Adem.

The prospects for a protracted war depend on how Sudan’s neighbouring countries react. Due to its size as well as its strategic location on the Red Sea, Sudan has long been seen as strategically valuable within the region as well as by China, Russia and the West. It overlooks the shipping lanes leading to the Bab al-Mandab strait, through which around 10% of the world’s sea trade passes.

The Gulf countries, in particular the United Arab Emirates (uae) and Saudi Arabia, eye economic interests at play. In December an Emirati firm inked a $6bn deal to develop a port and economic zone on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. The Saudis and the Emiratis supported General Burhan and Mr Dagalo after the joint coup, handing out some $3bn in emergency aid. But neither country has an obvious interest in fuelling the conflict. Saudi Arabia has already evacuated thousands of Sudanese fleeing via Port Sudan. Much as Europe does, it fears a sudden influx of refugees.

Complicating matters, though, is the Emiratis’ murky relationship with Mr Dagalo, who received cash and arms in return for sending his rsf to aid their war in Yemen in 2017. He has since cultivated ties in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the uae’s two main statelets. Still the Emiratis do not have “any particular affection for Hemedti”, says Harry Verhoeven of Columbia University. Since the war began there has been little evidence that the uae has continued to supply his forces.

So the Gulf countries may be “hanging back and hedging their bets to see which way the cards fall”, suggests Ms Ero. That may also be the approach of Russia, whose murky mercenary outfit, the Wagner Group, is said to be involved in gold mining in Sudan while helping arm the rsf. The Kremlin’s main aim is to “thwart a democratic transition in Sudan”, says Samuel Ramani, author of “Russia in Africa”. This is because its ambition to build a naval base on the Red Sea is better served by a military government in Khartoum than a civilian, democratic one. And it does not care whether the saf or the rsf prevails.

The civil war in Sudan is not yet a proxy one like those in Syria, Libya or Yemen. But the country shares long and porous borders with conflict-racked neighbours, including the Central African Republic, Chad, Libya and South Sudan. Each has its own bewildering array of militias and rebel groups, many with ethnic or business ties to the rsf or to its rivals. Some may watch for a chance to profit from Sudan’s chaos. “The longer the conflict continues, the more external actors will meddle,” warns Suliman Baldo, who heads the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker, a conflict-monitoring group.

Another potential meddler is Issaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president, who has sought ties with Mr Dagalo and has a history of backing Sudanese rebels. Another is Khalifa al-Haftar, a Libyan warlord with links to the Wagner Group, who is said to have already sent fuel and arms to the rsf.

Mr Dagalo’s rsf and Mr Haftar’s Libyan National Army (lna), which controls much of eastern Libya, have worked together in the past. In 2019 rsf troops were sent to support the lna, which was also backed by the uae, in its assault on Tripoli, Libya’s capital. Two days before Sudan’s civil war erupted, Mr Haftar’s eldest son arrived in Khartoum for talks with Mr Dagalo.

Whatever support Mr Haftar may offer, the rsf may be limited by the Libyan warlord’s need to keep in with Egypt, another of his foreign sponsors. Long Sudan’s most influential neighbour, Egypt is a staunch backer of the saf under General Burhan. It views Sudan as vital to its national security and is loth to see either a civilian government or Mr Dagalo in charge.

Early in the war an Egyptian jet was reported to have struck an rsf ammunition dump. On May 1st Mr Dagalo accused Egypt’s air force of hitting targets in Khartoum North. Though the extent of its military involvement is unknown, Egypt is likely to step up its support for the saf if it is flagging. “Egypt is the most serious factor,” says Magdi el-Gizouli of the Rift Valley Institute. “The Egyptian goal now is to save central power in Sudan as they know it.”

A wider conflagration may still be avoided. Despite ethnic clashes in Darfur, the conflict has so far been generally limited to fighting between the two armed factions. On May 2nd both sides agreed to a seven-day ceasefire brokered by South Sudan’s president. Peace talks in Juba, South Sudan’s capital, could soon begin.

All the while, a humanitarian disaster is mounting. Food and water supplies in Khartoum are dwindling. Almost no hospital in the capital is functioning. Pregnant women have died on route to give birth. “If there is no ceasefire, everything will collapse,” warns Mohamed Lemine, who heads the un’s sexual and reproductive health agency in Sudan.