Introduction
Nonviolent struggle is based upon the very nature of power in society
and politics. The practice, dynamics, and consequences of nonviolent
struggle are all directly dependent upon the wielding of power and its
effects on the power of the opponent group. This technique cannot be
understood without consideration of this important element in its
nature.
This perception is in direct contradiction to the popular misconceptions
that nonviolent action is powerless, that it conceptually and
politically ignores the reality of power in politics, and that its advocates
are naive in not accepting that violence is the real source of
power in politics. These misconceptions, however, are themselves
rooted in a denial or ignoring of the nature of power in politics and the
crucial role of power in the operation of nonviolent struggle.
Nonviolent struggle is a political technique that needs to be understood
in its own right, not explained or assessed by an assumption
of its close association or identity with quite different phenomena.
This technique of action uses social, psychological, economic, and
political methods of applying sanctions, that is, pressures or punishments,
rather than violent methods? The technique includes nearly
two hundred identified methods of symbolic protest, social noncooperation,
economic boycotts, labor strikes, political noncooperation,
and nonviolent intervention (ranging from sit-ins to parallel govem2
Gene Sharp
ment). These many methods are also called the "weapons" of nonviolent
action.
The nonviolent technique is not to be confused with the important
but separate phenomena of religious and ethical beliefs that espouse
abstention from violen~e.T~h ose beliefs may be shared by the same
persons or movement using nonviolent action. However, far more
frequently the practice of nonviolent struggle has been conducted by
people and movements that lacked a principled commitment to nonviolent
means. They had previously used violence or would be willing
to do so in the future in other circumstances. Under the current
conditions, however, people were willing to follow a grand strategy of
nonviolent struggle for a particular purpose. They were willing to use
these nonviolent weapons in place of violence, and to maintain nonviolent
discipline, even though they were not committed to those
means in other possible situations. The overwhelming reason for this
choice of nonviolent means in conflicts has been that reliance on this
type of struggle would increase the chances of their being successful
in the current conflict.
Nonviolent struggle is a technique of matching forces against an
opponent group. The opponent group usually has sigruficant adrninistrative,
economic, political, police, and military capacity. The opponent
group is commonly itself the State apparatus, controlled by an
elite that is seen as hostile and injurious to the welfare and interests of
a wider population. Or, the opponent group is frequently a non-state
body that is backed by the State apparatus.
The broad population that feels itself to be negatively affected by
a policy or action of the opponent group may be called the "grievance
group." This body may be concerned with limited issues, a broad
policy, or may even repudiate the whole regime. The group actually
participating in nonviolent struggle is smaller than the general grievance
group, although the size of the population and the number and
types of institutions that participate in the nonviolent struggle will
vary widely.
Power is an integral part of nonviolent struggles. These conflicts
cannot be understood or waged intelligently without attention to
power capacities and power relationships. "Power" is used here to
mean the totality of all influences and pressures, including sanctions,
available to a group or society for use in maintaining itself, implementing
its policies, and conducting internal and external conflicts.
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 3
Power may be measured by relative ability to control a situation,
people, and institutions, or to mobilize people and institutions for
some activity. Such power may be used to enable a group to achieve
a goal; to implement or change policies; to induce others to behave as
the wielders of power wish; to oppose or to maintain the established
system, policies, and relationships; to alter, destroy, or replace the
prior power distribution or institutions; or to accomplish a combination
of these.
Political power may be possessed by governments, the State, institutions,
opposition movements, and other groups. Such power may
be diiectly applied, or may be a reserve capacity, having influence
merely by its existence. For example, power is present in negotiations
as well as in war.
In order to understand the role of power in nonviolent struggles
it is necessary to look at the nature and dynamics of the power
available both to the opponent group and to the nonviolent group.
Dependent Rulers
It is an obvious, simple, but often forgotten observation of great
theoretical and practical signhcance that the power wielded by individuals
and groups in the highest political positions of command and
decision in any government-whom we shall for the sake of brevity
call "rulers"-is not intrinsic to them. Such power must come from
outside themselves. The political power that they wield as rulers
comes from the society which they govern. Thus, if persons are to
wield power as rulers, they must be able to direct the behavior of other
people, draw on large resources (human and material), wield an
apparatus of sanctions, and direct a bureaucracy in the administration
of their policies.
The rulers of governments and political systems are not omnipotent,
nor do they possess self-generating power. All dominating elites
and rulers depend for their sources of power upon the cooperation of
the population and of the institutions of the society they would rule.
The availability of those sources depends on the cooperation and
obedience of many groups and institutions, special personnel, and the
general population.
Political power appears to emerge from the interaction of all or
4 Gene Sharp
several of the following sources:
(1) Authority. The extent and intensity of the rulers' authority or
legitimacy among the subjects.
(2) Human resources. The number of persons who obey, cooperate,
or provide special assistance, their proportion in the population, and
the extent and forms of their organizations.
(3) Skills and knowledge. The skills, knowledge, and abilities of such
persons, and their capacity to supply the needs of the ruler.
(4) Zntangiblefactors. Psychological and ideological factors, such as
habits and attitudes toward obedience and submission, and the presence
or absence of a common faith, ideology, or sense of mission.
(5) Material resources. Property, natural resources, financial resources,
the economic system, means of communication, and transportation.
(6) Sanctions. The type and extent of pressures and punishments
available for rulers to use against their own subjects and in conflicts
with other rulers.
It is almost always a matter of degree to which some or all of these
sources of power are present; only rarely, if ever, are all of them
completely available to rulers or completely absent. Their availability
is subject to constant variation, however, which brings about an increase
or decrease in the rulers' power. The degree of the rulers'
power is determined by the extent to which there is unrestricted
access to these sources.
A closer examination of the sources of the rulers' power indicates
that they depend intimately upon the obedience and cooperation of the
governed. If the subjects reject the rulers' right to rule and to command,
they are withdrawing the general agreement, or group consent,
that makes the existing government possible. This loss of authority
sets in motion the disintegration of the rulers' power. That power is
reduced to the degree that the rulers are denied authority. Where the
loss is extreme, the existence of that particular government is threatened.
Denial of authority leads to restriction or refusal of cooperation.
This is serious for any regime because by their cooperation the subjects
contribute to the operation and perpetuation of the established
system. Both the economic and the political systems operate because
of the contributions of many people, individuals, organizations, and
subgroups, and the rulers are dependent on their cooperation and
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 5
assistance. The more extensive and detailed the rulers' control is, the
more such assistance they will require.
The rulers' power depends on the continual availability of all this
assistance, not only from individual members, officials, employees
and the like, but also from the subsidiary organizations and institutions,
which comprise the system as a whole. These may be departments,
bureaus, branches, committees, and the like. However, these
individuals, groups, and institutions may refuse to cooperate, and
may decline to provide sufficient assistance to maintain effectively the
rulers' position and enable them to implement their policies.
Limits of Enforcement
In the face of widespread noncooperation and disobedience, if the
rulers do not make sigruficant concessions they will have to place
increased reliance on enforcement. In efforts to ensure the needed
degree of assistance and cooperation, the rulers may apply sanctions
(or punishments). Such sanctions are usually possible because very
often while one section of the populace rejects the rulers' authority
another section often remains loyal and is willing to carry out their
policies. Loyal police and soldiers can be used to inflict sanctions on
the remainder of the people.
That is not the whole story, however. The ruling group (foreign
or domestic) will itself still be united by something other than sanctions,
and therefore vulnerable to other influences. Furthermore, the
ability of rulers to apply sanctions at home or abroad arises from and
depends upon a significant degree of help from the subjects themselves,
which can be restricted or refused. Also, rulers need more than
grudging, outward forms of compliance by the population and the
multitude of helpers they require. However, efforts to obtain this
assistance by compulsion will inevitably be inadequate as long as the
rulers' authority is limited.
Sanctions are important in maintaining the political power of
rulers-especially in crises. However, whether those sanctions are
effective depends on the response of the subjects against whom they
are threatened or applied. In many situations people have, as do
soldiers regularly in wars, refused to retreat in face of dangers. Even
in the case of sanctions, there is a role for an act of will, for choice. To
6 Gene Sharp
be effective, the sanction must be feared and the people must become
willing once more to cooperate and obey. They may, however, not do
so. If they do not, then the power relationship remains uncompleted
and the rulers' power is threatened fundamentally.
Corporate Resistance
The availability of each of the sources of power is, then, related to, or
directly dependent upon, the degree of cooperation, submission, obedience,
and assistance that the rulers are able to obtain from their
subjects and the institutions of the society. That dependence makes it
possible, under certain circumstances, for the subjects to restrict or
sever these sources of power, by reducing or withdrawing their necessary
cooperation and obedience.
If the rulers' power is to be controlled by withdrawing help and
obedience, the noncooperation and disobedience must be widespread.
These must, in addition, be maintained in the face of repression aimed
at forcing a resumption of submission. Once, however, there has been
a major reduction of, or an end to, the subjects' fear, and once there is
a willingness to suffer sanctions as the price of change, large-scale
disobedience and noncooperation become possible. Such action then
becomes politically sigruficant. The rulers' will is thwarted in proportion
to the number of disobedient subjects, the extent of
noncooperating institutions, and to the degree of the rulers' dependence
upon them. The answer to the problem of apparently uncontrollable
power may, therefore, lie in learning how to carry out and
maintain such withdrawal of cooperation.
If the withdrawal of acceptance, cooperation, and obedience can
be maintained in the face of the rulers' punishments, then the end of
the regime is in sight. Thus, all rulers are dependent for their positions
and political power upon the cooperation of their subjects. The theory
that power derives from violence, and that victory necessarily goes to
the side with the greater capacity for violence, is false. Instead, the
will to defy and the capacity to resist become central.
If this insight into the dependent nature of political power is to be
implemented, the question is how. The lack of knowledge of what to
do has been one reason why people have not more often acted effectively
on this insight and, long since, abolished tyranny and oppresThe
Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 7
sion. Two of the components of implementation are clear. First, the
citizens' rejection of the tyrannical govenunent must be actively expressed
in a refusal to cooperate. This refusal may take many forms,
as we shall see. Second, there must be group or mass action. When
the ruling minority is unified but the ruled majority lacks independent
organization, the subjects are usually incapable of corporate opposition.
They can be dealt with one by one. Effective action based on this
theory of power requires corporate resistance and defiance.
The Structural Basis
The structural condition of the society is therefore highly important in
determining the general capacity of a society to control its rulers. This
structural condition refers to the existence of various institutions (or
loci of power). These are bodies or institutions in the society where
power is located, converges, or is expressed.
The precise form and nature of loci of power vary from society to
society and from situation to situation. They are, however, likely to
include such social groups and institutions as families, social classes,
religious groups, cultural and nationality groups, occupational
groups, economic groups, villages and towns, cities, provinces and
regions, smaller governmental bodies, voluntary organizations, and
political parties. Most often the loci are traditional, established, formal
social groups and institutions. Sometimes, however, loci of power
may be less formally organized, and may even be recently created or
revitalized in the process of achieving some objective or of opposing
the ruler.
Their status as loci will be determined by their capacity to act
independently, to wield effective power, and to regulate the effective
power of others, such as the rulers, or of some other locus or loci of
power. Their numbers, the degree of their centralization or decentralization,
their internal decision-making processes, and the degree of
their internal strength and vitality are all then very important.
The society's power structure, that is, these relationships, in the
long run determines the sphere and the degree of the rulersf maximum
effective power. When power is effectively diffused throughout
the society among such loci, the rulers' power is most likely subjected
to controls and limits because such bodies provide the capacity for
8 Gene Sharp
resistance to governmental control. This condition is associated with
political "freedom." When, on the other hand, such loci have been
seriously weakened, effectively undermined, or have had their independent
existence and autonomy of action destroyed by some type of
superimposed controls, the rulers' power is most likely to be uncontrolled.
The ability for corporate resistance is then drastically weakened
or destroyed. This is associated with "tyranny."
The condition of the society's loci of power will in large degree
determine the long-run capacity of the society to control the rulers'
power. A society in which groups and institutions exist which possess
significant social power and are capable of independent action is more
capable of controlling the rulers' power, and thus of resisting tyranny,
than a society in which the subjects are all equally impotent because
there are no groups through which the populace can act together to
gain objectives and to resist the ruler.
The sources of the rulers' power are normally only threatened
significantly when assistance, cooperation, and obedience are withheld
by large numbers of subjects at the same time, usually by social
groups and institutions. The ability of such bodies to withhold the
sources of power they supply is then pivotal. That ability will be
influenced by various factors, including the subjects' skill in applying
the technique of struggle by noncooperation, and also the rulers'
relative need for the sources of power that the subjects and their
institutions may provide. Important, too, is the degree to which these
groups possess the capacity to act independently against the ruler.
The capacity of the society's non-State institutions to control the
rulers' actions will, then, be influenced by (1) the relative desire of the
populace to control their power; (2) the number of the subjects' independent
organizations and institutions; (3) the organizations' relative
strengths and the degree of their independence of action; (4) the
sources of power institutions control; (5) the amount of social power
which they can independently wield or control; and (6) the subjects'
relative ability to withhold their consent and assistance. If these
factors are all present to a high degree, the loci may choose to make
freely available the sources of power needed by the rulers, or instead
they may choose to restrict or sever the sources that the rulers require.
The variations in the rulers' power are therefore directly or indirectly
associated with the willingness of the subjects to accept the
rulers, and to obey them, cooperate with them, and carry out their
wishes.
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle
Dissolving the Power of Rulers
When people refuse their cooperation, withhold help, and persist in
their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the
basic human assistance and cooperation that any government or hierarchical
system requires. Subjects may disobey laws they reject.
Workers may halt work, which may paralyze the economy. The
bureaucracy may refuse to carry out instructions. Soldiers and police
may become lax in inflicting repression; they may even mutiny. If
people and institutions do this in sufficient numbers for long enough,
that government or hierarchical system will no longer have power.
The persons who have been "rulers" become simply ordinary people.
Everything is changed because the human assistance that created and
supported the regime's political power has been withdrawn. Therefore,
its power has dissolved.
Generalized obstinacy and collective stubbornness are not
enough, however, to wield effective power against entrenched rulers.
General opposition must be translated into a strategy of action.
People will need to understand the technique based on this insight
into power, including the specific methods of that technique, its dynamics
of change, requirements for success, and principles of strategy
and tactics. The implementation must be skillful. This includes
knowing how to persist despite repression. We need, therefore, to
understand more fully the technique of nonviolent action-which is
built on this insight into power.
A Nonviolent Weapons System
Nonviolent action is a means of combat, as is war. It involves the
matching of forces and the waging of "battles," requires wise strategy
and tactics, and demands of its "soldiers" courage, discipline, and
sacrifice. (The casualty rates, however, are usually much lower than
in conventional or guerrilla wars.) People seeking victory by nonviolent
struggle need to increase their basic strength, to apply skillfully
their chosen technique of action, and to fulfill its requirements for
success to the maximum of their capacity. Although it is widely
assumed that nonviolent action must always take longer to succeed
than violent struggle, this is not necessarily so. It has at times succeeded
within weeks or even days.
10 Gene Sharp
The many methods of nonviolent action can be viewed as limited
implementations of the theory of power presented above. Three
broad classes of nonviolent weapons exist within the technique of
nonviolent struggle: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation,
and nonviolent intervention. These "weapons" of nonviolent
struggle can change the selected social, economic, or political relationships,
and can at times alter fundamentally the balance of forces.
Nonviolent protest and persuasion is a class of mainly symbolic
actions of peaceful opposition or of attempted persuasion, extending
beyond verbal expressions but stopping short of noncooperation or
nonviolent intervention. Among these methods are parades, vigils,
picketing, posters, teach-ins, mourning, and protest meetings.
By far the largest class of methods of nonviolent action involves
noncooperation with the opponent. Noncooperation entails the deliberate
discontinuance, withholding, or defiance of certain existing relationships-
social, economic, or political. The action may be
spontaneous or planned, legal or illegal.
The methods of noncooperation are divided into three categories:
(1) methods of social noncooperation (including social boycotts); (2)
methods of economic noncooperation (subdivided into economic boycotts
and strikes); and (3) methods of political noncooperation (also
known as political boycotts). The capacity of the nonviolent struggle
group to wield the weapons of noncooperation-social, economic, or
political-is of extreme importance in the dynamics of a particular
nonviolent struggle.
The third class of the methods of nonviolent action is that of
nonviolent intervention. These methods intervene in the situation and
disrupt or basically change it in some way. They include fasts, sit-ins,
nonviolent obstruction, the establishment of new social patterns, stayin
strikes, alternative economic institutions, the seeking of imprisonment,
work-on without collaboration, and parallel government.
Wielding Power
Nonviolent action wields power, both to counter the power of an
opponent group, and to advance the objectives of the nonviolent
group. By striking at the sources of the opponents' power, the nonviolent
technique may be viewed as operating more directly than does
The Role of Power in ~onviolhStt ruggle 11
political violence. For example, if the issues at stake are primarily
economic, the resistance can be economic. If the issues are political,
and the opponents require the political cooperation of the population,
the resistance, too, can be political. Instead of striking indirectly at the
opponents' military forces, which are the outward expression of the
opponents' power, the nonviolent sanctions strike directly at the
sources of that power: cooperation and obedience. For example,
massive strikes can paralyze the economy and large-scale mutinies
can dissolve the army.
The technique of nonviolent action may also be viewed as striking
at the opponents' power more indirectly than does violence. Instead
of confronting the opponents' police, troops, and the like with forces
of the same type, the nonviolent struggle group counters them indirectly.
This operates to undermine the opponent while helping the
resisters to mobilize increased strength and support for their cause.
For example, by responding to repression nonviolently instead of by
counter-violence, the nonviolent resisters may demonstrate that the
opponents' repression is incapable of cowing the populace. Their
continued resistance while maintaining nonviolent discipline may
cause the opponents' usual supporters to become alienated from the
rulers, hence weakening their relative power position. The numbers
of resisters may grow, and support for them may also increase sigruficantly.
(This process is discussed more fully below.) All this may
happen because the opponents' violence is countered indirectly instead
of violently.
The whole course of the conflict will be highly influenced by the
strategy and tactics applied by the nonviolent struggle group. They
need, therefore, to plan their strategy with extreme thoughtfulness
and care, drawing upon the best available resources about strategic
principles and their own knowledge of nonviolent struggle and the
conflict situation.
Repression
The challenge by nonviolent action may be a mild one and disturb the
status quo only slightly. In extreme cases, however, the challenge may
shatter it.
The opponents' difficulties in coping with nonviolent action are
12 Gene Sharp
associated with the special dynamics and mechanisms of the technique.
These tend to maximize the influence and power of the nonviolent
group while undermining those of the opponents. Their
difficulties do not depend on being surprised by the nonviolence or on
unfamiliarity with the technique.
Repression is a likely response. Repression can be applied with
such means as censorship, confiscation of funds and property, severance
of communications, economic pressures, arrests, imprisonments,
conscription, concentration camps, use of agents provocateurs, threats
of future punishment, beatings, shootings, torture, martial law, executions,
or retaliation against others. The amount and type of repression
will vary with a variety of factors. Because repression may be counterproductive
to the opponents' cause, the repression against nonviolent
action may be sigruficantly more limited than that applied against
a violent rebellion, guerrilla warfare, or conventional war.
The likelihood of violent repression is strong evidence that nonviolent
action can pose a real threat to the established order. This is
a confirmation of, and tribute to, the power of the technique. Repression
and even brutalities are no more reason for abandoning nonviolent
action than is the enemy's military action in a war seen as a reason
to abandon one's own military action. Nonviolent action is designed
to operate against opponents who are able and willing to use violent
sanctions.
Combative Nonviolent Discipline
Contrary to what might be expected, repression will not necessarily
produce submission. For sanctions to be effective, they must operate
on the minds of the subjects, producing fear and the willingness to
obey. Just as in war, however, there is the possibility that planning
and discipline, or some overriding loyalty or objective, will cause the
nonviolent struggle group to persist despite the dangers. The nonviolent
group in this situation needs to maintain nonviolent discipline to
gain increased control over the opponents, reduce the violence against
itself, and increase its chances of winning. To have the best chance of
success, the nonviolent group must stick with its chosen technique.
An extensive, determined, and skillful application of nonviolent
action will cause the opponents very special problems, which will
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 13
disturb or frustrate the effective use of their own forces. The nonviolent
struggle group will then, be able to throw its opponents off balance
politically, causing their repression to undermine their support
and weaken their power.
Faced with repression, the nonviolent resisters, if they have the
strength, must persist and refuse to submit or retreat. There are in
history many examples of groups defylng overwhelming violence,
both violently and nonviolently. The nonviolent struggle group must
defy repression. This response continues the noncooperation and
avoids the trap of shifting to fight with the opponents' chosen weaponry
(in the possession and use of which the grievance group is
inferior). Nonviolent discipline also facilitates the process of "political
jiu-jitsu" which can shift power relationships sigmfmntly (as discussed
below). News of brutalities may eventually leak out despite
censorship, and harsher repression may increase, rather than reduce,
hostility and resistance to the regime. The violence of such repression
can alienate support for the opponent and increase support for the
nonviolent resisters.
The maintenance of nonviolent discipline in the face of repression
is not an act of moralistic naivete. Instead, it contributes to success and
is a prerequisite for advantageous changes in the distribution of
power. Nonviolent discipline can only be compromised at the severe
risk of contributing to defeat.
Political Jiu-Jitsu
By remaining nonviolent while continuing the struggle, the nonviolent
group will help improve its own power position in several ways.
As cruelties to nonviolent people increase, the opponents' regime may
appear still more despicable, and sympathy and support for the nonviolent
side may increase. The general population may become more
alienated from the opponents' regime and more likely to join the
resistance. Third parties may increase support for the victims of the
repression and opposition to the opponents' violence and policies.
Although the effect of national and international public opinion varies,
it may rally to the support of the nonviolent resisters, and may at
times lead to significant political and economic pressures. The opponents'
own citizens, agents, and troops, disturbed by the brutalities
14 Gene Sharp
against nonviolent people, may begin to doubt the justice of the policies.
Their initial uneasiness may grow into internal dissent and at
times even into noncooperation and disobedience in their own camp,
such as strikes and mutinies. Thus repression of nonviolent resisters
can rebound against the opponents. This is "political jiu-jitsu" at
work.
Power Changes
To a degree which has never been adequately appreciated, the nonviolent
technique operates by producing power changes. This happens
as the result of several factors. The process of political jiu-jitsu has a
very signhcant influence on the potential growth of the power of the
nonviolent struggle group and the potential shrinking of the power of
the opponents.
The nonviolent struggle group can seek continually to increase its
strength. It will usually gain growing support and participation from
the grievance group. The nature of nonviolent action makes it possible
for the resisters to win considerable support for their cause
among third parties and even among the opponents' population and
aides. The potential for recruiting such support is far greater than in
violent struggles. The ability to gain these types of support gives the
nonviolent group a capacity, directly and indirectly, to influence--
and at times to regulate-the opponents' power, by reducing or severing
its sources, as discussed above. The ways this occurs will differ
from case to case; the pattern in an intra-societal conflict will differ
from that in a conflict with a foreign occupation regime-whose
power bases of administration and enforcement agents largely lie
outside the country. The process is, however, generally applicable in
both situations.
The size of the resistance group may therefore vary widely within
a single conflict. At times the population and numbers of institutions
participating in the struggle will grow or shrink dramatically. Similarly,
the supporters of the opponent group and the extent of their
institutional support can increase or decrease to an extreme degree
during the conflict. Those shifts will be influenced, directly and
indirectly, by the actions and behavior of the nonviolent struggle
group, among other factors. Frequently, power relationships will also
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 15
be influenced by third parties, which may shift away from positions
of indifference or neutrality to support or oppose one side or the other.
The course of a nonviolent struggle is likely to cause, and to
reflect, shifts in the power capacity of each side and the relative power
of each in comparison with the other. The power of each of the
contending groups can change continuously, rapidly, and extremely
during the course of the struggle. These shifts do not seem to have a
parallel in conflicts in which both sides use violence.
Usually the results of these complex changes in the absolute and
relative power positions of the contenders will determine the
struggle's final outcome.
Four Mechanisms of Change
Despite the variations from one case of nonviolent action to another,
it is possible to distinguish four general "mechanisms" of change that
operate in nonviolent action. These are conversion, accommodation, nonviolent
coercion, and disintegration.
In conversion, the opponent, as a result of the actions of the
nonviolent group, adopts the point of view of the nonviolent group
and accepts that the group's goals are good. Conversion occurs only
occasionally.
In the mechanism of accommodation, the opponents are neither
converted nor nonviolently coerced; yet elements of either or both are
involved in their decision to grant concessions to the nonviolent
struggle group. In accommodation, the opponents grant demands, all
or more usually some, without fundamentally changing their minds
about the issues. The opponents do this because they calculate that it
is the best they can do. Their aim may be to undercut internal
dissension, minimize losses, avoid a larger disaster, or save face. This
appears to be the most common mechanism.
Accommodation is therefore similar to nonviolent coercion and
disintegration, in that these mechanisms bring success by changing the
social, economic, or political situation and the grievance group itself by
nonviolent action, rather than changing the opponent, as does conversion.
Basic power relationships are changed so as to alter the entire
picture.
The third mechanism, nonviolent coercion, can gain the grievance
16 Gene Sharp
group's objectives and produce success against the will of the opponent.
Nonviolent action becomes coercive when the struggle group
succeeds, directly or indirectly, in withholding to a major degree the
necessary sources of the opponents' power. Nonviolent coercion may
be produced when the opponents' will is blocked. This may occur
because (1) the defiance has become too widespread and massive to be
controlled by repression; (2) the system is paralyzed; or (3) the opponents'
ability to apply repression and implement policies has been
drastically undermined by widespread mutiny of soldiers and police,
large-scale refusal of assistance by the bureaucracy, or massive withdrawal
of authority and support by the populace. Yet the opponents
retain some power and continue to exist as a body, able to capitulate
or survive the imposed changes.
Disintegration, the fourth mechanism, occurs when the sources of
power to the opponents are so completely severed or dissolved that
they simply fall apart as a viable group. No coherent body remains,
even to accept defeat. The opponents' power has been simply dissolved.
Removing the Sources of Power
Nonviolent action may reduce the availability of each of the sources
of political power in the following ways:
(1) Authority. The nonviolent challenge to the opponents offers a
clear demonstration of the degree to which their authority is already
undermined. The struggle may help to alienate from the opponents
more people who have previously supported them. At times there will
be a clear transfer of loyalty from the opponents to another authority,
even a rival parallel government.
(2) Human resources. Widespread nonviolent action may also reduce
or sever the human resources necessary to the opponents' political
power, by withholding the general obedience and cooperation of
the masses of subjects who maintain and operate the system. The
sheer numerical multiplication of noncooperating, disobedient, and
defiant members of the grievance group creates severe enforcement
problems for the opponents. The opponents' traditional supporters
may at times withdraw their previous support, thereby reducing the
opponents' power further.
The withdrawal of human resources will also affect other needed
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle 17
sources of power (skills, knowledge, and material resources). Thus the
opponents require greater power at the very time that their enforcement
capacity is being reduced. If the resistance grows while the
opponents' power weakens, eventually the regime may become powerless.
(3) Skills and knowledge. Certain people or groups possess special
skills or knowledge of particular importance; these include special
administrators, officials, technicians, and advisors. Withdrawal of
their assistance disproportionately weakens the rulers' power. In addition
to outright refusal, reduced or deliberately incompetent assistance
may also be important.
(4) Intangible factors. Habits of obedience and loyalty to authority
may be threatened by widespread nonviolent action.
(5) Material resources. Nonviolent action may reduce or sever the
supply of material resources to the opponents: control of the economic
system, transportation, means of communication, financial resources,
raw materials, and the like.
(6) Sanctions. Even the opponents' ability to apply sanctions may
on occasion be negatively influenced by nonviolent action. Their
supply of military armaments may be threatened by a foreign
country's refusal to sell them, or by strikes in the munitions factories
and transportation system. In some cases the numbers of agents of
repression-police and troops-may be curtailed as the number of
volunteers declines and potential conscripts refuse duty. Police and
troops may carry out orders inefficiently or may refuse them completely,
potentially leading to nonviolent coercion or disintegration of
the opponents as a viable group.
The most significant long-run results of the struggle are likely to
be its impact on the resolution of the issues at stake, on the attitudes
of the groups toward each other, and on the distribution of power
between and within the contending groups. In all these respects the
contributions of nonviolent struggle are highly sigruficant.
Changes in the Struggle Group
Participation in nonviolent action is likely to have several important
effects on the people taking part. For example, as people learn about
and experience this technique of action, they may gain increased selfrespect,
enhanced self-confidence in their ability to influence the
18 Gene Sharp
course of events, general reduction of fear and submissiveness, and
greater awareness of their own power. In common with experience in
other types of conflict, the group using nonviolent action tends to gain
greater unity, internal cooperation, and solidarity. However, there
also appear to be special qualities in nonviolent action that contribute
to these results.
The non-state institutions of the society (loci of power) that have
been the social bases for resistance are likely to have been strengthened.
The population will therefore have in the future strong structural
bases for resistance in crises. The struggle is also likely to have
taught the participants how to struggle effectively against apparently
overwhelming forces of administration and violent repression. The
result is likely to be a growth of popular empowerment which may
have significant long-term effects.
Political Relevance
Nonviolent action is possible, and is capable of wielding great power
even against ruthless rulers and military regimes, because it attacks
the most vulnerable characteristic of all hierarchical institutions and
governments: dependence on the governed. If, despite repression, the
sources of power can be restricted, withheld, or severed for sufficient
time, the result may be the paralysis of the political system and the
impotence of the regime. In severe cases, the rulers' power will
progressively die, slowly or rapidly, from political starvation.
This insight into political power, and the cross-cultural use of
nonviolent sanctions based upon it, demonstrate that nonviolent
struggle is not restricted by cultural or national boundaries. It is,
therefore, potentially relevant to the problems of liberation, international
aggression, and internal usurpation in all parts of the world.
The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle
1. See Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, 3 vols. Boston: Porter
Sargent, 1973. The present paper is abstracted from this extensive three
volume examination of the technique of nonviolent action. For those interested
in a more thorough exposition of the topic, The Politics of Nonviolent
Action can be ordered from Porter Sargent Publishers, 11 Beacon Street, Boston,
MA 02108, USA.
2. See Gene Sharp, "Types of Principled Nonviolence" in Gandhi as a
Political Strategist, with Essays on Ethics and Politics, pp. 201-234. Boston: Porter
Sargent Publishers, 1979.